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Politico - Social Background 
I - A Brief Survey of the Political Development 
Leading to the Promulgation of 
the Constitution April 19, 1923. 
Parliamentary institutions, and the representative form of 
government were not a new introduction to Egypt. In recent 
history, during the French Expedition (1798- 1801), Napoleon 
created various consultative councils to help him in governing 
the country.(1) The "Special Council" (Ad- Diwánu ki '1- hususi) was 
one of these. Although its members were appointed by the occupying 
Power, they represented various interested groups such as the cÜla_.:a , 
i.e. the Muslim leaders; (2) the army; the merchants; the minorities, 
i.e. the Copts; and the French and other European co munitios. (3 ) 
This experiment was followed by others, in which the 
different representative institutions derived their functions from 
the will of the governor and the needs of the time. Thus 
(1) Landau, J.: Parliamentary institutions and political parties 
in Egypt, 1866- 1924, pp.1 -7. 
(2) It is interesting to notice that the c Ularná ' "like the clergy 
of the ]fiddle Ages, found power and wealth in the practice of 
sanctity of their vocation. They were the accredited leaders 
of the populace, to whom the people would resort in times of 
suffering and unrest. They were the sole repositories of 
peace, knowledge and justice in the country, and on them 
Napoleon decided to build his new regime." Rifaat, I.A.: 
The awakening of modern Egypt, p.8. 
(3) Ibid. p.13 
2. 
Mohamed Aly (1805-1848),, in his turn established a large council 
under the name of the "Consultative Council" (Ma,jlisu31- Musháwrah) 
consisting of high State officials of the central and local 
governments and the notables,(1) all of whom were chosen by the 
Pasha for their talents or some other qualifications. This 
council was an executive body and had a consultative function in 
matters of administration, education and public works. Its object 
was to advise the governor and assist him; but, because of the 
manner in which this council was formed, the will and interest of 
the Pasha swayed the members in all their decisions.(2) 
Said Pasha (1856 -1863), also had a kind of State Council 
composed of one of the princes of the ruling family, four high 
ranking military officers and four important State officials. The 
róle of this council continued to be advisory. Like the above 
mentioned institutions, it had consultative and advisory functions 
rather than legislative; all of these institutions were meant to 
help the governor without interfering with his autocracy.(3) 
A noticeable step towards semi -parliamentary institutions 
was taken during the reign of Ismail Pasha (1863 -1879). In 1$66, 
(1) The figures of representatives were: 33, 24 and 99 respectively. 
(2) Lane, E.',.: The manners and customs of the modern Egyptians 
p. 115 Shafiq, A: L,Egypte moderne et les influences 
'etrangeres p. 24; Subhi, M.Kh: Tgrikhu'l- Hayáti'l- Niyábiyah 
Fi Misr, Vol. IV, pp. 10 -12. 
(3) Landau: op.cit. pp. 7 -8. 
3 
the "Assembly of Delegates" (Nïajlisu Shüra'l -Nuww ii was instituted. 
It was composed of seventy -five delegates who were elected 
indirectly, that is to say only '0-mad and Masha )ik:h ; 1 who were 
supposed to represent the people, were entitled to elect the 
members of this assembly. The President and Vice -President of the 
assembly were nominated by the Khedive. The delegates' mandate 
was for three years; the assembly's session was of only two months 
duration, and its sittings were not open to public. The Khedive 
had the right to convoke and prorogue the assembly, and to extend 
the duration of its sessions. The power of initiation resided in 
the Khedive's Government and Council, and the delegates had no 
right to take any initiative nor could they receive any petition 
whatever. The assembly could give only an advisory opinion which 
was to be submitted to the Khedive for endorsement or rejection.(2) 
Although the assembly was constituted with merely consultative 
functions and without any legislative powers, it succeeded in 
enlarging its authority and in representing the people effectively. 
Most of the discussions were limited to problems of agriculture, 
irrigation, property and judiciary, the spheres of the personal 
(i) 'Umad is the plural of 'Umdah who is the administrative chief 
or head of a village. Rashd'ikh is the plural of ShayJh who is 
the assistant of the cUmdah. 
(2) Rifaat: op.cit. p.164; .A wad,F.T.: La sauverairité égyptienne et 
la déclaration du 28 Fgvrie-r 1922, pp. 79-80; A'r-P.áfi4i, A.R.: 
sr Ismáil, Vol. II, pp.78-$l and 287-298. 
4. 
interest of its members. It showed an interest in discussing 
questions of education, the financial situation and the Budget. 
In spite of the absolute power of the Khedive to impose taxes, on 
August 7, 1$76 he invited the assembly to an extraordinary session 
to discuss and approve a new tax called "Al- I.u,gábalah ", (1) for he 
needed the approval of the assembly to ensure the help of its 
members in the collection of this tax. During the deliberations 
the members asked the government for a full explanation of its 
past, present and future financial proceedings and policy. To 
realize clearly how the assembly extended its functions one must 
consider the financial situation and problems of Egypt, and their 
significance in its politics of the sixties and seventies.(2) 
Up to the time of Ismail, there were no political parties in 
Egypt. At most there were groups, loosely held together by one 
personality or another who was serving his own interests. Secret 
organisations could provide the basis for the growth of political 
parties, by virtue of the fact that they had some sort of 
organisation and ideals aiming at the common weal. It was because 
(1) A measure introduced to redeem half of the land tax, and thereby 
pay the floating debt with the proceeds. In exchange for 
perpetual reduction of one -half of the tax, land- owners were to 
pay six years' land tax in advance. Rifaat: op.cit. p.155; 
Chirol, V.: The Egyptian problem, pp.26 -27; Rothstein, Th.: 
Egypt's ruin. A financial and administrative record, pp.79 -S0. 
(2) . Cf . Wahid ah, S : Fi Usuli' 1 -Pdas ' alati 'l- ,;ti ivah, 
p. 170. 
5. 
of the inadequate and unsatisfactory representation of the people 
that secret associations developed among different classes of 
society. 
For instance, a secret organisation was formed among 
Egyptian officers to defend Egypt's interests against Turkish 
domination, especially in the army. Though the exact date of its 
formation, whether in the 1860's or the 70's, is unknown, it 
appeared openly on the political stage in 1879; and this 
appearance was due to the "discontent with religious laxity, 
economic depression and social discrimination.,,(1) Eventually 
this organisation of army officers developed into the "Patriotic 
Party" (Al Hi2bu'i- 'Jatani) . (2 ) 
Another organisation of the same pattern existed in Alexandria 
in 1879. It was called the "Union of the Egyptian Youth" 
(hvïisru'1- Fatát) and was composed chiefly of intellectuals. Shortly 
after the accession of Khedive Tawfiq, the organisation presented 
to him a bold project of reform which can be summarized under the 
following headings: the separation of governmental powers, the 
establishment of ministerial responsibility, equality before the 
law, the creation of an independent house of representatives 
invested with well -defined powers, free elections, inviolability 
(1) Landau: op.cit. p.131. 
(2) Saleh, D.: Les pouvoirs du roi dans la constitution 'e° tienne, 
p. 110; Newman, E.;.P.: Great Britain in_kat, pp . 3 -40. 
6. 
of individual liberty and domicile, liberty of religion and the 
Press, guarantees of Egypt's public debts, and no imposition of 
taxes without a special law. No further evidence about this 
organisation is available after the beginning of 1550. Some of 
its members formed and supported the "Islamic Benevolent Society's 
(Al Jam`iya to °'1- Khayry2tu'1-lslárniyañ), which had a philanthropic 
and educational character.(1) 
By the end of Ismail's rule and before his deposition, the 
name of the assembly was changed to "The Assembly of Deputies" 
(Majlisu)n -Nuv. iab1). Uhen drafting a constitution for the country 
which this assembly should observe, the Prime î";inister, Sherif 
Pasha, took into account the general spirit of the 1575 session of 
the Assembly of Delegates and its attitude in demanding wider 
power, particularly in supervising the Budget. This factor along 
with the Khedive's financial troubles, which decreased his absolute 
power, and his desire to show the European Powers his constitutional 
inclinations resulted in his bringing out a draft constitution 
tending to be liberal. The most characteristic features in that 
draft constitution were: the full liberty given to the delegates 
to express their views ( 9); the responsibility of the ministers 
to the assembly for their decisions and acts ( §§36, 43-44); the 
right of the assembly to have control over finance (1. .t 45 -46) . A 
very significant principle was admitted: the right of the Sudanese 
(1) Letter from Alexandria correspondent of The Times, January 20, 
1$52; Landau: op.cit. pp. 179 -153. 
to be represented in the new assembly by their own delegates 
( §34). Members of the assembly had the right to initiate 
legislation, and every Egyptian had the right to present petitions 
to the assembly through any of the delegates ( 23). The sessions 
of the assembly were open to public ('l ).(1) That liberal 
constitution never came into existence because of the intervention 
of European countries which resulted in the deposition of Khedive 
Ismail to be succeeded by his son Tawfiq. This latter dissolved 
the assembly in July 1$79 and semi -parliamentary life was suspended 
for about two years. 
The years between 1879 and 1$82 were eventful ones in the 
history of Egypt. The secret organisation of the Egyptian officers 
had, by this time, developed into the Patriotic Party. In 
addition to the officers it embraced religious leaders, 
distinguished notables, merchants and high officials; in other 
words, the rich and middle class group with liberal tendencies. 
This party drafted a programme which dealt chiefly with 
constitutional and financial aims. Although it admitted the 
suzerainty of Turkey and the position of the Califate, it stressed 
the ability of the country to stand on its own feet without 
foreign intervention. 
One part of the programme frankly stated that the party paid 
allegiance to the Khedive, but at the same time demanded a change 
(1) Ai- Ahrám, 12.1.1$79, quoted by A-R fici: op.cit. Vol. II, 
pp.l94-200; Subhi: op.cit. Vol. IV, p. 41; Ghosh, Y.C.: 
Constitutional develo ments in the Islamic world, pp. 62 -63. 
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in the constitution of the Assembly of Deputies: the assembly 
should be modelled on European parliamentary institutions with 
ministerial responsibility to it. The Khedive naturally opposed 
these demands because they were intended to curb his powers. The 
second part of the programme which tried to show that the revenues 
of Egypt were sufficient for its expenditure and for the payment 
of its public debts and liabilities, and which clashed with the 
views of the financial advisers who were working to declare the 
country "bankrupt,"(1) did not deny the foreign debts. It 
demanded a policy for their repayment by regular instalments to 
enable the country to get rid of European. intervention, and for 
foreigners to pay taxes and to be subject to the laws of the 
country. Moreover, the party declared that it was a political 
party, aiming at the development of the political, economic and 
social conditions of Egypt. It believed that all Egyptians were 
equal, without any discrimination on account of difference of 
religion.(2) 
The acknowledged leader of the Patriotic Party was Ahmed Uraby 
(1841 -1911) . He was an officer of fellah origin who reached the 
(1) Although the word t'bankrupt "could never be applied to a State 
the financial advisers insisted on using it to explain the 
economic inability of the country to repay its liabilities in 
time. 
(2) The Times January 18$2., quoted by Air- Rafici: A.R. A'Dth- 
Thawrat'1 Urábiyah, pp. 144-147; Blunt, W.S.: The secret 
history of the English occupation of Egypt, pp. 173 -174 & 556 
et seq.; Mou -Cho, L.: De la condition internationale de 
l'Egypte depuis la déclaration an.laise du 1222, p. 10; `Urabi, 
A: Mudhakkirát `Urabi, Vol. I. pp. 116 -117 
 
rank of colonel. 
(1) 
He was influenced as were most of his 
colleagues and supporters, by the teachings of Jamal El -Din Al 
Afghany.(2) Uraby has received much praise and much abuse. He 
had a magnetic personality, which explains his influence on the 
officers and outside the army. His gift of oratory helped him to 
appear as the spokesman of the party. He was known as a than of 
character, patriotism, and courage.(3) 
(1) About Uraby's life and career see: Ibid, pp. 10-26; Newman 
op.cit. pp. 46 -50. 
(2) On these teachings see Gibb, H.A.R.: Modern trends in Islam, 
pp. 27 -26, where he sums them up as being aimed at inspiring 
a pan -Islamic movement through encouraging and enforcing 
nationalism in Islamic countries. At the same time while the 
pan -Islamic movement was directed against European penetration 
and intervention, the evils of the Muslim governments were 
vigorously attacked by Al -Af hany. About his influence in 
Egypt see: Landau: op. cit. pp. 110 -146. Al -Af hany's most 
influential disciple, Shaikh i uhammad Abduh and his teachings 
had a very great effect on subsequent national movements in 
Egypt. Prof. Gibb in his above mentioned work exposes Abduh's 
teachings as follows: "1. The purification of Islam from 
corrupting influences and practices; 2. the reformation of 
Muslim higher education; 3. the re- formulation of Islamic 
doctrine in the light of modern thought; and, 4. the defence 
of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks." 
Gibb: op.cit. p. 33. Moreover, he mentions in p. 29 that 
Abduh's teachings resulted, by the end of his life, in the 
separation of religious issues from the political conflict. 
Cf. Alexander, J.: The truth about Egypt, pp. 1 -2. For 
a more detailed study of Al- AffD-hany's and Abduh's teachings 
see, Adams, C.C.. Islam and Modernism in Egypt. 
(3) A'r -Ráfiç i : op.cit. pp. 77-83; Ninet,J.: " Uraby Pasha, " 
p. 39; Hocking, E. W.: The spirit of world olitics with 
special studies of the Near East, p. 49. 
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With Uraby at its head, the Patriotic party led a 
nationalist movement aiming at the foundation of a representative 
responsible government and the elimination of the discrimination 
between Egyptians and foreigners. So liberal and progressive 
was this movement, that the Khedive, the reactionaries and the 
foreigners considered it a revolution. This movement which is 
known as the "Uraby's Revolution" led to foreign military 
intervention and ended with the British Occupation of Egypt in 
1$$2. The leaders of this movement were tried and were either 
imprisoned or exiled.(1) 
To explain the sincerity of the "Uraby Revolt," and to refute 
all hostile criticism of this nationalist movement, it would seem 
sufficient to quote here from the written statement of the leader 
of that movement in his own defence. "I am no rebel," he said, 
"I led the nation in seeking the liberty of our country, and 
employed all honorable means to this end, respecting the laws and 
not thinking of self, as others say, but of the welfare of Egypt. "(2) 
(1) CUrábi: op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 14$ et seq.; Arad, E.S.: La 
uestion d'Égypte l$41 -193E, pp. 55 -56; Elgood, P.C.: 
The transit of Egypt, pp. 59 -90; Cromer: Modern Egypt, 
Vol. II, p. 324. For a detailed study of the Patriotic 
Party and the Uraby Revolt see Landau: op. cit. Part II, 
Chapter II; Newman: op.cit. Chapter II. 
(2) Ibid, p. 115. 
11. 
Moreover, the memorandum which Uraby wrote on Egypt's reform in 
November 1882 before his deportation, throws sufficient light on 
the intentions of the movement. In this memorandum Uraby prayed 
for a nationalist ruler for Egypt, "well acquanted with the 
country, popular amongst the Egyptians, of sufficient influence 
to impose his authority by moral force; ?r (l) two freely elected 
houses of legislature; ministerial responsibiìity' abolition of 
Capitulations,(2) and equality between all inhabitants of Egypt; 
thorough reform of Egyptian judiciary and education; dismissal 
of unnecessary European officials; no discrimination to be 
applied between natives and foreigners in filling governmental 
posts; and care to be taken of the irrigation and other means 
of fertilising the soil. (3 ) 
Before the British military intervention in July 1882 an 
election for a new Assembly of Deputies had been held in November 
1881. It was the chief task of that assembly to frame a 
constitution which was promulgated in February, and became to r_c 
known as the Constitution of 1882. It is very striking.to notice 
(1) Ibid, p. 285. 
(2) Capitulations were exterritorial privileges or immunities of 
jurisdiction enjoyed by foreigners. They öriginated in the 
concessions and facilities given by the Ottoman Empire to 
Europeans in order to encourage the trade. In course of 
their development, the Capitulations created a status of 
political immunity of foreigners from all local jurisdiction 
and constituted a flagrant encrouchment upon the sovereignty 
of the State. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. III, 
pp. 213 -215; Amad: op.cit. pp. 129 et seq. 
(3) Newman: op.cit. pp. 283 -291. 
12. 
that this constitution contained most of the rules and principles 
established by the draft constitution of 1879. This Constitution 
did not, however, last long; clearly it did not meet with any 
approval from the occupying Power.(1) 
After an investigation of the Egyptian administrative machine 
and the semi- parliamentary institutions the representative of the 
occupying Power, Lord Dufferin, whose duty was to lay down the 
foundations of self- government in Egypt presented his report which 
became the organic law of 1883. In this report, he suggested 
the creation of provincial councils and two semi- representative 
central institutions, i.e. the Legislative council (Iviajlisu Shúra'`l 
Qawanin) and the General Assembly (Al Jam`Eutu ̀ 1:- 'Umümiyah) 
The Legislative Council was composed of thirty members, 
fourteen of whom, including the President and one of the Vice - 
Presidents, were nominated by the Khedive and his ministers, and . 
they were members for life. The remaining sixteen, including the 
second Vice- President, were elected for six years by the 
provincial councils and elector delegates from the cities. It was 
to meet four times a year on the first days of February, June, 
August, and October. Its powers were mainly consultative. It 
discussed legislation and the Budget, but it could not initiate 
legislation. The government could refuse to accept its advice but 
was obliged to explain to the council the reasons of such refusal. 
(1) cUr.5.1T: op. cit. Vol. I. pp. 102-109; op. cit. 
Vol. II, pp. 200-206. 
13 . 
The second institution, i.e. the General Assembly was 
composed of the I' Iinisters who formed the Khedive's Council, the 
members of the Legislative Council, and forty -six delegates elected 
indirectly for six years. Certain financial qualifications were 
required from any candidate for membership of the assembly. He 
had to be a tax payer of not less than `E. 50 a year, in addition 
to being literate and not less than thirty years old. The 
imposition of such qualifications was intended to curtail the 
representation of the masses. The General Assembly was to meet at 
least once every two years. Like the Legislative Council its 
powers were mainly advisory, but it was consulted in more important 
matters than those brought before the council. No direct tax 
could be imposed without its approval. The government was obliged 
to ask its opinion on public loans and the building of canals and 
railways. On the whole, the General Assembly could discuss any 
matter whatsoever and offer thereon advice, which the government 
was, however, entitled to reject.(1) 
This system of government was rightly stigmatised in the 
House of Commons as "a perfect sham of constitutional governments (21 
11) See the text of Lord Dufferin's report in Newman: op.cit. 
2883 -291; Elgood, P.G.: Egypt, p. 90; Chirol: op.cit. p. 88, 
Cromer: op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 271 -274; Subhi: op.cit. Vol. 
IV, p. 41; Shafiq: op.cit. p. 135; R.I.I.A.: Memorandum 
on a study of the working of democratic institutions of 
government in E t, p. 1; Fay, R.':^ .: Episodes in Anglo- 
Egyptian relations, p. 7; Lambelin, R.: L'Egypt et l' 
Angleterre vers l'ind'ependance, pp. 62 -63. 
(2) Mr. Labouchere, Hansard Parliamentary debates, Vol. 276, 
1883, p. 1310 quoted by Rothstein: op.cit. p. 237. 
14. 
The powers conferred on the Legislative Council and the General 
Assembly were not very wide. They were mainly consultative and 
had very little real authority. Crippled as they were, these 
two bodies were the only parliamentary institutions in Egypt under 
the British Occupation. Within the scope of their rights and 
authority, they functioned regularly from 18$3 to 1912. 
One example of such functioning was the rejection by the 
General Assembly in 1910, of the proposal to extend the concession 
of the Suez Canal Company. The offer of the company held 
important financial advances to the government. "Financially 
the proposal was attractive enough; politically it was no doubt 
premature . hT (1) Therefore, at the same time as the Cabinet and 
their British advisers were considering the proposition to be a 
fair one, it was being bitterly attacked by the National Party and 
all other political groups, on the grounds that it would defer 
the date of Egypt's independence. In a special meeting lasting 
from February 9 to April 4, 1910, the assembly discussed the 
project, and when it was put to the vote the opposing majority was 
so great that the whole transaction was abandoned. This is a 
very important incident in the history of the assembly, as well 
as in the history of Egypt, because it was the first time that the 
government yielded to the assembly in such an extremely important 
financial and political matter.(2) 
(1) Elgood: op. cit. p. 106. 
(2) Alexander: op.cit. pp. 251, 283-289, 298-308 & 324-329; 
Rothstein: op.cit. p. 358 
15. 
Hostility to the British Occupation had been continuous 
amongst the former partisans of Uraby, the anti -European element 
of the people, and the discontented officials. The progress of 
education and the development of the native Press contributed 
largely to the change in the general attitude towards politics. 
Educated Egyptians began to participate in political life and to 
form groups and parties whose various attitudes towards the 
British Occupation gave them their character. 
The opposition to the occupation was cleverly exploited, 
at the end of the nineteenth century, by a youth named Mustafa 
Kamil, who formed a well organised group, which was moulded later 
into a political party. Born in Cairo in 1874, Kamil soon 
his praise at sch ,ol. He 
at the Law School and was sent on a scholarship to France to 
continue his studies.(1) In Paris and Toulouse he had the 
opportunity to study not only law, but also political tactics and 
the methods of party organisation. He wasted no time in 
expressing the national demands of Egypt. He spent much time 
and energy convincing the Europeans and especially the French, of 
these legitimate demands. Being a good orator, he used to 
lecture on them giving the Egyptian point of view. Convinced of 
the importance of the Press, and with the intention of uniting 
educated progressive Egyptians, he published Al -LiwV in Cairo in 
(1) Kaykal, H.H.: Tarájim Miiriyah Wa Gharbiyah, p. 144; 
Alexander: op.ci . pp. 26=31. 
16. 
1900. To canvass the support of the foreign element living in 
Egypt, and encouraged by the success of the Arabic organ, he 
published two dailies in French and in English in 1907.(1) 
In all these and in various other activities, Kamil was 
acting in name of those unorganised group of his colleagues who 
were feeling the suppression of political freedom, and who were 
opposing the occupation. Believing that greater efficiency and 
more success might be achieved if they were formed into a regular 
party on the Western pattern, they declared the existence of their 
organisation, calling it the National Party (Al Hizhu'l- :,fatani), 
in a public meeting held in Alexandria in October 1907.(2) The 
discontent caused by the conclusion of the 1904 Entente between 
France and Britain, and the Dinshawai incident(3) facilitated their 
task. 
(1) Ibid, pp, 38 -39._ 
(2) Al- Hizhul- atani is the same name as Uraby's party called in 
this work the "Patriotic Party." To distinguish between the 
two,this one will be called the "National Party." 
A'r- Rafi`i A.R. Mustafa Kamil, pp. 255 -256. 
(3) Dinshawai is a small village famous for the pigeons which the 
inhabitants breed. A party of British soldiers visited the 
village to shoot the birds. At the sight of guns a misunder- 
standing arose on both sides - on those of the villagers and 
of the shooting group. The situation was complicated and 
resulted in injuries to some of the British group. Twenty were 
accused, and the severe punishment of death sentences on four 
and imprisonment and flogging of the rest was inflicted in 
public. On that incident see: Hocking: op.cit. p.54; Saleh: 
op.cit. pp. 180 -181; Lambelin: op.cit. p. 96; Shafiq; op.cit. 
pp. 173 -174; Schmitz, p.: La politique de violence de 
l'Angleterre dans la vallée du Nil, pp. 2F -30; Lloyd: Egypt 
since Cromer, Vol. I. pp. 46 -49; Brocklemann C.: History of 
Islamic peoples, pp. 436 -437; Elgood: op.cit. p. 104; ELgood: 
The Transit of Egypt. p. 46; Elgood; Egypt and the army, pp. 
23 et seq. 
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The approval of the statutory rules and basis of this party - 
which is considered to have been the first of its kind in Egypt, 
was followed by the proclamation of its programme. It demanded 
the autonomy of Egypt as established in 1810 according to the 
London Treaty, the increase of the rights of the representative 
institutions and government, the widening of the scope of education, 
the recognition of the rights of Egypt's public creditors, the 
soothing of susceptibilities of foreigners in Egypt, and the 
strengthening of the ties of friendship with other people and 
nations especially the Ottoman Empire. This party laid down the 
foundations of the principles which became its main slogan: there 
should be no negotiations with Great Britain before the evacuation 
its troops. On the the National Party advocated political 
independence and freedom of rights. The party was one of the 
dominating political forces in the country until the Revolution of 
1919.(1) 
There were some other minor parties which were almost entirely 
based on personal attachments to a leader. The steady decline and 
rapid disappearance of these parties as soon as the personages 
with whom they were connected died or fell from power proves that 
these parties were dependent on the influence of their leaders, and 
(1) Alexander: op. cit. pp. 121 -123; Mou -cho: op.cit. p. 20; 
Lambelin: op.cit. p. 99; Elgood: The transit of Egypt, pp. 
146-148; Elgood:_ Egypt, p. 104; Ghurbál, M. Sh .: Tarikhu a l- 
Mufáwaçláti)l- Mi §riy ati'l- Brifániyah, Vol. I, p. 27; Landau: 
op.cit. devotes Part , ap er for the study of the 
National Party. 
1$. 
that this leadership was the cloak of private ambition. The 
programmes of these parties show an amazing resemblance to one 
another, especially in connection with the internal issues. It 
was their attitude towards the British Occupation that differed 
and distinguished each of these parties from the others. 
One of these parties was the Nation's Party (Hizbu'l- Ummah) 
which was an opponent of the National Party. If the latter is 
considered a liberal, the former was a conservative party, mainly 
composed of aristocratic elements and some of the westernized 
educated class. So long as this party was supported by Lord Cromer, 
the British High Commissioner whose unofficial encouragement 
brought it into existence as an antidote against the extremity of 
the National Party, no political or social programme materialised. 
.'then it got no support from Cromer's successor, it tried tò gain 
popularity by calling for social reform, especially education, 
and demanding wider powers for the existing representative bodies.(11 
From 1905, the semi -parliamentary institutions, i.e. the 
Legislative Council and the General Assembly, side by side with the 
political parties and groups, fought for the enlargement of the 
share of representatives in governing the country. They continued 
their efforts until the new organic law of 1913 created the 
Legislative Assembly (Al Jamqyatu'1- TashriCiyan). 
1 Lloyd: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 50; Landau: op.cit. pp.253 -259; 
Lambelin: op.cit. pp. 99 -100; Ghurbal: op.cit. Vol. I, 
pp. 27 -2$; Elgood: The transit of Egypt, p. 145; Young, G: 
Egypt, p. 180. 
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The new assembly was composed of the ministers, sixty -six 
elected members and seventeen other members nominated by the 
government to secure the representation of the following categories 
and interests: four representing the Copts, three the Beduins, 
two the merchants, one the municipal councils, two the 
educationalists, one the engineers, and the remaining two were 
left to the choice of the government. In addition, the 
government had the power of appointing the President and one of 
the two Vice- Presidents of the assembly. The mandate of the 
assembly was six years with the replacement of one third of the 
members every two years. A new system of emolument was adopted, 
and the elected members were now alloted a definite sum every 
year as compared with the old system which had had been designed 
to cover the members' travelling expenses. The system of the 
elections for the Legislative Assembly was intended, it is said, 
to result in a real representation of the country. It was 
indirect giving a vote to each man who was at least twenty one 
years old. It was not mere chance, however, that, out of the 
sixty-six elected members in the first elections for the assembly, 
forty -nine were landlords and sound men of standing personally 
known to the electors. This may be due to the reliance of the 
candidates on intrigues and recommendations in high quarters 




In spite of its name, the Legislative Assembly had only 
consultative functions and the real power resided in the Khedive, 
who was an absolute monarch, and his ministers who were responsible 
to him. The main difference in the functions of this assembly, 
in comparison with the others, was the increase in its powers 
concerning financial questions. Article 7 of the organic law. 
stressed the necessity of the agreement of the assembly before 
imposing any new taxes. The' Budget could be discussed by the 
aseembly, except the parts concerning the civil list, the public 
debt and all obligations towards foreign Powers. In addition to 
the functions of the two older institutions the Legislative Assembly 
had the right to express its opinion upon government measures and 
to formulate projects of its own to be presented to the Council of 
T-linisters. The assembly vas convened for only one session, which 
lasted from January. to June 1914. It was never convened again and 
(1) Saleh: op.cit. p. 148; ülgood: op.cit. pp. 206 -207; 
Lloyd: op.cit. Vol.I, p. 142j Lambelin: op.cit. p. 104, 
Chirol: op.cit. p. 111; Subhi: op.cit. Vol. IV, pp. 41 -42, 
op.cit. p. 1. 
It should be noticed that a few candidates for membership 
of the assembly published programmes of their own. Amongst the 
few was Saad Zaghul who led the nationalist movement in 1919, 
and whose programme can be summerised as follows: (1) 
Elemination of irregularities and reformation of the courts of 
law. (2) Extension of education to give equal opportunities 
for all classes. (3) Enactment of free Press law. (4) 
Improving the cleaning, lighting and paving of the streets of 
Cairo. (5) Improving the conditions of the agriculturalists 
by paying attention to methods of agriculture and irrigation, 
to railways, and to prices of cotton and other products. 
Sad Zaghlul. Srahwa taliyah, pp. 154 -155; 
Saleh: op.cit. p. 185; Landau: op.cit. p. 97. 
21. 
its meetings were postponed indef initely.(1) 
When the First World War broke out, consultations between 
the acting British Consul General, and the British Foreign Office 
resulted in the proclamation that "in view of the state of war 
arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the 
protection of His Majesty and henceforth constitutes a British 
Protectorate. "(2) This declaration terminated the Ottoman 
suzerainty, and Britain interposed herself. as the legal heir to 
Turkey in Egypt. This action was followed by the deposition of 
the Khedive, who was at the time visiting Turkey, and thus Britain 
had no significant challenge.(3) The deposition of the Khedive 
was Britain's answer to his manifesto to Egyptians in which he said: 
"A foreign Power has been occupying our beloved country 
two years. The decisive hour of our liberation has come 
Note that our enemy is the British army of occupation and all those 
who collaborate with it '(L ") 
(1) Lambelin: op.cit. pp. 102 -103; Chirol: op.cit. pp. 111 -112; 
Newman: op.cit. pp. 174 -175; Fahmy: M.H.: The legal 
principles governing the international status of Egypt, D. 148; 
Naguib, M.A.: Nature juridique ,du conflit anglo-egyptien, 
p. 26. 
(2) The Times, 1$.12.1914. 
(3) Newman: op.cit. pp. 202- 2C8; Chirol: op.cit. pp. 127 -130; 
Lambelin: op.cit. pp. 108 -109; Ghurbal: op.cit. Vol. I, 
pp. 40 - 45; Newman, E.W.P.: The Mediterannean and its 
problems, pp. 263 264. 
(4) Amad: op.cit. p. 70. 
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During the war, in addition to the suspension of the 
Legislative Assembly, other political activities were eleminated. 
Meetings of more than five persons were prohibited. The military 
authority had a powerful hand and the intelligence service was 
very active. Prisons were filled with political suspects. 
Nationalist newspapers were suppressed and political news were 
put under censorship.(1) All these measures never weakened the 
nationalist movement, and when the war came to an end the people 
had a great hope for a brighter political life. The political 
awakening of the people, the unpopularity of the Protectorate, 
the banning of political activities under martial law, and the 
proclaimed principles of President Wilson inspired the national 
feeling. These factors along with the deteriorating social and 
economic conditions which appeared as a natural repercussion to 
the war, revived Egyptian nationalism.(2) 
The flare up started peacefully, with the people demanding 
their natural rights to govern themselves, and the unification of 
Egypt and the Sudan. It was the first time since the British 
(1) Elgood: op.cit. in Chapter XI, pp. 20$ et seq. gives an 
account of conditions during the war. 
(2) Young: op.cit. p. 21$; Chirol: op.cit. pp. 131 et seq.; 
Awad: op.cit. pp. 109 -110; Lambelin: op.cit. pp. 120 -121; 
Hocking: op.cit. pp. 55 -56; Newman: op.cit. 264 -266; 
Dutcher, G.M.: The political awakening of the East, pp. 20- 
21; Newman: Great Britain in Egypt, pp. 208 -214; Centre 
dtEtudes de politique Etrangére: L'Egypte .indé-endante, 
p. 34; A)r- Rafi'i, A.R.: Thawratu Sanati 1919, Vol. I. 
pp. 54 -59. Hayter, W.: Recent constituional developments 
in Egypt, pp. 22 -24. 
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Occupation that the people demanded complete independence. This 
may be due to the fact that before World War I Egypt was paying 
allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey, who was considered the Muslim 
Caliph, and this relationship was repudiated by the Protectorate 
declaration during the war. A delegation of three Egyptian 
(1) 
leaders with the elected Vice -President of the Legislative Assembly, 
Saad Zaghlul Pasha,(2) at its head, speaking on behalf of the 
people, demanded from the British High Commissioner recognition of 
Egypt's rights and stressed their right to defend their case at 
the Peace Conference and in London.(3) 
(1) The meetings of this assembly were postponed during the war 
for later dates: from October 1914, to January 1915, and then 
to April 1915 and then indefinitely. The assembly was never 
abolished officially until it was replaced by the Parliament 
established by the Constitution of 1923. After the 
promulgation of that Constitution, a law abolishing the assembly 
was published on April 30, 1923. 
(2) About Zaghlul, Lord Cromer said in his farewell speech: 
"Lastly, gentlemen, I should like to mention the name of one 
with whom I have only recently co- operated, but for whom, in 
that short time, I have learned to entertain a high regard. 
Unless I am mistaken, a career of great public usefulness lies 
before the present Minister of Education, Saad Zaghlul Pasha. 
He possesses all qualities necessary to serve his country. 
He is honest; he is capable; he has the courage of his 
convictions; he has been abused by many of the less worthy 
of his own countrymen. These are high qualifications. He 
should go far." 
Quoted by Chirol: op.cit. p. 9$. 
(3) Elgood: op.cit. p. 231; Lambelin: op.cit. p. 121; 
Shafiq: op.cit. p. 200; Ghurbál: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 52 -54. 
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A quick glance at the character of the formation of the 
delegation shows that it was intended to represent the nation. 
First of all, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the elected Vice- President of 
the Legislative Assembly was supposed to be representing the 
c,reat mass of the people. In the meantime the other two members 
of the delegation Aly Pasha Shaarawy and Abdul Aziz Bey Fahmy were 
representing the landlords and the intellegentsia, i.e. the middle 
class, respectively. 
It is not easy to trace the origin of the leadership in this 
movement. Every person in the country was feeling the suppression 
of his rights and hoping for a change for the better. Many 
distinguished personalities were considering the necessary steps to 
achieve it. It is said that an intellectual of the ruling family, 
Prince Umar Tussun, on the one hand, and the Prime Minister, 
Hussain Rushdy Pasha, on the other, were planning to raise the 
voice of Egypt in the Peace Conference; but they were forestalled 
by the action of Zaghlul and his colleagues.(1) 
This action took place on November 13, 19l8, which is 
considered the opening day of a new era in the history of Egypt. 
(1) Tú sún, " U : Mudhakkirah Bimá aadara `Anná 1viundhu Fa j ri Jl- Harka.ti'l- 
ataniyah Min 1918 ilä 1928, pp. 4 et seq.; Shafiq, 
Hawliyátu Misru's- S:iyásiyah, Vol.I, pp. 144 -145; A'r- Ráfi``i: 
op.cit. Vol.Ì, pp. 75-76; Al- CAmggd: op.cit. pp. 1$6 -196; 
Ghurbal: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 50 -51; Youssef, A: Independent 
Egypt. p.61; Wavell: Allenby in Egypt, p.40; Ransome, A.: 
TT`l'he history of the Eptian crisis," Manchester Guardian, n 
gy 
March 30, 1925; Vo  Bosch, F.: Vingt anneesd yp ?E t, 
pp. 25 -27. 
- 
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The demands of the deputation, despite the recommendation of the 
High Commissioner, were refused by the British Foreign Office. 
This refusal aroused the national feeling to such a degree that 
even the Prime Minister was compelled to resign. By the end of 
1918, a "Delegation" (: :'afd) was formed with Zaghul as President, 
and most of its members were members of the Legislative Assembly. 
Its programme was based on the achievement of national complete 
independence. Signatures were collected from every part of the 
country, giving the ?Tafd the mandate to represent the people and 
to speak in the name of the nation. 
The popularity of the Wafd was fought by the authorities. 
Thinking that its power lay in its leadership, Zaghlul and other 
three leaders were arrested and deported to Malta.(2) This 
increased the tension and the Revolution of 1919 started. 
Demonstrations spread everywhere; destruction of property, 
buildings, railway lines and telegraph and telephone wires occurred. 
This was the first time in the country's recent history that such 
a revolutionary movement covered all the country. Continual riots 
taking place everywhere compelled the British forces to interfere 
(1) 
(1) Young: op.cit. p. 232; Elgood: op.cit. p. 237; Fahmy: 
op.cit. p. 275; Lambelin: op.cit. pp. 121 -123 and 128; 
Symons, M. T.: Britain and Egypt, p. 111, Hayter: op.cit. p.31. 
(2) Von De Bosch: op.cit. p. 30; Howell, J.M.: Egvnt'S past, 
present and future, pp. 181 -182; R.I.I.A.: Great Britain and 
p. 8. 
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to quell the outburst.(1) 
This move was a failure as the Revolution was flaring up 
all over the country and, being a popular one, was supported by 
all elements, men and women of different religions and different 
social classes. To face the Revolution, Britain nominated Lord 
Allenby, the Commander -in -Chief of the Palestinian campaign, as 
Special High Commissioner to succeed Sir Reginald Wingate, who 
had been recalled because of his failure.(2) 
It is significant to point out that Allenby was a military 
man without previous political and administrative experience. "Of 
diplomacy he knew nothing, and he was inclined to despise its 
methods, but his prestige was high throughout the whole Near 
East "(3) The choice of such a person for this post was 
an indication of Britain's intentions towards the Revolution.(4) 
The curious phrasing of the orders and instructions to the strong 
(1) On the incidents of the Revolution see: Lloyd: op.cit. Vol. I, 
pp. 295 -300; Young: op.cit. pp. 235 -242; Wavell: op.cit. 
pp. 40 et seq.; Elgood: op.cit. pp. 235 -240; Chiral: op.cit. 
pp. 177 et seq.; Amad: op.cit. pp. 77 -51; Schmitz: op.cit. 
p. 39; Lambelin: op.cit. pp. 129 -135; op.cit. 
Vol. I, pp. 155 et seq.; Shafrq; Hawliyát, Tamhid, Vol. I, 
pp. 246 et seq.; Newman: 'The Mediterranean and its problems, 
pp. 267 -265; Sabry, M.: La rrevolution 'egyptienne. 
(2) Young: op.cit. p. 235; Lambelin: op.cit. p. 136; Hourani, 
A.H.: Minorities in the Arab world, pp. 4.3 and 47 -45. 
(3) Newman: Great Britain in Egypt, p. 215. 
(4) Schmitz: op.cit. p. 40; Atad: op.cit. pp. 111 -112; Centre 
d'Etude de Politique Etrangere: op.cit. p. 42; "Egypt, A 
Kingdom," p. 483. 
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man shows the real objects of his mission. He was "directed to 
exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil, to 
take all such measures as he considers necessary and expedient to 
restore law and order and to administerate in all matters as 
required by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate 
over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis. "(1) 
Trying to find a gap in the leadership of the Revolution, 
Allenby encouraged the compromising elements who were hoping to 
reach an understanding with Britain. This attempt failed because 
of the strong public opinion and the political awakening of the 
people. Thinking that the release of the deported leaders would 
calm the country, Britain gave them the freedom to go where they 
pleased. Although the released leaders went to Paris to find 
some means of pleading the Egyptian case before the Peace Conference, 
the people did not accept their mere release as the end of their 
struggle: instead, strikes and riots continued all over the 
country. For the first time, civil servants as a whole joined the 
strikes in support of the vVafd.(2) 
Faced by this state of affairs, Great Britain appointed a 
Special Mission to "enquire into the causes of the late disorders 
in Egypt and to report on the existing situation in the country 
and the form of the Constitution, which under the Protectorate, 
(1) Cited in Dutcher: op.cit. p. 22. 
(2) Elgood: op.cit. pp. 216 -24e; Newman: op.cit. pp. 221 - 222. 
2$ . 
will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the 
progressive development of self -governing institutions and the 
protection of foreign interests. "(1) The Mission, which was 
headed by Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
was boycotted by the people as had been expected; the only 
support they got was from the Sultan and his circle. The people 
believed that the Wafd and Zaghlul in Paris were their accredited 
representatives.(2) 
After spending three months in Egypt, the Mission left, 
having learned the strength of Egyptian nationalism, and having 
become acquainted with the state of public opinion. Before their 
report was written, negotiatidns between the Mission and the Wafd 
took place through an intermediary from one of the moderate 
elements, Adly Yakan Pasha. They ended with the Milner - Zaghlul 
Agreement, which had been the basis of every further negotiation. 
The agreement was based on the recognition of the independence 
of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative 
institutions and having the right to representation in foreign 
countries, with certain reservations.(3) This agreement was 
(1) Cmd. 1131, Report on the special mission to Egypt, 1921, p.2. 
(2) Ibid, pp. 3 and 4; Lloyd: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 354; Elgood: 
op. cit. pp. 251 -255; Dutcher: op.cit. pp. 23 -24; Centre 
d'Etude de Politique Etrangere: op.cit. p. 43; Lambelin: 
op.cit. pp. 142- 144; Ghurbal: op.cit. Vol.I, p. 62. 
(3) Cmd. 1131, pp. 23 -26. 
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attacked by some members of the Wafd as not fulfilling the demand 
for complete independence; but it was considered acceptable as 
a basis for further negotiations. Thus controversies in ideas 
about negotiations with Great Britain caused a split in the Wafd. 
Some of its leaders and members, influenced by the moderate trend, 
and thinking that the government would be more competent to 
negotiate with Britain than the Wafd, left it to form later in 
1922 the Liberal Constitutionalist Party under the presidency of 
Adly Pasha.(1) The mission had been seeking for a gap between the 
leaders and the people; it succeeded only in exposing differences 
and splits amongst the leaders themselves. 
It was not till 1922 that political conditions in Egypt began 
to clarify. In February 1922, Britain declared Egypt an 
independent sovereign State, in a unilateral declaration, which was 
accepted by the moderates who were holding office.(2) It might be 
(1) Amad: op.cit._ p. 81; Mou -Cho: op.cit. pp. 31 -32; ShafTq: 
Hawli at Tamhid Vol. II, pp. 80-83; qUurb61 : op.cit. Vol. I 
pp. 52 et seq.; Ebeid, W.M.: Complete independence versus the 
Milner scheme, pp. 10 -11; Shafl q, A.: Mudhakkeráti FI Nisfi 
Qarn, Vol. III, pp. 273 -275. 
(2) The text of that unilateral declaration reads as follows: 
"Whereas His Majesty's Government in accordance with their 
declared intentions, desired forthwith to recognise Egypt as an 
independent sovereign State; and 
'tT.:hereas the relations between His Majesty's Government 
and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire; 
"The following principles are hereby declared: 
"(1) The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated 
and Egypt is declared an independent sovereign State. 
"(2) So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass 
an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of 
Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on November 2, 1914, shall be 
withdrawn. 
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the absence of the leaders of the fd, in exile for the second 
time, that enabled the moderates to accept it. It is significant 
to note here that this Declaration was based on the pattern of 
Milner- Zaghlul Agreement. The four reservations mentioned in the 
Declaration, were maintained in the Milner- Zaghlul Agreement. It 
is also interesting to notice that the Declaration which proclaimed 
the independence of Egypt did not give her the right to assume all 
the authority of a sovereign State. It laid down certain 
conditions to be fulfilled prior to the termination of martial 
law which would be suspended by the High Commissioner with the 
threat of British intereference.(1) 
rß(3) The following matters are absolutely reserved to the 
discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it 
may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation 
on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between 
His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt: 
(a) The security of the communications of the British 
Empire. 
(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or 
interference, direct or indirect. 
(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the . 
protection of minorities. 
(d) The Sudan. 
"Pending the conclusion of such agreements the'status quo' 
in all matters shall remain intact." 
A detailed study of the Declaration is found in Mou -Cho: 
op.cit. pp. 39 et seq. 
(1) Cmd. 1131, pp. 23 -26; Cf. Elgood: op.cit. pp. 266 -261 and 287 - 
288; The Declaration of February 28, 1922, and a note from 
Lord Allenby to the Sultan on the same day, The Times, 1.3.1922; 
Hocking: op.cit. pp. 123 -127; Naguib: op.cit. p. 134; Awad: 
op.cit. pp. 121 -122 and 130; Merton, A: "Constitutionalism 
in Q;YptL" P. 32. 
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In consequence of the Declaration of February 26, 1922, the 
Sultan assumed the title of "His Majesty the King of Egypt," and a 
royal decree establishing the basis and principles of the 
succession to the throne was promulgated. A committee of thirty 
members under the chairmanship of an ex -Prime Minister, Rushdy Pasha, 
was appointed to draft a constitution. (1) The 'lafd did not take 
part in that committee because it was demanding a constituent 
assembly to frame the constitution. IIost of the committee's 
members were those who later formed the Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party and the Unionist Party (known as the Palace Party). The 
reaction of the people was that demonstrations flared up, students 
went on strike and in shouting they declared their principles: 
"Down with false independence, down with the new King, down with 
Sartat Pasha (the then Prime IIinister), we want Saad Pasha 
(Zaghlul). "(2) 
The Committee of the Thirty studied modern European 
constitutions and discussed the most suitable bases for the new 
constitution. They clashed with Britain when they tried to give 
the King the title of "King of Egypt and the Sudan." Britain 
threatened to revise the recent Declaration of February 1922, if 
any article in the constitution referred to the Sudan. This 
(1) This committee will 
of the Thirty." It 
sometimes, known in 
Dareste, F.R.& P.: 
(2) Dutcher: op.cit. p. 
be referred to in thiswork as the ''Committee 
may be interesting to point out that it is 
the history of Egypt as "Lajnatu -'l -Ash i -a ' 
Les constitutions modernes, Vol. V. p.421. 
26; Cf. Von De Bosch: op.cit. p.15. 
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caused a delay in the promulgation of the constitution, as well 
as a ministerial crisis, which ended in the resignation of the 
Cabinet. The King, who was reluctant to proclaim the 
constitution, bowed to a British ultimatum and agreed to 
promulgate it on April 19, 1923 without making mention to the 
Sudan. 
(1) 
(1) Ghosh: op.cit. p. 90; Lloyd: op.cit. Vol. II, p.72; Newman: 
op.cit. pp. 238 and 240- 241; Howell: op. cit. pp. 201 -202; 
Newman: The Mediterranean and its pblerns, pp. 278 -2c1; 
Centre d'Étude de Politique Etrangere: op. cit. p. 49; 
Shafig; :_ Hawli,at, `I'amhid, Vol. III, pp. 528-529; 
Al- ^_qqad: op.cit. p. 420; Ghurbal: op.cit. Vol. I, 
pp. 116-117. 
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II - Socio- Economic Conditions on the Eve 
of the Promulgation of the Constitution 
It would seem necessary before proceeding further with the 
study of the political background, to take a glance at the economic 
conditions of the country especially on the eve of the promulgation 
of the Constitution, i.e., in the nineteen twenties, because "man 
does not exist only as a ruler and ruled; man exists also as 
dealing with material nature and its forces. rt (1) 
Lying in the desert of North East Africa, with a superficial 
area of 363,000 square miles, Egypt does not receive much rain. 
Without the Nile, one of the most remarkable rivers geographically 
and historically, which runs through its territories, Egypt would 
have been a barren desert. It is just as true as it was centuries 
ago that "Egypt is the gift of the Nile." Apart from a few oases 
scattered in the Western and Eastern deserts, life has only existed 
in the Nile valley, i.e. the narrow strip of irrigated land stretch- 
ing from Cairo to the southern frontiers, and in Lower Egypt, which 
is the delta formed from alluvial mud deposits, in the shape of a 
traingle whose southern apex is Cairo. 
The inhabited area which can be irrigated from the Nile 
is only 13,000 square miles, on which lives a population of 
about 19,000,000.(2) This means that the economic density 
(1) .Malik, C. "The Near East: The Search for the Truth", p.139 
(2) R.I.I.A. The Middle East, a Political and Economic Survey, 
p.139. These are the figures of the 1947 census. 
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of population(1) is about 1,450 to the square mile, a density 
which is more than twice that of industrial countries of Europe. (2) 
While the population has been increasing very rapidly, as in other 
Middle Eastern countries, (3) e.g. from the level of 12.72 million 
in 1917 with a density of population of 965 to the square mile, 
the population reached 19.04 million in 1947; the cultivated 
area, however, is almost unchanged. 
In spite of the high death rate - which has been considered 
the highest in the world,(4) - the population has been increasing. 
This high death rate has been counterchecked by a birth rate of 
about forty per thousand,(5)and this reveals the cause of the 
increase of population. The high death rate has been due to 
the spread of endemic disease amongst the population along with 
poverty. To this latter factor, as well as to the cultivation 
of cotton, which requires a dense population with a birth rate 
above the average, and which renders the child at a very early 
age a financial asset, to those and to the social factors forcing 
early age marriages, the high birth rate may be attributed.(6) 
(1) It is important to distinguish between the "geographical 
density" of population which is the simple relation between 
total population and area; and the "economic density" of 
population which takes into account the economic resources of 
the country. Therefore in Egypt's case the economic density is 
the relation between the total population and the cultivated 
area. On this see Namek, Y.S.E. The Social and Economic 
Aspects of the Population Problem in Evpt, pp.193 -200. 
(2) Warriner, D. Land and Poverty in the Middle East, p.26. 
(3) Prest, A.R. War Economics in Primary Producing Countries, p.126. 
(4) For details about death rate in Egypt, see Namek,op.cit. 
Chapter V, pp.120 et. seq. 
(5) Ibid, Chapter IV, pp.90 et seq. for details about Egyptian 
birth rate. 
(6) Issawi, C.-Egypt, an Economic and Social Analysis, pp.44 -47. 
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It was truly said that tttlîe peasant is imprisoned within the 
walls of his own agricultural system, year by year his numbers 
grow and the walls remain. The difficulties in attempting to 
break out are great . tt (1) These walls are the system of land 
tenure, an important subject in a country like Egypt, which is 
almost wholly dependent upon agriculture, because the system 
induces factors leading to poverty, indebtedness, ignorance and 
instability. The distribution of land ownership has been unequal 
and the following table shows that unjust distribution in 1920. (2) 


















Less than 1 feddan 1,207,694 64.7 485,045 8.8 0.40 
1 -5 feddans 506,025 27.1 1,004,137 19.2 2.10 
5 -10 it 79,767 4.3 551,276 9.9 6.91 
10-20 tt 38,707 2.1 533,563 9.6 13.78 
20 -30 11 11,866 0.6 287,021 5.2 24.29 
30-50 t! 9,190 0.5 352,783 6.4 38.39 
Over 50 1 13,512 0.7 2,261,527 40.9 167.37 
Totals 1,866,761 100.0 5,535,352 100.0 2.96 
A quick glance at the table shows the inequality of the 
distribution of land. While 0.7 per cent of the proprietors 
owned 40.9 per cent of the cultivated land, the remaining 99.3 
per cent of the land holders possessed 59.1 per cent of the land. 
(1) Peen, B.A. The Agricultural Development of the Middle East,p.109. 
(2) Crouchley, A.E. The Economic Development of Modern Egypt, p.258. 
1 feddan = 1.038 acres = 4,201 square meters. 
3 (3. 
In most cases, the owners of large -sized estates did not them- 
selves cultivate the whole of their possessions, and therefore 
they frequently leased them to tenants, who cultivated them or 
sub -let them to the fellaheen (small farmers and agricultural 
labourers). 
A comparative absence of middle -class land -owners, i.e. 
proprietors of 10 to 50 feddans, is clearly observed. This 
middle class group composed 3.2 per cent of the owners. 
A very important feature is clearly illustrated in the 
table, i.e. the large number of those who possessed less than one 
feddan. It is a group which has been increasing in number 
because of the Islamic law of inheritance, which gives all 
children the right to inherit their parents' property generally 
in a ratio of two to one as between male and female. It is 
striking that nearly 65 per cent of land -holders possessed 8.8 
per cent of the land, with an average holding for each proprietor 
of less than half a feddan, an area which could not be economically 
cultivated. Moreover, the aggregate average of the possession 
of landowners illustrates clearly the inadequacy of cultivated 
land. As shown in the table, this average is 2.96 feddan, which 
is not only a small area, but also proves the scarcity of land. 
A tendency towards urbanization has been noticed. Egypt's 
urban population has shown a larger increase in number, though 
not solely on account of migration, than that of the rural 
districts. It may be a consequence of that phenomenon that 
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few of the big estates were directly managed by their owners. 
The following table shows the differences in the number and 










1907 1,550,000 13.9 
1917 1,$$4,000 14.$ 
1927 2,448,000 17.3 
Moreover, the influx of population into Cairo and Alexandria, 
the main two cities, could be illustrated by the following 
figures which show the percentage of the increase in population.(2) 
1907 -1917 1917 -1927 
All Egypt 13.6 11.4 
Cairo 16.6 24.5 
Alexandria 25.6 2$.$ 
What were the conditions under which the rural population 
of Egypt - the bulk of the inhabitants of the country - lived? 
The pattern of life in the Middle East, of which Egypt is a part, 
was described as "near starvation, pestilence, high death rate, 
soil erosion (and) economic exploitation It The poverty 
prevailing in Egypt has been due to the constant increase of 
population, while the resources under exploitation have almost 
(1) Bonne, A.: The Economic Develo ment of the Middle East, p.27 
(2) The Economist, Vol.CXXII, No.4821, p.119 
(3) Warriner: op.cit. p.1 
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been unchanged. Loreover, the land tenure system is considered 
a fundamental cause of poverty. 
(1) 
In spite of the high 
productivity of agriculture, its real income has been probably 
the world's lowest. The level of money wages was very low: as 
little as seven piasters, i.e. one shilling and sixpence, for a 
twelve hour working day for an unskilled labourer in 1920.(2) 
Revenue figures of agriculture pointed to an exceedingly low 
level of subsistence and to a per capita income which, whether 
earned in kind or specie, scarcely sufficed to cover the barest 
necessities of life. 
This low level of earnings means that consumption even of 
energy producing food was very low. The chief item for the 
nutrition of peasants has been bread made of maize. Milk and 
meat have been considered luxuries. No wonder that pellagra, 
rickets and night- blindness have been some of the malnutritional 
diseases frequently met with. Moreover, the peasant has 
suffered from an all pervading disease caused by the absence of 
clean water, and from the filth and squalor resulting from the 
lack of building materials and fuel. It has been truly said that 
"the physical conditions of existence are peculiarly bad, since 
such disease is directly due to the methods of irrigation. There 
is no standard of living, (mere existence is accepted as the 
standard), anything lower would be death, as the high death rate 
proves. ,f (3 ) 
(1) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p.l$l; Malik: op.cit. p.24$ 
(2) %Iarriner: op.cit. p.3$ 
(3) Ibid, p.3$ 
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The educational policy in Egypt during the British Occupation, 
and up to early in the twentieth century was severely criticised. 
Not only was expenditure on education so limited that at no time 
did it reach more than three per cent of the Budget, although 
illiteracy was about $5 per cent, but also the principal aim of 
that educational policy appeared to be to form a suitable class to 
meet the requirement of government service.(1) Nevertheless, there 
were some technical high schools along with Al -Azhar University. 
It is very significant to notice that the graduates of these high 
schools and university formed a group of the middle class, and 
were very effective in the nationalist movement. 
A brief examination of the structure of Egyptian society seems 
important, as it may be of some help in showing whole-re the holders 
of political power. The Egyptian people were mainly divided into 
three social classes.(2) The first of these was the one which 
might be called the ''aristocratic class", or the upper class. It 
was composed of people whose material interests were determined 
either by their landed property or by their invested capital. The 
first group of this class, i.e. the landlords who possessed more 
than fifty feddans, acquired their land either through purchasing 
the liquidated properties of Khedive Ismail in the l88Ots or by 
exploiting peasants and tenants. The other group was that which 
had accumulated capital during the First World War as the fruit of 
(1) Issawi: op.cit. pp.40 & 179; Dutcher: op.cit. p.36; 
Hocking: op.cit. p.53; Hayter: op.cit. pp.19 -20 
(2) Cf., Bonne, A.: State and economics in the Middle East, pp.45 -49 
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its speculations in the cotton trade or in consequence of the 
instability of prices and economic conditions.(1) 
This upper class, in general, was reluctant to support the 
nationalist movement at its beginning because "their own vested 
interests or at least their interest in the prosperity of their 
clan,, left no room for any other considerations or impulses. tt (2 ) 
But the enthusiastic support of the people to that movement 
induced this class to participate in and seek part in its leadership. 
The first group of this class was trying to safeguard its interests 
and increase the land it possessed, while the second group was 
looking forward to the extension of its investments, especially in 
the industrial field. It is important to note that the economic 
interests of landlords have been safeguarded, but the area of the 
land they acquired has not increased because of the Islamic law 
of inheritance, which might have caused the decline of landlords' 
heirs to middle -class landowners. Moreover, the depression which 
prevailed in the late twenties might have been another factor. 
In the meantime, the other group has been successful in establishing 
some industrial and commercial firms. One of these firms is the 
group of Bank lasr (Bank of Egypt) which was established in April 
1920 and which started to flourish in 1930's. (3) 
The second social class in Egypt, which may be called the 
middle class, was formed of the intelligentsia, i.e. the graduates 
(1) Crouchley: op.cit. pp.l89-190; Centre d'Etude de Politique 
Etamgere: op.cit. p.26 
(2) Bonne: op.cit. p.4b 
(3) Crouchley: op.cit. p.20$; Centre d'Etude de Politique Etrangere: 
op. cit. pp.330-336 
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of Al -Azhar University and the high technical and professional 
schools, and civil servants on one hand, and landowners whose 
lands ranged between ten and fifty feddans on the other. (1) The 
former group within that class, i.e. the intelligentsia was numeric- 
ally so small that it was thought it would not exercise anything like 
the far- reaching influence that intellectuals usually do. But to 
the astonishment of all, they took over the leadership of the 1919 
Revolution and the nationalist movement.(2) Lawyers played a 
significant róle in the activities of that class, and this explains 
the distinguished position they had acquired, during the ensuing 
years, in the political field. "The educated Egyptians ", said 
P.G. Elgood, "noted bitterly that Englishmen replacing Egyptians 
frequently were without the technical knowledge which would have 
excused their appointment. Men were posted to high commands in 
the police who had no knowledge of criminal law; others obtained 
places in the ministry of finance without any qualification for their 
important duties save that of unimpeachable honesty.... "(3) There- 
fore,it is no wonder that the intellectuals, though as all intellect- 
uals following a liberal line of thought, aimed at replacing those 
civil servants who held superior posts especially foreigners. In 
the meantime, the other group of the middle class, i.e. the land- 
owners, was hoping to have equal rights in the water of irrigation 
with the landlords, and was struggling to become as rich as they. 
This was clearly observed when cotton prices rose high, and this 
(1) Cf. Ibid, pp. 2b- 28. (2) "Egypt, a Kingdom", pp. 47g-479 
(3) Elgood, P.G.: Egypt and the army, p.17; Cf."Egvpt, A Kingdom", 
P.482. 
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group obtained unexpectedly high gains; they looked forward to 
such great profits that they bitterly competed to purchase cultivated 
land by instalments, even at very high prices. Because of the 
unexpected fall in prices of cotton and the change of world and 
home economic conditions, these people were not able to pay regularly; 
in some cases, their land was confiscated, while, in others, the 
(1) 
payment of debts was postponed. This was the beginning of the 
problem of the mortgage loans (credit foncier), which had been, 
until recently, a main issue in the governments' policy. It must 
be understood that those who escaped the difficulties of paying the 
prices of the land were lifted in the thirties into the class of 
landlords, while those who could not reach any settlement for their 
payment continued to be middle -class landowners. 
Finally came the peasants and the working people, who formed 
the third class in Egyptian society. This class, as elsewhere, 
and as usual, constituted, numerically speaking, the basis of the 
population. It consisted mainly of two types of person: firstly, 
those who owned some land but could not support themselves, so that 
they were obliged to work part of their time, or let some of the 
leased land of the absentee landlords; and secondly, the landless 
people who were whole time agricultiral labourers, and who in a few 
cases had some of the leased land to work on. Beside this rural 
proletariat, industrial labourers formed a very small portion of 
that-third social class. Industrial workers were limited in number 
(1) Crouchley: op.cit. pp.l89 -193; National Bank of Egypt, 
1$9$- 1948, pp.48 -50 
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and not very well organised. The numbers of this social class 
had been increasing, even in comparison with the increasing number 
of population. In other words, the proletariat population had 
been multiplying without any chance before them of a rise in the 
standard of living. (1) This class, however, was patriotically 
devoted to the 1919 Revolution and believed that it would create 
a system which would be a safeguard against the extortion of 
taxation and exploitation of landlords. 
(1) Centre d'Etude de Politique Etrangére, op.cit 
Keen: op.cit. p.40; Abushady, A.L.: Egypt's 





III - The Political Development After the 
Promulgation of the Constitution. 
The Constitution, which was promulgated on April 19, 1923, 
ensured and gave justification to the 'status quo ?. It followed 
the pattern of the Belgian Constitution; and the Committee of the 
Thirty which adopted this latter Constitution to be applied in 
Egypt, did not pay much attention to the inherent differences 
between the two countries.(1) 
This Constitution, which was promulgated by a Royal Rescript, 
became the corner stone of the parliamentary system in Egypt. 
Most writers consider it to be the natural result of the Declaration 
of February 1922, and that it was framed under the dominant influence 
of Great Britain. They prove this theory by the letter of Lord 
Allenby to the Sultan accompanying the Declaration, and by the 
fact that Egypt was occupied by British troops who never left its 
territory during the framing of the Constitution. Moreover, 
additional proofs to this argument are given by quoting the 
intervention of Great Britain and the High Commissióner to compel 
the promulgation of the Constitution subject to the four reserved 
points, and their repeated threats to review the Declaration.(2) 
On the other hand, some other writers do not accept that 
argument and deny that Great Britain was the ultimate legal source 
of the Constitution. They claim that the origin of the Constitution 
(1) Amad: op.cit. p.102; Merton, A.: op.cit. p.32; "Egypt: The 
Background of Negotiations ", p.267, 
(2) Ghosh: op.cit. pp.109 -110. 
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lies in the actions of the then existing functionaries of the 
7gyptian government, and in the development of the Egyptian 
nationalist movement. 
(i) 
The new Constitution(2) furnished the sovereignty and 
independence of the country, declaring it to be a hereditary 
monarchy with a representative government.(3) The nation was the 
source of all powers.(4) The legislature was composed of the 
King, together with the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. (5) 
The King nominated two -fifths of the Senators, and the remaining 
three -fifths were elected by universal suffrage.(6) Each elected 
senator represented 180,000. inhabitants or thereby.( ) Special 
qualifications of prominence or property were required in senators, 
whether elected or nominated. ( 8) The mandate of senators was ten 
years.(9) The Chamber of Deputies was composed of members elected 
on the basis of universal suffrage, and each deputy represented a 
constituency of 60,000 inhabitants or thereby.(10) Although the 
Chamber of Deputies was designed to last for five years, the King 
had the right to dissolve it,(11 ) and to adjourn sittings of 
(1) OtRourk ,V.A.: The uristic status of Egypt and the Sudan, 
pp.65 -6a; "he Sudan", pp.667 -6 8. 
(2) French text in Davis, H.M.: Constitutions electoral laws, 
treaties. of States in the Near and Middle East; An English 
translation from the French text in Peaslee, A.J.: Constitutions 
of Nations, Vol.', A translation from the Arabic text, see 
Appendix I. 
1923 Constitution, Art. 1. (4) Ibid, Art. 23. 
(5) Ibid, Art. 24. (6) Ibid, Art. 74. 
(7) Ibid, Arts. 75 and 76. (8) Ibid, Art. 78. 
(9) Ibid, Art. 79. (10) Ibid, Arts. 82, 83 and 84. 
(11) Ibid, Art. 86 and 38. 
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Parliament for not more than one month without the consent of the 
two Chambers.(1) 
The executive power was vested in an hereditary King(2) who 
exercised his authority through the ministers.(3) He appointed and 
dismissed the Cabinet. The Council of Ministers was conjointly 
responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for the general policy of 
the government; and the ministers were individually responsible for 
the acts of their respective departments.(5) Ministers had free 
access to both Houses of Parliament and were heard if they so 
requested, but did not have votes unless they were members. (6 ) 
The judicial power was exercised by courts; and sentences 
were passed and executed in the name of the King.(7) Judges were 
independent and could not be interfered with in the dispensation of 
justice by any authority of the government.($) 
Moreover, the Constitution stated that all Egyptians were equal 
before the law,(9) and were protected against expulsion from Egyptian 
territory, having freedom to move and stay wherever they liked.(10) 
They were guaranteed the right to form associations, to petition 
public authorities, and to assemble peacefully.(11) Elementary 
education was obligatory for young Egyptians of both sexes and was 
(1) Ibid, Art. 39. 
(3) Ibid, Arts. 4$ and 60. 
(5) Ibid, Art. 61. 
(7) Ibid, Arts. 30 and 31. 
(9) Ibid, Art. 3. 
(11) Ibid, Arts. 21, 22 and 20. 
(2) Ibid, Arts. 29 and 32. 
(4) Ibid, Art. 49. 
(6) Ibid, Art. 63. 
(8) Ibid, Art. 124. 
(10) Ibid, Art. 7. 
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free in public schools.(1) There were general guarantees of 
individual liberty, nobody could be arrested or punished except 
by legal process.(2) The inviolability of homes and property was 
safeguarded with the prohibition of punishment by wholesale 
confiscation of property.(3) The Constitution stipulated for the 
secrecy of letters, telegrams and telephone communicetions.(4) 
It guaranteed the freedom of religion, of opinion and of the Press 
within the limits of law.(5) It established Islam as the religion 
of the State and Arabic as the official la.nguage.(6) 
Although this Constitution seems to be liberal, especially in 
recognizing that the sovereign power originated in the people them- 
selves, and stipulating for the different rights of individuals,(7) 
its defects were mainly the extensive powers conferred upon the 
executive, and especially the King, and the looseness with which 
the private rights of individuals were defined.($) 
The Wafdists, whose leaders were released in Larch 1922, return- 
ed to agitate against the Declaration of February 1922 maintaining 
that it was "the worst calamity which Egypt had ever suffered, that 
it was a deceit covering a Protectorate, and that it was a fraud 
unacceptable to any Egyptian."(9) In the same manner they bitterly 
attacked the politicians who had accepted the Declaration. They 
(1) Ibid, Art. 19. (2) Ibid, Arts. 4 and 6. 
(3) Ibid, Arts. $,9 and 10. (4) Ibid, Art. 11. 
(5) Ibid, Arts. 12,13,14 and 15. (6) Ibid, Art. 149. 
(7) Al- 'Aggrd: op.cit. p.420; Ghurbrl: op.cit. Vol0I, p.116; 
Peaslee: op.cit.. Vol.I, pp.6 -7; Ghosh: op.cit. p.89; Laoust, 1.H.: 
L'évolution politieue et culturelle de 1'Egrpte contemporaine, 
p.76; cf.. 0,Rourke:op.cit. pue. 
(£3) Ibid, p.71; Landau: op.cit. p.109. 
(9) Newman: op.cit. p.281. 
condemned the Constitution because it was not framed by a con- 
stituent representative assembly, as they had been demanding. But 
when they took part in the general elections, which were held in 
January 1924, and in which they obtained an overwhelming majority 
over the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the National Party, 
and when, according to parliamentary traditions, the King charged 
Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the Wafd, to form the Cabinet, they 
changed their tone and stopped their agitation against the 
Constitution. 
(1) 
The success of the Wafd in the first general elections became 
the basis of its insistance on the Constitution; and on the other 
hand the cause of the continued. cries of the opponents of the Wafd 
against the very same Constitution which they had framed. It is 
worth noticing, that, till the convocation of Parliament in the 
first session, the Wafd had. been acting as a popular organisation 
in the name of the people. It was only the requirements of par- 
liamentary discipline and life, especially when opposition to 
Zaghlul and his Cabinet appeared from amongst the Wafdist members 
of Parliament, that necessitated the formation of the 
(2) 
"Parliamentary Wafd Party" (Al- Hai'ah Al- Wafdiyah Al- Barlamaniyah). 
The Government and Parliament attained a spirit of independence, 
(1) Landau: op.cit. pp.l13 -115; Elgood: Egypt, pp.119 -121; 
Kohn, H.: Nationalism and imperialism in the hither East, 
pp.$2 -$3. cf.f Dutcher: op.cit. p.45. 
(2) Kohn: op.cit. pp. &2 -83 ; Shafiq : Hawliyát, Vol.l, pp.14.3 -154.; 
Colombe, N.: L'évolution de l'EgypteA 1924 - 19522 
pp.9 -12. 
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confidence and energy which was applauded and encouraged by all 
the nation. (l) But, a few days after the inauguration of the 
second ordinary session of Parliament, Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar 
(Chief) of the Egyptian Army and the Governor General of the Sudan 
was assassinated in Cairo on November 19 -21, 1924.(2) Profiting 
by that assassination, Great Britain, which had been watching with 
anxiety the development of the new parliamentary system in Egypt 
and the Egyptian interpretation of the Declaration of 1922 which 
raised the national spirit to the extent of ignoring the occupying 
army, addressed an ultimatum to the Egyptian Cabinet accusing the 
policy of the Government and Parliament of being the indirect, if 
not the direct, cause of that assault. Britain demanded an ample 
apology, punishment of the assailants, suppression of popular 
demonstration, an indemnity of half a million pounds sterling, the 
Withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison from the Sudan within twenty - 
four hours, the acceptance of increasing the irrigated area in the 
Gizera from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure and the recognitio 
(3) 
of Britain's exclusive right to protect foreign interests in Egypt. 
(1) Landau: op.cit. pp.120 -122; Cburbál: op.cit. Vol.I,pp.133 
et seq; «wad: op.cit. p.139; Arminjon, p. : L'experience 
constitutionelle et parlementaire de l' Egvpte, pp. 9 -12. 
(2) He was shot on November 19, and died on the 21st. 
(3) Landau: op.cit. p.119; Newman: op.cit. pp.245 -247; Howell: 
op.cit. pp.211 et seq; Centre d'Étude de politique Etrangere; 
op.cit. pp.51 -54; riou -Cho: op.cit. pp.136 -139; Awad: op.cit. 
pp. 141 -147; Arininjon: op.cit. pp.12 -14; Ghurbäl: op.cit. 
Vol.I, pp.155 -15$; Elgood: The transit of Egypt, pp.294 -297; 
Newman: Great Britain inEgvpt, pp.245 -246; Kimche, J.: 
Seven fallen pillars, pp.30 -32; Shah, S.T.A.: Fuad, King of 
Egypt, pp.193 -197; Sabry, .S.: Le pouvoir législatif et le 
pouvoir exécutif en Evpte, pp.273 -276; The Economist, 
Vol. XCIX, No. 4239, p.804. 
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It is said that the assassination of Sir Lee Stack gave the 
British authorities the opportunity, they had been seeking since 
the breakdown of the Zaghlul - IacDonald's negotiations in October 
1924, to embarrass the dafdist Cabinet. 
(1) 
Therefore, when the 
Egyptian Government showed firmness in facing the situation and 
reluctance in accepting the ultimatum, Britain occupied Alexandria 
Customs House. In consequence, the bdafdist Cabinet resigned and 
an extra-parliamentary one presided over by Ahmed Ziwar Pasha was 
nominated. Contrary to the nation's will expressed by its rep- 
resentatives, the new Cabinet accepted the British demands. 
(2) 
Feeling unable to face the representatives of the people, the 
Cabinet adjourned Parliament, and soon afterwards the Chamber of 
Deputies was dissolved. Violations against the Constitution were 
committed. Deputies and Senators were arrested, in spite of the 
parliamentary immunities they enjoyed even during the adjournment 
of Parliament. Private liberties recognised by the Constitution, 
were practically suspended. Public meetings were prohibited and 
all public manifestations in favour of the dafd were severely 
repressed. 
The decree dissolving the Chamber of Deputies stipulated for 
(1) Quri55.l: op.cit. Vol.I, pp.153-155; Colombe: op.cit. pp.21-22; 
Cf. The Economist, Vol. CII, IvTo.431$, p.1033. 
(2) Lloyd: op.cit. Vol.1I, pp.94-10$; Young: op.cit. p.277; 
Colombe: op.cit. p.23; Sabry: op.cit. pp.276 et seq; Ghosh: 
op.cit. p.91; Zurbál: op.cit. Vol.1, pp.l58-159; Haykal, L.H. 
Mudhákkarát fi's-S1yásati 1-Llisriyah, Vol.I, pp.211-216; 
réghéñ, . F'n. . Säad Zaihlül, pp.97-101 
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new elections to be held on March 12, 1925. In order to keep 
better control on the elections, the government re- established the 
indirect electoral system which had been replaced by direct man- 
hood suffrage by the dissolved Parliament. In spite of all 
these measures, the election results gave a strong majority to the 
Wafd over other political parties. This majority was obscure 
before the convocation of Parliament, but it clearly appeared when 
Zaghlul was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies with a 
majority of 123 votes against the Government's candidate, Sarwat 
Pasha, who obtained $5 votes. Seeing the march of events to that 
conclusion, the Prime Minister tendered his resignation to the 
King who did not accept it and, instead, dissolved the Chamber 
of Deputies which did not last more than a few hours. 
Suddenly in January 1925, a new political party under the 
name of the Unionist Party (Hizbu.'1 Ittihad) appeared. It is 
no wonder that its main aim was to increase and protect the 
influence of the Palace because it was established through the 
encouragement of the Vice -Chief of the Royal Cabinet, Hassan 
Nashaat Pasha. This party was intended to be an instrument used 
by the Palace to keep the balance among political parties, and to 
check the Wafd, which was dominating the political situation by 
(1) 
(1) Kohn: op.cit. pp.90 -91; Elgood: op.cit. pp.29$ -299; Newman: 
op.cit. p.247; Shah: op.cit. p.199; Yeghen,: op.cit. p.140; 
Arminjon: op. cit. pp.14-15; Centre d'Étude de Politique 
Etrangere: op. cit. p. 55; Ghurb &1: op. cit. Vol.I, pp.164 -166; 
Elgood: Egypt, p.121; Newman: The Mediterranean and its roblems, 
p.291; "Egypt ", A Kingdom ", p.490; -c . Haykal: op.cit. Vo 
PP.225. -22 
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the popular support it enjoyed and the majority it had had in 
Parliament. In order to gain adherents, the Unionist Party accused 
the Wafd of being on hostile relations with the Crown, and claimed 
that its own object was to assure the people's allegiance to the 
King. 
The Unionist Party brought nothing new to the political stage 
except its frank support of the King to such an extent that its 
members were known as the "King's Friends" because of their 
efforts to make the Palace, first powerful, and then predominant, 
in politics. The party backed Ziwar's Cabinet and, along with 
reactionary elements enabled it to give a chance to the Palace to 
suspend parliamentary institutions. It continued to be of some 
influence in political life as long as it derived power and 
authority from the Palace. When that support and encouragement 
stopped, especially after Nashaat Pasha was transferred to a 
diplomatic post in Madrid, under the influence and intervention 
of Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner, the Unionists ceased 
to be of any significance in politics. This could be clearly 
observed from the results of the élections held in 1926.1) 
Although May 23, 1925 Was fixed for new elections to be held, 
(1) Elgood: op. cit. p.121; Kohn: op. cit. p.$2; Lloyd: op. cit. 
Vol. II, pp.111 -113; Young: op. cit. p.279; Yeghen: op. cit. 
p.139; Colombe: op. cit. p.24; Centre d'etude de Politique 
Etrangere: op. cit. .55; Haykal: ope cit. Vol.', pp223 -224 
& 226 -227; A'r -Ráfi' i' , A.R.: Fi A gqabi' th - thawiati l- 
Misriyah, Vol.I$ p.212; Shah: op. cit. p.269; Elgood: 
The transit of gypt, pp.299 -300; Newman: Great Britain in 
Egypt, p.249; "Egypt, the background of Negotiations", p. 69; 
The Times 10.1.1925. 
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these elections never took place and the Cabinet along with the 
Palace continued to govern the country after a dictatorial fashionl) 
Continuous violations against the Constitution brought about a 
general reconciliation of all other parties, which then stood to- 
gether in opposition to the Unionist Party and Ziwar Pasha. The 
Liberal Constitutionalist ceased to support the Cabinet and joined 
the .' afd and the ì ational Party in their struggle for the restor- 
ation of constitutional life and the convocation of Parliament. 
(2) 
While the Government professed to pay no attention to the 
opposition, members of the dissolved Chamber of Deputies and the 
suppressed Senate decided to meet to consider the political 
situation. Because of the impossibility of meeting in the usual 
official building defined in the Constitution, members of the two 
houses met separately in the Continental Hotel in Cairo, and took 
(1) Kohn: op.cit. pp.90 -93; Colombe: op.cit. pp.24 -26; Sabry: 
op.cit. pp.320 et seq. 
(2) It was the incident of uÁl_Islamu Wa "Usizlu) l- Hukmtt, a book 
written by Aly Abdel Paziq, a judge in the liahákim Shardivah, 
which did not meet with the ambitions of King Fuad that led 
to narrowing the gap between the Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party and other parties. In the book the author expressed 
the view that Liohamedan law was intended solely to regulate 
individual life and personal conduct not social life or state 
legislation; and therefore the Caliphate have never been an 
essential part of Islam. The author was condemned by the 
Council of Al -Azhar University, but the ïhhinister of Justice 
Abdel Aziz Pasha Fahmy, who was the leader of the Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party, was reluctant to take any action 
against him, and therefore he was dismissed. In unity with 
their leader, the Liberal Constitutionalist :Ministers resigned, 
and that brought the coalition of the Liberal Constitutionalist 
and the Unionist parties to an end. Haykal: op.cit. Vol.I, 
pp.231-240; Ghurbál: op.cit. Vol.', p.167; Kohn: op.cit. p.91; 
Colombe: op.cit. p.26; Centre dtEtude de Politique Etrangere: 
op.cit. p.57; Kohn, H.: A History of Nationalism in the East, 
p.218. 
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an oath to safeguard the Constitution at any price. Although 
this courageous gesture made by those popularly regarded as being 
the representatives of the nation weakened the authority of 
Ziwar's Cabinet, it did not lead to its resignation, which took 
place only after the intervention of British authorities in favour 
of restoring parliamentary life. (1) 
The new elections, which were held in May 1926, gave the Wafd 
the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Although it is 
the natural right of the leader of the parliamentary majority to be 
the Prime Minister, Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the Wafd, did not 
become Premier in 1926 because of British intervention and his 
declining health. Therefore, a coalition Cabinet under the 
presidency of Adly Pasha Yakan, a distinguished member of the 
Liberal Constitutionalist Party, was formed.(2) Here it should be 
noticed that at that time "the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and 
the Wafd agree(d) in standing for constitutionalism as against court 
influence in the internal politics of Egypt, and they also 
virtually agree(d), as against Great Britain, in their formulation 
of the Egyptian national claims." (3 ) 
From May 1926, for about two years, the parliamentary system was, 
(1) Youssef: op.cit. pp. 145 et seq.; Lloyd: op.cit. Vol. II, 
pp. 326 -327; Shah: op.cit. pp. 202 -203; Yeghen: op.cit. 
pp. 144 -145; Haykal: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 243 -261; Ghurbal: 
op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 167 -168; Elgood: Egypt, p. 121; The Times 
9.12.1925. 
(2) Ghosh: op.cit. pp.91 -93; Elgood: The transit of Egypt, pp. 302- 
303; Marshall J.E.: "The solution of the Egyptian problem," 
p. 255; Colombe: op.cit. pp.26 -30; Ghurbál: op.cit. Vol.I, 
p. 168; The Economist, Vol. CIV, No. 4365, p. 845; cf. R.I. 
I .A.: Great Britain and Egypt 1911L -1936, pp. 20 et seq.; 
Shah: op.cit. pp. 204 -209; Arminjon: op.cit. p. 17. 
(3) The Economist, Vol. CII, No. 4319, p.1080. 
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in general, functioning normally. The country found in its working 
the peace and order which were badly needed, especially after 
passing through the first constitutional crisis carried out 
by Ziwar Pasha; but in the summer of 1928 a second crisis arose. 
During 1927, negotiations took place between Sir Austin Chamberlain, 
the British Foreign Secretary, and Sarwat Pasha, the Egyptian 
Prime Minister who succeeded Adly Pasha in 1927, in order to find 
a settlement for Anglo- Egyptian relations. These negotiations 
resulted in a draft treaty which was considered unsatisfactory by 
the Egyptian Parliament dominated by the Wafd. 
(1) 
In consequence of the rejection of the draft treaty by 
Parliament, Sarwat Pasha resigned, and Nahas Pasha, Zaghlults 
successor to the leadership of the Wafd,(2) formed a coalition 
Cabinet of Wafdists and Liberal Constitutionalists. The presence 
of the leader of the Wafd at the head of the Cabinet indicated the 
dominance of the Wafdist policy which was considered by Britain 
to be endangering British interests in Egypt. It revived British 
anxiety and induced Britain to intervene in Egypt's internal 
politics. Britain demanded from the Egyptian Government 
disregard of that legislation regulating public meetings and 
demonstrations which Parliament was then discussing, claiming that 
it endangered foreign interests and lives. When the Government 
(1) Cmd. 3050, Papers regarding negotiations for a treaty of 
alliance with Egypt; Colombe, op.cit. pp.34 -35. 
(2) Zaghlul died on August 23, 1927. 
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refused that demand, an ultimatum was addressed to them, to with - 
draw that Bill within seventy -two hours, and, in the meantime, 
some units of the British Fleet proceeded from Malta for Alexandria. 
Faced with this situation, the Government bowed in defeat; and 
some weeks later the Liberal Constitutionalist ministers resigned 
all of a sudden. In spite of the majority the Wafd had in the 
Chamber of Deputies, even after the breakdown of the coalition 
with the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, the rupture of that 
coalition was the direct reason for the dismissal of Nahas Pasha 
in June 1928.(1) 
This was how the second constitutional crisis arose. :While 
the first crisis appeared in consequence of the dissolution of the 
Chamber of Deputies, the second began when the Cabinet was dis- 
missed by the King. The right of the Head of State to dismiss 
the Cabinet is recognised in most parliamentary governments, but 
its practide is restricted. The electorate decides, and the 
sovereign judges the suitable situation according to the results of ti 
(1) Cmd. 3097, Papers respecting the proposed Egyptian law 
regulating public meetings. Cf. The Economist, Vol.CVI, 
No.4419, p.911; it considers that British intervention an 
attempt to embarrass the 'Wafd, who was in power, because 
of his opposition to and rejection of the draft treaty 
reached to by Sarwat Pasha. This opinion was expressed 
by Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd in one of his public 
orations, Cited in Howell: op.cit, pp.34 -344-. Cf. Ghurbál: 
op.cit. Vol.I, pp.193 -195; Haykal: op.cit. Vol.I, pp.2$6 -2$8; 
Colombe: op.cit. pp.35 -3d; Sabry: op.cit. pp.366 -3b9; 
Arminjón: op.cit. p.21; Centre d'Etude de politique 
Etrangere: op.cit. p.61; Ghosh: op.cit. p.94; R.I.I.A.: 
Memorandum on the Anglo- Egyptian relations from 1914 to the 
present day, p.10; Kohn: Nationalism and imperialism in the 
Hither East, p.101; "Egypt, A Kingdom", p.495. 
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general elections and the will of the nation. The King shall not 
dismiss a Cabinet enjoying the confidence of the majority of the 
members of Parliament elected in accordance with the national will. 
The dismissal of a Cabinet in such a case is nothing but a prelude 
to the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. It is evident that 
not only did the majority of members of Parliament support Nahas and 
his Cabinet, but that the majority of the people also had confidence 
in them. Therefore, the dismissal of the Cabinet was contradictory 
to the parliamentary system and was a revolution from above.(1) 
The new Prime,_inister, Mohamed ilahmud Pasha, the leader of 
the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, did not try to hide his plans. 
He started by adjourning the sittings of Parliament for a month. 
Not long afterwards, he dissolved both Houses of Parliament and 
postponed the elections of Deputies and Senators for a period of 
three years, subject to prolongation, and declared: "I shall not be 
a tyrant, but if necessary I shall be a dictator, a benevolent 
di ctat or." (2 
) 
During the suspension of parliamentary life, it was 
for the King to maintain legislative power and promulgate decrees 
having the effect of laws. Realising that he was not backed by 
the people, and wishing to continue in office, Mahmud Pasha used 
dictatorial powers to suppress any movement against his Cabinet, 
and he was often called the "Iron Hand". This dictatorship of the 
Cabinet which the Prime minister had estimated to last for three 
years at least, did not actually extend beyond seventeen months. 
(1) Kohn: op.cit. pp.103 -104 
(2) The Observer, 22.7.1928 
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The end of the second constitutional crisis came when Britain 
insisted that the draft treaty in which the Mahmud- Henderson 
negotiations resulted should be approved by the Egyptian peoplefs 
representatives. Therefore, under British pressure there was 
no escape from elections for a new Parliament being held.(1) 
It might not be without interest to consider here the motives 
behind the second constitutional crisis and the establishment of a 
dictatorial government. In fact, "it is only reasonable and 
logical that a crisis of such a magnitude could not possibly spring 
up in a single day. It has to be preceded by a series of 
incidents with many grave undercurrents ".(2) There are quite a few 
opinions about these undercurrents. First of all, it is said 
that the dismissal of the Cabinet came as a result of British 
manoeuvering to get rid of Nahas and the Wafd who, following a 
policy hostile to Britain, had caused the breakdown of Sarwat - 
Chamberlain draft treaty. 
(3) 
A gain it is said that the crisis 
emerged because the King was not very much in favour of a par- 
liamentary system of government in Egypt, especially with a Wafdist 
Parliament, and with, in particular, Nahas Pasha at the head of the 
(1) Hocking: op. cit. p.148; Youssef: op. cit. p.179; Saleh: 
op. cit. pp.265 -270; Sabry: op. cit. pp.370 -379; Arminjon: 
op. cit. pp.25 -26; Centre d'Etud.e de Politique Etrangère: 
op. cit. pp.62 -63; Cmd. 3376, Exchange of notes to proposals 
for an Anglo -Egyptian settlement; The Economist, Vol, CIX, 
No, 4493, p.604. 
(2) From a speech by Nahas Pasha, cited in Howell: op. cit. p.336. 
(3) Sabry: op. cit. p.369; Saleh: op. cit. pp.245 -246. 
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government. Earlier hostility between the Wafd and the King was 
revived when the anti- Wafdist Press published what purported to 
be a contract signed by Nahas Pasha and two fellow members of the 
Wafd, with the relatives of Prince Seif El Did - a member of the 
Royal family who, thirty years before, had made a murderous 
attack on the King (then Prince ruad).(1) A third line of thought 
tends to believe that the crisis arose as a result of the 
competition and ambitions of different political parties.(2) 
These views should be considered carefully; most of the 
advocates of the first and third opinions were Egyptians, while 
those of the second were Europeans. It seems obvious that the 
Egyptians were trying to avoid placing any responsibilities on 
the King and the Palace for that constitutional crisis and a group 
of them were blaming Britain, while the other put the blame on 
political parties and organisations. As regards the Europeans, 
who were not meddled in the internal political life of Egypt, 
they were putting all the blame for the emergence of this crisis 
on the King. Actually, this crisis seems to have been the out- 
come of all these complicated factors. 
(3 ) 
(1) Kohn: op.cit. pp. 101 -102, Lloyd: op.cit. Vol. II, p. 274, 
The Economist, Vol. CVI, No. 4427, p.1328 and Vol. CVII, No. 
4431, p. 173; cf. Arminjon: op.cit. p. 23; Hocking: op.cit. 
p. 147. 
(2) Ghurbál: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 197 -199; Youssef: op.cit. p. 159. 
(3) Such a view was expressed by Nahas Pasha in a letter to Dr. 
J.H. Howell American Minister Pelipotencier to Egypt at that 
time, cited in Howell: op.cit. pp.333 -335; cf. Centre 
d'Etude de Politique Etrangere: op.cit. pp.5$ -31. 
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A general election was held in December 1929 under the auspices 
of a neutral ministry presided over by Adly Pasha Yakan. This 
resulted in a powerful Wafdist majority, and Nahas Pasha, who had 
been dismissed in 192$, was called to form a Cabinet. That was 
the third time that a Wafdist Cabinet had assumed power; and like 
other Premiers, Nahas Pasha left for London to negotiate with the 
British authorities a solution for Anglo- Egyptian relations. Although 
the negotiations were not successful and the Egyptian delegation 
returned to Egypt declaring that Egypt had "lost the treaty but 
gained the friendship of Britain ", they resulted in a draft treaty 
which later became the basis of further negotiations in 1936. Not 
very long after the return of the delegation to Egypt, friction 
between the Palace and the Cabinet appeared when the Wafd, to prevent 
any recurrence of the Palace interference in politics, submitted 
to the King two bills designed to prevent infringement of the Con- 
stitution. Nahas Pasha did not wait for his dismissal but resigned. 
It was alleged that the internal economic situation and the world 
depression which prevailed in the late twenties was one of the 
factors leading to Nahas' decision.(1) 
(1) Cmd. 3575, Papers regarding the recent negotiations for an 
Anglo- Egyptian settlement, March 31 - hay 8, 1931; Newman :. 
"Egypt ", p.570; Mellor, A.R.I.: "The Egyptian Riddle", 
pp.427 et seq; "Egypt: The Background of NeFfotiations', 
pp.272 -273; The Economist, Vol.CX, No.4530, p.1378; 
Ghosh: op.cit. p.106; Hocking: op.cit. p.151; Amad: op.cit. 
p.105; Centre d'Etude de Politique Etrangere: op.cit. pp. 
63 -64; Ghurbál:op.cit. Vol.', p.246. 
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A new Cabinet, presided over by Ismail Sidky Pasha, who was 
reputedly in strong disagreement with the Wafd, was nominated. 
Following the customary procedure, the Chamber of Deputies was 
dissolved and constitutional guarantees were suspended. In order 
to destroy the afd's popularity, the Cabinet simply abrogated the 
1923 Constitution and King Fuad promulgated a new one on October 22, 
1930, which has been known as Sidky's Constitution. The importance 
of that incident is that it confirms the belief that the Constitution 
was a gift from the King, who had the competency and ability to 
abrogate one constitution and promulgate another by Royal Rescriptstl) 
In spite of the fact that the Government in its note about the 
new constitution stated that "the Parliamentary system is not the 
only form of a constitutional representative government and that 
there are some other forms, which, like the Parliamentary system,aim 
at maintaining equilibrium among different authorities, "(2) the new 
Constitution did not dispense with the Parliamentary system 
introduced in Egypt by the 1923 Constitution. A characteristic 
feature would, however, be noticed in the new Constitution; it 
reinforced the executive power and augmented the King's privileges 
at the expense of the rights of the peopleis representatives. In 
other words, the predominance of the executive replaced that of 
Parliament. 
That reinforcement was manifested as follows: the King was 
to nominate the majority of Senators (three- fifths);(3) the 
(1) Air - Ráfi *i: op.cit. Vol.II, pp. 133 -134; O'Rourke, V.A.: 
'The British_osition in Egypt'; p. 6R9; R.I.I.A.: Great 
Britain and Egypt, 1914 -1936; pp. 38-41. 
(2) A'd -Dustúr 1 -Misri wa Qdnúnu'l- Intikháb, October, 1930, p.21. 
(3) 1930 Constitution, Art. 75. 
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parliamentary session was to last for five months and could be 
closed whether the Budget had been approved or not;(1) the King's 
right to veto was extended;(2) the right to initiate financial 
legislation became an absolute right of the King;(3) the executive 
adopted the right to enact legislation and open new credits during 
the parliamentary vacation;(4) the political responsibility of 
ministers to the Chamber of Deputies was restricted, and conditions 
under which a vote of confidence could be carried were limited.(5) 
Along with this reactionary Constitution, a reactionary electoral 
law was promulgated. It stipulated for indirect elections, raised 
the age for the franchise and restricted the suffrage. 
Demonstrations in protest against that "coup d'etat" and the 
abrogation of the 1923 Constitution occurred; but the Government 
which had expected and was prepared for such actions, immediately 
crushed them, using the force of the Police and the Army. Protests 
from the L afd, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the National 
Party against Sidky's Constitution were manifested, and the first 
two organisations decided not to participate in the elections, 
which were to be held under the new Constitution and according to 
the new electoral law. This might have been one of the factors 
leading to the appearance of a new political party under the 
leadership of the Prime Minister.(6) 
The main purpose of that new party which was called the 
(1) Ibid. Art. 91 (2) Ibid. Arts. 35 & 36 
(3) Ibid. Art. 28. (4) Ibid. Arts. 41 & 132 
(5) Ibid. Arts. 65 & 66; Cf. Centre d';tude de politique Etrangere : 
op.cit. p. 64; For a detailed study of that reinforcement of the 
executive power see. Raafat, W.: La crise du régime parlimentaire 
et le renforcement de l'exécutif,:,,, 1923 -1933, pp. 18 et seq.; 
i. ïerton: op.cit. p. 36. 
(6) A'r Ráfi'i: op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 138 -142. 
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People's Party (Hizbu)l- Sha'b) was to make propaganda for Sidky's 
Constitution and to defend the material and economic interests of 
its members, who were mainly of the aristocracy. The spirit 
and the programme of the new party were very similar to those of 
the Unionist Party. In addition to the demands for the complete 
independence of Egypt, the abolition of the Capitulations, and 
the settlement of Anglo- Egyptian relations by a treaty with 
Great Britain, the programme of the Party stated that the party's 
aim was to safeguard the rights of the Throne.(1) 
Sidky Pasha used every means to weaken all other political 
groups and gain popularity and strength for his party. He 
proscribed anti -People's Party meetings, confiscated manifestoes 
and suspended newspapers that dared to publish them. He "had 
the armed forces of the Crown at his back and he used them 
remorselessly. t' 
(2) 
The People's Party was in full power while 
its leader was in office and while the Palace approved the policy 
of Sidky Pasha; but when the latter came to disagree with the 
Palace and resigned, the Party lost the ground on which it was 
standing. Although the party's name was the "People's Party," it 
never gained the sympathy of the people, and its dictatorial 
policy deserved and had the resistance of different groups of the 
nation, even of people such as Ziwar Pasha and ` dahmud Pasha, who 
(1) Centre d'Etude de Politique Etrangére: op.cit. p. 65; 
R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p;66; The Manchester Guardian, 19.11.1930. 
(2) Elgood: E'' ypt, p. 127. 
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R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p;66; The Manchester Guardian, 19.11.1930. 
(2) Elgood: Egypt, p. 127. 
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had practised other kinds of dictatorship.(l) 
The struggle against Sidky's Constitution continued and 
resulted in its abrogation in November 1931. It is difficult 
to find a convincing reason for the abrogation of Sidky's 
Constitution, but once one remembers that its creation was in 
accordance with an agreement between the British authorities, - 
who were very anxious to reach a settlement and conclude a 
treaty with 7gypt - and the Palace, - which was aiming at an 
autocratic rule -, one can realise that the influence of Britain 
was behind its abrogation. Furthermore, the anxiety about 
King Fuad's health was another factor.(2) 
The Royal Rescript which abolished the 1930 Constitution 
did. not furnish the principles of the system which would replace it, 
except to state that they would be under consideration, and it 
established a personal government of the King. Pending the 
application of a new Constitutional system, all the functions 
of Parliament were centred in the King in addition to those of 
the executive power. He was to exercise these prerogatives 
through the intermediary of the Council of Ministers and the 
Ministers. 
(3) 
(1) Ar-Rá.fi°`I: op. cit. Vol. II, pp.179-181; Haykal: op. cit. 
Vol.I, pp.324 et seq.; Hocking: op. cit. p.59. 
(2) A'r-Ráfi"i: op. cit. Vol.II, pp.191-193; Haykal: op. cit. 
Vo1.Ii pp.313 & 364-369; Colombe: op. cit. pp.42-43; cf. 
Ghurbal: op. cit. Vol.I, p.264; Mellor: op. cit. p.427; 
Kelly, D.: The ruling few, pp.223-224 
(3) Royal Rescript No. 67 of 1G34, quoted by A'r-Räfi`T: op. cit. 
Vo1.II, pp.193-194. 
"In the present phase of historical evolution in the cast ", 
Professor Hans Kohn said, ''Parliament has the same emotional value 
as in 7urope a hundred years ago. Parliament is the great hope 
for the consolidation and free development of the awakening 
popular forces. It not only means liberation from ancient 
despotsim and feudalism, but it stands too, as the symbol of 
emancipation from petrified tradition and centuries of corruption. 
It embodies a new confidence of the nation in itself. "(l) This 
seems to have been the real motive for all movements and 
demonstrations which demanded the restoration of the country's 
constitution and the maintenance of its freedom and independence. 
It is worth remarking that students took an active part in these 
movements until the revival of the 1923 Constitution. 
Political parties in existence at that time - the Wafd,the 
Liberal Constitutionalist, the National, the Unionist and the 
People's - along with the Independents, formed a National Front 
to achieve the restoration of the 1923 Constitution and a settlement 
with Great Britain on the basis of the Nahas - Henderson negotiations 
in 1930.(2) The tendency of the Front to wish for a settlement 
with Britain, along with the dangers emanating from the Italian 
(I) Kohn: op. cit. p.113. 
(2) Letter from the National Front to King Fuad on December 12, 
1935, and another letter to the British High Commissioner 
on the same day; quoted by A'r- Räfi`r: op. cit. Vol.II, 
pp.204 -209. Cf. "cgypt: The Background of Negotiations ", 
p.276. 
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invasion of Abyssinia, induced Britain not to object to the 
revival of the 1923 Constitution.(1) Since December 12, 1935, 
when. a Royal Rescript re- established the 1923 Constitution, it 
had been in existence until it was abrogated oh December 10, 
1952 by the Government'of the Revolution which had started in 
July 1952 and had forced the King to abdicate.(2) 
In 1936, before the general - elections under the restored 
constitution were held, a delegation to negotiate with Britain 
was formed from representatives of all parties of the National 
Front, except the National Party. Again the Mediterranean 
crisis created by the Italian invasion of Abyssinia helped the 
delegation to reach an agreement with Britain and a treaty of 
alliance between the two was concluded on August 26, 
1936. 
(3) 
This treaty regulated Anglo- y,gyptian relations till 
it was abrogated in October 1951, by the same Tgyptian political 
party, i.e. the Wafd, which had played the main róle in its 
conclusion. 
(1) U. Amad: op. cit. pp.105 -107. 
(2) The text of the proclamation of the abrogation of the 
Constitution: La Bourse rgyptienne, December 10, 1952. 
(3) Cmd. 5270 of 1936; OtRourke :op. cit. pp.69$ -700; Kelly: op. 
cit. pp.225 -229; Carr, r.H.: International relations since 
peace treaties, p.241; Newman: Great Britain and North East 
Africa, pp .35 -36; "Egypt: the Background of Negotiations ", 
pp. 274 -276 . 
C H A P T E R II 
Political Farties 
Political parties are older institutions than democracy, and 
are essential for the working of a parliamentary system of 
government.(1) Democracy is government by discussion, and the 
process of political discussion "begins originally with actions of 
political parties, which debate and formulate their programmes as 
the issue of electoral discussion, and then proceed to select and . 
propose their candidates as the exponents of those programmes. "(2) 
The function of a political party is, therefore, to enunciate 
policies and programmes, to organise the electorate and try to 
keep them, or at least a. majority of them, behind particular 
platforms and leaders, to be able to attain the majority in 
legislative bodies and to conduct the government of the country.(3) 
However, "where democracy exists, there parties are found. 
Political parties are devices for doing indirectly in democratic 
nations what is done directly in dictatorships. They control the 
approaches to public power and provide instrumentalities by means 
of which organised interests are able to carry out their programs. 
(1) Bryce, J.: Modern democracies, Vol.I, P.125; Vol.II, p.507; 
Barker, E.: Reflections on government, p. 88. 
(2) Ibid, p. 37. 
(3) Ibid, pp: 38 -40; Bryce: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 128; Finer, H.: 
The theory and practice of Modern government, Vol. I. p. 417; 
McIver, R.I.: The modern state, p. 3 96 ; Corry, J .A. : 
Democratic government and politics, pp. 128 and 132. 
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They serve to mobilize individuals and to determine what persons 
shall wield public authority. "(1) 
A study of political parties in any country requires a 
review of the political history of that country. Political 
parties cannot be clearly understood unless seen in relation to 
their development in their environment. Their policies and 
platforms cannot be appreciated except in relation to the social 
and economic structure which reveals their sources of support. 
A study of political parties in Egypt will be carried out in the 
following pages. 
I. Major Political Parties. 
The Wafd. 
The origin of the Wafd, as has been indicated in the previous 
Chapter, coincides with the First World War. It appeared 
immediately after the armistice, demanding the country's 
independence and the people's freedom. It gained a popular 
representative character when the people, in 1918, gave it the 
mandate to represent them and speak on behalf of the nation to 
achieve the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan.(2) 
(1) Dimock, M.E.: Modern politics and administrations, p. 107. 
(2) Shafiq: Hawliyat, Vol. I, pp. 153 -154; Youssef: op.cit. 
p. 62; Al-= Aggäd: op.cit. p. 195; Ransome: op.cit. The 
iiianchester Guardian, March 30, 1925; see supra Chapter I, 
pp.22 -31 
6 8 . 
The mandatory document was first intended to be signed by 
the members of the Legislative Assembly, but as popular and 
national feelings were aroused by the march of events, copies were 
.circulated throughout the country to be signed by the populace. 
Although the movement for collecting the people's signatures was 
opposed by the authorities, great numbers were obtained approving 
the delegation of certain personalities, with Saad Zaghlul at 
their head, and giving them the competency to accept whomsoever 
they chose to join with themselves in the struggle by peaceful 
and legal means to achieve the complete independence of Egypt.(1) 
This seems to be quite convincin,; evidence that the Wafd at 
the time of its formation was a sort of a national front composed 
of different types of people and of representatives of various 
interests. It was supported by all the nation without regard to 
differences in age, sex, religion and social status.(2) Ioreover, 
a glance at the names of those who composed the first `afd 
confirms that it was representing the various elements in Egypt, 
(1) It is important to nOtice that 'The complete independence of 
Egypt's meant that of the Sudan also, and the union of both 
countries. A'r -Ráfi' i A.R.: Thawratu Snneti 1919, Vol.i, 
p. 77: Cf. Al- `Aggad: op.cit. p. 195; Symons, =I.T.: 
op.cit. p. 114. 
Youssef: op.cit. pp. 51 -52; Hocking: op.cit. p. 58; 
Young: op.cit. p. 231; Landau: op.cit. p. 283; Marshall: 
op.cit. pp. 237 -240; Saleh: op.cit. p. 186; Colombe: 
op.cit. p. 9; Centre d' Etude de Politique Etrangere : 
op.cit. p. 30. 
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(I) 
socially, economically and religiously. 
Again, this might have been the reason of the claims which the 
?lafd had been urging since its formation that it was the nation 
and its sole representative and that every other political party 
lacked a sound foundation in Egypt's political life.(2) This 
argument could be reinforced by the fact that most of the 
Egyptian political parties were dissentient Wafdist groups. This 
claim might have been true during the early thriving years of the 
dafd when it incorporated all the different political trends, 
even that of the extremist National Party whose members either 
agreed with the policy of the Wafd or adhered to it. 
(3) 
Since the 
breakaway from the Wafd in 1921 . of some members who came to be 
known as the Liberal Constitutionalists, this claim became mere 
hypocrisy. This opinion is based upon the fact that the Wafd, 
(i) These names were: Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the Vice- President of 
the Legislative Assembly; Aly Shaarawy Pasha, Mohamed Aly Bey; 
Abdul Latif El Mekkabbaty Bey, Senot Hanna Bey, Hamad El Basil 
Pasha, Hussein ' assif Pasha, iiichel Lutfalla Bey, members of 
the Legislative Assembly; Abdul Aziz Fahmy Bey member of. 
the Legislative Assembly and leader of the Bar 
, 
d'Ordre des Avocats) 
; 
i ohamed iilahmud Pasha, former Governor 
of a province (i, udir) ; Ahmed Lutff El Sayed Bey, former 
director of the National Library; Ismail Sidky Pasha, a 
former minister; Mahmud Abu El Masr Bey, former leader of 
the Bar; George Khayat Bey, a Coptic notable; Dr. Hafez 
Afifi Bey, a doctor of Cairo; and, Abdul Khaleq Madkour Pasha, 
member of the Legislative Assembly and President of the 
Chamber of Commerce. Symons: op.cit. p.114. 
(2) Shafiq: Hal v yTamhid, Vol.IIT, p.5$8. Cf. Kohn: 
op.cit. p.$2; Saleh: op.cit. p.274. 
(3) Youssef: op.cit. pp.62 -65. 
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in spite of its opposition to the Constitution, participated in 
the first general elections in 1924. This participation in itself 
constituted a challenge to other political parties which had found 
some response among the people and the electorate. Moreover, the 
formation of the Parliamentary Wald Party is sufficient evidence 
that the Uald was a political party and was not 'the nation', as 
had been alleged. In addition, it is very clear that in every 
general election held in Egypt under the parliamentary system 
established by the 1923 Constitution, opposition to the :afd had 
been found, although such opposition had varied according to 
circumstances. All this adds up to the fact that not all the 
people had given the Iafd their support and votes.(1) On these 
grounds, therefore, the ; ;afd ought to be considered a political 
party. 2) 
Largely responsible for the formation of the Wafd, the flare 
up of the nationalist movement in 1918, and the union of the whole 
Egyptian nation is Saad Zaghlul. He was of fellah origin, a man 
of great courage and tenacity.(3) The position of Zaghlul as a 
(1) For figures showing the stand of different parties in the 
nation, see Appendix II, Table No.17 P , eA -4 t 
(2) Cf. Colmbe: op.cit. pp. 116 -117, where he bases his 
arguments that the Wald is a political party on the fact that 
its structure which gave it, when first formed, the character 
of being a representative of the nation, had been changing by 
the continual splits from it. Cf. Symons: op.cit. p. 114. 
(3) See supra Chapter I, p.23 
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national hero and leader of the Wafd is given by Professor Hans 
Kohn as follows: "Both as a young and an old man he suffered 
persecution. .... Abroad he was the accredited representative of 
his people and at home a sacred symbol to the broad masses, 
embodying all the dim political consciousness of the peasantry 
and the political aim of the intelligentsia He stood as no 
other politician could, for years the unquestioned head of the 
people who trusted him to an extent perhaps unique in the modern 
history the world over. Instinctively the people recognised 
and loved in him their representative and hero. His name is 
associated not only with the rise and triumph of Egyptian 
nationalism, but also with that of the Egyptian middle class in 
their struggle against the land -owning nobility. "(1) 
From that, one can easily find some basis for the popularity 
of the Wafd among the people; but, nevertheless, the róle of the 
people in the nationalist movement and in their empowering of the 
Wafd should not be overlooked. If the Wafd was responsible for 
the flaring up of the 1919 Revolt, that Revolt was really a 
continuation of the movement of resistance against the British 
Occupation.(2) 
(1) Kohn: op.cit. p. 95. 
(2) Cf. Kohn: A history of n =ti o.nalism in the East, pp. 190 -192; 
Young: op.cit. p. 229. 
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It is clear that after Zaghlul,s death in August 1927, a new 
Vafdist policy was needed, but before filling the vacancy of the 
leadership of the party, the ' -'a.fd issued a manifesto declaring 
that "it would continue its efforts to obtain the true independence 
of Egypt and would follow the principles adopted by Zaghiul."(1) 
These principles, it should be noted, were to limit the absolutism 
of the temporal power and to liberate Egypt from the British.(2) 
The composition of the íIafd had varied since its inception. 
Temporary instability in the construction of the Wafd in the early 
years of its existence was due to the arrests and deportations of 
some of its members; and one of the main reasons of the success 
of the Wafd is that it faced these actions of the authorities with 
disciplined calm; but usually new leaders appeared to replace 
those who had been arrested. (3) On the other hand, continual 
disagreements among the'afd had been noticed, a phenomenon due to 
the fact that the Wafd at its formation comprised differing social 
classes and representatives of different, and it might be opposing, 
interests; and whenever differences appeared, splits in the Wafd 
occurred.(4) 
(1) Newman: Great Britain in Egypt, p. 265. 
(2) Colombe: op.cit. p. 10; Cf. The Times, and The Manchester 
Guardian, September 20, 1927. 
(3) Ransome: op.cit. The Manchester Guardian,March 30, 1925; 
A1- ̀ Aggád: op.cit. p. 251 et seq. 
(4) Colombe: op.cit. pp. 13 -14; Landau: op.cit. p. 283; Kohn: 
Nationalism and imperialism in the Hither Fast, pp. 82 -83. 
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Adherents to the Wafd were more or less a "petit bourgeois" 
type, a type which was the backbone of the 1919 Revolt. This does 
not deny that there were several other interested groups within its 
ranks. For instance, there was already a definite and strong 
landlordst element in the party, since a representative of that 
interested group managed to hold the office of its Secretary - 
General. 
(1) 
The existence of landlordism in the Lafd can be 
further proved by the attitude of the Wafdist dominated chamber 
of Deputies in 1951 when financial difficulties obliged the 
Government to present a Bill doubling the tax on the proprietors 
of land with retrospective affect for two previous years. This 
bill was bitterly opposed and rejected for no other reason than 
the instinctive tendency to safeguard the interests of landowners. 
However, after making the Bill a matter of personal confidence, 
the minister of finance succeeded in carrying it through.(2) 
(1) Ministe e des Finance et des Affaires Economiques: Momento 
economiguef, L'Egy.Ete, p. 27. See appendix II, Table IV, infra 
p. will, from which the powerful landlordism in the Wafd, as 
well as the strength of other interested groups could be 
noticed. The person in question who became the Secretary - 
General of the Wafd, is Fuad Seraj El Din Pasha, a well known 
landlord. 
(2) Ma jlisu'n- Nuwwab : Ma jmu'atu Mac abit, X -ii, S. 16 pp. 33 et 
seq.; S. 17 pp. 9 -11, 33 -34 & 56; 3.18 pp. 9 -10; Lieth- 
Ross, F.: "Financial and economic development in Egypt," pp. 
35 -37 
Further evidence to prove the power which landlords exerted 
in the Wafd can be provided from their attitude in discussing 
issues affecting their interests in the Chamber of Deputies. 
For example: the regulation of the mortgage dybts, La Chambre 
des Deputes: Comptes rendus analytiques des seancep,VIII -i, 
S.6 pp. 75 et seq.; the depreviation of rural workers to form 
trade unions, Ibid. S. 26 pp. 326 et seq.; the attempts to 
increase prices of tariffed agricultural products, Ibid.VIII -ii, 
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The first constituent programme of the 4^/afd., which was 
declared at the time of its formation, contained after listing the 
members of whom it was composed, the definition of its aim, namely 
the achievement of Egypt's independence by peaceful means (2), 
and the authorisation by the people for the Wafd to represent 
them (3) . The programme, set out in twenty -six paragraphs, 
established the principles of the internal organisation of the 
Wafd; and it was observed that it contained two striking points: 
first the thorough administrative consolidation of that political 
organisation, and secondly, the extensive powers conferred on its 
leader.(1) 
As to the general policy of the Wafd, it was defined by 
Zaghlul his appeal to Powers by the of Revolt 
as: the independence of Egypt, as independence is the natural 
right of all nations; the establishment of constitutional 
government under reservation (a) of the country's relation towards 
other nations, (b) of the rights of foreigners with respect of the 
T 5.46 pp.432 -43$, VIII - iii, S.5, pp. 25 -28; Majlis'n- Tvuwwab: 
op.cit. i -ii, S.22 pp.19 -24;. and the opposition to rural reform 
especially the limitation of landownership, Ibid. X -i, S.12, p.14. 
A comparative weakness of commercial and industrial interests 
can be noticed, see La Chambre des Deput6s: op.cit. VIII -i, 
5.7, pp.90 -91, VIII -ii, S.34 pp.2E1 -282 and Majlis)n- N'uwwab: 
op.cit. X -ii, S.32, pp.52-59. 
Professionals had more strength amongst the Jafdist ranks, 
see Ibid. X -i, S.24 pp.27 -37 and S.18 pp.44 et seq. 
(1) Shafiq: Hawliyát, Vol.1, pp.154 -156; Al- ̀ Aggád: op.cit. 
pp.195 -196 
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Capitulations, (c) of the public debt, and (d) of the neutrality 
of the Suez Canal; and, the admission to membership of the League 
of Nations. Reforms in education and in the moral and material 
status of the fellahin and workmen were afterwards added to the 
programme. 1) 
Another programme, not very different from that just mentioned, 
was enunciated in 1921 by the ''Wafdist organ "Al- khbár' In 
retreat from the defiant attitude showed in it, the Wafd outlined 
a new one in a telegram sent to "The Times" in February 1922. 
After asserting that Egypt had never been a part of the British 
Empire, four points were stressed in that programme: (a) the 
right of Egypt to live free from the domination of any foreign 
Power; (b) the safety and neutrality of the Suez Canal; (c) the 
safeguard of British and foreign interests in Egypt; and, (d) the 
guarantee of the interests of shareholders of the Egyptian public 
debt. (2) 
Up to 1922 the ;fafd led the nationalist movement for Egypt's 
independence. Its leader was the popular hero of the country. 
The differences in the Wafd about the Milner Report, and the 
breakaway of those who later formed the Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party, did not affect its popularity.(3) It was the .Declartion of 
1 A r- Ráfi'i_: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 106 -107; Q .urbál: op.cit. 
Vol. I, p. 55; Centre d'Etude de Politique Etrangere: op.cit. 
p. 32; Landau: op.cit. p. 287; Elgood: The transit of 
Egypt, pp. 232 -233; R.I.I.A.: The Middle East, p. 157. 
(2) The Times, February 11, 1922; Landau: op.cit. pp. 288 -291. 
(3) Al- 'A,ggád: op.cit. pp. 339 -346; R.I.I.A.: Great Britain and 
Egypt, 1914 -1, pp. 5 -7. 
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February 2, 1922, however, which set the Wafd at variance with 
other political groups and parties. At the time when these 
groups were enthusiastic over the Declaration,. the Wafd protested 
strongly against it as offering only a sham independence. Another 
point on which the Tafd differed from other political groups was 
the framing of the Constitution. Its main claim was that an 
elected national constituent assembly representing the people 
should be the only competent body to draft the new Constitution. 
Other political organisations, with the exception of the National 
Party, approved the competency of the appointed Committee of the 
Thirty to frame the Constitution.(1) 
When the Constitution was promulgated in 1923, the Wafd 
opposed it as being the natural result of the 1922 Declaration 
which it had never recognised. The opposition of the Wafd to the 
Constitution was, on the whole, based on the following grounds: 
(a) that it had not been formulated by a representative constituent 
assembly; (b) that all references to the boundaries between 
Egypt and the Sudan and the unity of the Nile Valley had been 
overlooked; and (c) that Egypt was no more independent under the 
(2) 
new Constitution than under the Protectorate. 
(1) R.I.I.A.: Memorandum on a study of the working of democratic 
institutions of Government in li Ypt, pp. 6 -7; Newman: The 
Mediterranean and its problems, pp. 281 -282; O'Rourke: The 
,juristic status of Egypt and the Sudan, p. 65; Dutcher: 
op.cit. pp. 13 et seq.; Al- cggad: op.cit. pp. 420 et seq.; 
Haykal: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 13U. 
(2) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. pp. 6 -7; Landau: op.cit. pp. 291 et seq. 
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In spite of its vigorous opposition to the Constitution, the 
°Tafd, curiously enough, participated in the first elections held 
in 1924 under that constitution. It organised its electoral 
campaign and the propaganda for its candidates thoroughly, and 
because of this good organisation, it obtained 179 seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies out of a total number of 211. The natural 
result of that situation was for the ?i1afd to assume power; but 
to the astonishment of political observers and Deputies, the first 
Speech from the Throne read by Saad Zaghlul referred to the 
Constitution as being formulated according to the most modern 
constitutional principles.(1) Moreover, in an address to the 
Chamber, Zaghlul asserted what he had declared in the Speech from 
the Throne and added that "although the Constitution safeguards 
the freedoms of thought, speech and work, and establishes the rule 
of national sovereignty, it contains certain rules which need 
modification.,(2) In spite the declaration of Zaghlul that in his 
capacity as the leader of the afd and Prime Minister he would 
accept any proposal for the amendment of the Constitution, that 
statement aroused opposition not only from the anti-Uafdist groups, 
but also among the ?,'afdist Deputies. Moreover, this statement 
illustrated the difference between a nationalist leader who was 
( 1 ) The Speech from the Throne, March 15, 1924, cited in A . ) r - 
Rafii i : A -q hiP th- thawrati 1 -? isriyah, Vol, I . pp. 151 -153 
(2) Speech given by Zaghlul in the Chamber of Deputies on March 29, 
1924, cited in Al Ahrám, March 30, 1924. 
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acclaimed a hero, and a responsible Prime Minister. This 
incident, however, is significant. in the history of the development 
of the 'lafd; it was the turning point, that the Wafd had become 
the defender of the Constitution, and it showed the necessity for 
the 1afd to be organised according to parliamentary rules.(l) 
Since 1924, the Wafd had been reputed to have been seeking to 
safeguard the Constitution and parliamentary life. So far as 
that holds, it is sufficient to recall the attitude of the Wafd 
towards the different constitutional crises which resulted in either 
the suppression of the Constitution or its abrogation. This change 
in the Z"úafd's policy as regards the Constitution seems to be the 
outcome of its realisation that the parliamentary system stipulated 
for by the Constitution and the support of the people were the 
only forces from which it could derive power in its struggle 
against both Britain and the King. It should be noted, however, 
that in spite of its assurances that it would introduce amendments 
into the Constitution, the ' ;;afd did not carry any of these into 
effect except the article providing for change in the King's title 
in October, 1951. 
(2) 
(1) Dutcher: op.cit. p. 45; Marshall: op.cit. pp. 252-253; 
Sabry: op.cit. pp. 264-265; Colombe: op.cit. p. 19; 
Hakal: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 186-187. 
(2) Ministére de Finances et des Affaires Economique: op.cit. 
p. 27; Centre d'Etude de Politique Ltrangére: op.cit. p. 
32; Al-c Aggad: op.cit. pp. 420 et seq.; Majlisu-)n-IdutiWáb: 
op. cit. 1L-ii, S.46 pp. 9-l8 and S. 47 p. 46. 
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The - ;:`afd had carried on its struggle against the British 
Occupation and for Egypt's independence up to 1924 as the 
representative of the people. Although it had copied the ,:Jestern 
pattern of party organisation and had issued manifestoes and 
enunciated programmes, it was not considered a political party 
in the accepted sense of the term. (1) It had seemed 
advantageous since 1922, when differences arose between the `iafd 
and other political groups, that the Wafd should mould itself into 
a political party. The final decision, however, did not come 
until after the opening of the parliamentary session of 1924, when 
T'afdist Deputies often embarrassed the Wafdist Government by their 
questions and opposition in voting. The necessity for the stern 
discipline of parliamentary organisation in order to do away with 
these inconveniences, along with the fact that the had to face 
the organised opposition of other political parties were forceful 
enough factors for the establishment of the Parliamentary T :afd 
Party- (Al- tIizbu .l- Tafdi Al Ni abi) . 
(2) 
The Wafdist congresses of 1935 and 1943 could give some 
indication of the policy of the party. Resolutions passed in both 
Congresses might be considered as the outline of the party's 
programme. 
(1) Cf. The formation of the National Party, see supra Chaffer, I, 
pp.15 -17 
(2) Kohn: op.cit. pp. 82 -83; Landau: op.cit. pp. 292 -293; 
5aleh: op.cit. p. 274. 
Here is an incident where a political party was organised 
mainly to perform the function of "holding together the members 
of a representative assembly who profess the political opinions 
for which the party stands, so as to concentrate their efforts 
on the advocacy of its principles and the attainment of its 
ends." Bryce: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 129. 
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In the congress held in January 1935, the most important 
resolutions concerned: (a) the continuation of the struggle for 
the restoration of constitutional life and the 1923 Constitution; 
(b) the hope that the Wafd would reach an honourable settlement 
with the British Government on the Egytian question realising the 
Country's wishes and placing the relationship with Great Britain 
on a sound and friendly footing; (c) the intorduction of reforms 
in the irrigation and drainage systems, as well as in that of the 
(1 ) wa,"; (d) ttgfs the elimination of the Capitulations; (e) the 
encouragement and protection of industries; (f) the observance 
of the freedom of the Press; and (g) the development and rise of 
the standard of living.(2) 
In the 1943 congress, most of the rules established in 1935 
were confirmed. The most prominent item was that efforts of the 
national movement should be directed to the achievement of the 
unity of the Nile Valley since the 1936 Treaty with Britain had 
realised Egypt's independence.(3) Moreover, in order to maintain 
the country's independence and its Constitution, it should be the 
duty of the ?'afd to overcome all handicaps in the way of the 
1 ":' a ii's" are either endowments in favour of religious or 
educational bodies known as "Charitable Waqfs" (Khaiyri), or 
family T. agfs (Ahli) which vest the usufruct of the land in the 
heirs in perpetuity while the property itself becomes 
inalienable. 
(2) Al-Ahram, January 10, 1935; The Times, January 9 & 10, 1935; 
Le Temps, January 11, 1935; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
1934-1937, p. 1503. 
(3) A1- Ahrám, November 15, 1943, the speech delivered in the 
Congress by 1;ïustafa El Nahas Pasha, the leader of the party. 
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execution of the rules of the Constitution. (1) In addition, 
legislation to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and keep 
it free from the influence of any other power was urged; and in 
the sphere of foreign policy, the foundation of the Arab League 
(2) 
was recommended. 
As regards the internal policy of the Wafd, one would have 
expected vast and diverse reform plans from such a party which 
emanated from the national will and derived its power from the 
masses of the people. From the very beginning when it ascended to 
power, the lafd showed interest in the various aspects of home 
affairs. It is said that it had projects for reforming education, 
irrigation, agriculture, commerce, transport, justice and taxation. 
(3 ) 
Actually, real reform did not occupy much of the Wafdist 
platform prior to the early 1940's. One wonders why the Wafd was 
late in tackling home affairs. First of all it would seem that 
the foreign policy and the settlement of the Anglo- Egyptian dispute 
engaged most of the ''afd's time. The only interest it showed 
,.while in office was in its attempts to reach an agreement with 
Great Britain. Secondly, the Capitulations might have stood as an 
(1) Al- Ahram, November 15, 1913, the speech delivered in the 
Congress by the eminent member of the Uafd, and the President 
of the Senate, Al Zaky El.Uraby Pasha. 
(2) =:1- Ahrám, November 15, 16 17, 1943. 
(3) Landau: op.cit. p. 311; Youssef: op.cit. pp. 123 -129; 
Cf . The .peech from the Throne of r_arch 1924, cited in 
A >r- Räfici: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 151 -153. 
82. 
obstacle to any reform, since any legislation or act of government 
affecting the status of foreigners needed, prior to its coming 
into effect, the consent of the Capitulatory Powers. In fact, it 
was not until after the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty with Britain 
and the i-iontreaux Agreement for the elemination of the 
Capitulations in 1937, that the Wald started to frame some effective 
and practical projects of reform for the development of home 
conditions and of progress in economic and social standards. 
Although it is rather difficult to assess its real value, partisan 
competition might have resulted in that new cafdist policy 
towards home affairs; especially since a new anti - afdist party, 
namely the Saadist, appeared in 1938 enunciating a social and 
economic policy. 
It seems rather strange that a country like Egypt, where 
social and economic standards were so poor, could have tolerated 
such deteriorating conditions, and, in the meantime, have given its 
support to a party which had not for a long time enunciated a 
social policy nor economic plans. However, it is obvious that it 
was the foreign policy of the ')afd which attracted its supporters 
who paid no attention to the internal conditions. The Uafd as a 
party, and the whole parliamentary system in Egypt, in general, 
were the outcome of the nationalist movement; and therefore, it 
is no wonder that the working of Egyptian parliamentary institutions 
was influenced by the nationalist feeling of the people. Moreover, 
in a country like Egypt which had endured so much of foreign rule, 
one would expect a strong nationalism aiming at the national 
salvation and the achievement of national aspirations; and that 
was the case in Egypt, where such aspirations were considered not 
so much in the securing of a parliamentary system as in the 
(1) 
achievement of the complete independence of the country. 
The address on the Budget in 1942 of the Wafdist Minister 
of Finance, who was in the meantime the Secretary - General of the 
Wafd, seems to have sketched the outlines of the internal policy 
of the party. In that address he emphasised that the Budget 
showed a clear and positive aafdist financial policy, "of a 
popular character tending towards safeguarding the interests of 
the people without distinction of class. That appears in the 
exemption of small landholders from taxes and burdening other 
tax payers; in improving the situation of the working people and 
the lower rank of civil servants; in establishing a positive 
policy for food supplies and harvest conciliating the interests 
of producers, merchants and consumers; in ensuring peace and 
order and justice; in encouraging science, commerce, industry 
and agriculture; in improving sanitary conditions and transport; 
in facilitating the execution of large schemes of irrigation and 
drainage tr (2 ) 
(1) Cf. Gibb, H.À.R.: "Egypt" pp. 69 a 72; in that address to the 
Royal Empire Society he emphasised that Egyptian politicians 
and journalists deliberately exploited the national feeling 
of the people. 
(2) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VIII -i, S.5, p.35. Cf. The 
Report of the Committee of Finance in the Chamber about the 
1942 -43 Budget in which details about that policy are found. 
Ibid. VIII -i, S.15, pp.157 et seq. 
In its electoral campaign in 1949, the iJafd placed more 
emphasis on its home policy which it outlined as follows: mutual 
confidence between the governing and the governed; liberty, 
Paternity and equality; reinforcement of national economy and 
wealth by increasing the production and utilisation of the 
country's resources; industrialisation of Egypt with the object 
of raising the standard of living; encouragement of tourism as 
an important source of national income; ensuring social justice 
among all the people and raising the social standard especially 
of the poorer classes; and, reforming the administration through 
reviewing the system of centralisation.(1) 
Within the limits of its policy, the sclafd when in power 
initiated in 1942 a social welfare scheme in order to raise the 
standard of the masses of the rural population. It was rightly 
said that "the betterment of existing conditions in villages and 
of the fellah is very important, because that matter is of interest 
to the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the country who 
suffer from poverty, ignorance and disease, to such a degree that 
one could not keep silent about it.T1(2) The scheme seemed to be 
the first sound rural reform in Egypt as it was intended to cover 
all phases of rural life, economic, social, cultural and hygienic 
(1) La Bourse Egyntienne, November 14, 1949. 
(2) The report of the Committee of Health, La Chambre des 
Deputes: op. cit. VIII -i, S. 24, p. 307. 
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at one and the same time. It was mainly based on the 
co- ordination of a comprehensive social welfare service, and the 
co- operation of the public in the construction and management of 
social and health centres. In its explanation of the scheme to 
Parliament, the Wafdist Government stressed the fact that previous 
attempts for improving rural conditions had failed because of 
political divergences, lack of finance, or governmental mal- 
administration; and being aware of that, it had avoided such 
difficulties. The scheme, however, was not an absolute success; 
and that might be due to the placing of too much reliance upon the 
inhabitants themselves, whose limited financial resources and 
abilities have not been a hidden secret.(1) 
In of policy, social 
security scheme in 1950 "with a view to meeting the necessities 
of life for every family whose income is interrupted on account of 
the death of the breadwinner, total incapacity for work or old 
age. "(2) Although this scheme was made to cover all groups of the 
-population irrespective of their occupation, whether in industry 
or agriculture, it was criticised because of the low rate of 
pensions and allowances granted.(3) 
(1) Ibid, pp. 307 -308. Cf. Rinistry of Social Affairs: Social 
welfare in Egypt, pp. 10 et seq. where a contradicting view 
about the success of that scheme is expressed. 
(2) The letter of the Minister of Social Affairs to the President 
of the Council of Ministers presenting the legislation, cited 
in: Ministry of Social Affairs: The Egyptian social security 
scheme, p. 1. 
(3) Ibid. p. 2; Majlisu'n- Nuwwàb: op.cit. X -1, S 34 Pp. 46 -47. 
For the purpose of illustration, some rates of the pensions 
were as follows: for a widow in urban areas £E.9,000 mills. a 
year and in rural areas £E.7,20û mills.; for an orphan in urban 
areas E. 6 a year and in rural areas fE.4,E00 mills,; for 
$6. 
The ?:Tafdt s policy towards education materialised in 1944. 
The '.iafdist Minister of Education declared in the Chamber of 
Deputies that "partisans of democracy consider that the education 
of the people has become an imperious necessity, in order that 
every citizen become acquainted with the manner in which he shall 
use his rights The pedagogues, sociologists and statesmen 
of the civilized nations are unanimous in considering that 
education constitutes the pillar of democracy' in all its political, 
social and humanitarian manifestation."(1) Therefore, the Wafd 
adopted the principle of giving an equal chance to every citizen 
as regards education. It claimed "free education in primary and 
secondary schools, and extension, as much as possible, of free 
education for possessing aptitude enabling 
them to reach the most elevated cultural level."(2) 
Although the Wafd did not have a chance to execute its 
educational policy in 1944 as it was dismissed from the Cabinet 
in October that year, it was earnest.of.its execution in 1950. 
One of the first actions of the Wafdist government in 1950 was the 
realisation of that policy. It introduced free elementary, primary, 
secondary and intermediate technical education including the 
disabled and old aged in urban areas £E. 15,600 mills. a year 
and in rural areas 12. For a detailed explanation of the 
system see Ibid, p. 46; The Ministry of Social Affairs: op. 
cit. pp. 10 -11. 
(1) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VIII -iii, S. $, pp. 49 -50. 
(2) Ibid, p. 52. 
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exemption from fees for examinations, school meals, books and 
medical treatment. (1) Credit must be given to the Wafd for the 
establishment of Farouk University in 1943 and Ibrahim the Great 
University in 1950.(2) 
A point of interest is the policy of the Wafd towards 
students. It is well known that students had formed in Egypt 
a valuable political asset which every political party tried to 
gain to its side. Therefore the Wafd never lost an opportunity 
to attract them to its platform. The most effective method 
appeared to be the relaxing of restrictions controlling 
examinations such as reducing pass marks and providing supplementary 
examinations.(3) 
This policy seems to have been followed Wafd order 
to attract supporters from different social classes. It tried 
hard to present itself as the protector of the suppressed groups, 
realising, in fact, the importance of these classes in the 
political scene. The Committee of Finance in the Chamber of 
Deputies referred to that, though in a round about way, and 
provided convincing statistics in that regard.() 
(1) -inistry of Social Affairs: Social Welfare in Egypt, p. 96. 
(2) The names have changed. into Alexandria University and 
Abbassiyah University respectively. 
(3) La Chambre des Deput'es: op.cit. VIII -i, S. 6, pp. $3 -86; Great 
Britain and the East, Vol. XLIX, No. 1374, p. 430. Cf. The 
Policy o t e anti- 7afdist parties, Ibid, Vol. LIT, No.1442, 
p. 37. 
(4) Majlisun- Nuwwab: op.cit. X -i, S.25 pp. 15 -16. 
The Committee showed the increase of salaries of selected 
groups of the civil service, the most striking of which is that 
of teachers of elementary schools. This group exerted a great 
influence on the electorate especially in the country side. 
However, the Committee showed that the policy of the Wafdist 
Governments in 1942 -44 and 1950 resulted in such that a school 
teacher who commenced with a monthly salary of LE.3 in 1939 
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This viewpoint may be reinforced by the attitude of the 
Wafd towards the working class and labour problems. Although 
there had been desperate need for organising the labour movement 
and legalising trade unionism in Egypt since the early thirties, 
the Wafd did not pay much attention to workers until 1942. It 
was only then that the Wafdist Government pressed the promulgation 
of laws authorising trade unions in Egypt and providing for 
compulsory insurance against work accidents. (1) It seems that 
it was only the circumstances of the Second World War which showed 
the strength and progress of the development of the labour movement, 
especially when great numbers of workers were concentrated in the 
British and American Army Ordnances. This argument is further 
proved by the fact that all attention was paid to industrial 
workers in spite of the fact that the overwhelming madority of 
the people are engaged in agriculture. 
To show the real inclination of the Wafd, there is no better 
argument than the comment of the Wafdist Deputy, Dr. Mohamed 
Mandur, on the Budget of 1950 -51. In that regard he said: "We 
did not recognise a general policy in the Budget. It is neither 
socialist nor a capitalist one. It is not an agricultural nor an 
= ending in 1950 with a salary of £18. That increase amounted 
to 600 per cent while the cost of living index increased only 
to 325. 
(1)La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit.VIIT -i, S.26, pp.327 et seq; 
Ministry of Social Affairs: op.cit. pp.53 -54. Cf. The 
Economist, Vol.CXXIV, No. 4848, p.167, and Vol.CXXV, No.4862, 
p.211. 
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industrial one. It is not progressive nor reactionary. It is a 
collection of figures meeting with urgent needs and governmental 
(1) 
routine." 
Since the outstanding purpose of the formation of the ' 'afd 
was active opposition to the British Protectorate and the struggle 
"by peaceful and legal means for the complete independence 
of Egypt, "(2) it seems essential to make a survey of the relations 
between the Wafd and Britain and to analyse the stand of the 
former with regard to the settlement of Anglo- Egyptian relations. 
"Champion and defender of all the national aspirations of 
Egypt, the Wafd constitutes the declared enemy of Great Britain."( 
,i) 
It was only because the äafd was the one organisation acceptable 
to the people to settle Anglo-Egyptian relations that the Milner 
Mission, as has been shown, was obliged to start its talks with it. 
The Mission did not, however, reach an agreement with the Wafd 
which considered its proposals as "approximating to a veiled 
Protectorate. "(4) Since then until the first general elections 
were held in 1924, all attempts to solve the Egyptian problem 
were made between Britain and anti -Wafdist groups which the Milner 
Mission had succeeded in creating. 
(1) Majlisu'n -NuwT b: op.cit. X -i, S.25,p.65. 





(4) R.I.I.A.: Grea  Britain and E y 1914 -1951, p.6. See 
supra, Chapter I, pp. 27 -29. 
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The character of the hostility between Great Britain and the 
Wafd can be deduced from the fact that Britain usually tried to 
embarrass the Wafd whenever that latter caused a breakdown, or 
failed to reach a settlement 'of Anglo- Egyptian relations, as 
witness, the ultimatums addressed to the Wafdist Cabinet in 
1924 after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, and in 1928 with 
regard to public meetings.(1) 
The Wafd stood faithfully to its principles with regard to 
the achievement of the complete independence of Egypt and the 
unity of the Nile Valley till 1930 when it was forced by the 
influence of some moderate political tendencies to deviate from 
its uncompromising attitude towards Britain.(2) The words of the 
leader of the Wafd after the breakdown of the Nahas- Henderson 
negotiations in 1930 may elucidate this deviation. Before his 
departure from London, Nahas Pasha declared: 11We lost a treaty 
of friendship with Great Britain, but we have won her actual 
friendship, which is all -important. " (3 ) 
The Wafd, which insisted on the evacuation of British troops 
and the unification of Egypt and the Sudan, opposed every agreement, 
whether concluded by itself or by other political parties, because 
(1) Ghosh: op.cit. pp. 91 et seq.; Kohn: op.cit. pp. 93 et seq; 
Young: op.cit. p. 279 et seq.; R.I.I.A.: Memorandum on the 
AnL10- Egyptian relations from 191/, to the present da'r, p. 10; 
C urbal: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 162 et seq. See supra Chapter 
I, pp. 49 -50. 
(2) Colombe: op.cit. p. 17. 
(3) R.I.I.A.: Great Britain and Egypt, 1914 -1951, p. 26. 
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such agreements could never realise its objectives following, 
as they did, the lines recommended by Lord Milner: "It is 
necessary that any treaty entered into between us and the 
Egyptians should secure the special position of the British 
representative in Egypt, enable us to maintain a force within 
Egyptian territory for the protection of our imperial 
communications, and take adequate security that Egyptian policy 
shall be in line with that of the British Empire."(') 
It seems, however, that the Wafd modified its policy when 
it concluded the 1936 treaty, which did not differ in detail from 
the previously reached draft treaties except in the construction 
of its texts. The '':afd considered the Treaty to be "the treaty 
of honour and independence," and therefore, it is believed, had 
adopted a more compromising attitude towards the achievement of 
the national demands than its stand during the early years after 
its formation. It seems, however, that it was the rapidly 
increasing international tension, and the danger of a world war 
which inspired the Wafd to improve Egypt's relations with Great 
Britain and conclude the 1936 Treaty.(2) 
Did the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty bring an end to the 
hostile attitude of the Wafd towards Great Britain? Immediately 
after the conclusion of the Treaty both sides were on good terms, 
(1) Ibid. p. 107. Cf. Saleh: op.cit. pp. 256 et seq. 
(2) Ghurbál: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 27$ et seq.; Colombe: 
op.cit. p. 17; Carr: op.cit. p. 241; The Egyptian Green Book, 
p. 167. 
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and such situation continued for a while. After the dismissal 
of the `Wafdist Cabinet in the end of 1937, however, the Wafd 
being now in the opposition, it re- opened its campaign against 
Britain which it accused of encouraging and helping, morally if 
not materially, the anti- Lafdist parties which were then in 
p ower.(1) Moreover, reverting to nationalism, the Wafd tried to 
make an issue out of Anglo- Egyptian relations. During the Second 
world War, in a memorandum presented to the representative of 
Great Britain in Egypt, it asked for concessions that all foreign 
troops would evacuate Egypt after the war, and that negotiations 
should be opened on the status of the Sudan. (2) 
Again, a change from those semi -hostile relations between 
the Wafd and Britain occurred in February 1942. On the fourth of 
that month an ultimatum was sent to the King by the British 
Ambassador in Cairo announcing that "Unless I hear by 6 p.m. that 
Nahas Pasha has been asked to form a cabinet, His Majesty King 
Farouk must accept the consequences." This was accompanied by a 
British military demonstration around the Royal Palace to force 
the King to appoint a Wafdist Cabinet. Although there is no 
detailed information available about that incident, it seems that 
it was the dangerous military situation of the Allied forces in 
the Western Desert on the Egyptian frontierss which dictated such 
(1) A speech by Nahas Pasha reported in "Great Britain and the Bast" 
Vol. LII, No. 1170, p. 98. 
(2) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p. 61; The New York Times, April 3, 1940. 
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a drastic action. Its aim. was to ensure the establishment in 
Egypt of the most competent government to execute Egypt's 
obligations during the war as stipulated in the 1936 Treaty.(1) 
However, a very important point to be considered with regard to 
that incident is the acceptance or refusal of the Wafd of the 
charge to form a Cabinet. Actually it accepted, but assuming 
hypothetically that it did not, Britain would have been in a very 
critical situation, both in its relations with. the King and the 
people. Therefore, it would seem that there must have been a 
previous understanding between the British authorities and the 
Wafd before the taking of such drastic action. (2) 
This has led us to the phase of February 1942 to October 1944, 
during which the Wafd was in power, and when a truce seems to have 
been declared between Britain and the Wafd. In spite of the fact 
that the Anti- Wafdist parties were using the nationalist question 
(1) Hourani, A.: "The decline of the 'West in the East," p. 41; 
Fitzsimons, i.A.: "Britain and the East, 1944- 1950,"p.24; 
Awad, M.: "Egypt, Great Britain and the Sudan," p. 282; 
R.I.I.A.: op.cit. pp. 70 -71; Kimche: op.cit. pp. 32 -33; 
Setton -Williams, Britain and the Arab States, pp. 69 -72; 
Roosevelt, K.: Arabs, oil and history, pp. 89 and 95. 
(2) It is worth noticing that anti-Wafdist parties considered that 
action being a British interference in purely internal 
Egyptian politics which could not have been possible without 
the collaboration of the Wafd. The Opposition tried to discuss 
the incident in the Chamber of Deputies in 1942, but it failed 
because of the domination of the :Jafdist majority. La Chambre 
des Deputés: op.cit. op. cit. VIII -i, S. 5 p. 64. Although 
the incident was not discussed in the following chamber, yet 
every year the Chamber on that date declared its protest 
against foreign interference. As an example, on February 4, 
1947 the Chamber suspended its sitting for some minutes as a 
protest against the incident. Ibid, IX -iii, S. 14, p. 91. 
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as a means through which they attacked the Wafd, the Wafd did not 
consider it expedient to air such problems during the war. Even 
when the weak Opposition in the Chamber of Deputies tried to raise 
the question of national aspirations and the relations with 
Britain, the Wafdist majority and Government managed to repress 
(1) 
it. 
However, from the end of the Second World War until its 
return to power in 1950, the Tiafd seems to have been influenced by 
its desire to appear to the people as their national saviour and 
hero. In order to take the lead in any national movement that 
might arise, the Wafd lost no time after the surrender of Germany 
before presenting, in July 1915, a memorandum to the British 
Ambassador in Cairo on the subject of national aspirations. It 
demanded the evacuation of all foreign troops and the settlement 
of the situation of the Sudan. It also led a compaign against 
the coalition anti -Wafdist Cabinet for its reluctance to start 
negotiations with Britain to that end.(2) 
When that coalition government officially proposed to Britain 
the revision of the 1936 Treaty, the Wafd accused it of being very 
slow and lenient in achieving the country's demands. When 
negotiations between the Sidky Government and Britain were 
proceeding in 1946, the Wafd issued a manifesto opposing any 
(1) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VIII -i, S. lo, pp. 190 -192 
and S. 17 p. 202; Also VIII -iii, S. 5, pp. 61 -62, 64 and 
87 -89 
(2) Colombe: op.cit. p. 228. 
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alliance with Great Britain, asserting that an independent country 
chooses its own allies and does not accept an alliance forced upon 
it by its oppressors. Again, it opposed any joint defence plan 
on the basis that the U:N.O. has the right to ensure Egypt's 
defence. It insisted on the withdrawal of all British forces 
before any negotiations could take place, and on the principle of 
the Unity of Egypt and the Sudan.(1) 
Moreover, when the government decided to appeal to the U.H.O. 
differences between the Wafd and the Cabinet arose as to the most 
effective institution to which the Egyptian case should be taken, 
the Security Council, the General Assembly or the International 
Court of Justice. When the Government appealed to the Security 
Council, the Wafd, which always accused the government of being 
a minority deriving its power not from the people but from the 
King, denounced its ability and competency to carry out such a 
task and sent a telegram to that effect to the President of the 
Security Council.(2) 
(1) Le Monde, November 5, 1946. Cf. R.I.I.A.: op.cit. pp. 86 
et seq. M. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 99 -100; Air - Ráfici: op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 223 - 
234. The text of the cable may reveal the motives behind it. 
It said: "We know that the U.N.O., as a matter of principle, 
only accepts complaints from member governments. However,such 
governments should be democratic and really represent their 
people... The present Egyptian Government does not represent 
the people of the Nile Valley in any way. It does not even 
represent a homogeneous minority. It represents only feudal 
reaction and its territorial policy. The Egyptian people 
fight: against that present Government, and for this reason 
the Wafd declares that the Government's approach to U.T.O. 
cannot have any value and cannot express the demands of the 
people of the Nile Valley. These demands are: complete 
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It is said that "in order to conserve or gain the sympathy 
of the people, parties usually, while in opposition exaggerate 
their promises, and they cannot fulfil them when they come to 
power." (1) That was the case with the Wafd after the return of 
the Egyptian delegation from Lake Success. It agitated for the 
abrogation of the 1936 Treaty which it had itself concluded with 
Britain, and the repudiation of the 1$99 agreements with regard to the 
Sudan.(2) 
Did the Wafd follow that policy after its return to power in 
the beginning of 1950? In fact, it returned to negotiations with 
Britain for a settlement of the dispute, and it was not before the 
expiration of a period of nineteen months that the Wafd carried 
out the policy for which it had agitated while in opposition. In 
October 1951, it abrogated the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 Condominium. 
Agreements, declaring the King to be the f"King of Egypt and the 
Sudan. "(3) However, this drastic action of the Wafdist Cabinet 
evacuation and the recognition of the unity of the Nile Valley - 
Egypt and the Sudan being two parts of the same nation." 
Cf. R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p. 100, r.2. It states that the 
:afd accepted the participation in the delegation presenting 
the case to the Security Council on condition that it should 
have the majority representation and the chairmanship, and be 
given the guarantee that a general election would be held after 
the return of the delegation to Egypt. 
(1) Colombe: op.cit. p. 226. 
(2) A'r - Räfi° i : op.cit. Vol. III, p. 234. Cf. The 
interpellation presented by Puad Seraj El Din Pasha, the 
Secretary General of the Wafd, in the Senate, about the 
national demands and the way for their achievement; reported 
in La Bourse Egyptienne, November 30, and December 14, 194; 
also in The Eo-votian Gazette, December 14, 191. 
(3) The Egyptian Green Book, pp. 111 & 167 et seq.: Majlisu'n- 
Nuwwáb: op.cit. K -ii, S.46 pp. 9 -16 and S. 47 pp. 6-8. 
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seems to have been simply an attempt to divert public opinion 
from the deteriorating political, economic and social conditions 
caused by the mal- administration of the Wafdists. 
From the foregoing survey of the relations between the Wafd 
and Great Britain, it is quite clear that the Wafd was a party 
which sought the settlement of Anglo- Egyptian relations through 
negotiations, and preferred a treaty to regulate these relations. 
I '_oreover, realising the value of the national spirit and how it 
could be used to gain adherents and sympathisers, the Party tried 
out that asset against its opponents. Being in a better position, 
in that it was the organisation which led the people's nationalist 
movement in 1919, the Uafd attempted to appear to the people as 
the only organisation which echoed the general will as regards the 
national demands. Usually it took the extremist attitude while 
in opposition, but it changed its tone as its seats in Parliament 
changed from left to right. 
(1) 
A very important feature which distinguished the Wafd from 
other political parties, was the reputation it had for animosity 
to the Palace, to the extent that the electoral victory of the Wafd 
in 1950, is said to have been mainly due to that characteristic 
of the party and the will of the people to rid the country of 
(1) That idea was expressed by Mahammad Tawfiq Khashabah, 
a 
Saadist Deputy, He quoted extracts from speeches and 
declarations of the leaders of the Wafd and deduced that 
the policy of the Wafd while in power was inconsistent 
with 
its agitation while in opposition. 
Ibid. !í -1, S. 28 pp. 39 -41. 
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governments directed against the people.(1) 
The roots of the hostility between the Wafd and the Palace 
extended back to 1922 when the ljafd demanded a constituent assembly 
to frame the Constitution, while then King fearing that such an 
assembly might deprive him of most of his prerogatives, appointed 
a committee to draft it. Moreover, these differences gave rise 
to rumours in Egypt that the Wafd was aiming at the deposition of 
the King and the establishment of a republic, and it seems that 
the Albanian and Turkish elements, who had great influence and 
power in the Palace, had good reason to know that the Wafd stood 
for the removal of their influence as much as for that of 
foreigners. 
(2) 
Differences between the 'dafd and the Palace usually arose 
because of the interpretation of the Constitution, especially 
Articles 60, 61 and 62 stipulating the manner in which the King 
should exercise his authority. The first conflict of that 
character arose in connection with the nomination of Senators in 
the first Parliament in 1924, and was only solved by an arbitration 
in which the views of the Wafd, which was in power at the time, 
carried greater weight» This precedent should have established 
1 k'r - Pafi i: op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 289 -291; Kimche: op.cit. 
pp. 290 -291. 
(2) See Supra Chapter I, pp.31 -32; Kohn: op.cit. p. 82; Harris,M. 
Egypt under the Egyptians, p. 128; Newman: Great Britain in 
Egypt, p. 249. 
(3) Von De Bosch: op.cit. pp. 75 -79; for a detailed study of 
that incident see infra Chapter VI, pp. 
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a constitutional custom, especially after its acceptance by the 
King; but in spite of that, disputes between the Wafd and the 
Palace upon this subject appeared repeatedly.(1) 
Another factor which increased the strain upon relations 
between the Wafd and the Palace was the persistent struggle of 
the former to preserve the rules of the Constitution against the 
efforts of the latter to maintain and retain as much authority as 
possible. In other words, the Wafd, as a party in a parliamentary 
country regarded the political arena as being reserved for the 
party holding the majority of seats in Parliament and enjoying 
the confidence of the people, without any interference from the 
Palace or the King. These views were, of course, unacceptable 
to the King who tried by every means to maintain his autocratic 
rowers. So it was that in the period between 1924. and 1952, the 
Wafd came to power six times "with a huge majority, only to be 
dismissed or forced to resign by the Palace, each time thus 
demonstrating to the people the indisputable weakness of their 
political and constitutional structure. "(2) 
Moreover, the Palace fought the popularity of the Wafd by 
encouraging splits within the Party, and creating political 
organisations and parties to oppose and weaken its political 
(1) A'r - Ráfi`i: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 150. 
(2) Heyworth- Dunne: op.cit. p. 5; Cf. Gibb, H.A.R.: "Anglo- 
Egyptian relations, a revaluation, p. 441. 
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authority. (1) The establishment of both the Unionist Party 
(Hizbu'l- Ittihad,) in 1925, and the People's Party (Hizbu'sh- 
Sha( b) in 1931, was aimed at reinforcing the King's autocracy and 
weakening the Wafd. 
(2) 
On the same lines, the Saadist Party and 
the Wafdist Block (Al- Kutlatu' l- 'Jafdiyah) appeared by the 
encouragement of the Palace. 
(3) 
Nevertheless, it had always been 
true that "Egypt under a free election would vote for the leaders 
of the Wafd, perhaps from a vague belief that they alone will 
protect her from misrule and exploitation." (4) 
The dislike of the Palace for the Wafd heightened in 1942, 
when the Wafd came to office against the will of the King under 
pressure from the British Government and in consequence of a 
British military demonstration. Therefore, the King lost no 
chance of trying to dismiss the Wafdist Cabinet, and he seized 
the opportunity of the growing unpopularity of the Wafd to dis- 
miss the Cabinet in October 1944 on account of the accusation of 
corruption, and because of the deterioration of cordial relations 
between the ,afd and the British. (5) 
(1) Issawi: op.cit. p.170 
(2) See supra Chapter I, pp. 51 -52 
(3) 'See infra, pp.108 -109 141 -142 
(4) Elgood: Egypt, p.127 
(5) Fitzsimons: op.cit. p.24; Colombe: op.cit. p.115; 
A'r- Ráfi`i: op.cit. Vol.111, p.138. The latter mentions 
that the King wanted to dismiss the Wafdist Cabinet in April 
1944 but because of the interference of the British Govern- 
ment he could not. Cf. The Economist, Vol.CKLVII, No.5277, 
p.507. 
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Although the overwhelming majority which the Wafd obtained 
in the 1950 elections was mainly due, as previously mentioned, to 
its repeated attitudes which had showed hostility towards the King 
and the Palace, it seems that after coming into power that 
hostility disappeared and ttKing Farouk and Nahas Pasha buried the 
hatchet, and the alliance so formed and maintained between the 
Crown and the Wafd has given Egypt the strongest Government she 
has enjoyed since the Constitution was established. "(1) The 
actions of the Wafdist Cabinet gave strength to that theory; but 
the views that the Wafd changed its attitude towards the Palace 
after its return to power in 1950 can hardly be reconciled with 
the fact that the King dismissed its government in January 1952. 
In fact, the Party might have changed its attitude towards the King 
and the Palace in attempting to foster its administration, but, it 
appears quite obvious that the other side of the so- called 
'alliance' never changed their views against the Wafd. Moreover, 
the dismissal was due to the attitude of the Lafd towards Great 
Britain after the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty when the Wafd 
nearly broke off diplomatic relations between the two countries.(2) 
(1) Gibb: op.cit. p. 449. 
(2) Some of the actions of the Wafdist Cabinet which indicated its 
friendly relation and change of policy with the King and the 
Palace are worth recording here: 
(A) After the electoral victory of the Wafd, the King appointed 
Hussein Sirry Pasha, the Prime Minister under whose 
administration the elections had been carried, to be the Chief 
of his Cabinet. Sirry described the first interview between 
the King and Nahas, the new Wafdist Prime linister, as being 
the first indication of the Wafdist policy "to preserve their 
posts by accepting blindly all the caprices of the sovereign." 
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In its opposition to the Palace and its struggle against 
Great Britain, "the ]afd has been backed by only a single force: 
the enthusiasm of the masses which followed it - this source of 
strength has appeared to be weak in comparison with the powerful 
74 That became apparent by the fact that the first demands made by 
the new Prime Minister before sitting down to discuss State 
affairs were that he should be permitted to pay homage and 
express loyalty to the King by kissing both of His Majesty's 
hands. 
(B) The King expressed his desire to be exempted from taxes, 
and asked Sirry Pasha to convey that Royal wish to the Wafdist 
Cabinet so that they might arrange for the publication of 
legislation to give effect to that exemption. That caused a 
difference between the King and the Chief of his Cabinet who 
resigned on that issue. However, the policy of the Wafd 
towards the request was that it could not legislate for such an 
exemption. The plan adopted was that if His Majesty did not 
pay, the government would not claim anything. 
See Sablier, E.: "Comment on perd un trne," in Le Monde, 
August 13, 1952, where he mentioned these incidents after an 
interview with Hussein Sirry Pasha. See. also: La Bourse 
Egyptienne, August 26 & 27, 1952. 
(C) In 1951, when there was a shortage of American dollars, the 
Wafdist Government managed to open a supplementary credit in 
the secret expenditure fund of the Ministry of the Interior, to 
convert it into dollars, and to transfer it abroad for the credit 
of the King. The sum amounted to 300,000 American dollars, and 
was considered to be a payment in advance of the Civil list for 
the following financial year. 
La Bourse Egyptienne, September 25, 1952; Le Monde,September 
27, 1952; The Times, September 26, 1952. 
(D) When in 1950, the Press attacked the King and the Royal 
Family on account of their personal behaviour and conduct, the 
Tafd legislated for the prohibition of the publication of any 
news about the King without the previous authorisation from the 
Minister of the Interior. 
Ma.jlisu n - NuwVrab: op.cit. X-i, S. 39, p. 63. 
(E) The attitude of the Wafd towards some constitutional 
problems for which it had hitherto stood. For instance, it 
brought about the expulsion of some Senators in 1950 when they 
had dared to criticize the King's entourage. This point will be 
discussed later in Chapter VI. Moreover, there was the Party's 
attitude towards the nomination of Hafiz Afifi Pasha, a 'persona 
non grata' according to the opinion of the 'iafd, to the post of 
the Chief of the RoyalCàbinet'in 1951. This should be compared 
with the Party's opposition in 1937 to the appointment of Aly 
Maher Pasha to the same post. For further details see Chapter III 
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resources which have been at the disposal of the Palace and the 
Government of London. "(l) Upon these facts there could be built 
one theory regarding the political forces which operated in Egypt. 
These forces, it could be said, were: the Palace, Great Britain 
and the .afd. The latter had to mould its policy to the relative 
strength of the other two forces. To illustrate this theory, it is 
sufficient to mention that in 1942, the Wafd allied itself with 
Britain against the Palace; while in the opposition in 1944-50 it 
took the side of the people against both Britain and the Palace; 
and in contrast, after coming to power, it tended to desert the 
side of the people and co- operated with the Palace. 
Here it might be mentioned that the Wafd simply could not 
understand the actual position of a King in a parliamentary 
government. The result was that it began at the one extreme of 
hostile relations with the King and the Palace and ended with being 
at the other extreme. To look at the matter from the point of 
view of one solely concerned with the working of the parliamentary 
institutions, we need only to consider the attitude of the Wafd 
towards particular legislation in 1930 as against 1951. 
In 1930, the Wafd saw that its salvation depended upon 
safeguarding the Parliament from dissolution; and therefore, 
prepared a Bili to restrain the King's powers and to ensure 
constitutional democracy. The Bill provided for the condemnation 
for high treason of any Prime Minister without a parliamentary 
(1) Colombe, op.cit. p. 10. 
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majority who refused to hold a general election. The disapproval 
of the Bill by the King forced the Wafd to tender its resignation - 
in the hope that the King might change his attitude - instead of 
resorting to the simplest of parliamentary manoeuvering, namely 
inducing a '.:afdist member of Parliament to initiate the legislation 
as a private member's Bill . (1) 
In 1951, in accordance with its policy to surrender to all the 
demands of the King and the Palace, the Wafd induced one of its 
members to initiate a private member's Bill suppressing the freedom 
of the Press. The legislation gave to the Council of Ministers 
the right to suspend and suppress any newspaper and to the Minister 
of the Interior a free hand in supervising the Press. The unseen 
behind this legislation was the that the King had been 
subjected to vigorous attacks from some newspapers and that seemed 
to be the only way to quell them. However, this legislation found 
opposition inside and outside Parliament, even from amongst the 
Wafdists themselves, and the member of Parliament who initiated 
the proceedings was forced to withdraw his measure.(2) 
(1) Elgood: op.cit. p. 127; Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrange"re: 
op.cit. p. 63; Kohn: op.cit. pp. 107 -111; R.I.I.A.: The 
Middle East, p. 160; Newman: "Egypt," p. 570. Cf. R.I.I.A.: 
Great Britain and Egypt ,1914 -1951, p. 27, n.l. where it states 
that: "The Wafd hoped by this combination in legislation to 
secure control over the exercise by the King of the prerogatives 
reserved to him under the Constitution, and make it impossible 
for any one to challenge its position. In the circumstances, 
in holding up the decrees the King was defending not only his 
prerogatives, but also his people against the creation of a 
permanent dictatorship, which the legislation in question was 
clearly intending to confer on the Wafd." 
(2) A'r - Rafi` i : op.cit. Vol.III, pp. 302-303; Majlisu'n- 
Nuvvwáb : op.cit. X-ii; S .3 8, pp. 27-34; Al- Ahram, July 31, 
and August 1, 1951; La Bourse Egyptienne, July 21, 25, 26, 27, 
28 & 31, and August 2 & 3, 1951. 
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There is no doubt about the popularity and the wide powerful 
support the Wafd had enjoyed in Egypt. The difficulty lies in 
determining the factors behind this popularity. Since, as will be 
shown in the following pages, political parties' programmes were 
alike, and their home and foreign policies differed but slightly, 
it seems as though the popularity of the u[afd was due to the 
following: 
The prime factor in creating the mass support given to the 
Wafd was the fact that its formation was aimed at the liberation of 
Egypt from the British Protectorate. That hostile attitude towards 
Britain gave it a better chance than other parties to attract the 
people. This argument is strengthened by the fact that whenever 
the popularity of the Wafd tended to wane, it resorted again to 
nationalism and the issue of Anglo- Egyptian relations to restore 
its popularity. For instance, the action of the Wafdist Government 
in 1951 to abrogate the 1936 Treaty with Britain and to bring an 
acute crisis, seems to have been an attempt to regain its adherents 
and popularity which it had lost during the previous year because 
of its own mal- administration.(1) 
In the second place, the popular strength of the Wafd was due 
to the fact that it was the only party which stood up to the Palace 
and the King's autocracy. It has been shown previously that one 
(1) Air - Ráfic!: op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 298 -299 & 303 -305. 
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of the main factors behind its sweeping of the polls in 1950 
elections was its reputed hostility to the ?alace.(1) 
Thirdly, the fact that the Wafd was the first political 
organisation appearing in recent history to proclaim the national 
aspirations, gave it a better opportunity of exciting the emotions 
of the people by recalling the heroic stands of its leaders. 
iaoreover, most of other political parties were dissentient Uafdist 
groups, which left to the Jafd all the funds and administrative 
organisation, and who had to start again to build themselves up.(2) 
(1) This argument may be further proved by the deviation of the 
popular support to the leaders of the Coup d'Etat which 
dethroned King Farouk in July 1952. Cf. Crossman, R.H. 
S.: "Egypt's nine just men," p. 56. Also the change of 
policy of the Revolution from reformative as it started 
to 
be characterised with nationalist inspirations could 
be a 
proof for the first argument provided above. 
(2) Cf. Ransome: op.cit. The Manchester 
Gua rdian, March 30, 
1925. 
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The Saadist Party. (.il -Hay }atu's -Oa`" di_yah) . 
This Party which was formed in ttanuary 1938, was a dissentient 
rafdist group. That may be the reason for the belief that it was 
only personal differences which led to its formation.DJ A brief 
survey o the factors leading to the secession of that group from 
the Wafd would help in understanding the motives behind the creation 
of that Party. 
Differences in the Wafd seemed to have started immediately 
after the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty about that treaty itself. 
One group with Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd, at its head 
considered the treaty an 'honourable credential of independence" 
liberating the country from the British occupation and influence. 
Another group led by Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, believed that the treaty was just a step 
towards the achievement of the country's complete independence.(2) 
The delegation of extensive authority to the Secretary - 
General of the Wafd, Makram Ebeid Pasha, was resented by some 
leading members.(3) Further, differences about the electrification 
(1) Ministere des Finances et des Affaires Economiques: op -cit. 
p..2$; R..I.I.A.:_ The Middle East, p.168. 
(2) Mahir, A.: Khitab 13 November 1938, p.10; see lurbà1: op.cit. 
Vol.I, pp.2$l et seq. where opinions of Nahas Pasha and his 
group along with those of Maher Pasha and his group are cited. 
It is interesting to notice that in spite of that opposition, 
laher and his group approved the treaty when it was presented 
to Parliament. Ibid. p.315. 
(3) Graves, P.P.: "The story of the Egyptian crisis," p.300 
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of the Aswan Dam seem to have been the first clear conflict. 
These led Nahas Pasha to take the opportunity of the King's coming 
of age in July 29, 1937 to resign and re -form a new Cabinet from 
which he dropped Nokrashy Pasha and three other ministers who 
showed dissatisfaction with his policy. Nahas later became 
powerful enough to cause their expulsion from the afd. This 
expulsion led to a revival in party politics and alarmed many 
members of the Wafd who feared the repercussions of that action 
since it was known that Ahmed Maher Pasha did not agree with Nahas.( 
In addition, accusations against the Cabinet for their abuse 
of authority which resulted in the spread of nepotism and corruption 
in the governmental machine was another factor which led to the 
formation of the Saadist Party.(2) The crisis between the Palace 
and the Wafd arising from differences in the interpretation of the 
Royal prerogatives hastened the formation of this new Party.(3) 
All these factors, along with individual ambitions, were 
quite sufficient to push the new Party forward. It did not appear, 
however, until after the dismissal of the Wafdist Cabinet and the 
expulsion of Maher Pasha from the Wafd. That action against Maher 
Pasha was taken because of his sympathy with Nokrashy and because of 
(1) Ibid, p. 301; Colombe: op.cit. p. 72; - Ráfitii: op.cit. 
Vol. III, pp. 44 -46 & 50 -51; The Observer, October 10, 1937; 
Great Britain and the Near East, Vol. XLIX, No. 1374, p.430. 
(2) Mahir: op.cit. pp. 14 et seq. enumerates the features of 
that corruption. Cf. Graves: op.cit. p. 301; R.I.I.A.: 
Great Britain and E. st 1" 1 -1 1, p. 48. 
(3) Ibid, pp. 48 -50; Graves: op.cit. 302 -309. 
) 
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his apparently hostile attitude when he presided over the sitting 
of the Chamber of Deputies during which the Royal Rescript 
dismissing Nahas Pasha was read.(1) 
The formation of the Saadist Party was declared on January 4., 
1938. Although the ground had been ready for the formation of 
this Party since the dismissal of Nokrashy Pasha from the .afd in 
September 1937, it did not come into the open till after the 
dismissal of the Z''afdist Cabinet in December. It might be said 
that the necessity for forming a new party was not apparent until 
after the expulsion of Maher Pasha from the Wafd; but the very 
short period elapsing between that expulsion and the formation of 
the new party throws suspicion on the existence of some inter- 
relation between the formation of this party and the constitutional 
differences between the Palace and the Wafd. This suspicion is 
associated with the fact that there was a strong belief that Dr. 
Ahmed Maher Pasha would succeed Nahas Pasha as Premier; but that 
failing to reach this objective, the Liberal Constitutionalist 
leader formed the new Cabinet and Naher supported him. Moreover, 
the adjournment of Parliament in 1938 was made in the hope that 
differences within the Wafd might result in a split within the 
Party and that the new Cabinet might secure the confidence of the 
Chamber without any need for its dissolution.(2) 
(1) A4r - Ráfiti: op.cit. Vol. III, P. 58; PJïáhir: op.cit. 
PP. 40-42. 
(2) Cf. Graves: op.cit. pp. 305 - 309; Setten -Williams: o1).cit. 
p. 6$; Saleh: op.ecit. pp. 278-280: Sabri, A. 
Al-gánünu'd-dustüri, pp. 635-636. 
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The Party to which supporters of Maher and Nokrashy "broke 
away from the Wafd on an issue of Party discipline, "(1) in order 
to secure popularity, adopted its name from that of the original 
leader of the Wafd, Saad Zaghiul. Its leaders declared that 
Nahas Pasha and his Party (the Wafd) with the policy they had 
followed had forfeited the right to consider themselves the 
successors of the founder of the Wafd. They claimed that the new 
Party would be organised on the principles of Saad, that they were 
the real successors to Zaghlul and would pursue his policy to 
achieve the country's independence, that they would observe the 
inviolability of the Constitution, and maintain justice and equality 
amongstEgyptians.(2) 
The Party enunciated its programme which could be summarised 
as follows: (a) the maintenance of co- operation of all Egyptians 
in order to unify and organise all efforts to secure the country's 
independence and to enable it to face the necessities of modern 
civilisation; (b) the remoulding of the old political policies 
and tactics to reconcile them with the march of time; (c) the 
The viewpoint expressed above about inter -relations between 
the Palace and the formation of the Saadist Party may be 
strengthened by the fact that after 194, the Party complied 
with the Palace orders and desires; for example the selection 
of Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha, who had occupied the post of the 
chief of the Royal Cabinet to the leadership of the Party in 
1949; the declaration of war against Israel in 1948, and the 
dissolution of the i'_oslem Brotherhood Association in 1948 
and 
the persecution of its members afterwards. 
(1) Maliroy, H.: Political handbook of the world, (1940), p. 55. 
(2) Heyworth- Dunne: op.cit. p. 24; Great Britain and the East, 
Vol. L, No. 1390, p. 49. 
establishment of a new national policy aiming at social security 
through the re- organisation of the country's social and economic 
structure, the development of agriculture, industry and commerce, 
and the reformation of the financial system; (d) the rehabilitation 
of the people to ensure that new generations shall be secured 
against illness,immorality and illiteracy; (e) the observation of 
the relations of friendship and alliance between Egypt and Britain 
based on the latter's recognition of Egypt's independence; and (f) 
the assurance of friendship with foreign countries, especially 
oriental states.(l) 
That programme of the Party did not change much. On the 
occasion of coming to power the Saadist Prime Minister declared in 
1946 the policy of the government to be identical with that of the 
Party. That policy centred in the achievement of the national 
demands, the amelioration of working people's conditions, the 
reformation of the financial system, and the execution of 
productive projects such as the electrification of the Aswan Dam 
and the construction of railways.(2) This policy was again 
asserted during the Party's campaign for the 1950 general electionsÇ3 
Immediately after its formation, the Saadist Party participated 
in the general elections held in April 193e and obtained about one- 
(1) IvIáhir: op.cit. pp. 44 -45; 4anúnu'l -Hay ti's - Sa diyah, 
Art. I, p. 1. j 
(2) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. IX -iii, S.6, p. 18. Cf. 
Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha's declaration on January 3, 1949; 
Ivlajlisuh- Nuwwáb: op.cit. IX -v, 3.9, p. 157. 
(3) La Bourse Egyptienne, November 4, 1949. 
112. 
third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The strength of the 
Party in the Chamber, enabled it to have a decisive influence 
upon the policy of the various Cabinets between 193$ -1942.(1) 
The success of the Party in those elections was due to the 
fact that its policy coincided with the national feeling at the 
time, which has been described as revealing that all Egyptians were 
agreed upon 'Tthe jealous preservation of the national independence, 
the maintenance of the constitutional monarchy and the parlaimentary 
regime; the relations of Egypt with the Sudan; the upholding of 
public security; the national defence, the fight against illiteracy, 
the need of improving the conditions of hygiene .:.. the general 
improvement in the lot of the working classes. "(2) Administrative 
interference in the running of these elections might have been 
another factor tending towards the success of the Party.(3) 
The Party acquired acquired its adherents from the intellectuals 
ex -civil servants especially those of high ranks, the upper middle 
class with industrial and commercial elements. This does not mean 
that the Party's ranks did not also contain landlords; and it is 
interesting to notice that the percentage of the Saadist Deputies 
(1) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VII -iv, S.71, pp. 591 -592, 
where while discussing the reshuffle of, and the participation 
of the Saadists into the Cabinet such a view was expressed 
by 
Abdul Mejid Nafeh and Mahmoud Solian.- Ghannam. 
(2) Graves, P.P.: "The Egyptian elections," p. 5$5 quoted from 
The Times. Mn 
(3) eld, M.: ' Nizámu)l- Intikháb fist -Tashr 
i l Misri wa- ̀l- Mugáran, 
p. 120; Great Britain and the East, Vol. L, No. 1403, p. 413. 
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from this last category had been increasing.(1) 
The first tribute due to the Saadist Party is the appreciation 
of the policy of financial reform which it initiated while in power 
in 1938. This reform comprised the re- adjustment of land taxes, 
the creation of some new income taxes, the subjection of industrial, 
commercial and financial profits as well as dividends to taxation, 
and the introduction of stamp duties on deeds, transactions, 
advertisements, etc. Death duties were also envisaged, but 
the Bill dealing with them was ,blocked in the Senate; and they were 
not imposed until 1944.(2) In continuation of its financial policy 
and in order to achieve social justice, the Party while in power in 




Along with the party's efforts to encourage small holdings 
through the distribution of reclaimed cultivated areas among 
peasants who did not possess any land, and with the reduction of 
taxes on small land holders, the Saadistsgave attention to the need 
for the standard of living being raised.(`") Accordingly, it began 
(1) According to data obtained from the Secretariate of the Chamber 
of Deputies, the Saadist Deputies coming under the heading of 
landlords formed 49.4%, 53.9w, and 71 of the total number of 
the Saadist Deputies in 1938, 1945 and 1950 respecitvely. 
(2) Issawi: op.cit. pp. 140 -141; Cf. R.I.I.A.: op .cit. , p. 59 . 
(3) La Chambre des Députes: op.cit. I:: -iv, S.31, pp. 3 -11, Cf. 
Hassan, A.-L.: A comparative study of income taxes in Britain, 
Egypt and France, pp. 101 -103. 
(4) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. lY -ii:, S. 23, pp. 205 et seq. 
Notice is to be paid to the refusal of the Chamber of a 
resolution urging the government to distribute the general 
domain. 
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to apply the Wafdist policy towards education. It introduced free 
primary and technical education in 1945. The party claimed to be 
as liberal in its views towards educating the people as the Wafd. 
The part of the Budget devoted to education might have increased 
in figure but not in proportion to the total of the State 
expenditure.(1) It paid attention to public health and continued 
the policy of the Wafd of establishing social and hygienic units 
in the villages, and it is said that during the period when the 
Saadists were in power two hundred units were set up. In addition, 
the party adopted a housing policy to secure dwellings for 
industrial and agricultural workers alike, and made efforts for the 
reclamation of land, the establishment of barrages and the 
construction of canals and drains.(2) As regards industry, along 
with the execution of the electrification of the Aswan Dam to provide 
the power needed for the revival of some industries,(3) the 
Industrial Bank was established to facilitate the financing of 
new industries,(4) Chambers of industries were created to foster the 
(1) The Saadist Party when first held office in 1944 allocated the 
sum of a.9,994,020 representing 11.1 per cent of the total 
expenditure of the'financial year 1945 -46, for education. The 
sum increased in 1949 -50 to £E.19,365,570 but did not count to 
more than 10.3 per cent of the expenditure. Cf. Hassan, A.R.: 
"State Expenditure in Egypt," III, pp. 52 -53. For more detailed 
figures see The Ministry of Social Affairs: Social Welfare in 
Egypt, p ..,. 95. 
(2) Ayr- Kafi`i: op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 274 -276; Abdul -MI, I.: 
Khitáb November 13, 1949. 
(3) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX -i, S. 24, pp. 2 -4. 
(4) Ibid, Iii -ï. , 3.6, pp. 25 -30. 
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position of existing industries,(1) and a law was promulgated 
enabling the Egyptianisation of joint stock companies.(24 
For all these activities along with the refusal to renew the 
concession of the Cairo lighting company in 1948, the Saadists 
claimed to be socialists; yet it is difficult to reconcile the 
policy of the Saadist Party with that of socialism. It seems that 
it was the current international political set up which induced the 
Saadist Party, and other Egyptian political parties, to claim that 
they were socialists whilst 
. in reality they were far from being 
included in that category. However, these actions of the Saadist 
governments were along the lines which; every government followed in 
order to develop the resources of the country and raise the standard 
of living of the masses. Moreover, when practical issues emerged 
which could have showed the real socialist inclinationsof the 
Saadists, if there were any, they avoided them. For example when, 
in order to raise the standard of living, the fixation of a minimum 
wage for rural labourers and the limitation of landownership were 
urged, neither the Saadist government nor the Saadist dominated 
Parliament showed any earnestness in that direction.(3) 
An important feature which distinguished the Saadist Party 
from all other political parties is its attitude towards the 
Second World War and the necessity that Egypt should participate 
in it instead of standing apart as a non -belligerent State. At the 
(1)Ibid. IX-111., S. 8, p. 34 
(2)Ibid. IX-iii, S.12, p. 2. 
(3 )Ibid. IX-ii, S.11, p. $9; IX-iii, S. 16, pp. 124-125. 
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time when other political parties and independent politicians were 
insistant on Egypt's avoiding the dangers and horrors of the war, 
and urged that "Egypt would take part in the war only if Italian 
soldiers took the initiative in an invasion of Egyptian territory, 
destroyed Egyptian towns by bombardment, or if Italy carried out 
air raids on Egyptian military objectives.p'(1) 
In holding the view that it was necessary for Egypt to take 
part in the war, the Saadists were seeking grounds for the defence 
of Egypt against both the Italians during the war, and the British 
at its end. Although the idea of Egypt having a belligerent part 
did not find enough popular support, and the ';áafd attacked the 
Saadists for trying to push the country into the war, the latter 
insisted on their views and the Saadist ministers resigned when the 
Cabinet,in September 1940, rejected their proposal to declare war 
against Italy in defence of Egypt against the former's aggression.(2) 
(1) H.l.l.ti.: op.cit. p.63. Cf. Colombe: op.cit. p.85; 
The New York Times, August 28, 1940 reports that the Chamber 
of Deputies passed a resolution in that effect. 
(2) i . I.1.1á.: op.cit. pp.65 -66; Colombe: op.cit. pp. $9 -91; 
A'r -i áfi` i : op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 91 -94. 
Cf. Great Britain and the East, Uol. LV, No.1531, p.233 
where it says that the Saadistsexpressed the public opinion 
in their demands of declaring war against Italy. 
In the letter sent to the Prime Minister urging the 
declaration of war, the Saadists declared: 91We are well 
aware of the dangers to which Egypt is exposed resulting 
from the calamity of war, but consider that it is better 
for 
Egypt's honour and independence to bear such calamities than 
to bear the shame of cowardice and humiliation of her 
reliance 
on others to defend her soil." The Manchester Guardian, 
September 24, 1940. See The New York Times, September 22, 
1940 where it quotes El- Nokrashy Pasha in defence 
of the 
party's viewpoint to declare = 
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The opportunity to carry out the Party's policy in that 
matter came in 1945 when the Yalta Conference resulted in the 
decision that any State taking part in the San Francisco Conference 
and becoming a founder- member of the United Nations should have 
declared war against the Axis by the beginning of March. In 
Compliance with this decision Egypt declared war on February 26, 
but at the price of the assassination of the Saadist Party leader, 
Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha.(1) 
As regards the Party's attitude towards Great Britain, and the 
achievement of national demands, one must remember the Party's views 
on the 1936 Treaty with Britain. In spite of these views, already 
mentioned above, the various governments, whether the Saadist Party 
participated or not, did, during the Second World War, implement all 
obligations incumbent upon Egypt as stipulated in the treaty. It 
was under a Saadist Government that Egypt awaited the end of the war. 
"The war itself served as a forcing -house for all the continual 
grievances of Egyptian nationalism, and completely undid the 
war despite Great Britain did not ask for such action. He 
declared: "We consider that it is our duty to defend our 
country against invasion,whether it is demanded of us or not." 
Cf. La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VII -iv, S.7, pp.27-29, 
where, although the discussion of the part of the Speech from 
the throne dealing with the war, the military situation, and 
the foreign policy was discussed in a secret session, 
differences between the Saadists and other political groups 
are shown. 
(1) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX -i, S. 7, pp. 1 -2 and S.8, 
p. 3; Colombe: op.cit. pp. 227 -228, R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p. El; 
Asr- Rafi`i: op.cit.Vol. III, pp. 150 -153; Russell, T.: 
Egyptian service, 1902 -1946, pp. 214 -216. 
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psychological effects of the treaty. All classes suffered in one 
way or another from shortages of various kinds - foodstuffs, 
consumer goods, fertilizers; and the great mass of townspeople in 
particular suffered severly from rising prices. "(1) Therefore, the 
Saadist Party and "Egyptian parties all but unanimously assumed that 
they would be rewarded for their wartime co- operation for which they 
were so often thanked by the British, and that their reward would 
be the revision of the Anglo- Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the complete 
withdrawal of British forces and the effective recognition of the 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. "(2) 
The reluctance of the Saadist Government to open negotiations 
with Britain to that effect, induced the Wafdist Opposition to 
attack the government and the Saadist Party. Whenever the Prime 
Einister was asked about the time which would elapse before 
negotiations would begin, the Saadist leader, El- Nokrashy Pasha, 
always replied: "When the right time comes." In their attack 
against the Saadist Party, the Wafdist Press nick -named him "His 
Excellency the Right Time." This might be the factor which induced 
the statement in the 'Round Table' that at this time Egypt 
"was in 
a mood to respond generously to generous treatment. There is 
every 
reason to believe that the 1936 treaty could have been replaced 
by 
an agreement which would have secured 
Britain's vital 
interests'in the Middle East on the soundest 
foundation of all - 
(1) Gibb: op.cit. p. 71. 
(2) Fitzsimons: op.cit. p. 24. 
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the willing co- operation of a grateful Egypt.,r(1) 
However, in spite of the statement by the Prime Minister in 
the Chamber of Deputies that the achievement of the national 
aspirations was the duty of every Egyptian nationalist,(2) the 
government did not formally ask for the opening of negotiations with 
Britain for that purpose till late in December 1945.(3) The parties 
opposing the Saadist -Liberal Constitutionalist coalition agitated 
against the government and demanded not the revision of the treaty, 
but its denunciation altogether. The position of the Saadist Party 
became rather difficult when the text of the government's note to 
Britain was published. O It was accused of being very lax in its 
efforts towards achieving the nationalist demands and especially the 
(1) "An-lo- Egyptian Relations, " p. 115. 
(2) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX -i, S.34, p.2. That statement 
was on August Ü, 1945. 
(3) Ibid, IX -ii, S. 10, pp. 76 -77. 
(4) The text of this note along with the British reply was issued 
by the British Foreign Office on January 30, 1946. The text of 
the Egyptian note mentioned that: 
"The Egyptian Government, certain that they are interpreting 
a unanimous national sentiment, consider that the manifest 
interests demand that the two parties should revise, in the light 
of recent events of their experience, the arrangements which 
govern their mutual relations at the present time. It is 
certain that the treaty of 1936, was concluded in the midst of 
an international crisis, at a moment when the spectre of war was 
already appearing, and it is to these circumstances that it 
clearly ows its present form. 
"For this reason, and in view of the unanimous urge of the 
Egyptian people and their ardent desire to see their relations 
with Great Britain established on the basis of an alliance and 
a friendship which will no longer be inspired by past prejudices 
or out -of -date doctrines, the Egyptian Government express 
their 
confidence that these views will be shared by their ally, 
and 
that the British Government will take steps to fix an early 
date 
for an Egyptian delegation to proceed to London to 
negotiate 
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unity of the Nile Valley. Riots of students and industrial 
workers flared up in Cairo and Alexandria in protest against the 
weakness of the government in its attitude towards the achievement 
of the complete independence of the Nile Vaïley.(1) At any rate, 
at this stage, the Saadists realised that they could not carry on 
with their policy against the national will and the coalition 
cabinet presided over by E1- Nokrashy Pasha resigned.(2) 
After this resignation, which occurred on February 15, 1946, 
till the acceptance of the Party to take part in the Sidky Cabinet 
in September of that year, it was the support of the Saddist Party 
which gave the Cabinet enough confidence to proceed with 
negotiations with Britain for the revision of the treaty, and it 
was the only political party which participated in the Egyptian 
delegation for negotiating that revision with two representatives.(3) 
with them the revision of the treaty of 1936. It goes 
without saying that the negotiations will include the question 
of the Sudan and will be inspired by the interests and 
aspirations of the Sudanese." 
The Times, January 31, 1946. 
(1) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. Ik -ii, S.14, p. 145. 
(2) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. pp. $3 -86; Colombe: op.cit. pp. 22£3 -230. 
(3) A' r -Ráfi` i : op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 189 -190; La Chambre des 
Députés: op.cit. Ik -ii, S. 30, pp. 262 -264, where it was only 
the Saadists who expressed their satisfaction with the course 
of the negotiations while the Nationalist Party condemned 
them and both the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the 
Independent `U'Tafdist Block abstained to express any views. Also 
S. 35, p. 306, after discussing the Egyptian case and the 
negotiations, and the political situation with regard to 
Egypt's relation with Britain, the Saadist majority initiated 
a resolution that: "After hearing the expose of the President 
of the Council of Ministers, and the debate about it, the 
Chamber estimates that the attitude of the Egyptian negotiators 
is irreproachable and decides to accord them its support 
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The Fart, played an important and effective role in getting so far 
as the draft treaty known as the Sidky -Bevin agreement in 1946; 
thus it was a Saadist Finister of foreign affairs, who became later 
the leader of that Party, who initialled the agreement with the 
independent Prime Minister on the Egyptian side. Moreover, the 
Saadists were the leading political party in favour of that treaty, 
while all other politicians, with the exception of the Liberal 
Constitutionalists and some independents, were opposing and 
condemning ít.(11 
Following the resignation of Sidky Pasha in December 1946, 
because of his failure to reach an agreement with Britain, the 
El- Nokrashy coalition Cabinet tried to reach a compromise with the 
United Kingdom on the conflicting clauses of the Sidky -Bevin draft 
treaty.(2) The efforts of the Saadists to reach an agreement 
were a failure since their policy, especially towards the Sudan, 
did not gain the approval of the London Government. In a statement 
in the Chamber of Deputies on December 16, the Saadist Prime 
Minister asserted that policy saying: "In affirming the permanent 
(1) That could be deduced from discussions in the Chamber of 
Deputies about the negotiations. Refer to: La Chambre des 
Deputes: op.cit. IX -iii, S.2, pp. 7 -9; note the resolution 
pressed in the Chamber by the Saadist majority. Ibid. 3.3, 
p. 11. Cf. Sidgi: Mudhakkirati, pp. 126 -127; Papers 
regarding the negotiations for a revision of the Anglo- 
Egvptian Treaty of 1936, p. 2. The Sidky -Bevin agreement 
never came into existence because of differences between 
Egypt and the United Kingdom on the interpretation of the 
clauses concerning the Sudan. Cf.R.I.I.A.: op.cit. pp.93 -9$. 
(2) Ibid. p. 9$; La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. IX -iii, 
S.6, 
pp. 1$ -24. 
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unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, we but 
expressed the unanimous will and wishes of the inhabitants of this 
Valley ....... When I state the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under 
the Egyptian Crown is a permanent unity, I hope that the whole 
world will understand that I am expressing the opinion of all 
Egyptians and all Sudanese. There is therefore, no ground 
to suspect that we wish to colonize the Sudan, as the desire to 
dominate cannot exist between brothers.tt(1) 
Failing to reach a solution for settling relations with 
Britain, the Government decided, on January 25, 1947, to break off 
negotiations with the United Kingdom Government and to appeal to the 
Security Council concerning the whole question of Egypt and the 
Sudan. To this effect the Saadist Prime Linister made announcements 
in both Chambers of Parliament,(2) and to this action of the 
Saadist Party the British Foreign, Secretary replied in the House 
of Commons that "the British Government would hold to the 1936 
treaty until it could deal with 'a more fully representative 
Egyptian Government.' "(3 
) 
Although the Security Council did not arrive at a decisive 
conclusion about the Anglo- Egyptian conflict and has so far left 
the Egyptian question unsolved on its agenda, the significance of 
bringing the biliteral Anglo- Egyptian dispute to be discussed by an 
(1) Ibid, IX-iii, S.5, p. 23. 
(2) Ibid, IX-iii, 3.13, pp. 2-5; 
pp. 221-222. 
(3) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p. 99. 
Ar-i áfi` i: op.cit. VOl.IIl, 
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international organisation cannot be overlooked. This was the 
first time that such an international institution had participated 
in the attempts to find a settlement for Anglo -Egyptian differences; 
and it is recalled here that the denial of Egypt's right to defend 
its national demands in the Peac.eConference after the First World 
tJar was the main factor in creating the Wafd and causing the flare 
up of the 1919 Revolt. This provides one with an explanation of 
the 'rafd's attitude to the Saadist Party while these discussions 
were proceeding in the Security Council, and of the former's 
continual attacks even to the extent of cabling the Security Council 
denying the representative character of the Saadists and the 
Government they were forming. Had the Saadists succeeded in 
finding a settlement for the relations with Britain through the 
arbitration of an international organisation, the Wafd would have 
lost one of the most important assets on which it counted for its 
popularity. 
After the return of the Egyptian delegation from Lake Success, 
it became evident that the Saadist Party tended to follow an 
extremist policy. It declared that it would undertake negotiations 
with Britain only after the evacuation of its troops; that in 
carrying out this policy Egypt should ignore Britain and try to 
establish good relations with and seek the help and technical 
advice of some other country; and that it should reinforce its 
army and pay attention to the internal conditions of the country.(1) 
(1) A'r -R afii: op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 231+-235; Cf. Majlisu)n- 
Nuwwâb: op.cit. 1 -i, S. 28, p. 39. The Saadist 
Deputy 
Mohammed Tawfik Khasbabah declared that the policy 
of the 
Saadist Party at that stage was "to reinforce 
the army as much 
as possible, and to act without being bound up with the 
provisions of the 1936 treaty 
which became null and void." 
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Although the Saadists had tried to secure the help of the.U.S.l. in 
order to find a solution for Anglo- Egyptian differences, they did 
not keep to their policy with regard to negotiations with Britain. 
They had sought a settlement but did not succeed in obtaining it.(1) 
It can be rightly said, therefore, that the Saadist Party had 
a more conciliatory attitude towards Britain than the Wafd. It 
preferred an agreement or a treaty with the United Kingdom to 
regulate the relations between the two countries. Although it might 
appear that the Party deviated from that policy in 1947 when it 
broke off negotiations with Britain and appealed to the Security 
Council, the fact is that such an action was not taken by the 
Saadists except under pressure from the people and other political 
parties.(2) 
A study of the Saadist Party would not be complete without 
referring to its responsibility for the War in Palestine in 1948, 
which ended in a shameful defeat of the Egyptian forces. It is 
not the scope of this work to study the Palestinian problem and the 
Zionist danger to the Arab States. Although one cannot disregard 
the threats to the States of the Middle East from the establishment 
of a State within that area founded principally upon religious 
and 
racial basis, it would seem that the governments of these 
States, 
and especially the Government of Egypt, "had created 
a Frankenstein 
(1) Ministre des Finances et des Affaires Economiques: 
p. 2$; R.I.I.A.: op.cit. pp. 
(2) Cf. Colombe: op.cit. pp. 237 -238. 
op.cit. 
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monster for themselves in fostering the heady and uncritical 
nationalism of their urban masses,IT(1) in order to divert the 
attention of these masses from the more important issues, namely 
their economic and social standards, and their national aspirations. 
The Saadists are responsible, therefore, not only for the 
diversion of public opinion, but also for participating in these 
military actions without sufficient equipment and previous 
preparation. They are to be blamed for all the economic and 
political repercussions of that war. In other words the Saadists 
are responsible for the expenditure of all the reserve funds, and 
for diverting even those voted for social, economic and hygienic 
schemes to be spent on a cause in which they had not sufficient 
confidence for its success. Moreover, because of that so- called 
war the country was governed and suffered from martial law for two 
years beginning in May l948.(2) 
The Saadist Prime Minister, El- Nokrashy Pasha, exercising his 
powers as General Military Governor, ordered on December ó, l948, 
the dissolution of the association of the Moslem Brotherhood 
(Jarn`i ay tu'1-Ikhwáni l IlulJ_imin)(3) because of its terrorist 
attitude. In consequence of that action El- Nokrashy was 
(1) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p. 116. 
(2) Cf. Hey orth -Dunne : op.cit. p. 48. 
Under the new regime of government in Egypt, a former 
leader of the Saadist Party, Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, who was 
holding the post of the Chief of the Royal Cabinet in 
l948 was 
accused of and condemned for pushing the country in 
a war 
without sufficient and previous preparation. 
(3) It was an organisation established 
by Hassan Al- Banna, a 
school teacher, in the late twenties. 
It was principally 
aimed at the revival of Islam, its traditions 
and teachings. 
The place from which the association emanated, 
Ismailiyah which 
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assassinated by a fanatical youth, a. member of the Brotherhood. 
Succeeding El- Nokrashy in the Premiership and the leadership of the 
Saadist Party was Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha who notwithstanding his 
declaration to Parliament after the formation of his Cabinet that 
"the foundation of this government's policy is the observation of 
public and individual freedoms,"(1) followed a policy which had 
grave effect on his own popularity, on that of his government and of 
was mostly inhabited by Europeans working for the Suez Canal 
Company, may indicate that it was an anti -foreigners' movement. 
From its formation until its dissolution in 194e, and even 
after its revival in 1950, the Moslem Brotherhood never appeared 
as a political party. Notwithstanding that the Brotherhood 
meddled in political activities its leader often stressed the 
fact that they were "neither politicians nor a political party 
but simply nationalists working for the welfare of Egypt and 
the restoration of usurped Egyptian rights." ("Nationalism in 
Egypt - The Iiuslim Brotherhood Campaign," The Times, 
November 2 , 1946 . 
Membership of the Brotherhood ran to hundreds of thousands. 
In spite of there being no accurate estimation of the number of 
participants in this organisation, its religious character and 
organisation all over the country gave it a strong position in 
Egyptian social and political life. All its activities in the 
political field were from behind the scenes. It associated 
itself with different political groups and parties and helped 
them morally, if not materially. Its first political laison 
was with Al ÿ Maher Pasha in 1939 before World War II. -Jhen his 
Cabinet failed, the Moslem Brotherhood was banned during the 
war to appear again more powerful. In 1942 it made a truce 
with the 'afd, which continued until 1946 when it turned its 
back on the rafd and collaborated with Sidky Pasha. The change 
of attitude of the Moslem Brotherhood continued until the 
association was dissolved in December 1948. Nevertheless when 
it was reorganised it started with an understanding with the 
'cafd which was responsible for its revival. However, that 
understanding did not last long because of the Wafd's attitude 
towards Britain during its tenure of office in 1950 -1951. 
Montague, R.: "Modern nations of Islam," pp. 585 -587; 
Alexander, "Left and right in Egypt," pp. 123 -128; 
Setton- Tr'iilliams: op.cit. pp. $7 -89; Colombe: op.cit. 
pp.264 -269. 
For a detailed study of the Moslem Brotherhood see: 
Heyworth- 
Dunne, J.: Religious and political trends in modern 
Egypt. 
(1) Majlisu'n -NuWW b: op.cit. IX -v, 3.9, p. 158. 
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the party under his leadership. 
In his capacity as a military governor, Abdel Hady opened 
concentration camps in which to detain members of the Brotherhood 
along with any persons suspected of having sympathy with that 
association or possessing any liberal or communistic tendency. 
Although terrorism prevailed in the country at that time, and 
although the government frequently announced that munitions, radio 
transmitters and military uniforms were collected by them under 
their emergency powers from so- called cells of illegal Moslim 
Brotherhood and underground communists, conditions could hardly 
justify the extensive mass arrests which took place. These actions 
were justified as being essential for the repression of an alleged 
revolution against the then existing system of government. But in 
reality these steps were motivated by a desire to maintain the 
prestige of the King whose popularity had been .waning almost daily 
and in order to counter forcibly the dissatisfaction that had been 
increasing among all sections of the population because of the 
pressing economic difficulties. The repercussion of that policy on 
the popularity of the Saadist Party clearly appeared in the general 
elections of January 1950 when'it did not succeed in securing more 
than twenty -eight seats out of a total of 319 in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
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The Liberal Constitutionalist Party. 
(i izbu'l- Ahrári'1 Dustúrivien) 
This Party is the outcome of the differences in the r`lafd in 
1921 about the 1Ulner ïission. It was on October 30, 1922, when 
the formation of the Party was declared under the leadership of 
idly Pasha Yaken who was well known through his controversy with 
Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd. The Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party filled the vacuum left after the disappearance of the Umma 
Party. It comprised the same followers and adopted the same 
principles as the Umma Party except that the Liberal Constitutional- 
ists were ''inspired by the policy demanding complete independence, 
a policy which became the 'raison d' etre' of all Egyptian parties 
and groups. 41(1) 
A glance at the country's conditions at the time of the 
formation of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party clarifies the 
purpose of its formation. The country was in a political turmoil: 
the Jafd, on one side, was agitating against the Declaration of 
February 1922, the Government and the politicians who had accepted 
it, and the Committee of the Thirty which had been established to 
frame the Constitution. On the other side, the Government felt a 
gap between itself and the people and tried to narrow it, if not 
(1) Heyworth -Dunne: op.cit. p.5. See supra Chapter I, pp.28 -29. 
Al- ̀ Aggad: op.cit. pp.339 -346; Ghurbal: op.cit. Vol.I, p.3. 
Cf. Landau: op.cit. p.314; He considers the appearance of 
that Party a natural result of the awakening and development 
of public opinion and the spread of education. 
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eliminate it altogether. A political party was the only means 
through which the Government could achieve its object and the 
Liberal Constitutionalist Party was born. This concept is 
strengthened by the fact that although Adly Pasha was the type of 
man who did not like political rivalry, yet he accepted the leader- 
ship of the Party after being convinced that the idinistry of Sarwat 
Pasha, (in office at that time), which the new party would support, 
was a continuation of his own which had collapsed in 1921 because of 
the failure of the negotiations with Great Britain. Moreover, the 
unpopularity of the Party amongst the people who were backing the 
afd may be another indication. This unpopularity of the Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party, and the hostility of the nation to it was 
clearly shown when two of its leading members - Hassan Pasha Abdul 
Raziq and Ismail Bey Zohdi - were assassinated on November 16, 1922 
in a car in which both Adly Pasha and Sarwat Pasha were believed to 
be found. (1) 
The eighteen -paragraphs programme of the Liberal Constitution - 
alst Party enunciated in 1922 continued in existence for the whole 
duration of the parliamentary government, except for a very slight 
change introduced and approved by the Partyts general committee in 
(1) S afi q : Hawliyät, Vol.', p.3; Vol.III, pp. 34C-344; ü- 
3 1.; abafio, 
A.: Mudhakkiráti Fi Nisfi barn, Vol. III, p. 293; A'r -Rafi` i: 
op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 68=69; Haykal: op.cit. 
Vol. I, 2p. 145 - 
p 35; Hocking: op.cit. p. 8; Yeghen: 11.; Sidqi: op.cit.  5 , 
op.cit. p. 81. 
Here is ' a party established for the promotion of 
a particular 
set of doctrines and ideas amongst the 
people. See Bryce: op. 
cit. Vol. I, p. 126. Cf. The formation of 
the Parliamentary 
lafd Party, see supra, p.I 
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March 1941.(1) Besides the common demand for the complete 
independence and the unity of Egypt and the Sudan ('1); the Party 
called for the development of constitutional government, and of 
central and local representation accompanied with the preservation of 
the nation's sovereignty and the rights of the Throne (3 -4); the 
protection of individuals' rights and the safeguarding of their 
freedom within the limits of public benefit (§ 5); the defence of 
the country against any foreign aggression or intervention ( 6); 
the combat of illiteracy among men and women alike through establish - 
ing free compulsory elementary education ( 7); the improvement of 
hygienic and financial conditions of the country (' e -9); the fair 
distribution of the burden of taxation (§ 10); free trade ( 11); 
developments in agriculture, irrigation and drainage (9 12); 
improvements of industry and transport 13 -14); encouragement of 
the co- operative movement and societies, and Egyptian companies to 
undertake public works ( 15 -16) ; increase and utilization of the 
country's national resources (: 17) ; and the regulo tion of 
relations between employers and employees (e 18). 
The Party's programme brought nothing new into political 
orientation. In spite of the fact of the resemblance between the 
objects of the 4`afd and the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, namely 
(1) Q nún Hizbu l- Äbräri l- Dusturi in, pp. 4 -7; Shafiq: 
kiawliylt, Tamhid, Vol.111, pp. 335 -337; Landau: op.cit. 
pp. 318 -319. Cf. The programme of the Party manifested during 
the electoral campaign in 1949, La Bourse Egyptienne, November 
14, 1949. 
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the achievement of Egypt's complete independence and its unity with 
the Sudan, the means by which each party tried to reach its object 
differed. The Liberal Constitutionalists had pursued, in general, 
a policy of moderation.(1) 
Although the Party intended to satisfy diverse social elements, 
arid, in so doing enunciated its programme containing progressive 
social, educational and economic reforms, the Party seemed to be a 
grouping of the upper bourgeoisie, embracing the wealthiest landlords 
and businessmen who evaluated the economic benefits they derived 
through the efforts of the Egyptian administration helped and 
directed by the British, and found common interest in transacting 
business with Britain especially in the textile industry. Moreover 
the Party comprised the "majority of the old feudal aristocracy of 
Turkish and Circassian descent (who) were still on the side of the 
Government against the nationalist movement; they feared it (the 
nationalist movement) as the product of the democratic nineteenth 
century, involving the rise of new classes that might dispute their 
dominance. "(2) The party seems, therefore, to have had connections 
(3) 
with the Palace and prepared to work in collaboration with the King. 
(1) Mallory: op.cit. (1950), p. 57; Shafiq: Hawlryát, Tamhid, 
Vol.III, p. 325. 
(2) Kohn: History of nationalism in the East, p. 191. 
(3) Shafiq: Hawliyat, Vol. I, p.2: Centre d'Etude de Politique 
Etrangere: op.cit. pp. 30 -31; Ministere des Finances et des 
Affaires Economiques: op.cit. pp. 26 -27; Armin,on: op.cit. 
p.8; Saleh: op.cit. p. 189; Hayter: op.cit. pp. 44 -45; 
Hocking: op.cit. pp. 58-59; Mallory: op.cit. (1950), 
p.59; 
Landau: op.cit. pp. 319 -322; h.I.I.Á. 
Great Britain and 
LE-rypt,1 -1g36, p. 66; Kohn: Nationalism and imperialism 
in the Hither East, pp. 62 -83; Newman: Great Britain in EEVat, 
p. 239 -240. Colombe: op.cit. pp. 14 -15. 
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The Liberal Constitutionalist Party would have contributed much J 
to the development of the representative system and helped in the 
promotion of the parliamentary government, if it had not been used 
and accepted the position of being cat's paw for the Palace. Because 
of this fact, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, while in power, 
whether by itself or in coalition with other reactionary groups, 
violated the principles of successful parliamentary government and 
infringed the law of the Constitution. The Party shares 
responsibility for the suspension of parliamentary life in 1925 and 
for the unconstitutional dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in 
year, .,U with a sole aim, namely strengthening the authority of 
the Palace and the autocracy of the King. .gain, the Party bears 
complete responsibility for the second constitutional crisis in 
1928 and for governing the country with the ''Iron Hand" with no 
other object in view than that which had created the first crisis in 
1925.(1) 
It might be claimed, however, that these two clear violations 
to the Constitution took place in the early life of a newly intro- 
duced parliamentary system of government, and that the Party had 
refuted the reputation it had acquired as insistent on reactionary 
form of government when it took the side of the people in their 
struggle against Sidky's Constitution (1930-1935).(2) But how can 
(1) t'r -tiafi i: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 68 -69 & 208 et seq; Vol. II, 
pp. 47 -52; Yohn: op.cit. pp. 103 
-107; Landau: op.cit. 
p. 319. _ibout the two crisis see Supra Chapter I, pp,50- 51&55- 
(2) Kohn: op.cit. p. 112. 
c 
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one reconcile this view with the responsibility of the Party for 
fabricating the results of the 1938 elections as re-,oresenting the 
people's will; something which to a great extent, usually brings 
consequences very similar to the suppression of Parliament altogether, 
namely-instituting a government which does not represent the people, 
nor acts according to their will. (1) 
An important question rises: 'vhy was the Liberal Constitution- 
alist Party distinguished by its reactionary attitude to the 
Parliamentary system? An answer can be found in the previous pages, 
but it is our concern here to emphasize it. First of all, the Party 
was born at a time when the people thought that there was no place 
for it in the political arena. They understood that its appearance 
was only intended to suppress their struggle for complete independ- 
ence, i.e. the sovereignty of Egypt without interference from 
Britain, the unity of Egypt and the Sudan, and the establishment of 
constitutional representative government. The attitude of the 
masses towards the Party was clearly illustrated when two of 
its 
members were, as previously mentioned, assassinated. In 
the 
second place, the Party, ever since its formation, 
had created a 
wide gap between itself and the masses. 
As has been indicated 
above, the Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party had an exclusive 
membership drawn from the remnant of the old 
Turkish aristocracy 
and the surviving elements of the 
feudal system. It was noticed 
(1) ^ op.cit. Vol. III, p. 60; 
`Id: op.cit. p. 120. 
.;. r-Raî i i : > . 
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that members of Parliament bearing the political label of this 
Party won their parliamentary seats either because of their family 
and personal influence and feud, as was the case in 1924, or 
through fraud of electoral results as happened in 1938. (1) The 
Liberal Constitutionalist Party never enjoyed the popular support 
which, in a successfully working representative democracy, should 
be the only force to bring a party into office or turn it out. 
Therefore, there was no other alternative for the Party than to 
collaborate with the Palace in order to increase the autocracy of 
the King and crush their mutual rival, the Wafd backed by the 
T.eople. (2 ) 
To evaluate the political stand of theiberal Constitutionalist 
Party, it is sufficient to notice that after five years - 1944 -1949 - 
during which the Party held appointments in every Cabinet that 
Egypt had, because of the discontent of the people with the govern- 
ments of that period, the leader of the Party, Dr. Mohamed Hussain 
Haykal, declared on the day following the collapse of the coalition, 
that: "the Liberal Constitutionalist members are only responsible 
for matters relevant to their individual authority. With regard to 
the general policy of the different governments in which they 
have 
participated for the past five years, they are not responsible 
as 
they did not assume the Presidency of the Council of 
ï._inisters. "(3) 
(1) Haykal: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 224; 
`Id: op.cit. p. 120; 
A- )r- Hafi` i : op.cit. Vol. I, p. 12. 
(2) Cf. Colombe: op.cit. p. 15; 
Centre d' tuile de politique 
Etrangere: op.cit. p. 31. 
(3) Al- Ahrám, November 4, 1949. 
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This statement cannot be interpreted except that the Party reached 
the stage that, even while in power, it could not frame a policy to 
cope with its programme. 
As regards the Party's attitude towards Britain, it should be 
noticed, first of all, that the group of politicians which formed 
the Liberal Constitutionalist Party had dissented from the Wafd 
because of that group's tendency, which was characterised by a 
conciliatory and compromising position towards Britain. Therefore, 
it is not strange that this Party had favoured negotiations with 
Great Britain as the most suitable means of achieving the inde- 
pendence of Egypt and the Sudan, and had pursued a policy of 
moderation. It encouraged and approved all negotiations with 
Great whether the Liberal Constitutionalists took part in 
carrying them on or not. Such an attitude may be due to the fact 
that since the Party's rival, the Wafd, had the widespread popular 
support, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party could derive certain 
political advantages and support from Great Britain.(1) 
(1) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p. 66; Centre d 
Etrangére. op.cit. p. 30; Colombe 
A)r- Rafi`i: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 198 
84 -95; Haykal: op.cit. Vol. I, pp 
309 -312. 
'Etude de politique 
: op.cit. pp. 15 -17; 
Vol. III, pp. 13 -15 & 
. 276 -277, 283 -284 & 
136. 
II - Minor Political Parties. 
The National Party (Al- Hizbu1 -Wa ,ani) . 
It is the party established by Mustafa Kamil in 1907 as 
i 
previously mentioned.11) It arose at the beginning of the twentieth 
century as an outcome of the nationalist movement appearing in 
rgy pt at that time. This nationalist movement was "a townsmen's 
movement, it was the first awakening of a new middle class 
influenced by Turope and brought into existence by the adoption 
of Western types of economy and civilisation ". (2) This fact 
throws light on the type of men who formed that Party. 
According to its programme, the national Party stood for 
the development of representative government and the improvement 
of the standard of living. It opposed any negotiation with 
Great Britain and demanded the absolute independence of the 
Nile Valley, its evacuation by the British and the neutralisation 
of the Suez Canal under '?gyptian protection. The party's 
attitude towards negotiations with Britain, and the slogan which 
it had adopted, that there must be no negotiation with Britain 
before the evacuation of her troops, is a significant element in 
distinguishing this Party from all other Tgyptian political parties 
and groups. In explanation of the adoption by the Party of 
(1) See Supra Chapter I, pp.15 -17 
(2) Kohn: History of Nationalism in the 
^ast, p.191; See also: 
Newman: op. cit. p.164; Hocking: op. 
cit. pp.54 -55; 
Centre d'Ttude de politique Ftrangre: op. 
cit. p.30. 
that policy, it was 
that one demands the 
However, the goal of 
Egyptians by the way 
(2) 
people." 
Although the National Party was a powerful political element 
from the time of its formation until the beginning of the First 
World War, it ceased to acquire further influence after that war 
came to an end. Searching for the reasons which caused the 
Party's weakness, one finds, in the first place, that it had no 
deep popular roots; and therefore, there was not much trouble for 
the British authority to subdue it. Secondly, the extremity 
of the party's hostility to Britain and the sympathy which it 
showed towards Turkey and Germany, especially during the war, 
might have necessitated, after the armistice and the victory 
of the Allies, that the National Party clear the way for a new 
political organisation to lead a new phase in the Egyptian national- 
ist movement for achieving the national demands and aspirations. 
In addition, the need for solidarity among the people during the 
1919 Revolt imposed on the National Party the obligation to support 
the new rising Wafd and Zaghlul. Another important point is the 
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said that it was an application of the rule 
utmost in order to obtain as much as he can.(1) 
the Party was, in general, "Egypt for the 
of the political education of the entire 
(1) Alexander, J.: The truth about 'Egypt, pp.121 -123; Kohn: 
Nationalism a.ndimarialism in the Hither East, p.$2; 
R.I ..A. op. cit. p.66-; Centre d'ntude de Politique Etrangre: 
op. cit. g.30; A)r- Rafi`i; Mustafa Kamil, pp.260 -2633 
A r -Ráfic i: Muhammad Farid, p.68; Shafiq: MuC akkamti Fi 
Nisf Qarn, Vol.III, p.23E7 
(2) Brockleman, C.: History of the Islamic eoples, 
p.457. 
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fact that the National Party was founded by the encouragement of 
Khedive Abbas Hilmy, who was deposed during the war, and his 
successor feared the influence of the National Party and 
suppressed it. All these factors resulted in the disruption 
of the Party and a steady weakening until it was reduced to 
nothing more than a minor party.(l) 
In accordance with its policy that negotiations with Britain 
should not take place until after the withdrawal of her troops, 
the National Party opposed the Declaration of February 1922 and 
considered it an attempt to divert the people from their demands 
for complete independence. Therefore, its opposition to the 
Committee of the Thirty was to be expected. Actually the 
National Party denied the competency of that Committee to draft 
the Constitution and demanded a constituent assembly. However, 
curiously enough, like the Wafd which held the same views, the 
National Party participated in the first general elections in 
1924. From then, though it did not secure much popularity, it 
became a defender of that Constitution. The Party's participation 
in the 1931 general elections under Sidky's Constitution, was, 
however, interpreted by the Cabinet and the People's Party as an 
approval to the new regime, in spite of the fact that the National 
Party had denied the authority of the King and the Cabinet to 
(1) Kohn: op. cit. p.$5; R.I.I.A.: op. cit. p.66; A''r- Ráfil.": 
op. cit. pp.351 and 365; A-'r- Re1fi'i: Thawratu sanati 1912, 
Vol.I, p.69; Kohn: History of Nationalism in the East, p.191. 
Yeghen: op. cit. pp.79 -$0. 
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replace the Constitution by another.(1) 
As regards the Party's attitude towards Great Britain, the 
National Party seems to have insisted on its policy not to lead 
any negotiations with Britain before the withdrawal of her troops, 
since it never took part or encouraged such negotiations. It did 
not participate in the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty, but on the 
other hand condemned it as not realizing the independence of 
Egypt and the Sudan. This view was frequently expressed and that 
might elucidate the vigorous opposition of the National Party to 
the other parties after the Second World War because of their 
reluctance to settle Anglo-Egyptian relations by taking decisive 
actions such as the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty. 
In consequence of the policy o_f. the Party should 
not negotiate with Britain before the evacuation of the latter's 
troops, the rule that the Party should not take part in any 
Cabinet appeared. In that matter it was declared that "the 
National Party has never aimed at seizing power as long as British 
garrisons are residing in Egypt. It believes that no government 
(2) 
_ ..r ., - 
(1) A'.r-Rafi`i:Fi A qqabi. th-Thawrati 1-Misriyah, Vol.', pp.52 
et seq.; Vol.II, pp.53-5$ 
> 
(2) Shafi,g, A.: Acmáli Ba 
. 
da 1-Mudhakkirát, p.336; Ministere des 
Finances et des ires Economiques; op. cit. p.26; 
Centre 
dartude de Politique EtrangPre: op. cit. p.30. See 
La Chambre 
des Députes: op.cit.VII - iv, S.71, p.590; 
VIII - i, S.5, 
pp.61-64; VIII - iii, S.8 _0).61-62; IX - 
ii, S.$, pp.49-50, 
S.20, p.l$$; Majlisu'n-NuTA.b: op. 
cit. IX - 
vS.466ppp1671$78; 
X - i, S.3, pp.42-43; X - ii, S.4, pP.40-43, 
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can render real service to the country without clashes and 
conflict with that power of Britain."(1) It is regrettable to 
point out that the Party ignored this rule, and from 1938 it took 
part in the different Cabinets whenever it could manage. 
(2) 
The Independent Wafdist Block. 
(Al- Kutlatu '1- Wafdiyatu'l- Niustagillah) . 
As its name indicates, this Party was a dissentient Jafdist 
group which broke away from the Wafd in 1942 -43 with Makram Pasha 
beid at its head. From the time of the formation of the Wafd, 
iakram was one of its leading members; after the death of Zaghlul, 
and for the following fifteen years, he served as Secretary -General 
of the Jafd and lieutenant to its leader, Nahas Pasha. 
Differences between this group and the Wafd, first appeared 
in the character of Makram's objection, while Minister of Finance 
in the Wafdist Cabinet in 1942, to the Cabinet's policy of nepotism. 
This objection widened the gap between Ìakram and his colleagues, 
and led to his dropping from the Cabinet in May 1942, and later, 
in July, he was expelled along with other fifteen Deputies and 
four Senators from the Wafd. This expulsion was due to the 
fact that they raised and supported accusations in Parliament 
against prominent Wafdists, and particularly El -Wakil family 
(of which the wife of Nahas Pasha the leader of the '.'Tafd 
(1) Al-Liwá'1-Nisri, 
Vo1.I, p.62. 
(2) Colombe: op.cit. 
March 15, 1926 quoted in A'r- Rúfi`Ti: cr. 
pp.$$ and cf. pp.34O -352. 
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is a member) of enriching themselves through corrupt and black - 
market transactions.(1) 
These are the circumstances which led to the appearance of the 
Independent Wafdist Block. Nevertheless it seems that there were 
some other indirect factors that strengthened the creat.on of this 
Party. First of all the hostility between the Palace and the Wafd, 
as has been previously shown, was heightened by its coming into 
power in 1942 under the influence of Britain, and the King was 
seeking and encouraging any attempt or move to weaken the Wafd. In 
other words, it seems that the rise of the Independent Wafdist Block 
was motivated by the Palace in the hope that it would result in the 
collapse of the Wafd. This theory is strengthened by the fact 
that immediately after its formation, the Independent Wafdist Block 
published the so- called "Black Blook" in which allegations of 
corruption and repotisni against the Wafd and its members were 
chronicled. This book was presented to the King as a petition to 
rescue the country from the rule of the Wafd. At the same time 
(1) A' r- Rafi', i : .op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 11b -120; R.I.I.A.: Great 
Britain and Egypt, 1914 -1951, P. 75; La Chambre des Députés: 
op.cit. VIII -i, S. 17, pp. 209 -214: 
It is important to note that according to an'experienced 
observer' "the corruption of the afd Government was more 
widespread but less deep than that of minority governments. 
The Wafd had more hungry clients to satisfy than minority 
governments and its clients had been longer in the wilderness. 
Minority personalities, moreover, had more skill and knew better 
how to cover up their tracks." 
R.I.I.A. op.cit. p. 76, n.l; The Times, The Manchester 




copies were sent to the British and American Embassies in Cairo, as 
well as being circulated among the people. On the grounds of the 
accusations in the Black Book against the `: afd, the King determined 
to dismiss the Wafdist Cabinet, but he was deterred by the British 
Ambassador.(1) Moreover, the attitude of Makram in 1937 -38 
towards the Saadists who differed with the ...afd on several issues, 
one of which was the corruption and nepotism of the .-afd, asserts 
that theory.(2) However, last but not least, the personal element 
made itself felt in the background of the dissent of the Independent 
's:'afdist Block. Makram Pasha, a Copt by birth converted to a 
Protestant, who could not hope to lead the Party (the Wafd) himself, 
had manoeuvered to maintain ascendancy over ITahas and the Party, 
and this seems have in the appearance of the 
Jafdist Block. (3 ) 
(1) R.I.I.A.: op.cit. 76; Colombe: op.cit. pp. 110 -111. 
(2) Graves, P.P.: "The story of the Egyptian crisis," pp. 299-301; 
see La Chambre des Députes: op.cit. VIII -i, S. 17, p. 209 
where Nahas Pasha the leader of the Wafd reminded Makram with 
his attitude in 1937. 
(3) In the Black Book Liakram Pasha accused Nahas Pasha, the leader 
of the Wafd and Prime Minister, of transforming the Government 
into a sort of private business for him, for his parents and 
for his Ministers. Faced with these accusations the "`,afdist 
Cabinet did not resort to courts for fear of interminable 
legal delays and insisted on their discussion in Parliament. 
An interpellation about the most grave ten accusations, chosen 
by Makram Pasha himself, was discussed in the Chamber of 
Deputies. The Government, however, secured the confidence 
of 
the Chamber, and in due course Makram was expelled 
from the 
Chamber because he had made wild and foul allegations 
against 
members of the Government,and *Parliament. 
See: La Chambre des Deputes: 
op.cit. VIII -ii, S. 25, p.171 
S. 27, pp. 178-184; S.30, pp. 
194 -213; S.32, pp. 217 -224; 
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The Party enunciated a programme which can be summarised as 
follows: the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan; the 
evacuation of British troops, and only a treaty of alliance with 
Britain based on the reciprocal respect of the sovereignty of the 
two countries would regulate Anglo- Egyptian relations; the co- 
operation with the Arab States for achieving their national aspira- 
tions and developing economic, political and social relations; the 
enforcement of real democratic rules and resistance to any dictatorial 
elements 'Without any violation to the monarchial constitutional 
system; the improvement of social conditions by combatting illiterac3 
exempting poor classes from taxes, creating progressive taxation, 
establishing a social insurance system against unemployment, illness 
and old age; the industrialisation of the country; and the 
utilisation of its natural resources.(1) 
The programme of the Independent Wafdist Block seems to have 
aimed especially at introducing social reforms and raising the 
standard of living. This trend of the Party was more apparant in 
the programme enunciated during the elections held in 1950.(2) As 
regards the Party's efforts to achieve its policy, it had a narrow 
chance to act effectively. Nevertheless, in spite of the stipula- 
tion in its programme for the necessity of a treaty to regulate 
S. 33, pp. 226 -228; S.34, pp. 232 -236; 
3.40, pp. 322 et seq.; 
S. 41, pp. 335 et seq.; S. 46, pp. 470 -474. The Times, 
April 26, May 19 & 25, 1943; The New York Herald Tribune, 
May 25, 1943, and May 28, 1944. 
(1) Al- kutlatu 41- i;afdiyah wa barnámajuha. 
(2) La Bourse Eg;Tptienne, November 14, 1949. 
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Anglo-Egyptian relations, the Party had adopted an uncompromising 
policy and opposed every attempt to reach an agreement for the 
revision of the 1936 Treaty. This policy of the Party might be 
due to its desire to attract supporters after its resignation from 
the coalition Cabinet in 1946. The Party's insistence on the 
national aspirations and their preponderance to internal reform 
was stressed repeatedly. (1) 
The 3ocialist Party of :nt. 
THi zb l' isr'1- Isht_r Ici) 
Although this Party was only officially organised, and its 
programme was announced in 1949,(2) it is remarkable that it was 
actually a continuation of the 'Young Egypt' ( isr,'l -F atát) movement 
which had appeared in the early thirties. Therefore, it seems 
important to make a quick survey of that movement. In the first 
place, the ideology of the movement was fiercely nationalist as well 
as Islamic. Its social outlook was modelled on fascist lines which 
were very popular up to 1939 throughout the Middle East. (J) The 
fascist tendencies of that movement were clearly illustrated when its 
Green Shirts were formed. Here it might be of some interest to 
point out that these Green Shirts were established according to the 
King's wishes and through his encouragement in order to oppose the 
Colombe: op.cit. ip.230 et seq; R.I. 
Sidqi: op.cit. pp.111-113 and 125-129 
VOl.III, pp.199-204; La Chambre des 
3.15, p.153. 
A1-Ahrà:a, December 24, 1949. 
Cf. The programme of iìisru'1-Fatät, 
op. cit. pp.103-105. 
I.A. op.cit. pp.$6 et seq. 
; A'r-Räfi ̀ i : op.cit. 
Deputes: op.cit. IX-iv, 
cited in Hepworth- Dunne, 
115. 
Wafd. Because of these fascist tendencies it was believed that 
with the defeat of European fascism this 'Young Egypt' movement, 
which had been moulded into a party, would be a spent force. More- 
over, signs of its weakness appeared especially after the suspension 
of all its activities during the Second World War and the detention 
of its leaders by the police.(1) However, not long after the War 
came to an end, Misr)l -Fatah revived, and before the general 
elections held in January 1950, it changed its name to the Socialist 
Party of Egypt. 
The Party's programme can be summarised as follows: the 
inviolability of individual and public freedom, and the rights of 
individuals stipulated for by the Constitution (, 1); the guarantee 
by the State of a decent life and a minimum standard of living for 
every Egyptian by helping families to bring up their children and 
insuring individuals against illness, unemployment and old age (: 2); 
the establishment of free education, up to the secondary stage, for 
every Egyptian of both sexes, and the adoption of a policy to combat 
illiteracy within five years (`;' 3') ; the provision of suitable work 
for every Egyptian, with wages to vary according to variations in the 
social status of workers who should have the right to form general 
federations to regulate their relations both employers and the 
State ( 4); the replacement of the individualist system of pro- 
duction with a collective one, and during the transition period 
individuals would possess industries, (4 5); the ownership of the 
(1) Graves: op.cit. pp. 299 -300; R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p. 49; 
Issawi: op.cit. pp. 174 -175; Colombe: op.cit. pp. 141 -142. 
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land should be confined to those who work on it, nobody would possess 
more than five feddans, and the foundation of collective system of 
production U" 6) ; the imposition of progressive taxes, death duties 
and taxes on luxuries; the elimination of all factors leading to 
segregation between Egyptians to get rid of social discrimination 
and secure social justice (." 7); the liberation of the Nile Valley 
and the right of the Sudan to choose the form of its own government 
0 8); the amalgamation of the Arab States into a socialist federa- 
tion or confederation (.* 9); the security of international peace 
through spreading friendship and equality among the people without 
regard to colour, race or religion; and, the resistance of any 
imperialist attempt for the exploitation of the nation.(1) 
It is quite apparent that the Party's object in the foreign 
sphere was very much the same as that of other political parties, 
namely, the liberation of the Nile Valley. The Party's policy to 
achieve that aim had followed a demagogic line which clearly 
appeared after the repudiation of the 1936 Treaty; it demanded and 
agitated for the declaration of war against Great Britain. 
Moreover, 
the Socialist Party of Egypt, unlike other political parties, 
had 
hoped for an Arab socialist confederation. Here it 
is worth 
noticing that in April 1951 a Congress of Arab socialists 
was held, 
but "the parties represented at the conference 
could hardly be 
called 'bona fide' Socialists by T'Testern 
Standards, "(2) It might 
(1) Hi zbu MLi sri1 -I shtiraki : Barnáma.1u` l -bi 
zb wa 1ám iatuhu, 
Art. III, pp. 2 -14. 
(2) Alexander, Li.: "Left and right 
in Egypt," p. 127. 
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be due to this fact, as well as the weakness of socialist movements 
in the Arab countries, that the idea of an Arab Socialist Confedera- 
tion did not materialise in an effective way. 
The Party seems to have been aiming at a socialist revolution 
since it demanded a collective system of production. The Party, 
however, might have been just floating with international political 
currents, because it is rather strange that at the same time when 
the government banned all communist organisations and activities, 
such a party as the Socialist Party came into the open. Furthermore 
it was the same leaders of the Socialist Party who, in the thirties, 
had founded Misr'l -Fatáh and its Green Shirts in imitation of the 
fascist movements which prevailed in Europe at the time. Therefore, 
it is not strange that they appear later, at the beginning of the 
fifties, in this new camouflaged shape, to correspond with the 
socialist trend.(1) 
The Party participated in the general elections held in 
January 1950, and one of its three candidates succeeded in represent- 
ing the Party in the Chamber of Deputies.(2) He never missed a 
chance to express the Party's views. The Party's two weekly organs 
published its opinion on Egyptian nationalism and national socialism, 
as such drastic socialist propaganda that these two organs 
had been 
(1) Ibid. p.127. 
(2) This Deputy was Ibrahim Shukry, who in spite of 
being a 
university graduate and an agricultural engineer, 
was elected 
for a constituency in the country side (Sherbin) 
where he 
possessed a large estate and his family exerted 
some influence. 
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confiscated, suppressed or suspended at various times by the 
Government. (1) The membership of the Party, however, ran to 
thousands, mainly of youths, students, secondary school pupils and 
working classes. The attraction was due to the discontent spreading 
among the people because of economic crises caused by the continuous 
rise of the cost of living, the spread of corruption in the govern- 
mental machine and the circulation of gossip and rumours about it, 
ana the loss of faith in the old political parties.(2) 
The Labour Movement and the E,gypttan_Labour Party. 
Legally, trade unions did not exist in 4Lgypt before 1942 when 
a law was enacted permitting workers to form trade unions in order 
to organise themselves for the protection of their interests and for 
collective bargaining with their employers. 
In spite of the illegality of their existence, trade unions were 
found prior to the promulgation of that law. In 1920, through the 
encouragement of a goldsmith in Alexandria, Joseph Rosenthal, a 
body of right wing moderates formed the Egyptian Socialist Party. 
But not long after, an extreme left wing in that Party arose, and 
diverted it, under the leadership of Mahmud Bushy El- Uraby, into a 
(1) It was said that the Wafdist Government attempt to repress the 
Press in 1951 (see supra p.l -01- ) was because of the attacks of 
these two socialist weeklies on the Kin:, the corruption of the 
government and the prevailing poor social conditions. Majlisun- 
Nuwwáb: op.cit. X -ii., S.38, pp. 27 -34; La Bourse Eg ptienne, 
July 27, 1951. 
(2) Al- Baráwi, R.: Harakatu l- in.ilábi l- akhiri fi -íisr, p. 7E. 
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communist party which adhered to the Third International. Like 
other political organisations at that time, the Communist Party 
demanded the evacuation of the British from Egypt and the Sudan; 
but in distinction, it opposed reactionary legislation and aimed at 
modern labour protection and social legislation, the complete 
emancipation of women, and free education. However, this 
Communist Party did not live long and it was suppressed in 1924.(1) 
In the early 1930's a federation of trade unions flourished, 
but only to be banned in consequence of some strikes which were 
interpreted as being of political motivation against the government 
and Sidky's Constitution.(2) From then until the promulgation of the 
legislation of trade unions in 1942, the labour movement was 
restricted, and, to a certain extent tent underground. 
Because of the strong opposition of the 'Federation of 
Industries' to the law organising trade unions, this law was 
characterised by a number of restrictions. (3) The formation of 
unions should have been approved by the government; their financial 
(1) Kohn: Histor of Nationalism in the East, p. 214: Alexander: 
op.cit. p. 120; Badaoui, Z.: Les -.roblens du travail et les 
organisations ouvrieres in Egypte, pp. 24 -30. 
It is worth noticing that this communist party put forward 
demands for the abolition of large feudal estates, through the 
remittance of debts of peasants owing less than thirty feddans, 
the exemption from taxes of those with less than ten feddans, 
and limiting land ownership to a maximum of one hundred feddans. 
Kohn: op.cit. p. 214. 
(2) Handly, TJ . J .: "Labour movement in Egypt," pp. 280 -282; 
Badaoui: op.cit. pp. 33 -35. 
(3) Issawi: op.cit. p. 97. The 3gyptian Federation of Industries 
was established in 1922 to represent, defend, 
and safeguard 
the interests of industrial capitalists 
and employers. 
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reports and the minutes of their meetings should have been available 
for the inspection of government officials; they should not busy 
themselves with political or religious questions; and, their ïceeting. 
should have been authorised by the competent authorities which could 
withhold permission if the meetings were contrary to public security 
and policy. Although most of the working class people are engaged 
in agriculture, agrl cultural workers were prohibited from forming 
or joining trade unions. Moreover, the government had the absolute 
right to dissolve unions in case of their violation of the provisions 
of the law.(1) 
The Egyptian Labour Party, as its name suggests, claimed to 
represent the political aspirations of the working classes. Although 
active in the thirties and after the Second World War, the Party had 
not shown itself an important force in politics, and it seems to 
have lost many of its adherents after the appearance of the Socialist 
Party of Egypt.(2) 
The Party's programme was mainly concerned with raising the 
social and economic standards of the masses. This programme could 
be summarized as: (a) combatting poverty through raising the 
standard of living, recognising workers'trade unions and associations 
without any distinction, and making it compulsory that workers 
join 
(1) Handly: op.cit. p. 2$2; Badaoui: op.cit. 
pp. 102 -104; La 
Chambre des Députes: op.cit. VIII -i, S. 
26, pp. 326 et seq. 
(2) The Party was founded in 1931 by Prince 
Abbas Halim, a second 
cousin of King Farouk, but it was banned 
and vanished especially 
during the Second World 'war, when its leader 
was arrested 
because of his fascist tendencies; it 
sprang up again after his 
release in 1944. 
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these unions; (b) struggling against disease, and especially the 
endemics, through establishing a system of compulsory health 
insurance; (c) eliminating illiteracy; and, (d) amending the 
electoral law so as to effect a more representative government, and 
establishing a Miinistrz, of Labour. (1 ) 
In the general elections held in 1915 and 1950, the few 
candidates running under the auspices of the Egyptian Labour Party 
were unsuccessful. This seems to be mainly due to the fact that the 
leadership of the Party was drawn, to a large extent, from the upper 
classes which normally have conflicting interests with those of the 
working people. To show this aspect of the Party, it is interesting 
to notice that in conftection with a tram strike in Cairo in 1946, 
the leader of the Party emphasised that: iOur movement is free from 
all political characteristics, free from sectarianism, from social 
conflicts, from sugary promises Let all come and join us for 
the great benefit of the Fatherland, under the banner of the First 
(2) 
Worker for national prosperity H.M. K ing Farouk." This statement 
shows the tendency of the Party to the so- called 'Royal Socialism' 
which was an allegation that the King was the defender of the workers 
and working classes. 
In addition to the above mentioned political parties, an 
important feature was very apparent in the Egyptian platform, namely, 
the existence of a considerable number of independents who usually 
(1) Badaoui: op.cit. p. 152. 
(2) Al- zhrám, October 19, 1949. 
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swung with the current of affairs. Although it is rather 
difficult to find a definition for the 'independent' politician, 
he is usually characterised by his aloofness from political parties 
in order to avoid the consequences of his adherence to one party or 
to the other upon his economic interests.(1) As rightly described 
by J. Heyworth- Dunne, independent politicians in Egypt "were 
representatives of the old- fashioned idea of government, were 
sympathetic to a strong autocratic king, from whom they derived 
their power and prestige, as compared with the politicians, wh::; were 
striving for constitutional government on ''Jestern lines. "(2 ) 
Independents were one of the main reasons for the instability 
of parliamentary life, and are to be blamed for the stagnant poor 
social and economic conditions of the country, because they had the 
chance to come into power, repeatedly, but with no serious policy 
for developing these conditions. This might also be a result of 
the non -co- ordinate views they usually held. (3) Moreover, inde- 
pendents were a peril to the parliamentary system in Egypt, since 
they weakened the party system without which "the government in 
power is controlled only by the pressure of customs, which itself is 
weakest in times of crisis; by the desire for popularity, which is 
easily overborne by the ambitions of despotism."(4) 
(1) Cf. Ahmed Mañir Pasha and his views about independents, La 
Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX-i, S.6, p.4. 
(2) Heyworth- Dunne; op.cit. p.6. 
,r ST p 24-25; Sabry, (3) NTandúr, i.: Aid -)d ráti atus -si_ äsi.ra,l 
E.S.: "Les partis politiques sont les fondements du regime 
uarlementaire." 
(4) M.clver: op.cit. p. 399. 
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Political parties in Egypt were distinguished by their 
attitudes towards Great Britain, although, they were all insistent 
on the national demands for the evacuation of British-troops and 
the Unity of the Nile Valley. Their multiplicity with only slight 
differences in their programmes is quite apparent. This fact led 
to the belief that parties were mainly based on personal foundations 
and that most of the party members were personal followers of the 
leaders. This viewpoint was sarcastically expressed in the Chamber 
of Deputies where it was pointed out that the only possibility to 
quell the feuds between parties was through increasing the number 
of ministerial posts to include all the leaders of political 
parties. (1 ) On the other hand, some theorists called for the 
amalgemation of different political parties bearing the same 
character and adopting the same general principles and policies 
into one party.(2) Moreover, some thinkers believed that since 
Egypt was at the start of parliamentary life, and because of its 
social conditions, there should be only two political parties. In 
other words, they claimed the establishment of a two party system,on 
condition that both parties should agree on the principles of great 
national issues and only differ on minor ones.(3) 
However, it should be noticed first of all, that plurality of 
parties is an essential requirement for the existence of democracy 
since a single party system :"cannot provide the basis of a system 
S.71, p. 590. (1) La Chambre des Députés, op. cit. VII -iv, 
(2) Sabrd., E.: op. cit. pp. 739-741. ». 
(3) `Allúbah, M.A.: Mabádi' fies- siydsati- l- Misriyah, p. 
113. 
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of government by discussion. pt (1) The preference between the two 
party system and the multiple party system is rather difficult, 
and one should be aware of the fact that" complex social and 
historical circumstances predispose a given country toward one or 
the other system. "(2) 
(1) Barker: op.cit. p. 39; 
pp. 306-312. 
(2) Field, G.L.: Governments in 
modern society, p. 313. 
Dunverger, 14.: Les partes politiques, 
CHAPTER III 
The Monarch 
"according to Article 32 of the 1923 Constitution, Egypt was a 
hereditary monarchy. This monarchy was founded on the bases of the 
old institution of the Khediviate whose principles had been derived 
from the Califate.(1) It is of some importance to notice that 
Egypt's nationalist movement and struggle for independence and full 
sovereignty which started after the first World War did not lead to 
more than the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. 
The Constitution devoted the first chapter of its second title 
to enumerate the King's rights and prerogatives. In it the King 
enjoyed many prerogatives to enable him to safeguard the prosperity 
of the nation, perhaps because of the idea that when the glory of the 
Crown radiates over all, the country is happy and prosperous, but when 
the country becomes weak and impoverished, the Crown loses its brill - 
iance.(2) Another reason for the wide scope of the King's authority 
may lie in the fact that the attitude of the Committee of the Thirty, 
which was impressed by the differences among political leaders, 
especially Zahlul Pasha and Adly Pasha, was to give the King enough 
powers for him to check the various tendencies of the different 
political parties and to maintain a moderate policy rather than some 
extreme theories which might be feared by the gins. Moreover, faced 
by the fact that its functions were merely to draft a Constitution 
(1) Laoust: op.cit. p.75 
(2) Saleh: op.cit. pp.297 & 311 
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which would need the sanction of the King to become effective, the 
Committee of the Thirty was very reluctant to deprive the King of 
some of his powers because they wished to avoid any possibility that 
the King might oppose the promulgation of the Constitution. 
(1) 
Before assuming his constitutional powers, the King took a 
special oath before Parliament to observe the Constitution and the 
laws, and to maintain the country's independence and the safety of 
(2) 
its territories. This means that the King derived his rights from 
the Constitution, (3) and that, like all other constitutional institut- 
ions, he was a representative of the people. It is also a confirm- 
ation of the principle that all powers and authority emanated from 
the nation. (4 ) This conception is proved by the role of the rep- 
resentatives of the people, i.e. Parliament, in choosing a King, in 
the case of the vacancy of the Throne, or the absence of a legal heir 
to it. 
(5) 
Also, the Cabinet's right to act in the King's place 
during the period from his death to the time when his successor or 
the regents assume power, is further proof.(6) This provision of 
the Constitution was in practice in 1936 when King Fuad died and the 
Council of :Ministers, presided over by lily Maher Pasha, assumed the 
monarch's constitutional powers till the regents took the oath before 
Parliament in May l93ó.(7) Again this rule was in force after the 
(1) Haykal: op.cit. Vol.I, pp.136 -13$ 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art.50, see Appendix I 
(3) Sabry, E. S.: Le pouvoir legislatif et le pouvoir executif en 
Egypt e, pp. 41-42 
(4) 1923 Constitution, Art.23 
(5) Ibid. Arts. 53 w 54 (6) ibid. Art.55 
(7) It is worth noting that Parliament did not approve the appointment 
of the regents according to King Fuad's will; it unanimously 
elected those who undertook that office till July 1937 when 
King Farouk became of age and assumed his constitution) powers. 
A r- Páfi'`i: op.cit. Vol.III, pp.11 -12 
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abdication in July 1952, of King Farouk, in favour of his son.(1) 
The King's civil list and the allocations of the Royal family 
were constitutional rights. (2) Although the sums were fixed in the 
Constitution, Parliament had the right to increase or reduce them. 
In order to avoid any influence on the sovereign, it was provided 
that such alteration should take place only on the accession to the 
Throne of a new monarch. It was on the accession of King Farouk to 
the Throne in 1936 that the civil list, as well as the allocations 
to the Royal family were fixed at a sum reduced from what it had been 
during King Fuad I reign and as stated in the Constitution.(3) The 
question which may arise is, whether the King had any right to the 
civil list or not. Without doubt the King renders a public service 
to the State, for which he must be paid. Moreover, he is the rep- 
resentative of the country's dignity, which must be kept high; and 
this may be another justification of the King's right to the civil 
(4) 
list. 
(1) Since that abdication occurred under the pressure of the Revolutior 
carried out by the Army, and Parliament was dissolved at the time, 
conflicting viewpoints were expressed. On the one hand, the Wafd 
claimed that the dissolved Chamber of Deputies should be convoked 
to give its consent to the appointment of the regents. On the 
other side, the Cabinet, which was presided over by the same 
Premier who faced a similar situation in 1936, and the Army which 
have acquired political strength insisted that it would be the 
Council of Ministers which should perform the function of 
Parliament. However, the State Council was consulted. It ex- 
pressed the view that the abdication was an exceptional case for 
which the Constitution did not provide any rules; and therefore, 
the procedure following it might be as expressed by the Army and 
the Cabinet. La Bourse Egvptienne, August 1, 1952 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art.l61 M 
(3) The Law No.56 of 1936; Ra'fat & Ibráhim: Al- Qánunu d- dusturi, 
pp. 57Q7571 - - 
(4) Al- Ahwani, A.M.: Raisu°d- dawlah Fi >n- nizami d- dimoorati, p.249 
cf. Ogg, F.A.: English government and politics, pp.102 -103, 
where he argues that point with regard to Britain. 
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The King was the supreme head of the State. His person was 
inviolable and he was exempted from all laws. (1) Consequently, the 
King could do no wrong; that is why his orders, whether oral or 
written, did not exempt ministers from responsibility. (2) This 
illustrates an essential principle of parliamentary system, namely, 
the head of the State exercises his powers through the intermediary 
of his ministers, and that "the acts of the King in relation to State 
affairs must, to be effective, be counter -signed by the President of 
the Council of ministers and the linisters concerned." In Western 
parliamentary governments, exemptions from this rule are only those 
( 
acts which are strictly personal and relate to the private life of the 
sovereign; but in Egypt, on the contrary, there were many important 
exceptions to that fundamental doctrine, and in certain important 
functions the King acted without the participation of any of his 
ministers. (4) The actions which the King practised through the 
intermediary of his ministers were issued by 'Royal Decrees" signed 
by the King and the competent ministers with the introduction: 
"According to the advice of the Minister of (or the Council of 
(Ministers) and the approval of the Council of Ministers." Rights 
which he exercised without their participation were issued as "Royal 
Rescripts" signed only by the King and usually introduced with the 
formula: "We King of Egypt We order the following ...." 
The monarch was the head of the executive power and took part 
in the legislature. (5) The powers granted to him were "considerably 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art.33 
(2) Ibid, Art.62; Ra)fat Ibfdhim: op.cit. pp.543 -545 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art.60; see also Art.i 
(4) Saleh: op.cit. p.342 
(5) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 29 24 
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greater than those accorded to the Chief of most constitutional 
States. This is particularly evident in the latitude permitted him 
in participating in the legislative functions, (and) means by which 
he may exert control over the legislative and executive branches of 
the Government. "(1) The legislative power was exercised by the King 
concurrently with the two chambers of Parliament. This means that 
this power was a compound one.(2) The róle of the King in legis- 
lation was limited to his right to initiate, sanction and promulgate 
laws.(3) 
The initiative power was exercised concurrently by the King and 
the two chambers of Parliament.- It is believed that it was in a 
democratic spirit that the Constitution gave members of Parliament 
the right to initiate legislation; however, it is very difficult to 
imagine an institution having the right and a main function to make 
laws, but not able to propose them. As it was understood that the 
Government's right to initiate legislation was derived from that of 
the King, all Bills the government had to bring before Parliament, 
should have borne the King's signature, along with that of one or 
(4) 
more ministers. 
It was taken for granted that if the King did not approve any 
Bill proposed by the Government, he would not sign it, and consequent- 
ly it could not be submitted to Parliament. For example, when the 
Cabinet proposed two Bills designed to prevent infringements of the 
Constitution, they were not presented to Parliament because of the 
(1) O'Rourke: The juristic status of Ezvpt and the Sudan, p.71. 
(2) Sabry: op.cit. p.41; Sabry: op.cit. p.307. 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 28 and 34. 
(4) Sabry: op.cit. pp. 45 -4$. 
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refusal of the King to sign them, and the Cabinet, continuing to 
insist on these measures, had to resign.(1) It is interesting to 
notice that, while an individual member of Parliament could propose 
laws, the Council of i inisters, which was formed of Deputies and 
Senators, and was responsible for the interests and the safety of 
the State, could not initiate any legislation without the consent 
of the King. 
So significant were differences between the monarch and the 
Cabinet on the initiation of legislation, that Nahas Pasha, the 
leader of the Jafd, explained such a position when he was dismissed 
from the Cabinet in 1937. He said: 'The difference between the 
Palace and the Cabinet is not a question of persons, but of con- 
stitutional principles. The question was, whether there was to be 
a constitutional or purely despotic government. As a principle of 
constitutional law, the Ministry is responsible to Parliament, and we 
claimed that Bills presented for the King's signature before present- 
ation to Parliament for discussion should not be delayed, particularly 
(2) 
since a private member can present legislation on his own initiative." 
According to the 1923 Constitution, the initiative of financial 
legislation and taxation, and measures concerning the fiscal policy, 
was the right of the King and the real representatives of tax- payers, 
i.e. the Chamber of Deputies. 
(3) 
(1) Ghosh: op.cit. p.97; Newman: "Egypt", p.570; see supra Chapter II 
pp.103 -101, Chapter I, p.60. 
(2) Keesinp's Contemporary Archives (1937- 1940), p.2880 
(3) The 1930 Constitution made the initiative for the creation or 
modification of financial legislation an absolute right of the 
sovereign, and it clearly stipulated for that in Article 28. 
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The King's right to sanction laws is of greater significance 
than his right to initiate them because it was the way in which he 
could participate and have an effective part in the legislature.(1) 
dithout his sanction no legislation could be moulded in the con- 
stitutional form and have any real effect. If the King judged it 
not expedient to sanction a Bill accepted by both chambers of 
Parliament, that Bill should have been returned to Parliament within 
a month; otherwise it would be considered as having obtained the 
King's sanction. Parliament could re- examine that Bill, but the 
majority required for its re- approval was two -thirds of each chamber. 
In case of failure to get this majority, the Bill would not be dis- 
cussed again during the same session; but if in a later session 
Parliament passed that Bill by an absolute majority of votes, it 
would become law.(2) 
Therefore, it is said that the King's right to veto laws was 
non- existent, that even his right to sanction laws was not absolute, 
and that Parliament was the institution which had the decisive word 
(3) 
in matters of legislation. In practice, it seems unlikely that a 
re- examined Bill would have got the approval of two -thirds of members 
in each chamber of Parliament, especially in the Senate where two - 
fifths of its members were nominated by the King, and being influenced 
(1) Sabry; op.cit. p.56; 1923 Constitution, Art.34 
(2) Ibid. Arts. 34 w 35. The 1930 Constitution extended to two 
months the period during which the King should give his sanction. 
to Bills ratified by Parliament or return them to this latter 
institution. Furthermore, it considered that the default to 
return rejected Bills to Parliament within these two months 
amounted to non - sanction. 1930 Constitution, Art.35; Raafat, J.: 
op.cit. pp.22 -23; O'Rourke: op.cit. p.71 
(3) Raafat: op.cit. p.20; Saleh: op.cit. p.337 
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by him, they might have been an obstacle in forming the required 
majority. This situation gives some sense to the idea that the 
Kingts right to sanction laws contradicted the democratic system. 
That right might have been a handicap imposed on the will of the 
people as expressed in a Bill passed by Parliament; and moreover, 
it might have negatived the sovereignty of the people which was 
confirmed by the Constitution in Article 23. (1) 
In the Committee of the Thirty, there were two trends regarding 
the King's right to sanction laws. The first tended to the idea that, 
as real democracy is based on the sovereignty of the people and on the 
constitutional conception of the separation of powers, the approval 
of Parliament to any Bill should bear the idea of sanction. Further- 
more, the members of the Committee who adopted this idea feared that 
by giving such a right to the King who was at the same time the head 
of the executive power, a path might be laid for foreign intervention, 
especially by the Power whose troops had been residing in the country. 
They thought that the King's right to dissolve Parliament was suffic- 
ient to keep a balance among the powers active on the political stage, 
namely, the Cabinet and Parliament. The second line of thought was, 
that, as Article 24 of the Constitution stipulated for the partner- 
ship of the King in the legislative power, his right to sanction laws 
would be the only means through which he could be an effective partner. 
After long deliberations the Committee decided in favour of the second 




(1) Kamel, h..: Le regime democratique et parlementaire, pp.73-74; 
Sabri:ob.cit. pp.332-333_ -- 
(2) 1.bid, p.337; Al-Ahwani: op.cit. pp.253-264 
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Again, it is the King who promulgated laws. (1) This right was 
conferred on the King as the head of the executive power and because 
no law would become enforceable until after its promulgation. The 
promulgation of a law was only the announcement of the text ratified 
by the legislative power, without any modification introduced by the 
executive. It is worth recalling that Parliament by itself could 
promulgate laws in such cases as when it re- examined and ratified 
Bills which it had previously approved, but which did not get the 
sanction of the King. The Constitution did not state a precise 
period during which a law should be promulgated. This defect in 
the Constitution was easily used by the executive power to delay the 
promulgation of laws ratified by both Chambers of Parliament, However, 
the promulgation of laws usually accompanied the sanction of the King, 
(2) 
which was precisely restricted to certain conditions, mentioned above. 
It is very important to realise that at the very time when the 
King' s participation in legislation was very limited, and when the 
introduction of any modification of the Constitution needed the 
ratification of both Chambers of Parliament and the sanction of the 
King, (3) the King ,,]lone and independently could suspend the Con- 
stitution and replace it with another. This may be because, although' 
it is believed that the Constitution was a consequence of the 
nationalist movement of 1919 -1922, there was no basis to that Con- 
stitution except the Royal Rescript by which it had been issued. (4) 
Here, it might be recalled that the suspension of parliamentary life 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art.34 
(2) Sabry: op.cit. pp.85-91 
(3) 1923 Constitution, .-Lrts. 156 & 157 
3 6 O'Rourke: op.cit. .67-69 (!y1 Saleh: op.cit. p. , ro 2 1 
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and of some articles of the Constitution in 1925 and 192$; the 
replacement of the Constitution with a reactionary one in 1930, 
and its return in 1935 were all according to Royal Hescripts issued 
by the king. (1) 
In spite of the very minor share the King had as a partner in 
the legislative -cower, he could influence Parliament, the effective 
organ of the legislature, through practising certain of his prerog- 
atives. 
(2) 
The first of these prerogatives was his right to convoke 
Parliament in ordinary and extra -ordinary sessions. The King had to 
invite Parliament to meet every year in ordinary sessions before the 
third Saturday in November; in default of its being convoked by that 
date, it was to meet with full authority on that particular day.(3) 
There is no precedent that Parliament was convoked according to that 
latter way as it had usually been convoked by the King. Extra- 
ordinary sessions of Parliament were convoked by the King in cases of 
necessity or on request by the majority of either chamber of 
Pa.rliament.O The closure of both ordinary and extra- ordinary 
sessions of Parliament was pronounced by the King,(5) who could use 
this right to influence Parliament. To prevent Parliament from 
(1) Cf. The abrogation of that Constitution in 1952, while monarchy 
was still existing in Egypt. It was by a proclamation from the 
leader of the revolution carried out by the army, and in so doing, 
General Neguib declared that abrogation in the name of the 
Egyptian people. See the text of that proclamation, La Bourse 
Ecv- otienne, Betember 10, 1952 
(2) 0`tl òßr e ' op.cit. p.73 (3) 1923 Constitution, Art. 96 
(4) ibid. tlré.40. Cf. The 1930 Constitution which required the request 
of a majority of members of both Chambers of Parliament 
(5) 1923 Constitution, Arts 96 & 40 
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passing a particular Bill, the King could pronounce the closure of 
the session, giving no chance to members of Parliament to discuss 
and vote on that Bill. This right of the King, however, was not 
absolute. Ordinary sessions could not be terminated unless they 
have lasted for a minimum duration of six months and the Budget was 
approved. 
(1) 
The King could adjourn the sittings of Parliament for a maximum 
period of one month, but only once during the same session. In case 
of two adjournments being needed during one single session, the con- 
sent of Parliament itself to the second adjournment was required. 
(2) 
This prerogative of the King was another way through which he could 
influence Parliament. It was hoped that by using this right the 
dissolution of Parliament would have been avoided, as the adjourn- 
ment was meant to be a chance given to members of Parliament to 
return to the electorate and discuss the reasons for the adjournment 
with them and form their opinions and decide according to the 
electorate's will.(3) 
In practice, the adjournment of Parliament had been used as a 
preparatory step for its dissolution. Instead of being a measure 
taken to reconcile the Cabinet and members of Parliament, after 
this latter group has consulted the national will, the right to 
adjourn the sittings of Parliament was an instrument in the hands 
of the monarch, which he used to prepare public opinion for his 
(1) Al- Ahwáni: op.cit. p.26. Cf. The 1930 Constitution which 
reduced the minimum duration of a parliamentary ordinary 
session to five months and did not necessitate the approval 
of the Budget before the closure of the session. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art.39 
(3) Ra 2fat & ïbrahim: op.cit. p.556 
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intended drastic measures, namely the dissolution of the Chamber 
of Deputies. 
The first adjournment of Parliament's sittings was in 1924 
after the resignation of Zaghlul's Cabinet in protest against the 
British ultimatum addressed to the Egyptian Government in consequence 
of the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. That adjournment was an 
opportunity for the deputies to consider their attitude towards the 
new Cabinet, presided over by Ziwar Pasha, and to consult the 
electorate about the existing crisis. But, because of the insist- 
ence of the Deputies on supporting Zaghiul and backing the afd, 
there was no escape from dissolving the Chamber of Deputies. (1) 
Sometimes, the King may be compelled by foreign intervention to 
adjourn or even dissolve Parliament, as was the situation in 192$ 
when he founded a kind of dictatorship after the suspension of 
Parliament.(2) The adjournment of Parliament's sittings which took 
place in 1938, after the dismissal of Nahas Pasha's Cabinet in 
December 1937, was after the new Prime ,ïinister, i ohamed iIahmoud 
Pasha, realised that he could not face Parliament and asked the 
King to adjourn its sittings. This latter adjournment of 
Parliament's sittings created some differences of opinion about 
the constitutionality of adjourning Parliament before putting the 
issue of confidence in the new Cabinet to the test of a vote im 
the Chamber. To prove the theory that a newly formed Cabinet 
(1) Lloyd: op.cit. Vol.11, pp.94-104 
(2) Howell; op.cit. p.331; Kohn: op.cit. pp.103-107 
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should face Parliament and get its confidence before the latter's 
sittings were adjourned, it was argued that the Cabinet was formed 
and acquired its legitimate functions according to the Royal Rescript 
appointing the Prime iiinister and the confidence of Parliament in 
them. Once either of these two provisions was lacking, the Cabinet 
could not exercise their functions. (1) Others thought that this 
new line of thought was aimed at narrowing the King's prerogatives 
and alleged that there were no restrictions on the King's right to 
adjourn sittings of Parliament, except the stipulations of Article 
39 of the Constitution. In the meantime, when they believed that 
the adjournment of parliamentary sittings hindered its working and 
prevented. the people's representatives from carrying out their 
functions, some critics thought that it might have been necessary 
in particular cases, especially when it was a prelude to the dis- 
solution of the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, they did not object 
to the adjournment of Parliament's sittings at the very start of a 
new Cabinet's life. 
(2) 
It was in accordance with this latter view- 
point that parliamentary sittings were adjourned in February in 1952 
when Ahmed Neguib El Hilaly Pasha was appointed Prime ilinister. 
In fact, the adjournment of sittings of Parliament in 1924, 
1928, 1930, 193$ and 1952 was followed by a complete change in 
political conditions. In other words, such an adjournment was 
followed by the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in 1924, 
(1) Al-iiisri, January 4, 1938, quoted in Al-Ahwáni: op.cit. 
pp.2b9-270 
(2) A1-Ahwäni: op.cit. p.270 
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1938 and 1952,(1) the suspension of parliamentary life and certain 
articles of the Constitution in 192$ and the replacement of the 1923 
Constitution with a totally new and more reactionary one in 1930. 
Another prerogative of the King which he could practice to 
influence Parliament, was his right to dissolve the Chamber of 
Deputies. The dissolution of Parliament was of two kinds; the 
first was the ministerial dissolution, which followed a suggestion 
from the Cabinet; the second was a personal action, taken by the 
King himself. 
The Committee of the Thirty, when discussing the article of 
the Constitution which gave the King the right to dissolve the 
Chamber of Deputies, did not expect dissolution to take place except 
in either of the two following cases: First, when the Chamber of 
Deputies would not back the Cabinet and would not give its members 
its confidence, then the Cabinet may request the King to dissolve 
that Chamber; and secondly, if the Cabinet, instead of requesting 
the dissolution of the Chamber tendered its resignation to the 
King, who would not accept it and would estimate that the Chamber 
no longer represented the electorate nor corresponded with public 
opinion; therefore he would suggest its dissolution. The Committee 
believed that the King's right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies 
(1) It is worth noticing that the adjournment of the Chamber of 
Deputies in 1924 developed into the first constitutional 
crisis which has been discussed in the first Chapter. The 
adjournment of the Chamber in 1952 resulted in the instability 
of internal political conditions. That instability was due to 
the tendency of the King and his entourage who seemed to have 
been aiming at the establishment of a kind of autocratic 
government. However, this state of affairs induced the 
Revolution of the Array in July 1952. 
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was a natural right in a parliamentary system where the legislative 
organ was mostly elected by the people and possessed extensive 
powers. It thought that the participation of the Head of the State 
in cases of necessity would be an element of understanding and 
conciliation between the legislative and executive powers. (1) 
voreover, it was generally believed that this right was an instrument 
in the King's hands to avoid any dictatorship or absolutism of 
Parliament. This belief means that this right was a defensive one 
and should not have been practised except in grave cases of differ- 
ences between the Cabinet and Parliament.(2) 
Although this prerogative of the King was an absolute one 
according to Article 3$ of the Constitution which laid down that 
3) 
"the King shall have the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies," 
there were some restrictions on the practice of that prerogative, 
stipulated for by some other articles of the Constitution. These 
restrictions were considered by some writers to have been sufficient 
guarantees against the abuse of that right. (4) Once a Chamber of 
Deputies was dissolved for any special reason, it was unconstitution- 
al for the succeeding Chamber to be dissolved for the same reason.(5) 
i4oreover, the Royal Rescript dissolving the Chamber should have 
provided for holding new general elections within two months and 
the re- assembly of the new Chamber within ten days following the 
elections. (6) 
(1) Sabry: op.cit. p.241; Saleh: op.cit. pp.230 -231; 
Al- Ahwani: op.cit. p.271 
(2) Ibid. pp.270 -271 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art. 38 
(4) Sabry: op.cit. p.247 
(5) 1923 Constitution, Art. $$ 
(6) ibid. irrt. 89 
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The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was usually a 
consequence of a crisis between the sovereign and the Cabinet, which 
ended with the resignation or dismissal of the latter. If the new 
elections resulted in a majority of seats in the new Chamber held 
by some political parties other than who had had it in the dissolved 
Chamber, it would be considered a victory for the head of the State. 
On the other hand, it would be very critical for him if the same 
organisations returned to the new Chamber holding the majority of 
seats, because that result would mean that the people supported the 
Cabinet recently resigned or dismissed and that its members or at 
(1) 
least some of there, who followed their policy, would return to office. 
The King used his right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies more 
than once, and no doubt this prerogative of the King and its repeated 
practice had enabled the Crown to keep the Chamber of Deputies under 
its authority. No Chamber lasted for its constitutional term except 
the one whose duration expired in 1949. The following table illus- 
trates the very short life of the different Chambers since 1924. 
(1) Kamel: op.cit. pp.216 -217; Cf. Such a viewpoint expressed 
by Marriott, J.A.R. in his foreword to Forsey, B.A.: 
The royal power of dissolution of ',parliament in the 
British Commonwealth. 
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Year Month Day 
January 12,1924 March 15,1924 December 24 1924K - 9 10 
March 12, 1925 March 23,1925 March 23, 1925 - - I 
May 22, 1926 June 10, 1926 July 19, 1928K 2 1 10 
Dec. 21, 1929 Jan. 11, 1930 October 22, 1930 - 9 12 
June 1, 1931 June 20, 1931 November 30,1934 3 5 11 
May 2, 1936 May $, 1936 February 2, 193g 1 $ 24 
April 6 ß8,1938 April 12,193$ February 7, 1942 3 9 25 
March 24, 1942 March 30,1942 November 15,1944 2 7 15 
January 9, 1945 Jan. 1$, 1945 November 7, 1949 4 8 21 
January 3, 1950 Jan. 16, 1950 March 24, 1952' 2 2 7 
The first dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies took place in 
1924, after the sittings of Parliament had been adjourned for a month 
During the adjournment, the majority of the Wafdist members of 
Parliament tendered two petitions to the King to convoke Parliament, 
to discuss what they believed to be the unconstitutional actions of 
the Ziwar's Cabinet. As these petitions were clear evidence that 
there was a feeling in the Chamber against the Cabinet, and were 
sufficient indication that the Cabinet would not secure the support 
and confidence of the Deputies, there was no escape from appealing 
to the people to judge between their representatives and the Cabinet. 
New elections were held, and the whole pressure of the administrative 
machine was brought to bear in order. to assemble a Parliament com- 
plaisant to the policy of Ziwar's Cabinet. The first sitting of 
the new Parliament was decisive, as the elections for the Presidency 
of the Chamber of Deputies showed that the Wafd, which was opposing 
Before the dissolution, sittings of Parliament were adjourned 
for a month. 
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the Cabinet's policy, had an overwhelming majority. This was the 
reason for the dissolution of the Chamber on March 23, 1925, the 
very same day as its first meeting. (1) This is the only precedent 
when two successive Chambers of Deputies were dissolved for the same 
reason: the opposition of the Deputies to the policy of the Cabinet 
and their being pro -Waftist. The extraordinarily dangerous con- 
ditions through which the country was passing at that time may be an 
excuse for this unconstitutional dissolution of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Further, the lack of parliamentary experiments, and the 
absence of constitutional traditions may have contributed factors 
leading to that unconstitutional dissolution. 
The. dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in 193$ may have 
been the first constitutional dissolution, as it followed the dis- 
missal of the Cabinet, and occurred at a time when it was necessary 
(2) 
for the people to express their opinion about the political situation. 
In the meantime, where differences arose between the Palace and the 
Cabinet, which believed itself to be responsible for the King's 
actions and argued that he should practise his prerogatives, especially 
the nomination of civil servants, court officials and Senators, and 
the conference of ranks and decorations through their intermediary, 
there were indications that this Cabinet and Chamber of Deputies had 
lost the support and confidence of the people. (3) All these factors 
led to the dismissal of the 11afdist Cabinet and the appointment of a 
new one, presided over by the leader of the Opposition. Parliament 
(1) Kohn: Im- erialism and nationalism in the Hither East, pp.89 -91; 
Elgood: Egypt, p.119; Newman: The i.Iediterranean and its 
problems, p.291; Sabri: op.cit. pp6 -630 
(2) A1- Ahwáni: op.cit. p.279 
(3) The Royal Rescript of December 30,1937, dismissing the Cabinet. 
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was adjourned, in the hope that, during the period of the adjourn- 
ment, the differences inside the ':'1afd would result in a definite 
split, and the new Cabinet would find support in the Chamber. This 
split did not bring a powerful opposition to the Wafd, and there was 
(1) 
no other alternative than the dissolution of the Chamber. 
The last prerogative of the King through which he could influence 
Parliament was his right to nominate two- fifths of the members of the 
(2) 
Senate and appoint its President. The Committee of the Thirty 
in drafting the Constitution had fixed the number of Senators to have 
been nominated by the King at thirty, and had decided that the King, 
in appointing the President of the Senate, should have been limited 
in his choice to one of three candidates elected by the Senate itself. 
The modification of these principles to the actual provisions of the 
Constitution was introduced by the governmental Legislative Consult- 
ative Committee, which revised the Constitution before its promul- 
gatioil. 
(3) 
By giving the King the right to nominate some Senators, 
it was thought that it would help in keeping a balance in Parliament, 
as there would be a chance that those capable personalities who were 
not elected members of Parliament would be nominated to the Senate. 
iioreover, it was hoped that it would help in avoiding the domination 
of any particular political party in the Senate. 
It was for the first time in 1924, that differences between the 
Crown and the Cabinet on the nomination of Senators arose. :'chile 
(1) Sabri: op.cit. pp.630 -636; Ghosh: op.cit. pp.1C6 -108 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 74 and 80 
The 1930 Constitution reinforced the nominated group of 
Senators, and the King's powers were extended to nominate three - 
fifths of the members of the Senate. Raafat: op.cit. pp.l8 -19. 
(3) Shang: Hawliirat, Tamhid, -vol.Ill, p.470 
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the Cabinet believed that it was their right to take part with the 
King in nominating the Senators by recommending the names, and that 
the nomination should be by a Royal Decree signed by both the King 
and the Prime i:iinister, the Crown alleged that it was a personal 
prerogative of the head of the State. 4hen divergence between the 
Palace and the Cabinet grew very grave, both sides accepted the 
arbitration of Baron F. Von De Bosch, the Prosecutor General (Attorney 
General) in the Mixed Courts at the time. That arbitration gave 
weight to the viewpoint of the Cabinet, granting them full authority 
to participate in the nomination of Senators, as the King could not 
exercise his powers except through the intermediary of the Council 
of ministers, which was entirely responsible to the representatives 
of the people. 
(1) 
In spite of that clear settlement of differences between the 
Palace and the Cabinet on the nomination of Senators, they were 
revived in 1937, when the King refused to accept the recommendations 
of the Cabinet on the same matter. (2) A new line of thought, how- 
ever, appeared to justify the King's position stressing that the 
monarch was not obliged to sign any decree, including of course the 
nomination of Senators, unless he approved it.(3) The conflict was 
not settled until after the dismissal of the ;Tafdist Cabinet which 
was opposing the conferring of extensive authority on the King. It 
(1) Von De Bosch: op.cit. pp.76 -$l 
(2) Saleh: op.cit. p.4.31 
(3) Dubois Richard in "L'Lgypte Contemporaine" quoted by 
Al- Ahwáni: op.cit.pp.392 -395 
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seems that this incident was a turning point in the method of 
practising the right to nominate the two- fifths of the Senators, 
because the King used to dictate to different Cabinets of different 
(1) 
party colours the nomination of Senators. 
A striking example of the very great influence the King had 
over Parliament through the nomination of Senators, is the annulment 
of the membership of some Senators in June 1950. This action was 
justified from the constitutional and legal viewpoints in a way which 
will be the scope of study in a further part of this work. (2) But in 
fact, the direct motive behind that action, was to expel from the 
membership of the Senate some Senators who had put forward an inter- 
pellation accusing some officials in the Royal Court of corruption 
and of being a factor in the supply of fraudulent arms, weapons and 
ammunition to the Army, and to get rid of the President of the Senate, 
who had taken a neutral position. (3) 
The King was the head of the executive power, which resided 
(4) 
solely in him, under the conditions established by the Constitution. 
But as he was inviolable and non- responsible, responsibility for 
executive action rested with his liinisters, and it was to Parliament, 
not to him, that they were responsible. The Constitution provided 
for that principle by stating that the "Council ofinisters shall 
supervise the State services, " 
(5) 
"the acts of the King in relation 
to State affairs must, to be effective, be countersigned by the 
(1) Bahá.'u'd-Din, A: Farai ... iïaliká , p.33 
See infra Chapter VI, pp. 311-311 (2) 
(3) hajlisu'sh-Shuyúkh: ;1ahádiru 'l-ialasát, sittings of May 29 & 30 
1950; AJr-RäFi`i: op.cit. Vol.III, pp.316-325 
(4) O'Rourke: op.cit. p.70; 1923 Constitution, Art.29 
(5) Ibid. Art.57 
176. 
President of the Council of Ministers and the Ministers concerned, "( 1) 
and that "oral or written commands of the King shall not, under any 
circumstances, exempt ministers from responsibility."(2) Moreover, 
it stated that "the King shall exercise his powers through the inter- 
mediary of his Ministers. "(3) This means that under such circum- 
stances a King "reigns but does not govern, being a titular head of 
the State in whose name executive acts are done, while it is his 
Ministers who are in fact responsible for them to the sovereign 
legislature. "(4) To realise the significant róle of the King and 
his position with regard to the executive power, we need to study 
and analyse the several rights which were vested in him as the head 
of that power. 
The first of these rights is that he appointed and dismissed 
his Ministers collectively and individually..(5 ) Without the inter- 
vention of any of his Ministers, the King selected the person whom 
he commissioned to form a Ministry. Sometimes, difficulties and 
crises created by the resignation of the Cabinet demanded that the 
King should consult political leaders and the Presidents of the two 
Houses of Parliament, as they were the persons best qualified to 
advise him on that. An example of such consultations is the one 
which the King sought after the resignation of Hussein Sirry Pasha's 
Cabinet in February 1942 and the presentation of the British ultimatum 
for the appointment of Nahas Pasha to be Prime Minister.() The 
1 Ibid. Art. 60 2 Ibid. Art. 62 3 ibid. Art. 4 
(4) Bryce: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 253 (5) 1923 Constitution, 
Art. 49. 
(6) That resignation resulted from the breaking off of diplomatic 
relations with Vichy in January 1942. The King claimed that 
he had not been properly consulted, and the Palace demanded 
the resignation of the Minister of foreign affairs. 
The Times, 
February 3, 1942. 
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advice of the politicians did not oblige the King to act in a certain 
way, and he might follow it or disregard it altogether. 
It was supposed that the freedom of selection of the Premier 
was restricted, since he should have been the leader of the party or 
of one of the coalition parties having the majority in the Chamber 
of Deputies. More than once, the Prime Minister had been a non- 
party man (independent) having no support in Parliament except the 
King's right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. The first 
independent Prime Minister was Ziwar Pasha who succeeded Zaghlul in 
1924; and it was the first time that the leader of the majority was 
deprived of his constitutional right. This incident provided a 
Precedent in the constitutional history of Egypt , for the repeated 
appointment of independent Prime Ministers.. 
Sometimes the King fell under foreign influence and acted 
according to directions imposed on him. In spite of the sweeping 
majority acquired by the Wafd in the elections held in 1926, the 
King yielded to British intervention and selected a non- Wafdist, 
Adly Pasha Yaken, to be Prime Mínister.(1) again in 1942, the 
British Ambassador in Cairo, Lord Killearn, compelled the King to 
(2) 
appoint Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd, to be Prime Minister. 
Although the Prime Minister was supposed to be the leader of the 
majority, and therefore should be a member of Parliament, very often 
the King selected Prime Ministers who were not members of Parliament. 
(1) Saleh: op.cit. p.260; Sabri: op.cit. p.503; Ghosh: op.cit. 
pp.92-93; Lloyd: op.cit. Vol.II, pp.158-168; Kohn: op.cit. 
p.93; Marshall: op.cit. p.255 
(2) vú`ells, 5.: Where are we heading, p.208; Fitzsimons: op. ci t. p. 2 
Setton-Williams: op.cit. p.69; %. I.1.. Li. : The ìïiddle Last, 
a political and economic survey, p.164; rïa j lisu' n-Nuwwdb : 
op.cit. IX-ii, .5.9, pp.63-64 and ÿ.14, p.134. 
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For example Dili Pasha Mahir in 1939 and Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha 
in 1948 were first selected for the Premiership and were later 
nominated Senators. 
There is no better evidence to grove the influence of the ding 
in the choice of Prime Ministers than the fact that after the resig- 
nation ofl- Hilaly Pasha in June 1952, Hussein Sirry Pasha was 
charged to form a Cabinet. There were some indications that he 
could not succeed in forming that Cabinet, therefore Bahi El in 
Earakat Pasha was asked to become Prime Minister. :chile this 
latter nominee for the Premiership was proceeding with contacts to 
form the Cabinet, the King agreed to Sirry Pasha's propositions, 
and issued the decrees appointing the Cabinet chosen by Sirry Pasha, 
notwithstanding the fact that Barakat Pasha was still engaged in 
seeking a Cabinet.(1) 
As regards the composition of the m=inistry, it was the Prime 
Minister who chose his colleagues, and a Royal decree signed by the 
King and the Prime Minister was necessary for the actual appoint- 
ment of Ministers. The liberty of the Prime Minister to choose 
his colleagues was not absolute, as there was nothing to prevent the 
King from advising him as to the men who were more or less fit or 
unfit to be invited to join the Cabinet. Very often the King 
objected to the appointment of certain persons to be nnisters, 
though they had been chosen by the person whom he had selected to 
(1) La Bourse Egyptienne, June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1952 
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be President of the L,ouncil of iinist ers. 
The first interference of the King in the selection of 
ministers was in 1924 when he did not approve the appointments of 
Aly Pasha El Shamsy, Neg°uib El Gharably, and Vas sif Ghali to be 
ministers in the first Constitutional Cabinet, because the first 
was accused of being in touch with the ex- Khedive and the other two 
had not the title of ''Pasha ". That objection was over-ruled, and 
although this precedent should have established that the King should 
raise no objection to the Prime .;iinister's choice of his colleagues, 
the Crown's interference in that matter was very frecuent. King 
Fuad objected to the nomination of Hafiz Afifi Pasha ih 1925, and 
Ying Farouk refused to appoint Youssef El Guendi in 1937, to be 
Linisters. (1) 
imoreover, the King's attitude towards the selection of a 
minister of war in June and July 1952 shows clearly the great in- 
fluence he had acquired with regard to the appointment of _flinisters. 
It was the difference between the King and Hussein Sirry Pasha on 
the name of the 1:inister of 'War, that induced the Prime iMinister to 
resign in July 1952. 
(2) 
The new Prime :Minister, El- Hilaly Pasha, 
whose Cabinet lasted only for one day as it was forced to resign 
under the pressure of the coup d'état of the armed forces, chose 
i.ortada 31 ,_araghy Pasha for that portfolio, but the King imposed 
(1) Al- Ahwáni: op.cit. pp.40O -101; Saleh: op.cit. pp.125 -426 
(2) The Prime Linister had chosen General Iiohamed Net ib, who 
seemed to enjoy popularity amongst the Army, but the King 
rejected that choice and insisted on the appointment of 
General Hussein Sirry Amer, one of his entourage. 
Cf. The `limes, July 23, 1952, Sablier: op.cit. 
l8C:. 
on him, as a Minister of War, his brother -in -law, Colonel Ismail_ 
(1) 
Sherin. 
The length of time which a reshuffling in the Cabinet some- 
times took may elucidate some difficulties which a Prime Minister 
faced when forming or reshuffling a Cabinet. Once in 193$ it took 
the Premier more than three weeks to make the change -over which was 
needed.(2) Again in the summer of 1951 a reshuffle of the Cabinet 
seemed necessary, especially after the death of the iqinister of 
Religious Endowments (Wakfs) in July and the resignation of the 
Minister of Social Affairs in August, but the reshuffle was post- 
poned more than once, and the reason forwarded for that postpone- 
ment was the absence of the King abroad. In spite of this fact, 
the appointment of a Minister without portfolio and the acceptance 
of the resignation of the Minister of Social Affairs took place 
while the King was still abroad. 
It is a natural right of whoever appoints the Ministers to 
dismiss them, and this right of the King was confirmed by the 
Constitution. In practice the King had used his right to dismiss 
the Cabinet without regard to the weight of support they were having 
from the Chamber of Deputies and the people. Most of the Ministries 
Egypt had had from 1923 until the abrogation of the Constitution in 
1952, were put into power in spite of the fact that they had no 
majority, and the Wafd, the popular party, as has been previously 
pointed out, came to power only to be dismissed by the 
King. 
(1) The Times, July 23, 1952, BahPu 'd -Din: op.cit. p. 33. 
(2) Al- Ahwani: op.cit. p. 304. 
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It was observed that while their appointment was by Royal 
Decree, the Cabinet's dismissal was by Royal Rescript; that is 
something which had been criticised because it exposed the King to 
the possibility of bearing the sole responsibility for the dismissal 
of the Cabinet. Therefore, it had been proposed that the new Prime 
minister should sign the act dismissing his predecessor, and in that 
way he would undertake all responsibilities which may have arisen 
from the dismissal of the Cabinet.(1) 
Here we have to notice that the dismissal of the Cabinet took 
place under foreign pressure, as well as by the deliberate will of 
the Monarch. Rlthouph the direct reason for the dismissal of the 
afdist Cabinet in 1928 was the collapse of the coalition with the 
Liberal Constitutionalist Party, there were some unseen reasons for 
that dismissal. is has been shown in Chapter I, the revival of 
hostilities between the Palace and the ''iafd might have been an 
element, but the decisive factor leading to that dismissal was the 
British ultimatum addressed to the Government and the protests of 
the British High Commissioner against some legislation. (2) On the 
other hand, the dismissal of the Cabinet in 1937 was due to differ- 
ences of opinion between it and the Palace on some constitutional 
matters, especially the nomination of Senators, the appointment of 
civil servants and the royal court officials, the conference of 
ranks and decorations, and the right of the executive power to 
initiate legislation.(3) 
(1) Saleh: op.cit. p.402; Ra'fat ¿c Ibrahim: op.cit. p.566 
(2) See supra Chapter I, pp.55 -59, 
(3) Sabri: op.cit. pp.630 -639; r 'r- Rafi''i: o)Q. cit. Vol.III,pp.54-55 
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In consequence of the dismissal of the Cabinet, the Chamber 
was dissolved and new elections fell to be held as in 1944; the 
adjournment of Parliamentary sittings might have preceded the 
dissolution, as happened in 1937 -38 and 1952. In some cases 
repercussions became more grave and the parliamentary system and 
the Constitution were suspended, as in l928. 
In addition to the King's right to dismiss the Cabinet, he 
could dismiss individual ministers. The King had practised this 
right more than once, and the first precedent was the dismissal of 
Abdel Aziz Pasha Fahmy, the viinister of Justice, in September 1925, 
because of his attitude towards the author of a book about 'Islam 
and the Principles of Government" who contradicted the policy of the 
Palace at that time. 
(1) 
The dismissal of Dr. Zaki Abdel Motaal, 
i:iinister of Finance, in November 1950 when he disagreed with other 
i .ìinisters on the fiscal policy of the State, was in compliance 
with the Cabinet's attitude. 
If his right to dismiss the Cabinet and individual ministers 
was a constitutional one, stipulated for by the Constitution and 
regulated by its rules, the King practised influence on the Cabinets 
and ministers and, repeatedly, forced them to resign whenever he 
deemed it necessary. It was differences on the initiation of 
some Bill that resulted in the resignation of Kahas Pasha and the 
;rafdist Cabinet in 1930; but it was simply compliance with monarch- 
ial orders which obliged Mbhamed 1ahmoud Pasha in 1939, El-Nokrashy 
(1) See supra Chapter I, p.53. 
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Pasha in 1946, and Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha in 1949 to tender the 
resignation of the Cabinets which they presided over.(1) An 
example of forcing individual ministers to resign is that of putting 
pressure on Ahmed Attiah Pasha, Minister of ';Jar, in 1947, to clear 
his position in order to be filled by Mohamed Haidar Pasha, who was 
one of the King's entourage and a favourite of the Palace. 
It may be of some interest to discuss the right of the King to 
accept the resignations of Ministers. For the first time in the 
Loyal Decree of may l8, l938 appointing mohamed Mahmoud Pasha to be 
Minister of Finance, it was frankly stated that the King had accepted 
the resignation of the former Minister, Ismail Sidky Pasha. Prior 
to that, the King had never referred to the resignation of any 
Minister in any Decree, but the acceptance of such resignation was 
understood from the Decree appointing a new Minister to replace the 
one resigned. The political party in opposition at that time, i.e. 
the .,iafd, alleged that the incident mentioned was evidence of the 
reinforcement of the sovereign's authority at the expense of that of 
the Prime Minister and the people. In fact, the King who had the 
authority to dismiss Ministers, a right more significant than the 
acceptance of their resignation, should have had that minor right. 
Moreover, in practice, he had had that prerogative only in a round 
about way, and that is why it was believed that the King did not 
obtain a new right, but started to practise an old one in a more 
direct way. From then, the resignation of ministers was accepted 
(2) 
(1) Bahá'u'd-Din: op.cit. pp.34-35 
(2) Al-1lhwánn op.cit. pp.305-312 
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by a Decree signed by the King and the Prime <.iinister. The long 
time which elapsed before the acceptance of the resignation of 
Dr. Ahmed Hussein Pasha, the [Minister of Social Affairs - who 
tendered his resignation from the Cabinet in August 1951 - because 
of the absence of the King abroad, shows the important role of the 
monarch in accepting his Ministers' resignations. 
In consequence of the rule that the King exercised his functions 
as the head of the executive power, he was legally entitled to call 
for information on all that happened in every public department and 
to advise his Ministers on their conduct of public affairs, and could 
express to them his views on any subject. Moreover, he had the 
right to attend the meetings of the Council of inisters, which would 
then be called the Council of the Ministry or Cabinet Council, when 
it was deliberating matters and measures needed to face important 
problems; but because of his non -responsibility he did not have a 
vote although he was entitled to the honorary presidency of the 
Council. 
(1) 
Although the King's right to attend the meetings of the Council 
of Ministers was not mentioned in the Constitution, it had been the 
subject of discussion in the Committee of the Thirty which, however, 
did not approve it because of its belief that the King should be 
above political parties and aloof from their disputes, and because 
of its fear that, as in all oriental countries, his presence in the 
Council would influence the Ministers and constrict the democratic 
(1) Kamel: op.cit. p.212; Ra)fat & Ibráhim: op.cit. p.547 
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spirit. In practice, it was the habit of King Fuad to use that 
traditional right of attending the meetings of the Council of 
Ministers, but at the end of his reign and during the regency this 
right was not used so that it was believed that the King's prerog- 
ative had lapsed.(2) But King Farouk used the right to attend and 
preside over the Cabinet Council; for the first time on October 30, 
1941, he attended the meeting in which matters concerning rationing 
and food supply were discussed. After that meeting the Prime 
sinister conveyed to the King the gratitude of the Council of 
ministers for his attendance to the Cabinet Council. In his reply, 
the King said, "No thanks are to be paid for performing a duty ...." 
(3) 
That statement asserted the right of the King to attend such meetings 
The second prerogative which the King enjoyed as the head of 
the executive power, and which was very important in respect of 
administration, was his right to make regulations and issue decrees 
(4) 
of different kinds when certain exigencies required such action. 
The first of these regulations were those necessary for the execution 
of laws provided that they did not modify or suspend the operation 
of laws or exempt from their execution. It is obvious that although 
Parliament had the right to establish principles of regulations 
necessary for the execution of laws, it would seem too onerous that 
(1) Saleh: op.cit. pp.215 -219 
(2) ibid. p.446 _.. 
(3) Khalil, `U: A1- Qanúnu Vol.1, pp.148- 149. Cf. The 
position of the President of the French Third Republic, about 
which Bryce: op.cit. Vol.i, p.2J5, said: The President "holds 
a position between that of the British King, who reigns but 
does not govern, and that of the American President, who 
governs as well as reigns, but only for four years.n 
(4) O'Rourke: op.cit. p.72 
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it should have issued every detail about these regulations because 
of the vast number needed. Therefore, this function of Parliament 
was conferred on the head of the State who was at the same time the 
head of the executive power. These regulations were usually issued 
in the form of Decrees signed by both the King and the competent 
iinisters,unless certain laws bestowed on the Council of i,inisters 
the right to issue the_n,and in this case they took the form of 
ministerial decisions. (1) 
The so called 'independent regulations', which had no connection 
with the execution of laws and which the King issued in his role of 
administrator to organise public services, formed the second class 
of regulations which the sovereign could issue. within the sphere 
the regulations of the 
power to establish new ministries and departments, to abolish old 
ones and to issue police regulations which were slight restrictions 
on the liberty of individuals for the protection of public safety, 
security and health. It is important to notice that independent 
regulations might have been issued according to a decision of the 
Council of l:iinisters, as well as according to a Decree. In fact 
there was no stable tradition in that matter. In addition, there 
was no constitutional justification for the executive power to 
impose restrictions on individuals' freedom and punishment of 
offenders except the traditions which had been in existence from 
before the promulgation of the Constitution. (2) 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art.37; Sabri: op.cit. pp.46l -463 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 44 & 167; ä abri: op.cit. pp.464 and 
470 -471; Al- Ahwáni : op.cit. pp.233 -285; Khalil: op.cit. 
Vol.'. pp.15 5 -l56 
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The most exceptional prerogative of the King was his right to 
issue Decree laws during intervals between sessions of Parliament, 
provided that they were not contrary to the Constitution and were 
submitted to Parliament in the first sitting of an extra -ordinary 
session specially convoked for that purpose. The failure of their 
submission to Parliament, or their rejection by either of the two 
Chambers of Parliament would result in these decree laws ceasing to 
(1) 
have the force of laws. Decree laws which the King issued through 
the intermediary of his iciinisters constituted a third class of reg- 
ulations which the King had the right to issue. Not only could he 
through Decree laws issue new legislation, but he could also modify 
and suspend laws. Remembering that his partnership in the legis- 
lature did not exceed his right to sanction and promulgate laws after 
their ratification by Parliament, the exceptional nature of this right 
of the King appears because its practice was contrary to the principle 
of the separation of powers as well as to that of co- operation between 
them. 
2) 
Perhaps because the King had exercised this right very often, 
it was the topic of many discussions, especially when Decree laws 
were issued during the adjournment of the sittings of Parliament or 
the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. For the first time 
during the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in 1924 a decree 
law modifying the electoral law was issued. As it was issued during 
the nôn- existence of Parliament and its aim was to weaken the 'dafd, 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art.41 
(2) Al-Ahwáni: op.cit. pp.286-2$$ 
that political party alleged that it was unconstitutional to issue 
decree laws during the period of the dissolution of the Chamber.(1) 
Although Parliament in 1926 considered that decree laws which had 
been issued during the adjournment or dissolution of Parliament were 
unconstitutional,(2) some other decree laws were issued during the 
adjournment and dissolution of Parliament in 1938. 
Two different lines of thought about the competency of the King 
to issue decree laws during theriod of adjournment or dissolution 
of Parliament appeared. On the one hand, a group of thinkers 
believed that the Kingts right to issue decree laws should only have 
been exercised during the intervals between parliamentary sessions as 
the Constitution stated very clearly that this right was to be 
practised ttbetween sessions of They argued that if 
decree laws were issued during the period of the dissolution of the 
Chamber of Deputies, the constitutional provision that they should be 
discussed in Parliament in an extra - ordinary session would be a 
material impossibility.(4) Moreover, they considered that the 
(1) Ibid. p.277; Shah: op.cit. p.225; A'sh- Sharif, iii.: `Ala Hámish 
AI- Dustür, Part Is pp.201 -206 
(2) Ibid, Part. II, pp.501 -505; ilajlisu'sá- Shuyük 1 :. Tagrir La jnatu'l 
Shuúni'l- Dustúrivah, dated December 4, 1945, pp.4 -7 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art.41. The Sidkyts Constitution frankly 
stipulated for the competency of the King to issue decree laws 
during the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies: Art. 61 of 
that Constitution; Raafat: op.cit. pp.24 -25 
(4) In the French text of the 1923 Constitution Article 41 stipulated 
for the convocation of an immediate extra - ordinary session of 
Parliament to discuss decree laws issued between parliamentary 
sessions. The 1930 Constitution did not necessitate the con- 
vocation of an extra- ordinary session of Parliament, but stated 
that decree laws should be presented to Parliament within a 
month during the first parliamentary session following their 
issue. 1930 Constitution, Art.41; Raafat: op.cit. pp.24 -25 
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adjournment of Parliament was a break in one parliaentary session 
and did not separate two successive ones as was clearly indicated in 
the Constitution; also, that the dissolution ended a legislative 
term and thus its period separated two legislative terms and not two 
parliamentary sessions. For all these reasons, this group, support- 
ed by the ''dùfd, rejected the concept that the King could issue decree 
laws during the period of dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies or 
the adjournment of Parliament.(1) 
on the other hand, another group supported the viewpoint that 
cases of necessity mentioned in Article 41 of the Constitution may 
arise during the adjournment or dissolution of Parliament, and there- 
fore, to justify the competency of the King to issue decree laws during 
,Sucb. a period, they alleged that the phase of the dissolution of the 
Chamber Of Deputies started with the end of the last session of the 
old Parliament and ended with the beginning of the first session of 
the new one. In other words, they considered the period of dis- 
solution as separating two parliamentary sessions. 1.oreover, they 
thought that there was no contradiction between the dissolution of 
the Chamber of Deputies and the convocation of Parliament, especially 
as the Constitution in Article 89 laid down that the Act dissolving 
the Chamber of Deputies should provide for new elections to be held 
and the new Parliament to be convoked.(2) 
(1) Sabry: op.cit. pp.479 -480; : op.cit. pp.293 -295; 
Sabry: Le pouvoir le islatif et le pouvoir executif en L vpte, 
pp.171 -172 
(2) The speech delivered by the i;inister of Justice on July 18, 1938 
to the Senate about the constitutionality of decree laws 
issued during the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies 
(February 10, to April 11, 193$), quoted in Saleh: op.cit. 
PP.53( -542 
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Although the problem whether the King could issue decree laws 
during the period of dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was under 
discussion for a long time in Parliament, and although members of 
Parliament showed more than once their tendency to adopt a resolution 
giving no right to the King to issue such decrees during the adjourn- 
ment of the sittings of Parliament or the dissolution of the Chamber 
of Deputies, that resolution was not passed. During the period of 
dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies (Novei-roer 7, 1949 - January 15 
1950) more than thirty decree laws in connection with political and 
economic matters were issued.(1) Moreover, after the dissolution of 
the Chamber of Deputies in March 1952, up till the abrogation of the 
Constitution in December, the legislative function of the State was 
exercised by the King through issuing decree laws. 
One last remark about the King's right to issue decree laws is 
that in issuing decree laws, even during intervals between parliament- 
ary session, no observation was paid to the provisions laid down by 
Article 41 of the Constitution. In certain cases where necessity 
did not arise some decree laws were issued. In other cases, where 
conditions might have necessitated the issue of some decree laws, 
they were never presented to Parliament except during the ordinary 
session following their issue.(2) 
It is interesting to discuss the basis on which the King 
assumed the power to legislate during the suspension of Parliamentary 
life. The Royal Rescript No. 46 of 192$ suspending Parliament and 
(1) Ma jlisu'sh-Shuyuçh : op.cit. pp. 7-10 and JO; Maj li su'sh-Sñuyúkh : 
Taqrir La,lnatu'l-Shu`"uni'1-Dustúrlyah (dated September 4, 1951T 
pp. 1-4; MajlisuOn-Nuwwáb: op.cit. X-i, S.38, pp. 06-71 
. 
(2) Sabra: op.cit. pp. 491-493. 
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some articles of the Constitution frankly stated that ?'the legis- 
lative power during the three years (the period of the suspension of 
Constitutional life) .... will return to us (the King) in confirm- 
ation of Article 48 of the Constitution and will be exercised through 
decrees having the power of laws." This means that a new prerogat- 
ive was created to be exercised by the King during the suspension 
of Parliament, namely the right to issue decrees having the power of 
laws. These decrees were not the same as decree laws which the 
Ling could issue according to Article 41 of the Constitution. They 
were not repealed when Parliament would not approve them, but needed 
(1) 
decrees of the sane kind, laws or decree laws to abolish them. 
To secure the easy working of governmental departments the 
King was to "appoint and dismiss civil servants. "(2) It is quite 
apparent that this prerogative of the King was bound to the will of 
the legislative power shaped in the form of laws, and it is under- 
stood that Parliament could modify and create laws to widen or narrow 
the King's authority in that sphere. The appointment and dismissal 
of high ranking civil servants were reserved to the King through 
the intermediary of his ministers. The appointment of such civil 
servants sometimes raised friction between the King and the Cabinet 
when the King did not agree with the viewpoint on the advice of the 
government. This was clearly seen in the King's insistence on the 
creation of the post of the High Commander of the Armed Forces in 
1950, and on a particular person to occupy it. (3) It had been also 
(1) Saleh: op.cit. p.327. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art . t;.l,.. 
(3) ïiajlisu>n-NuwWäb: op.cit. X-i, 5.3, pp.15-17. 
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a factor contributing to the grave crisis which arose between the 
Palace and the Cabinet in 1937 and led to the dismissal of the 
latter. On this point the dismissed Prime Minister wrote: 
"Appointments to and dismissal from administrative posts were another 
point at issue. Unless the Government is free in this matter, it 
cannot be responsible to Parliament for the administration of the 
country. "(1) 
The appointment of high ranking officials of the Royal Court 
is a very important sub -division to the appointment of civil servants. 
In the Committee of the Thirty an opinion emerged that a change of 
the political party in power should be followed by a change of 
occupiers of high ranking posts in the Royal Court in the grade of 
Ministers, namely the Chief and Vice -Chief of the Royal Cabinet. 
So important was the tole of these officials of the Royal Court that 
the Committee of the Thirty sought co- ordination between them and 
the Government to avoid any friction between the Cabinet and the 
Palace. 
The post of the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, for instance, 
although it had no place in the Constitution, had in fact, significant 
delicate and dangerous functions of administrative and political 
nature, especially when held by a strong personality. The occupier 
of this post was the means of contact between the Palace and the 
Cabinet. In ordinary times he gave the Cabinet all information 
about the King's will and desires, and transmitted to the King the 
Cabinet's requests and demands. In case of crisis he was consulted 
(1) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1937 -40), p.2880 
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and undertook an important political róle. He gave his views when- 
ever they were needed, and all decrees and recommendations of the 
Cabinet passed through his hands before they were presented to the 
King and he could advise the refusal of any of them. 
It would have been much better, and the country would have 
avoided many crises and political troubles, if the rule that the 
occupiers of the high ranking posts of the Royal Court should have 
changed in consequence of the change of the governing political party 
had been adopted, because without doubt the co- ordination of policies 
of both the Royal Cabinet and the government would have enabled them 
to escape many critical situations, or at least to pass through them 
without much trouble. 
(1) 
The country would have escaped grave crises 
which occurred as a result of situations during which palace officials 
"monopolised all powers, dictated royal policies and dominated the 
premiers, imposing upon them coalition Cabinets, and sometimes even 
dismissing them. "(2 ) 
(1) Al- Ahwáni: op.cit. pp.3b3 and 3$2 -383; Hayworth- Dunne, op.cit.p.25 
(2) Ghosh: op.cit. p.109 
The officials of the Royal Court were of great significance in 
the political life; they infiltrated into every department of the 
governmental machine to exert great influence on civil servants 
through using threats or the words ''King's orders". By citing 
the following incidents, it is only meant to provide evidence of 
the corrupted actions of the Palace officials: 
(a) The resignation of 31- Hilaly Pasha's Cabinet, this Cabinet 
owed the tenure of its office to the monarch rather than to the 
will of the people, came in July 1952 as a product of court 
intrigue. It is said that this Cabinet decided to take over the 
administration of the t'Societé des Sucreries" which differed 
continually with the Government on the fixation of sugar prices 
and the payment of taxes levied on it. The management of that 
company could not afford leaving the government to take such 
194. 
After the promulgation of the Constitution, the appointment 
of high - ranking officials of the Royal Court was made by a Royal 
Decree till 1924 when Hassan Nashaat Pasha was appointed the Vice - 
Chief of the Royal Cabinet by a Royal Rescript without the approval 
or recommendation of the Prime Minister. This appointment created 
friction between the Palace and the Cabinet which seemed to be 
leading to a grave political crisis till the Chief of the State 
Legal Services, M. Piola Caseli, was consulted. Although he ex- 
pressed the viewpoint that the appointment of the Chief and the Vice - 
Chief of the Royal Cabinet was one of the King's functions which were 
related to State affairs and which should be exercised through the 
intermediary of the Cabinet by a decree signed by the Premier and 
the competent Ministers along with the King, he stressed the point 
that as long as holders of such posts were close to and very much in 
contact with the King, the Crown should have had freedom to choose 
= a drastic action, and therefore decided that "the government must 
goat' In its campaign against the Cabinet, the company had the 
help of the court officials. It is also said that this campaign 
cost the company the sum of one million pounds. The New York 
Times, July b & $, 1952; The Times, July 5, 1952. 
(b) In 1949 when the King charged Hussein Sirry Pasha to form 
a Cabinet, it is said, that the latter laid down as one of his 
conditions for acceptance, the purge of Palace officials. That 
condition was refused and Sirry left for Europe, to be called 
again after a short time for the formation of the Cabinet. Although 
the second call on Sirry meant the acceptance of the condition to 
purify the court officials, nothing was done in that effect. 
Sablier: op.cit. 
(c) One of the first actions taken by the leaders of the 
Coup d'Etat in July 1952 was to insist on the King to expel some 
members of his entourage who were well reputed of corruption and 
influencing the Palace decisions. The Times, July 26, 1952. 
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them. The Cabinet would in this case merely have the right that 
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance sign the decree with- 
out putting it under consideration or discussion in the Council of 
inisters. Thus, following that decision the Premier and the 
Minister of Finance signed the "Royal Rescriptq' according to which 
Nashaat Pasha had been appointed. 
(1) 
This rule did not last long because during the adjournment of 
Parliament in 1925 and while the Cabinet of Ziwar Pasha, which 
adopted the policy to extend the King's authority by interpreting the 
Constitution in his favour, was in power, it became a personal right 
of the monarch to appoint the Royal Court officials by a Royal Rescrip 
without the participation of any of the Ministers. This idea was 
based on the point which M. Caseli had expressed and which the State 
Legal Services, expressed in a new way: as the occupiers of the posts 
of the Royal Court should enjoy the King's confidence and must not 
be biased to any of the political parties, it would be preferable 
for the Crown to have complete freedom to fill these posts. Here 
the question might be asked if any of the chiefs or vice- chiefs of 
the Royal Cabinet had :-ever shown any bias towards some particular 
political party, and the situation when the King lost confidence in 
the majority of the people which was usually represented by the 
Ministers might be recalled. 
(2) 
From that time the appointment of Royal Court officials had 
(1) Al-Ahwáni: op.cit. pp.364-365 
(2) Ibid. pp.365-369; Saleh: op.cit. pp.261; Sabri: op.cit. 
pp.510-512; Vol.II, pp.234-237 
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been by Royal Rescript, and the application of that rule had caused 
many differences between the Palace and the Cabinet. In some cases 
such frictions even led to the dismissal of the Cabinet and the dis- 
solution of the Chamber of Deputies as happened when the Wafdist 
Cabinet in 1937 objected to the appointment of Aly'_ Maher Pasha as 
Chief of the Royal Cabinet. The appointment of Aly i,aher to that 
post was a shocking surprise to the Wafdist Cabinet which considered 
him to have been one of the leading political enemies of the Wafd. 
At that time he had the reputation of bearing strong allegiance to 
the King and certainly the monarch had great confidence in him. 
However, by the nomination of Alsr Maher to the post of the Chief of 
the Royal Cabinet the cleavage between the Palace and the Cabinet 
crystalised, and was ended as has just been mentioned by the dismissal 
of the Cabinet. 
(1) 
A parallel incident of appointment of a chief of the Royal 
Cabinet despite his antagonism to the Cabinet in office occurred in 
December 1951 when Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha was chosen for that post 
which had remained vacant for about two years. This appointment 
caused differences between the Palace and the Wafdist Cabinet because 
of the reputation of Afifi Pasha of being anti- Wafdist and his 
declared views which did not coincide with the government's policy, 
especially in relation to foreign affairs. This ffiction between 
the Palace and the Cabinet led the latter to consider their resig- 
nation, and demonstrations against Afifi Pasha's appointment rose all 
(1) Sabi: op.cit. pp. 512-516; op.cit. pp.3C-31; 
àaleh: op.cit. pp350-351; R.I.I.A.: op.cit. p.162 
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over the country. Although the Wafdist Cabinet, adopting a com- 
promising policy, bent to let the storm pass peacefully, not very 
(1) 
long after the appointment of Afifi Pasha that Cabinet was dismissed. 
A new line of thought with regard to the appointment of the 
Royal. Court officials appeared. It tended to distinguish between 
two groups of officials: the first, that group which was in the 
personal service of the King, such as his Private Secretary and the 
Director of the Royal Privy Purse, and it was alleged that their 
appointment ought to be out of the sphere of ministerial responsibil- 
ity, i.e., it should have been by Royal Rescript; the second, the 
group of other officials such as the Chief and Vice -Chief of the 
Royal Cabinet whose functions were related to State affairs should 
have been appointed by Royal decrees because that method might have 
secured the co- ordination of the policies of both the Cabinet and 
the Palace.(2) 
To realise the significance of such co- ordination we have to 
review the political situation during different phases of the history 
of Egypt. A first phase is that during which Nashaat Pasha was the 
Vice -Chief of the Royal Cabinet (1924- 1926), especially the period 
when the Waf d was in power. He used every means to weaken the 1afd 
which was striving for the establishment of real democratic rule, and 
to extend the King t s rights and authority, with the result that he 
established a political party, i.e. the Unionist Party, which helped 
(1) Bahá'u'd -Din: op.cit. p.42; The Scotsman, December 25, 26, 27 
and 28, 1951; The Times, December 26, 27 and 2$, 1951 
(2) Sabri: op.cit. p.506 
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him to reach his aim.(1) Similar periods of political turmoil 
existed when the Wafd was in power and different anti-Wafdist chiefs 
of the Royal Cabinet showed their feelings against that political 
party. The crisis of 1937 when Aly Maher Pasha held that post, 
along with that crisis of 1951 -52 when Hafiz Afifi Pasha was appoint- 
ed Chief of the Royal Cabinet have already been discussed. It was 
the responsibility of Ahmed Hassanein Pasha, who occupied that post 
during the Second World War, that animosity between the King and the 
.afd reached its height.(2) The very same three Chiefs of the Royal 
Cabinet served the King while anti -Wafdist Cabinets were in office, 
but the political scene was different and relations between the 
Cabinet and the Palace were rather friendly. It seems that the main 
reason for that cordial relationship was the fact that the anti - 
Wafdist parties were known as being the Kingts parties and might have 
given way to the wishes of the King and his entourage. In addition, 
there is the phase of 1947 -194 when Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha, one 
of the figure heads of the Saadist Party, and who became later in 
1949 the leader of that party, occupied the post of the Chief of the 
Royal Cabinet. That period was comparatively a quiet one, and the 
reason might be found in the fact that the Saadist Party for which 
the Chief of the Royal Cabinet had some esteem and appreciation, was 
in power. This does not deny that there were some occasions of 
friction between the Palace and the Cabinet, but before they became 
apparent they were amicably solved without bringing on any crisis. 
(1) Haykal: op.cit. Vol.I, pp. 223-227; 
seg. 
(2) Bahá?u'd-Din: op.cit. pp. 36-37. 
Young: op.cit. pp. 279 et 
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In order to curtail the influence of the Chief of the Royal 
Cabinet, the 4afdist Cabinet in 1936 insisted on the creation of a 
Liinistry for the Royal Palace Affairs with the aim to "renew alleg- 
iance and confidence between the Throne and the people, ... (and) - 
(1) 
to reinforce the parliamentary system on a democratic basis to 
This post was intended to supercede that of the Chief of the Royal 
Cabinet, its occupant to be appointed by the Prime i:iinister instead 
of the King, was to hold Cabinet rank, to resign with the Cabinet, 
and was to act as liaison between the Palace and the Cabinet. In 
spite of all suitable circumstances for the establishment of such a 
ministry, the Cabinet failed to achieve its full objective, and was 
satisfied with the appointment of a Parliamentary Under -Secretary of 
State for Palace Affairs in June 1936. Although the intentions of 
the CJafd and its hopes from the creation of such posts were very 
clear, the Note creating the post of Parliamentary Under -Secretary of 
State for the Royal Palace Affa'_rs clearly stipulated that neither 
the creation of aiinistry, nor the appointment of a Parliamentary 
Under -Secretary of State for the Palace Affairs meant that they would 
replace any of the Royal Court officials, but were just a means of 
contact between the Palace and different governmental departments in 
order to ensure co- ordination between the government's policy and 
(2) 
that of the Palace. As a matter of fact, after the dismissal of 
the úafdist Cabinet in 1937 the post of the Parliamentary Under - 
Secretary of State for the Royal Palace Affairs remained vacant until 
(1) The letter of the Prime Rinister, Nahas Pasha, when forming the 
Cabinet, cited in A'r- Rafi`i: op.cit. Vol.III, p.13 
(2) Ibid. p.15 
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it was abrogated later. A ministry for Royal Palace Affairs was 
never established before July 1952 when the influence of Palace 
officials increased enormously, and circumstances necessitated its 
foundation with, according to Hassein Sirry Pasha, the Prime Minister 
who founded that ministry, the object of minimising the influence of 
Palace officials and consequently of eradicating it. That ministry, 
however, failed in realising its object.(1) The reasons for that 
failure seem mainly to be first, the person who was appointed 
Minister for Royal Palace Affairs was in much sympathy with the King 
(2) 
and his entourage that he could not act against their wishes. In 
other words, the choice of the personality which occupied that post 
was not very successful. A second reason may be that the ministry 
functioned only for about three weeks at the end of which the army 
coup d'état started. 
The nomination of chiefs of religion was one of the prerogatives 
which the King enjoyed. The Constitution referred to a law to 
regulate their appointment and provided that in case of absence of 
any legislative provisions, rules and usages which had been in exist- 
ence at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution would con- 
tinue to be exercised. C3? Not before 1927 did Parliament use its 
constitutional right and ratify a law stipulating that all appoint- 
ments to all high ranking religious posts would be one of the King's 
(1) Sablier: op.cit. 
(2) The man appointed to be , inister of Royal Palace Affairs was 
Karim Thabet Pasha, who had occupied the post of the Press 
Counsellor to the King. He was accused of, and was condemned 
for charges of corruption by a revolutionary tribunal. 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art.l53 
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functions, exercised by him through the intermediary of his ministers. 
This rule did not last long, as the 1930 Constitution (Art.142) gave 
the King alone the right to appoint the Rector of Al -Azhar and all 
other heads of Moslem and non- lvioslem religions. Even after the 
abrogation of that Constitution and the revival of the 1923 one a 
decree law confirmed the principle that religious heads were to be 
(1) 
appointed by Royal Rescripts. The dismissal of religious heads 
was not referred to in that decree law, but no doubt he who had the 
right to nominate, had the right to dismiss;(2) and for the first 
time the King practised his right to dismiss heads of religions when, 
according to the recommendation of the Cabinet, he dismissed the 
Rector of Al -Azhar in September 1951.(3) 
Although there was no doubt that diplomatic representatives were 
considered civil servants and their appointment should have been made 
according to Article 44. of the Constitution, the Consultative Legis- 
lative Assembly added to Article 49, which stipulated for the King's 
right to appoint and dismiss his ministers, that he also would 
appoint and recall diplomatic representatives.() Although it had 
been customary for the appointment of diplomats to be made according 
to a Royal Rescript, the Cabinet bore the responsibility of the 
appointment which was usually made on the proposal of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs.(5) In spite of the fact that diplomatic 
(1) Sabri: op.cit. pp.504 -505 
(2) Saleh: op.cit. pp.362 -365 
(3) Akhbaru ?l Yawm., September 9, 1951 
(4) 1923 Constitution, Art.49 
(5) cabri: op.cit. p.504 
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representatives represented the King in foreign countries, they 
were at the same time representatives of the government; and this 
latter function has become more important than the former since the 
duty of diplomats has become purely political and its execution 
should be in co- ordination with the foreign policy of the government 
they represent. That may be the reason why the right to appoint 
and recall diplomats which was conferred on the King had been con- 
tinually criticised as it might have given a chance to the Palace to 
influence diplomatic representatives to carry out a certain foreign 
(1) 
policy perhaps different to that of the government. In fact, 
those critics had reason for their call to minimise the part of the 
monarch in appointing and recalling members of the diplomatic corps. 
Very often the King influenced the appointments of diplomatic rep- 
resentatives and insisted on particular persons to hold special posts. 
A very good example is his insistance in 1945 on the appointment of 
Abdel Faltah Amr'Pasha to be the Egyptian Ambassador in London. 
Although the Cabinet resented that idea, no concrete opposition to 
that nomination appeared. Another example is the appointment of 
Mohamed Ali Sadek Pasha (the uncle of Queen Narriman) to the post of 
Minister plenepotentiare to the Netherlands in 1950. As a result 
of the extensive authority the King had enjoyed in appointing and 
recalling diplomats, he acquired a new privilege, namely, ver y often 
diplomats sent their reports and studies to the Palace, and reported 
(1) Shafiq: Hawliyát, Tamhid, Vol.III, p.519; A'sh-Sh.atïf:op.cit. 
Part I, - ltip.227-22$ 
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their information and in person to the King and his entourage ptior 
(1) 
to the responsible Prime ;..sinister and :dinister of Foreign Affairs. 
The Constitution stipulated that the King was the supreme 
commander of land and sea forces, and gave him the right to nominate 
and dismiss officers. (2) Does this mean that the King took the 
command of the army and planned the defence of the country and the 
attack on the enemy whenever it was needed? Although the King in 
most constitutional monarchies is the supreme commander of the armed 
forces, no King took the command of his forces during the two world 
wars, leaving it to professional officers. The same happened in 
Egypt when qualified officers and military specialists, and not the 
King, took command of the armed forces when military actions were 
taken against Israeli forces in Palestine in 1948. It was the 
Legislative Consultative Committee, in order to avoid submitting the 
appointment and dismissal of officers to ministerial responsibility, 
which refused the proposal of the Committee of the Thirty to add the 
phrase "civilians and military officials" to Article 44 of the Con - 
stitution.(3) Although it was the King's right to nominate and 
dismiss officers, and although it had been the custom that their 
nomination and promotion were by Royal Rescripts, the scope of 
ministerial responsibility extended to embrace that, as they were 
nominated according to recommendations of the Committee of officers. 
(1) Bahá'u'd -Din: op.cit. p.37 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art.46. Cf. The position of the King in 
Belgium as the supreme commander of the armed forces, where he 
undertakes more responsibilities than monarchs in Europe, and 
where this function was completely subordinate to parliamentary 
controls Loewenstein, K.: Political reconstruction, p.170 
(3) Al- Ahwáni: op.cit. p.334 
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In 1950 interpellations about certain accusations against some 
officers were raised in the Senate.(1) This action proves that the 
nomination and dismissal of officers were within the scope of min- 
isterial responsibility. It emphasises also the concept that their 
appointment should be through the intermediary of competent ministers 
and in accordance with Article 60 of the Constitution. (2) In 
addition, the incident of differences between the Minister of .Defence 
Ahmed Attiah Pasha, and the Palace in 1947 about appointments to 
some posts in the army confirms that concept. Differences about 
persons to be appointed in some key posts in the army pushed the 
Minister to tender his resignation. It was only after a compromise 
between views of both the Palace and the Minister that the latter 
withdrew his resignation. (3) 
It was the Kingts right to declare war, make peace and conclude 
treaties. The declaration of offensive wars needed the consent of 
Parliament.(4) In practice, when war was declared against the Axis 
in February 1945 and against Israel in May l948, Parliaent held 
secret sittings during which the declaration of war was discussed 
and decided. The treaties which the Ding concluded should be sub- 
mitted to Parliament accompanied with suitable elucidation, and they 
would not become valid without having received the consent of Par- 
liament. In other words, treaties which were concluded by the 
executive power represented in the person of its head, i.e. the King, 
(1) Lajlisu'sh-ahuyúkh: Mab.ádiru'l-Jalasát, S. May 29 & 30, 1950 
(2) Sabri : op.cit. pp. 524-526 
(3) La Bourse Ezvptienne, January 21, 1947 
(4) 1923 Constitution, Art.46 
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would not have bound the country or imposed any obligation on the 
people until after receiving the consent of their representatives. 
In accordance with this rule the treaty of Alliance between Egypt 
and Britain, which was concluded and signed by official delegations 
on behalf of eq.ch country on August, 26, was ratified by Parliament 
on November 14, 1936. Likewise, the treaty of Montreaux which did 
away with the Capitulations and regulated the position of foreigners 
in Egypt, and which was signed in May 1937, did not get its validity 
until after Parliament had approved it the following July.(1) Examples 
of that character are numerous, but it should not go without pointing 
out that this principle applied also to international agreements, and 
therefore Parliament discussed the Charter of the United Nations and 
approved the governmentts policy to join that international organis- 
ation. (2) On the other hand, there were some cases where the rep- 
resentatives of the people were deprived from their right to approve 
treaties concluded by the executive power. For instance, the agree- 
ment reached between the Egyptian and British Governments in 1938, 
that members of the British ì,ßi litary Mission in Egypt who were organ- 
ising and training the Egyptian Army should enjoy certain immunities 
and exemptions, was brought into force without first being submitted 
to Parliament and getting its consent. It was only because of its 
being a subject for severe attacks from the Opposition, that this 
() 
agreement was communicated to Parliament and got its consent in 1940. 
(1) Ghosh: op.cit. pp.102 -105 
(2) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX - Session extraordinaire, 
October 1945, SS.1 & 2,pp. 5 et seq-, 
(3) Al- Ahwáni: op.cit. pp.339 -341; Sabri: op.cit. pp.558 -563 
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The King had the right to proclaim martial law, a very danger- 
ous prerogative as this system of governing imposed restrictions on 
public and individual freedoms and rights, and eliminated the working 
of the guarantees given by the Constitution. This right of the King 
was bound to the will of Parliament as the declaration of martial law 
must have been submitted immediately to Parliament, even in an extra- 
(1) 
ordinary session, for confirmation or rejection. At the beginning 
of the Second World War, according to the proposal of the British 
Government and Article 7 of the 1936 treaty, martial law was declared 
on Septembwr, 1939 but Parliament did not consider its declaration 
till its convocation in an extra- ordinary session on the second of 
October of that year. (2) When conditions made the declaration of 
martial law a necessity in May 1948, Parliament discussed and approved 
its declaration in the same week it was declared.(3) The King pro- 
claimed martial law on January 26, 1952 on the request of the Wafdist 
Cabinet. Although that Cabinet was dismissed on the same day, the 
decree proclaiming martial law was brought before Parliament by the 
new Cabinet and was approved by both Chambers. (4) 
It is of some interest to notice that there were no clear 
stipulations in the Constitution about the situation when martial law 
was to be declared during the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies 
or the adjournment of Parliament. At such times, it might have been 
difficult or even impossible to convoke an immediate session of 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art.45 
(2) Sabri: op.cit. p.528 
(3) Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. IX -iv, sittings of May 12 and 1$, 194$ 
(4) Ibid. X -iii, S.11, pp.7 -9; The Sunday Times, January 27, 1952; 
The Times, January 29, 1952. 
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Parliament; therefore, it was believed that martial law should not 
be proclaimed under such circumstances. At any rate, there is no 
precedent of martial law being declared during the adjournment or 
dissolution of Parliament.(1) 
The last prerogative the King possessed was his right to create 
and confer civil and military titles, decorations and other ranks of 
honour.(2) The Committee of the Thirty, when drafting the Con - 
stitution, had intended to introduce a restricted right which would 
ensure that any such creation of honours by the King should be 
exercised in conformity with certain rules of law laid down by the 
Constitution; but the governmental committee which revised the 
Constitution before its promulgation omitted that limitation. Con- 
sequently neither the government nor Parliament had any control over 
their creation or conferment.(3) There existed a tendency for the 
creation and conference of honorary titles to be exercised by the 
King through his ministers, and that was a reason for conflicts 
between the Palace and the Cabinet in 1924 and 1937.(). Those who 
adopted this concept alleged that the principles of the non- responsib- 
ility of the King, and the responsibility of the Cabinet to the 
people's representatives were the bases of a monarchial parliamentary 
system. Therefore, the acts which were not signed by the President 
(5) 
of the Council of Ministers and the competent ministers had no effect. 
In practice, a Royal Rescript issued in January 1923 regulated the 
(1) Al-Ahwáni: op.cit. p.336 
(2) 1923_Constitution, Art.43 
(3) abri:_op.cit. pp.544-545; Shafiq: op.cit. p.469 
(4) Al-Ahwani: op.cit. p.337; Saleh: op.cit. pp.368-369 
(5) Van de Bosch: op.cit. pp.79 et seq. 
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rights of both the King and the Cabinet in the matters of conferring 
honorary titles. According to that Rescript, the King alone, without 
any participation from the Cabinet, had the right to confer them on 
foreigners and Royal Court officials, while the Cabinet could re- 
commend their conferment onEgyptian notables and civil servants. 
The conferment and the creation of ranks, decorations and honorary 
titles were made by Royal Rescripts, and examples of the practice of 
these rules are numerous.(1) 
It is quite apparent from the above mentioned survey of the 
King's powers and prerogatives that he had a very extensive authority. 
Not only were the King's powers wide in theory, but also in practice 
they exceeded the limits prescribed by the Constitution. An 
important question arises here: What were the reasons for such an 
extensive authority of the King in theory and practice? 
In the first place the Constitution conferred upon the King 
extensive powers, and it is sufficient to recall here the attitude 
of the Committee of the Thirty when drafting that Constitution and 
the fact that it feared the King's rejection of the draft Constitution 
if it deprived him of much of the power he had enjoyed.(2) moreover, 
the Constitution itself which was considered the backbone of the 
parliamentary government in Egypt contained many loopholes through 
which the influence of the King infiltrated. Frequently one comes 
across articles in the Constitution which had no precise meaning, and 
usually these articles were interpreted in such a way as to give the 
King extra powers.(3) 
(1) §abri: op.cit. pp.542 -544 
(2) See Supra Chapter I, 115.47. 
(3) Mandúr: op.cit. p.10 
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The Constitutional parliamentary monarchy was a new system 
introduced into Egypt; it appeared as a result of the 1919 Revolt 
which was mainly aiming at freeing the country from the British 
Occupation. Prior to the introduction of parliamentary government 
to Egypt any governor who wielded a measure of authority stood high 
in the esteem of the people; and this fact explains why it was even 
after a parliament was instituted the mass of the people, who did 
not have a sufficient chance to become politically conscious and 
mature still gave their allegiance to the monarch despite his exer- 
cised autocracy. 
An important factor which encouraged the King in his course of 
exceeding his constitutional powers, was the fact that a certain 
group of politicians, not necessarily independents, but party 
politicians who would influence their respective parties to collabor- 
ate with the Palace and its clique, were always at hand whenever they 
were required. It might have been the personal ambitions of these 
politicians which induced them to disregard the rules of the Con- 
stitution and to follow blindly the policy dictated to them by the 
Palace.(1) The existence of some pro- Palace politicians and political 
parties was not sufficient at certain times and the King felt the need 
to create such a party as the Unionist Party in 1925 and the Peoplets 
Party in 1930 in order to bring about the reactionary policy of the 
Pal ace.(2) 
One would expect that a monarch reputed to possess extensive 
wealth should have used money as an instrument to maintain and increase 
(1) Al- Baráwl: op.cit. pp.127 -12$ 
(2) See Supra Chapter I, pp.51 -52 and 62 -62a. 
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his autocracy. It seems that the King had used his authority to 
accumulate and increase his wealth. King Fuad died in 1936 leaving 
an estate of 49,300 feddans; and it is rather difficult to assess 
its origin. However, it was King Farouk who inherited the 15,400 
feddans which in the fifteen years during which he reigned over 
Egypt increased to no less than 96,600 feddans. This figure does 
not include the land of Wakfs (Endowments) which was placed under 
his management.(1) 
Last, but not least, force is usually the natural backing for 
any sort of violation. Therefore, one would expect that the monarch 
who violated the rules of the Constitution and exceeded his powers, 
should have had some kind of this material backing, which seems to 
have been the army. This theory is strengthened by the fact that it 
was the army which quelled the police strike, in 1948, which was 
directed against a government deriving its authority solely from the 
King. (2) Moreover, on January 26, 1952 it was the army which 
suppressed the masses on that "Black Saturday".(3) Here it should 
be noticed that the interference of the army to restore order did 
not occur except after receiving personal orders from the King.(4) 
This special incident reveals the fact that the King had kept the 
armed forces as the last resort for suppressing any movements directed 
against his autocracy. However, it is necessary to notice that the 
King had secured the support of the army through appointing commanding 
officers from the ranks which were reputed to bear allegiance and 
(1) Bah k d -Din: op.cit. pp.4 -50 
(2) A tr- Räfici: op.cit. Vo.III, pp.521 -552 
(3) Keesingts Contemporary Archives, Vol.VIII, (1950 -52) p.12002 
(4) The Report of the Prosecutor General about the Cairo Riots, 
published in Al- Ahrám, March $, 1952 
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devotion to the autocracy of the Palace. In Egypt, as everywhere, 
military service is based on obedience, and once the King was 
assured of the support of the commanding. officers, he would rely on 
the help of the whole army. As proof of this argument, the differ- 
ences between the King and the Prime Minister over the person of the 
Minister of War may be recalled; and the insistance of the King on 
the creation of the post of the High Commander of the Armed Forces 
in 1950 when there was a Wafdist Minister of War, and the nomination 
of a particular person, Haidar Pasha, to occupy that post is to be 
(1) 
remembered. Moreover, it is alleged that when the King doubted 
the loyalty of the army, he formed an 'Iron Guard" whose members 
were not Egyptians, but Africans especially brought from Central 
Africa for that purpose. The function of that "Guard" was to 
liquidate so- called hostile elements opposing the King. (2) 
(1) See supra :p.191. 
(2) The New York Times, October 2, 1952 
CHAPTER IV(1) 
The Cabinet 
It was Article 29 of the Constitution which stipulated that 
"the executive power shall be exercised by the King within the 
limits of this Constitution. "(2) In the foregoing Chapter a study 
of the sovereign's róle as the head of the executive power has been 
carried out. Appointments were made, acts of Parliament were pro- 
claimed, war was declared and treaties were negotiated and ratified 
by the King. However, since the Monarch, as shown above, was non - 
responsible, the Constitution provided that he "shall exercise his 
powers through the intermediary of his minist ers.''(3) Therefore, 
if the King appeared to be the head of the executive power, it was 
in accordance with the Constitution which conferred on him that 
prerogative merely because he was the head of the State. The real 
executive authority resided in the Cabinet or, as it is usually 
called in Egypt, the Council of i_inisters (î'iajlisu'1- e(Tuzara -) . 
(4) 
"A Cabinet ", said Walter Bagehot, "is a combining committee - 
a 'hyphen' which joins, a 'buckle' which fastens, the legislative 
part of the State to the executive part of the State. "(5) The 
Cabinet in Egypt formulated and carried out all executive policies, 
it was responsible for the administration of all government 
(1) This Chapter is mainly based on material gathered through 
personal investigation. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art.29, see Appendix I. 
(3) Ibid. Art. 4$. 
(4) Osman, A.: Le mouvement constitutionnel en Egypt, pp.105 -107. 
(5) Bagehot, V'.: The English Constitution, p.12. 
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departments, and it also prepared by far the greater part of the 
legislative programme. The. Cabinet seems to have been the servant 
of the hing, yet it was entitled to advise him on what to do. It 
also appeared, in theory, the servant of the Chamber of Deputies, 
yet it led and directed that Chamber. Undoubtedly the Cabinet, and 
the Prime iinister at its head, exercised extensive power. This 
power was exercised according to the custom of the Constitution. 
The really vital points about the Cabinet, however, rest on the 
constitutional conventions. IIow would a Cabinet obtain office? 
Alen should it resign? What were its powers? What was the relatio 
between the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, between one minister and 
another? How many Ministers should be in the Cabinet? And so forth 
The Prime Minister differed from his colleagues in many differ- 
ent ways, such as, for example, the manner in which he obtained and 
relinquished his office. He was requested by the King to form a 
government, but he himself issued the invitation to all other 
members. Again, whenever the Prime Minister vacated his office, 
that act normally carried with it the resignation of all those who 
composed the government. In contrast, when any other member of 
the Cabinet left, the tenure of the remaining ministers was un- 
disturbed. 
The freedom of selection of a Prime _: .inister was not necessar- 
ily restricted by the general principle that the leader of the 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies should hold that office. As a 
result, not only were coalitions inside and outside Parliament 
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quite often found without a recognised leader, but Egypt itself 
was governed for some time without a Parliament at all. ia)reover, 
the failure of the party system to follow the English precedent of 
two political parties made it extremely difficult for the Prime 
Minister in Egypt to be, as in Britain, the leader of the majority 
in the Lower House. Therein lies an explanation of that character- 
istic phenomenon of the parliamentary experiment in Egypt - Independ- 
ents having no real support in Parliament, or amongst the people, 
held on repeated occasions the post of Prime Minister. Only six 
out of sixteen Prime Ainisters were party leaders; consequently, 
one might claim that these six had the backing of their parties and 
(1) 
other political groups with which they might have been in coalition. 
That phenomenon, of Independent Prime Ministers, was criticised 
in the Chamber of Deputies on two occasions. First when Hussein 
Sirry Pasha formed his Cabinet in August 1941, some Deputies raised 
the question of the unconstitutionality of an Independent holding 
that post.(2) again when Ismail Sidky Pasha came into power in 
1946, a similar situation occurred.(3) Without regard to the 
motives behind that criticism, it is significant to notice that the 
(1) The six Prime Ministers were: Saad Zaghlu; (1924) ; Mustafa 
El Nahas (1925, 1930, 1936 -37, 1942 -44, 1950 -52) ; Mohamed 
Mahmud (2.938-39)¡ Ahmed Naher (1944 -45) ; Mahmud Fahmy El 
Nokrashy (1945 -46, 1946 -45); and, Ibrahim Abdel Hadi (1945 -49). 
(2) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VII1iv, 5.71, p.591. 
(3) Ibid. Ix -ii, 5;.15, p.155. 
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Chamber took little notice of it, probably because of the fear of 
dissolut ion. 
(1) 
Independents not only held the post of Prime Linister, but they 
also had access to the most important portfolios in the Cabinet. 
They never attained such positions unless anti- 'Tafdist coalitions 
were in power. This was due to the fact that these parties had 
too few sound personalities to provide enough members worthy of 
Cabinet rank. Therefore, they had to seek men of capabilities 
which they themselves lacked, from a mongst the Independents. 
over, in  the anti- '',Jafdist Parliaments, Independent members were of 
some value in forming a majority for the government. 
So firmly established was the custom that Independents partic- 
ipated in anti- 6afdist coalition Cabinets, that the government of 
Dr. Ahmed i4aher Pasha in 19.5 was criticised because of the so- 
called 'barring' of the Independents from ministerial posts. (2) In 
his reply to that criticism the Prime sinister said: "The absence 
of Independents from the Cabinet is due to the fact that the 
Independent member expresses a special opinion which, most of the 
time, is personal. Constitutional governments which depend on the 
confidence of Deputies, demand the opinions of all members who 
(1) The story was circulated in political circles in Egypt that 
when Sidky Pasha felt a hostile tendency against his Cabinet, 
he declared that he had already acquired the sanction of the 
King to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies; but he would not 
resort to that measure if the Chamber upheld him and voted in 
supltrt of his government. This incident is not recorded in 
the minutes of the debates, but one could notice the change 
in the attitude of the Chamber by the end of the sitting. 
See Ibid. Ii -ii, S.15, pp.l4$ -155. 
(2) Ibid. IX-i, S.L., p.2. 
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represent the different parties. In normal circumstances, such 
governments are formed from one political party or more without 
any recourse to Independents except under very exceptional circum- 
stances; for example, when it is not possible to find a suitable 
personality representing one or other of the political parties of 
which the Cabinet is formed. Therefore, there is no prejudice 
against Independent Deputies, especially as they made their position 
clear that they have no intention of binding themselves to a definite 
opinion on any subject. iioreover, when an Independent takes part 
in a ministerial combination, it is difficult to guarantee that 
solidarity will always exist between him and other ministers with 
regard to the general policy to be followed. It is also difficult 
to guarantee that the policy of an Independent Minister with regard 
to a definite question will not raise obstacles in the way of the 
Cabinet in which he takes part. (1) 
In spite of this blunt and outspoken criticism of their 
political status, and in spite of their weakening the Cabinet by 
accepting ministerial portfolios, Independents never missed an 
opportunity to join the Cabinet. Not very long after the above 
mentioned statement was delivered in the Chamber of Deputies, the 
political party (the Saadist), of which Aaher was the leader, sought 
the help of the Independents in filling the seats of the Cabinet. (2) 
This not only shows the political strength of Independents, but also, 
(1) Ibid. IX-i, S.6, p.3 
(2) Ibid. IX-i, S.10, p.2 
217. 
and at the sanie time, illustrates the weakness of the political 
parties other than the Wafd. 
The tenure of Prime idnisters in general, with the exception 
of the 'dafdists, depended on the authority of the King to appoint 
and dismiss the Cabinet. This viewpoint could be proved by the 
fact that in their addresses to Parliament on the occasion of their 
coming to power, these Prime Linisters paid homage and expressed 
loyalty to the King for charging them to govern the country. If 
they ever appreciated any support they had from amongst the people 
or their representatives - who actually according to the Constitution 
were the source of all powers - the expression of such ap:.reciation 
came in a less prominent place and with wearer wording.(1) 
To estimate the types and methods of governmental leadership 
is to enter upon a subject where statistical data have little to 
contribute; it is a problem of evaluation, not of enumeration. 
Duration in office, age, previous experience are only faint indices 
of the qualities that enable a man to lead or dominate his fellow 
politicians and fellow citizens. In Egypt, as elsewhere, Prime 
Ministers fall into two broad classes: the titular leaders, and the 
effective leaders. That is a necessary distinction since the power 
actually wielded by the different holders of the same office varied 
enormously. 
(1) Cf. The address of Hussein Sirry Pasha on the occasion of 
coining to power in 1940. Ibid. VII -iv, S.4, p.11. The 
address of Sidky Pasha in 1946, Ibid. IX -ii, S.15, p.148; 
and his letter to the King accepting the charge of forming 
a Cabinet, p.149. Also the address of El Nokrashy Pasha in 
1946, Ibid. IX -iii, S.5, pp.17 -18. Also cf. the address of 
Hussein Sirry Pasha in 1949, iIajlisu' n- Nuwwab : op.cit. IX -v, 
S.35, p.2546. 
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If it is the reality and not the semblance of leadership that 
matters, certain Prime Ministers can straightaway be discarded. In 
some of the early Cabinets the dominating force, the direction, and 
the drive emanated from some minister who was nominally subordinate 
to his chief. Take for example the Ziwar Cabinet, (1925 -26), whose 
real head was the subtle, shrewd and skilful Ismail Sidky Pasha, 
the Minister of the Interior. Not only did the Primeïinister 
admit his dependence on Sidky, but also the resignation of the latter 
shook the Cabinet and could be considered the ultimate cause of its 
fall.(1) 
Another political leader who exercised supreme power from a 
supposedly inferior position is Saad Pasha Zaghlul. After the 
results of the 1926 general elections were declared showing the 
overwhelming majority that the Wafd, led by Zaghlul, had acquired, 
the King, instead of charging the leader of the majority to form a 
Cabinet, designated Adly Pasha Yaken to the Premiership. This 
Premier depended on the support he derived from Zaghlul, who was 
later elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. The situation 
followed the same pattern after the resignation of Adly Pasha in 
April 1927. His successor, Sarwat Pasha, counted on the backing 
of Zaghlul, and even after the latterts death, the Prime Minister 
depended on the support he got from the new leader of the Wafd, 
Mustafa El -Nahas Pasha. In support of this argument, the reper- 
cussions of El -Nahas Pasha's attitude towards Sarwat Pasha and his 
(1) See Supra Chapter I, pp. 52 -54. 
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Cabinet after the conclusion of the Sarwat- Chamberlain draft treaty 
are recalled. i1 -Nahas Pasha's opposition to that settlement of 
Anglo-Egyptian relations caused the fall of the Sarwat Cabinet. (1) 
How would a Cabinet vacate its place? In the first place, 
the Cabinet could either resign of its own free will or be dismissed 
by the King. The practice by the King of his right to dismiss the 
Cabinet was the scope of study in a previous part of this work. 
(2) 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the King never used 
this right to dismiss a non- Wafdist Cabinet. 
The King was not always satisfied with practising his right to 
dismiss the Cabinet, but preferred to force certain Cabinets to 
resign. It is said that all of a sudden in 1940 he demanded the 
resignation of Mohamed Mahmud Pasha. He also called on El Nokrashy 
Pasha in February 1946, after some internal disturbances, and forced 
him to tender his resignation. Again, in July 1949 he sent a court 
official to Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha in the middle of the night to 
awaken him and announce to him the King's command that he should 
resign. 
(3) 
It is important to notice that these Cabinets which were 
forced to resign under pressure from the King were always non-Jafdist, 
composed of anti- Júafdist elements who had little support from the 
people. .Since their sole source of power was the autocracy of the 
King, it would have looked ridiculous for the King to dismiss them. 
What were the circumstances under which a Cabinet would resign? 
(1) See Supra Chapter I, p.55. 
(2) See Supra Chapter III, pp. 181 -1$3. 
(3) Bahá ' u -1 -Din: op. cit . pp. 34 -3 5. 
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The conceivable case where a Cabinet should tender its resignation 
would occur when the Chamber of Deputies expressed no confidence in 
it. Such an expression could be by a direct vote of no confidence 
in the Cabinet, or by a vote against an important measure introduced 
by the Cabinet. In the parliamentary annals of Egypt there is no 
precedent where Parliament passed a vote of no confidence in a 
Cabinet; and there is only one instance where the Cabinet resigned 
in consequence of a resolution passed by the Chamber of Deputies. 
In 1927 during the discussion of the Budget in the Chamber, some 
Deputies proposed a vote of thanks to the Cabinet for its efforts in 
consolidating Bank kiisr. There was, however, strong opposition to 
that proposed resolution, based on the fact that the consolidation 
of the Bank was a result of a previous resolution passed by the 
Chamber itself. ,Then the Chamber did not pass the vote of thanks 
to the Cabinet, the government considered that action as no confidence 
in itself and resigned. 
(1) 
No doubt the Cabinet was over -sensitive 
with regard to the criticism of the Chamber. It seems that there 
must have been other causes for that resignation, because practically 
the same set -up of the Cabinet continued after the resignation, the 
only change in the new Cabinet being that a new Prime Minister was 
(1) áabri: op.cit. pp. 582 -583. In its comment on the resignation 
of the Cabinet The Times said: "To none has the result come as a 
greater shock than to the Chamber itself, which never intended to 
vote want of confidence but merely in one of its characteristic 
efforts to impress the country that it was fighting to improve 
the economic situation 
rr The TTimes, April 20, 1927. 
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installed, who, however had been the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
the outgoing Cabinet. 
In most cases the resignation of the Cabinet in Egypt emerged 
from causes different from lack of confidence between the government 
and the governed. (1) Prior to 1936 the British influence was very 
great in instituting or causing the fall of the different Cabinets. 
On that point Sir D. Kelly, who occupied a high position in the 
British Residency in Cairo said: "whether there was a Palace govern- 
ment or a lafdist government, it depended on the hidden hand of the 
resident High Commissioner. The question was, on which side would 
the Residency throw its weight. "(2) This situation seems to have 
been the result of the political set -up in Egypt at that time. The 
only political forces in the country were the Residency, the King, 
and the afd. Although there was a belief that the British inter - 
ference in the internal politics of Egypt ceased after the conclusion 
of the 1936 Treaty, it seems that such interference did not really 
stop. It was revealed in the Chamber of Deputies that the resigna- 
tion in 1940 of the Cabinet presided over by Ali Maher Pasha was 
forced by Britain. 
(3 ) 
An outstanding feature of Egyptian politics during the period 
under review in this study was the frequency with which Cabinets were 
made and unmade. Ministerial crises were continually recurring; 
(1) Ra' fat and Ibráhim: op.cit. p. 594. 
(2) Kelly: op.cit. p. 21$. 
(3) Abdel Salam El Shazly Pasha, the Minister of Wakfs in the ï,aher 
Cabinet, revealed that during the discussion of an interpella- 
tion. La Chambre des Deputés: op. cit. VIII -i, S.4, pp. 13 -14. 
222. 
resignations, "shakeups" and coalitions constituted the political 
history of that phase. From 1924 until 1952, i.e. twenty -eight 
years, the official record of Egyptian Cabinets is not less than 
forty. (1) On an average, therefore, each remained in office under a 
year. One of the Cabinets did not survive more than one day. This 
was i l- Hilaly Cabinet which was ousted by the army 'Coup d'Etat' in 
July 1952. How short -lived Egyptian Cabinets were may be seen from 
the following table which classifies them according to the length of 
their term in office. 
Length of Term of Egyptian Cabinets. (2) 
Length of Term dumber of Ministries 
Under Three Months 
Three to Six 
Months 13 
Six to Twelve 
Months 9 
Over a Year l 
Total 40 
Out of the forty Cabinets only ten survived for more than a 
year. Only three of them carried on for about two years or a little 
(1) Madk ar and Ghálf : op.cit. p. 125. 
The Cabinet presided over by General Neguib, which came into 
power in September 1952 is included. It is considered that 
although it continued in power until Neguib's forced resigna- 
tion in February 1954, it lived only until December 10, 1952, 
the date of the abrogation of the 1923 Constitution. 
(2) This table is based mainly on the list of governments in Egypt 
cited in Appendix III of Colombe: op.cit. pp. 330 et seq. 
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more; the remaining seven were in office slightly over a year. 
It is striking that those which survived more than a year prior 
to 1936 were extra -parliamentary Cabinets. They were the Ziwar 
Cabinet, which was responsible for the first constitutional crisis 
in 1925; the Mahmud Cabinet, which suspended the Constitution and 
carried out a 'coup d'etat' in 192$; the Sidky and Yeheya Cabinets, 
which forced the application of the somewhat reactionary 1930 Con- 
stitution; and, the Messim Cabinet, which governed without a 
Parliament in preparation for the restoration of the 1923 Con- 
stitution. 
The cold bare statistics of Cabinet changes conceal as much as 
they reveal. They do not show the continual shuffling and re- 
shuffling within the Cabinets. Moreover, they do not convey an 
accurate picture of the continuity of personnel which underlay many 
mutations. The statistics would be considerably modified if one 
picked out only those changes which involved substantial differences 
in personnel. However, the following table shows the numbers of 
incumbents in Egyptian Cabinets from March 1924 until December 1952. 
Number of Holders of Different Portfolios.(1) 
Portfolios Numbers 
Interior 19 
Foreign Affairs 24 
Finance 27 
War and Marine 28 
Justice 29 
Education 23 
Wakf s 2$ 
(1) This table is based on the list of governments in Egypt. 
Ibid. pp, 330 et seq. 
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Portfolios Numbers 
Public 'corks 24 
Agriculture 30 
Communications 31 
Commerce and Industry 
(Est. in Dec. 1934) 21 
Public Health 
(Est. in April 1937) 16 
Thus the average amount of change varied between once in eleven 
months, and once in eighteen months. This illustrates that few 
ministers held their portfolios long enough to acquire an informed 
impression of the quality of their activities, and to judge the 
success or failure of their policies. Moreover, even where there was 
continuity of office, it was with different colleagues under different 
Prime Ministers, and in some cases in different parliamentary 
coalitions.(1) 
The person who was summoned to form a Cabinet, as President of the 
Council of Ministers, selected his colleagues either from his own 
party, if he was a leader of a political party having a majority in 
the Chamber of Deputies, or from his political associates and members 
of other political parties if he were an Independent, or if the party 
he led was not strong enough to face the Chamber and the people alone. 
Usually other Prime Ministers than the two leaders of the Wafd,Laghlul 
and El- Nahas, sought their colleagues from amongst other political 
groups and parties rather than from those to which they belonged. The 
authority of the King with regard to the appointment of i,iinisters 
(1) Cf. The conditions during 1940 and 1942 and during 1944 -49 where 
there was a kind of continuity in office although weakened by 
these different factors. 
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could not be overlooked here. However, since this point has been 
discussed in a previous Chapter, it is sufficient to point out that 
the Prime Minister did not have absolute freedom in choosing his 
colleagues; The King had the decisive word in that matter.(1) 
The differences in their views and affiliations did not prevent 
the persons thus selected to the membership of the Cabinet from 
getting on together and presenting a united front to the opposing 
factions and parties. Nevertheless, in the political history of 
Egypt, one could find instances where coalitions collapsed because of 
dissension inside the Cabinet. The first collapse of that character 
was in 1925 when divergences inside the Cabinet between the Liberal 
Constitutionalists and the Unionists were heightened by the crisis 
of the book on "Islam and Principles of Government. "(2) The resigna- 
tion of the Saadist Ministers from the Cabinet in 1940 because of 
differences with their colleagues on the attitude and policy of Egypt 
towards the Second World War provides further evidence that differ- 
ences in political affiliations of members of the Cabinet would 
cause political instability.(3) Moreover, it was said that one of 
the main causes leading to the resignation of Abdel I- iadi's Cabinet 
in 1949 was the differences inside the Cabinet on the delimitation 
of electoral constituencies. Again, that same subject and the 
disagreement within the all- parties coalition Cabinet, were the 
decisive factors in bringing that coalition to an end in NoveAber 
(4) 
1949. Another incident which illustrates such conditions clearly 
(1) See Supra Chapter III, pp.l78 -1$0 
(2) See Supra Chapter I, p.53 
(3) See Supra Chapter II, pp. 115 -117 
(4) See infra Chapter V, pp. 116- 7 
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is that which took place in March 1952. The difference between the 
Prime Minister and his colleagues emerged during discussions on the 
future of the Chamber of Deputies. However, these differences 
resulted in the resignation of Maherts all- IndependentsCabinet.(1) 
The usual description of the position of the Prime Minister in 
the Cabinet was that he was 'primus inter pares.' This phrase was 
far from doing justice to the Prime Minister. He could not be first 
among his equals for the very excellent reason that he had no equal. 
His unique position was asserted by the Constitution in Article 60 
which required his signature with any other Minister's to countersign 
the King's acts. However, it should be kept in mind that the other 
Ministers were the colleagues of their chief and not his obedient and 
unquestioning subordinates. (2) A Prime Minister who would try to 
issue orders to his Ministers or would interfere persistently in their 
departmental work might find that before long he was out of office. 
This was a result of the fact that the Cabinet usually comprised 
different elements which were not ready to yield to the will of the 
Prime Minister. All Ministers were responsible to the Chamber of 
Deputies, and while they gladly acknowledged the leadership of the 
Prime Minister, and while, in fact, they frequently accepted his 
decisions, they never completely surrendered their individual judgment 
or responsibility. 
(3) 
(1) The Keesing's Contemporary 'archives, Vol.VIII, (1950- 52),p.12097. 
(2) Ra fat and Ibrahim: op.cit. pb. 592-593; Kalil: op.cit. Vol.', 
pp. 134-135; Madkür and Gháli: op.cit. pp. 138 -139. 
(3) Cf. The case when divergences occurred in 1950 between Dr. Zaki 
Abdel Motaal, the Minister of Finance, and Nahas Pasha, the Prime 
Minister. The latter insisted on a certain cotton policy to be 
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Although the Prime Minister was on the same footing as trie other 
Ministers with regard to legal prerogatives, he was really their chief 
with respect to the shaping of governmental policies and to the co- 
ordination of the activities of the Cabinet. The best evidence of 
his holding a controlling position in the Cabinet lies in the fact 
that after their participation in coalition Cabinets continuously for 
five years (1944 -49), the Liberal Constitutionalists denounced their 
responsibility for the actions of the different Cabinets during that 
period on the ground that they did not have any opportunity to preside 
over the Council of Ministers.(1) 
The powers of the Prime Minister were potentially enormous. They 
sprang from his position of primacy in the government, reinforced 
either by his leadership of the majority party (as was the case when 
the Wafd was in power) , or by the King t s right to dissolve the Chamber 
of Deputies (as was the case when Independents held the premiership). 
Therefore, the Prime Minister was the directing force in both the 
Cabinet and Parliament, and thus presided over the one and guided the 
deliberations of the other. He sketched the general policy of the 
Cabinet, determined its agenda and was the major influence in helping 
it to arrive at decisions. He led Parliament, answered many of its 
questions and submitted the measures of his government for its 
approval.(2) 
followed. The Minister of Finance did not agree with that policy 
and threatened to resign and make the issue of disagreement be 
known to the public. The Prime Minister retreated and the matter 
was dropped. Eventually this divergence was the cause of the 
dismissal of Dr. 'otaal. 
(1) AlAhr ám, November 4, 1949; Cf. Supra Chapter II, 1.134 
(2) Khalil: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 138 -141; Madkur & Ghali: op.cit. 
pp. 137 -139. Cf. The case when Nahas Pasha, during his term of 
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With the exception of Mohamed Mahmud Pasha in his fourth Cabinet 
(June 193k- August 1939) and iïustafa El Nahas Pasha in his seventh 
Cabinet (January 1950 - January 1952), the Presidents of the Council 
of Ministers always held at least one portfolio. This portfolio was 
usually the Interior, with the result that the Prime Minister was 
inclined to overemphasize the importance of internal politics at the 
expense of foreign affairs. It seems that the importance of the 
portfolio of the interior originated in the fact that this Ministry 
had a great influence on local government officials, and directed the 
general elections. In certain cases, a Prime Minister was not 
satisfied with one portfolio. He sometimes undertook the responsibil- 
ity of directing two ministries in addition to his task as Prime 
Minister. For instance, Aly Maher Pasha in 1936 and 1939 took the 
helm of the Ministries of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs. So too 
with Premiers Hussein Sirry Pasha in 1941, 1949 and 1952, Mustafa El 
Nahas Pasha in 1942 and Mahmud Fahmy El Nokrashy Pasha in 1945 and 
1946. What is certain, however, is that the direction of a minis- 
terial department was, in itself, a heavy task; when it was added 
to the duties and responsibilities of a Prime Minister, it is almost 
incredible that any one man could stand the resultant strain: 
The degree to which the Prime Minister used his colleagues to 
advise and assist him depended on many factors, the chief of which 
was purely personal. The most obvious ones to be considered were their 
= Premiership (1950 -52), very seldom attended the sittings of 
Parliament. Although that was due to his old age, he was not 
exempt from the criticism that he was not performing his function 
of leading the Parliament. 
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ability and loyalty. A fair proportion of the Cabinet were fairly 
capable of performing their own departmental duties efficiently but 
were probably useless as consultants in wider fields of governmental 
policy. Others did not have the full confidence of the Prime 
Minister or the respect and full approval of their colleagues. Thus 
there frequently arose within the Cabinet a small group of two or 
three ministers who because of ability of various kinds and exception- 
al personal qualities or characters were highly regarded by the Prime 
Minister and were consulted by him on all matters of importance. 
Occasionally the Prime Minister might have a special colleague 
whose intimacy made him a friend and almost a partner in the office. 
Those close relations were not very common, but when they did develop 
they were apt to create jealousies and antagonisms within the Cabinet. 
As evidence in support of this argument the split within the .-.'afdist 
Cabinet in 1937 which resulted in the dropping from the Cabinet of 
certain ministers, and ultimately led to the appearance of the Saadist 
Party, should be recalled. This controversy had some origin, it was 
alleged, in the jealousy of those ministers of the extensive powers 
delegated by the Prime Einister, Nahas Pasha, to the iinister of 
Finance, Makram Ebeid Pasha. (1) When Makram broke away from the 
1dafd in 1942, :Fad Serag El Din was in the ascendency. Actually he 
(1) Nahas and Makram stood side by side in the Egyptian Revolt in 
1919. They were exiled together, and an intimate friendship 
grew between them. However, that relation was broken off in 
1942 and Makram was dropped from the Cabinet and later expelled 
from the party. On the causes of differences between Nahas and 
Makram, see Supra, Chapter, II, pp.140 -142 
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did replace him and by 1943, he had become strong enough to hold the 
important portfolio of the Interior and to enjoy the confidence of the 
Prime Minister, who sought his advice and help whenever he so required. 
An analogy to the relation between Nahas and Makram could be found 
between Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha and Mahmud Fahmy El Nokrashy Pasha. 
(1 ) 
When the former became Prime Minister in 1945, it looked as if El 
Nokrashy was his partner in the office. 
It has been indicated that it was the Prime Minister who chose 
his colleagues. Nevertheless, his freedom of choice was restricted 
by the King's authority to object to the Premier's suggestions. The 
practice by the King of his power to appoint his Ministers and to 
reject the Prime Minister's choice of his colleagues has already been 
discussed.(2) The wide authority of the King to appoint his 
Ministers seems, however, to have emanated from the theory that the 
Ministers represented the King (who was the head of the executive 
power, but was non -responsible) in Parliament, and at the same time 
represented Parliament to the King. Therefore, if Parliament had the 
right to a vote of confidence in the Cabinet, the King should have the 
freedom to appoint to the Cabinet whomsoever he wanted.(3) 
The point of interest now is the powers of Parliament with 
regard to the Prime Minister's choice of his colleagues. Theoretically 
(1) Maher and El Nokrashy participated in the nationalist movement 
in 1919. They were accused of the assassination of Sir Lee Stack 
in 1924, but, both were acquitted. They broke away from the 'afd 
and formed the Saadist Party. 
(2) See supra Chapter III, pp. 175 -180 
(3) Raàfat and Ibrahim: op.cit. p. 589. 
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the Ministers here responsible to Parliament, and if that body did 
not approve the appointment of any Minister, that person should 
resign. In practice, however, the only incident when the nomination 
of a Minister induced both chambers of Parliament to criticise the 
inclusion of certain individuals in the Cabinet was in 1941 when 
Rashwan Mahfuz Pasha became the Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
A Deputy from the Opposition, Mahmud Soliman Ghannam, said: 
"The President of the Council of Ministers should, in choosing 
Ministers, take in consideration the resolutions passed by Parliament. 
. During the sitting held on June 19, 1939, on the occasion of the 
discussion of an interpellation related to the actions of Rashwan 
Mahfuz Pasha, who was then the Minister of Agriculture, the Senate 
declared the following: 
"The activities of the former Minister of Agriculture with 
regard to the subjects forming the interpellation constitute a 
serious neglect of his duty and his responsibility in his capacity 
as iinister.t 
41) 
In spite of Ghannamts urging the Chamber not to accept such a 
situation, and arguing that Ministers should be of solid character 
and integrity to raise the reputation of the Cabinet beyond any 
suspicion, the Chamber approved the composition of the Cabinet. 
Although this criticism did not have an immediate effect, it seems 
that it might have been one of its repercussions that Rashwan Mahfuz 
Pasha was dropped from the Cabinet in the first shuffling about a 
month later. 
(1) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VII -iv, 0.57, 'D.491. 
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Although it was not constitutionally provided that a ::sinister 
should be a member of Parliament, it was the custom that he was 
chosen from amongst members of Parliament. If it happened that a 
Linister was appointed, and was not a member of Parliament, he was 
designated to fill the first vacancy in either of the Chambers of 
Parliament. In such a case, however, nomination to the Senate was 
the usual procedure. It looked peculiar that the ':daf dirt Cabinet 
which was formed immediately after the Wald had swept the general 
elections in 1950 included six hinisters out of eighteen, who were 
not members of Parliament. The common practice was that Cabinets 
were comprised of Ministers who did not have seats in Parliament. 
So established was this practice that when in 1941 a Cabinet was 
formed from amongst members of Parliament, Hassan Ll Guiddawi said 
in the Chamber of Deputies: 
"That is the first time that a Ministry has selected all its 
members from amongst members of Parliament. If the Cabinet has 
deviated from that principle in the beginning, it has done so in 
reliance on a precedent. Nevertheless, by virtue of sound parliam- 
entary traditions, it is representatives of parties who should assume 
the responsibility of power. "(1) 
It seems that the principle that .':inisters should be members 
of Parliament was an outcome of the article in the Constitution which 
provided that i4the Ministers are collectively responsible to the 
(1) Ibid. VII-iv, S.71, p.590. 
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Chamber of Deputies for the general policy of the government and each 
is individually responsible for the acts of his ministry."(1) Since 
the tradition was that idnisters should be members of Parliament, 
this meant that they should acquire the qualifications of being 
members of Parliament. Qualifications required in a Deputy were 
not so severe as those required in a Senator. Therefore, a Minister 
should possess, at least, the qualifications required in a Deputy, 
which may be summed up in that he should be of the minimum age of 
(2) 
thirty years and should possess all political rights. In addition 
a Minister should be honest and incorruptible. This is the most 
elementary qualification required in a minister. He should not only 
possess this qualification but should also show evidence of possess- 
ing it. (3) Moreover, the Constitution clearly provided that only 
l923,Constitution, Art.61 
Khalil: op. cit . Vol. I, p.158. About the qualifications of 
Senators see infra Chapter VI,pp.31173Vfand of Deputies, 
Chapter VII, pp. 3$11-70( 
To discuss the effectiveness of that qualification and the 
extent of its observance is to enter into a wild field of dis- 
cussion and argument. However, it seems necessary to point 
out that many accusations against different Ministers were cir- 
culated, but they were never brought before the courts or before 
Parliament. The only case where Parliament took some action 
with regard to such accusations was when Makram Ebeid Pasha 
accused the o-Jafdist Cabinet and Ministers of corruption and 
dishonesty. Parliament discussed an interpellation about some 
of these accusations, and voted in confidence of the fidafdist 
Cabinet. See supra Chapter II, pp.141 -142 and infra Chapter VII, 
P. In 1945, a .iinisterial Committee was established to 
investigate these accusations. It presented its report to the 
Chamber of Deputies which formed a parliamentary committee to 
examine and report on i -t. La Chambre des Déput és: op.cit.IX -iv, 
S.25, p.2. However, there was no further procedure from either 
the Chamber or the Cabinet. Moreover, it should be noted that 
all these accusations and actions were the outcome of partisan 
jealousies, and they were all motivated by that spirit. = 
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Egyptians were eligible for ministerial posts, and that members of 
the Royal family were not entitled to such posts.(1) 
It is interesting to notice that a Minister, being a member of 
Parliament, could leave behind his capacity as a member of the 
Cabinet and participate, as a member of Parliament, in any discussion 
going on in the chamber to which he belonged. This was the case 
when Mahmud Soliman Ghannam Pasha, the Minister of Industry and 
Commerce took part in the discussion in the Chamber in 1950 on the 
validity of the mandate of one of the Deputies.(2) Moreover, 
Ministers had the right to attend the sittings cf either of the two 
chambers, and were entitled to speak, defend their departments and 
express the Cabinet's attitude on any subject. This was a practice 
contrary to the British tradition which does not allow Ministers to 
attend any parliamentary sitting unless they are members of that 
House. However, although Ministers in Egypt could speak in either 
of the two chambers of Parliament whenever they so demanded, they did 
not have the right to cast their votes except in that chamber of 
which they were members.(3) 
The size of the Cabinet changed from time to time. The first 
Cabinet under the 1923 Constitution comprised ten portfolios: the 
Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and I.iarine, Justice,Education, 
Under the new regime of government which abolished the Con- 
stitution, suspended parliamentary life and dissolved political 
parties, politicians of the older system were tried and con- 
demned on charges of corruption and dishonesty while holding 
ministerial posts. Although some of these charges were soundly 
proved, one should not count too much on them, since it seems 
that the motive behind them was to show these politicians as 
unfit to govern the country. 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 5e -59. 
(2) Majlisu°'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. X -i, 8.9, pp3 -39 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art.63. 
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Wakfs, Agriculture and Communications. In December 1934 a new 
portfolio of Commerce and Industry was established, and in April 
1936 that of Public Health was created. The iinistry of Social 
Affairs was founded in 1ß39. During the War, there was a necessity 
for the establishment of the îUnistries of Civil Defence and of 
Supply. The former disappeared with the War coming to an end, while 
the latter by virtue of the shortage of supplies of food and clothing, 
continued to be a portfolio within the Cabinet. Other two Ministries 
were created in 1950: the Ministry of National Economy and the 
Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. (1) In June 1952 a Ministry 
of Palace Affairs was established in order that its occupant should 
act as a mediator between the Cabinet and the Palace. (2) 
The creation of new Ministries was the result of the growth 
of different departments. When one department or more grew in 
importance because of its. functions or the increase of the number 
of civil servants attached to it, or because of the development of 
social, economic or political conditions, it was transformed into a 
Ministry. Social conditions induced the expansion of the Department 
of public Health, in the Ministry of the Interior, into a Ministry. 
The growing importance of various departments in the Ministries of 
Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Commerce and Industry forced the 
creation of the Ministry of National Economy. Since the Ministers 
were the heads of the various departments constituting the different 
(1) Colombe: op.cit. pp.338, 342 and 352; Khalil: op.cit. Vol.I, 
pp. 155-156. 
(2) The Daily Herald, July 1, 1952. 
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Ministries, the creation of a new Ministry caused many arguments. 
These were due to the insistance of some Ministries on maintaining 
their old authority over some departments which were designed to con- 
stitute the new Ministry. On the other hand, the Minister who held 
the new portfolio was eager to extend his powers to these departments. 
In addition to those Ministers who held portfolios, the Cabinet 
contained, in certain cases, Ministers without portfolio. They were 
called Ministers of State (Wuzai Dawlah). Although they had no 
regular office to work in, and had no departments to administer, they 
were members of the Cabinet and received renumeration equal to that 
received by those Ministers who held portfolios:l) The presence of 
(2) 
Ministers without portfolio in the Cabinet was due to varying reasons. 
For instance, the presence of six Ministers having no definite 
function in the all parties coalition Cabinet presided over by Hussein 
Sirry Pasha in 1949 was due to his attempt to give the different 
political parties equal representation in the Cabinet.(3) In other 
cases the presence of a Minister of State in the Cabinet was due to 
the fact that for a variety of reasons the person of that Minister 
should be honoured. A Minister, for example, might not have suffi- 
cient ability to warrant giving him a portfolio, yet his appearance in 
the Cabinet would provide partisan representation. This was the case 
when Raghib Hanna Bey was appointed Minister of State in 1945. 
Minister, too might be usuaually able and experienced, but no longer 
(1) Sabri: op.cit. pp. 589 -591. 
(2) Cf. Khali : op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 151 -152. 
(3) Notice that these six Ministers were: two Independents, a 
Wafdist, a Saadist, a Liberal Constitutionalist, and a National- 
ist. Colombe: op.cit. p. 350. 
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capable of meeting the heavy demands of departmental work. The only 
aim of appointing Ahmed Lutfy El Sayed Pasha, Minister of State in 
1946 was to benefit from his experience and talents despite his 
advanced age. Not very long afterwards, however, he undertook the 
burden of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Minister might be very 
competent, but wished nothing more than to sit in the seats of the 
mighty and be available for administrative duties as was the case 
when Mohamed Aly Allouba and Ibrahim Abdel Hady were appointed 
Ministers of State in the Naher Cabinet in 1939. Moreover, the 
appointment as Linister of State was a kind of test of the ability and 
talents of those who held such positions. This seems to have been the 
case with the appointment of Dr. Mohamed Hashim, a Minister of State 
in 1949. lie wes called to administer the Ministry of the Interior 
during the 1950 general elections. Showing success in that task, the 
subsequent ministerial post he held was the portfolio of Finance in 
1952. 
Although all Ministers, contrary to the British practice which 
differentiates between Junior Einisters and Cabinet Ministers, were 
members in the Cabinet and were theoretically on an equal footing, a 
hierarchy existed in the Cabinet, in fact if not in law. The Ministry 
of the Interior had tremendous political importance because whoever 
held that portfolio controlled the cUmad and local government 
officials whose influence on elections was paramount. Moreover, with 
the 'secret police' and the 'political police' under his discretion, 
the Minister of the Interior could obtain information about every 
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activity, even every breath, of his political opponents and rival 
parties. The Minister of Foreign Affairs enjoyed great prestige 
because whoever held that portfolio was constantly engaged in framing 
and carrying out the foreign policy of the country. The importance of 
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs reached its apex when differences 
between Egypt and the United Kingdom appeared. At such times the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs was busy attempting to reach a settlement 
with Britain. Indeed, at such times the Prime Ministers themselves, 
usually held that portfolio. That situation, however, was result of 
the importance of nationalism and the róle it played in the recent 
history of Egypt. The Ministry of Finance came next, because although 
credits were voted by Parliament, funds were actually provided by this 
Ministry. 
(1) 
It is well known that finance is the key to all adminis- 
trative and legislative possibilities. The Ministries of Education, 
of Public 'works, and'of Communications were also important because they 
comprised a large number of civil servants. Moreover, the Minister of 
(1) See the comment of Ibrahim Abdel Hadi on the Budget of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1941. He mentioned that 
the Ministry of Finance planted handicaps before the Ministry 
of Commerce through delaying the release of the funds devoted to 
that Ministry. La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VII -iv, 3.31, 
pp. 245-246. 
See also the comment of Abdel Salam Gomaa Pasha on the legis- 
lation providing for, the elimination of the tax on exceptional 
profits. He said: "When I was the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry I suffered from the authority the Minister of Finance 
had over the Ministers, because he was a dictator. I noticed 
that after the Budget was approved by the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate, some of its items were marked not to be released 
except after the authorisation of the Minister of Finance 
Majlisu'n- Nuwwäb: op.cit. X -i, S.22, p. 13. 
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Education commanded University students and school boys who played an 
effective and important part in political activities in Egypt. 
The importance of the different ministries could be assessed from 
the type of personalities who held them. It is noticeable that those 
who held the Ministry of the Interior were, in general, the Prime 
Ministers. If a Prime Minister failed to hold that portfolio for 
one reason or another, it was the person second to him who got it. 
The Minister of the Interior was usually considered the strong man 
in the Cabinet.(i) Although Prime Ministers occasionally held the 
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, its importance could not be 
neglected. Usually those who occupied that post were astute 
politicians. They might be former Prime Ministers or former Ministers 
who had a previous outstanding political record.(2) 
There would be no better evidence of the existence of a hierarchy 
in the Cabinet than the occasion when the Liberal Constitutionalists 
(1) In 1925 it was Sidky Pasha who held that portfolio and not the 
Prime Minister. See supra Chapter I about the position of Sidky 
in the Cabinet. In 1938 when the Prime Minister did not hold any 
portfolio, it was El Nokrashy Pasha, the Vice- President of the 
Saadist Party, one of the coalition parties, who held that post. 
Again in 1940 the Prime Minister, Hasson Sabry Pasha, left that 
portfolio to El Nokrashy. When Fuad Serag El Din became the 
Minister of the Interior in 1943, it was a sign of his political 
ascendency. Ahmed Mortada El Maraghy was considered, politically 
speaking, a strong Minister when he held the portfolio of the 
Interior in the successive Cabinets of Aly Laher, El Hilaly and 
Hussein Sirry in 1952. 
(2) Cf. Abdel Fattah Tehya Pasha, a former Prime Minister, holding 
that portfolio from December 1937 to August 1939. Cf. also the 
personalities of those who held that portfolio afterwards. For 
the sake of illustration: El Nokrashy (1944 -45); Abdel Hamid 
Badawy (1945 -46); Ahmed Lutfy El Sayed (1946); Ibrahim Abdel 
Hady (1946); Ibrahim Desouky Abaza and Ahmed ihashaba (1948 -49). 
They all had previous experience in holding less important port- 
folios, and did not reach the position of Minister of Foreign 
Affairs until after they had struggled for their political career 
and shown efficiency and aptitude. 
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decided not to participate in Aly Maher's Cabinet in 1939. They 
declared that their decision was made because the invitation they had 
received was not encouraging. That view was based on their estima- 
tion that the portfoliosthey were offered were not those which they 
considered important.(1) 
Now, what were the functions of a Minister? To enumerate these 
functions one should carry out a detailed study of the different 
departments which the Minister controlled. The sinister, first of 
all, was the head of the departments he supervised, and was respons- 
ible to Parliament for their functions and activities. Therefore, 
the prime function of a Minister was to control all the departments 
and administrations composing the Ministry he held, and these were 
scattered all over the country. He directed them to follow, in their 
functioning, the general policy formulated by the Cabinet of which he 
was a member. This function of the Minister was exercised through 
issuing instructions and circulars.(2) These instructions and circu- 
lars had their direct effect on the civil servants to whom they were 
issued. Those civil servants were obliged to follow them; otherwise 
they were held to be guilty of disobedience to their seniors. Although 
instructions and circulars did not imply any immediate effect on the 
people, they had, through their application by the civil service, 
indirect repercussions on them. 
(1) Great Britain and the East, Vol. LII, No. 1474, p. 199. 
(2) Instructions were orders, either written or verbal, issued to a 
particular civil servant; circulars were issued to a whole group 
of the civil service, and usually were in written form. 
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This function of the Minister was the most important, since a 
Minister in a parliamentary system should not administer the details 
of his departments, but should leave that type of work to the per- 
manent Under -Secretary of State and other high ranking officials who 
exercised their duties under the Minister's control. In short, the 
business of the Minister was not to control the detailed work of . his 
departments, but to see that they functioned properly. (1) Actually, 
a Minister in Egypt was not satisfied with only directing and con- 
trolling his departments, but insisted on participating in the real 
work of these departments. Therefore, the layman who observed this 
situation was very critical of the system which he felt was leading to 
chaos. It was particularly difficult for a layman to understand how 
a politician who was by profession a lawyer, a, doctor or a college 
professor, could become an expert in the many fields that he presided 
over. It was difficult for the layman to conceive, for example, how 
a lawyer could manage to work the Ministry of Public Works with all 
its diverse departments, or the Ministry of Finance with its various 
activities which were beyond the understanding of the common man. 
The existence of that situation, however, was due to the impact 
of the older system which had prevailed in Egypt prior to the intro- 
duction of parliamentary government. That system of government was 
based on the appointment of Ministers who were experts in their fields. 
No wonder therefore, that there had been for a long time a general 
custom of appointing Ministers who were specialists in the fields of 
(1) Al- ̀ Arabi, iI.CA.. "1slähu31- idárati'1- Hukúmiyah fi îisr," pp. 492 
et seq. 
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the departments they supervised.(1) This custom contradicted the 
principles of parliamentary government, and would usually produce 
only complications in the working of the Cabinet and the adminis- 
trative machine. First of all, while Parliament might have been able 
to furnish, here and there, an outstanding authority on a special 
subject or activity - and he would be worthless as an expert unless 
he was outstanding - one would scarcely expect that on the side of 
the government in Parliament there would be experts in agriculture 
social affairs, transport, and in a dozen other fields as well. To 
place a member of Parliament who was a third or fourth rate specialist 
at the head of a Ministry because he was supposedly. an expert, and to 
give this "pretender" the absolute authority to control those who 
were really masters in their fields, i.e. the permanent civil servants, 
would not merely be useless, it would be utterly disastrous. An 
"amateur" Minister of first -rate capacity was in large measure more 
dependable and safe because he knew he was technically ignorant, and 
he was therefore willing to seek and take the advice obtainable. The 
third or fourth rate specialist would not adequately comprehend the 
extent of his own ignorance and would continually set up his judgment 
on technical matters against the opinion of his advisers. A Minister, 
however, should possess some specialised talent rarely associated with 
(1) That custom was first noticed in 1939 in Aly Maherts Cabinet. 
:In that Cabinet experts were appointed to supervise the different 
departments coming within the sphere of their specialisation. 
For example, Abdel Yawy Ahmed, an engineer, was appointed Minister 
of Public Works; Mohamed Tawfik Hifnawy, an agriculturist, 
Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Hamid Mahmoud, a medical doctor, 
Minister of Public Health; and Saleh Harb, an army office, 
Minister of National Defence (War). 
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the professional work of any particular department. 
(1) 
Moreover, it 
seems that the custom of appointing experts in the ministerial posts 
was one of the main reasons which induced the different Prime 
Ministers to select their colleagues from outside Parliament.(2) 
The Minister was competent to organise the departments which he 
controlled. He had the authority to establish new departments and to 
define the function of each of these departments. Ministers went 
far in practising this function; and the first action of some of 
them after holding a portfolio was often to demolish all that their 
predecessors had established. This was a factor in causing in- 
stability in the administrative machine. It was due to the partisan 
spirit and individual ambitions which induced Ministers to seek all 
means to secure praise.(3) 
Another function of the Minister was to countersign all the King, 
acts which were relevant to the departments he supervised. All laws, 
decrees and bills had no legality unless they were countersigned by 
the competent Minister. This rule was established by the Constitution 
which provided that the acts of the King in relation to State 
affairs must, to be effective, be countersigned by the President of 
the Council of Ministers and the Ministers concerned. "(4) The 
Minister, with the help of his technical assistants, and particularly 
(1) Madkúr and Ghgli : op.cit. pp .127 -131. 
(2) Cf. The case of the six ministers in the Wafdist Cabinet in 
1950 who were not members of Parliament. It was said that they 
appointed to the portfolios they held because they were special- 
ists in their fields. 
(3) Ra'fat: op.cit. pp.449 -450. 
(4) 1923 Constitution, Art.60. 
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of the legal counsellor,(1) prepared all bills and decrees required 
for the working of his departments. That was an indispensable stet 
before any legislation was brought before the Council of Ministers. 
The Minister also decided on the different matters brought 
before him which were relevant to his departments. It is important 
to notice that a system of centralisation was adopted in Egypt. 
Therefore, no official had the authority to decide on any matter 
without consulting his superiors, and ultimately the administrative 
head of the Ministry, i.e. the Minister. The result was that a 
tremendous burden was laid on the shoulders of the Ministers. They 
made the decisions on different problems referred from different 
districts and parts of the country. The Ministers, therefore, could 
not perform such a task successfully. No matter how experienced, 
talented and energetic a minister was,the files he had to study before 
taking decisions on different matters would take up more time than he 
could afford to spend. No wonder then, that since inefficiency was, 
generally speaking, the characteristic feature of the Ministers in 
Egypt, outcries were often raised for greater authority for high 
ranking officials, if not for the application of decentralisation.(2) 
Being the administrative head of the departments he supervised, 
the Minister had the right to appoint, promote, transfer and dismiss 
civil servants. In addition to those posts which were, as indicated 
777) Prior to 1946 when the Council of State was established, there 
was a Councillor for every Ministry in the State Legal Services. 
After 1946, these Counsellors became members of that Council. 
(2) Madkur and Ghali: op.ci.. pp. 214 et seq.; Allubá: op.cit. 
pp. 134 -13. Cf. Khalil: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 128 et seas. 
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before, filled by the King, there were also certain high ranking 
officials who were appointed, promoted, transferred and dismissed by 
the Council of Ministers. However, the Ministers practised that 
function with regard most civil servants. This function of the 
Minister might appear natural since he was the administrative chief 
of the Ministry and was responsible before Parliament for the actions 
of the civil servants attached to that Ministry. Ministers were not 
only charged with administrative functions; they were also politi- 
cians dependant for their position on their party members, constit- 
uents, and associates who usually expected that the Ministers would 
help them and their relatives to attain governmental posts and to 
obtain promotions. Ministers were often questioned and even inter - 
pellated in Parliament because they did not meet the requests of 
members of Parliament for such favours. Therefore, it is no wonder 
that nepotism spread through government departments.(1) 
In every Ministry, a 'Cabinet of the Minister' (Maktabu'l- :uazir ) 
was found. It consisted of a number of civil servants headed by the 
'Director of the Cabinet'. In some cases a Minister had more than 
one 'Cabinet.' He had an administrative or technical 'Cabinet' and 
a political one. He had absolute freedom to choose those civil 
servants who would be attached to his 'Cabinet,' especially the 
(1) In 1924 when the anti- Wafdi sts criticised Saad Zaghlul because 
of his attitude in filling the governmental posts with his 
associates, Zaghlul said: "I, if I could, would like to make it 
all Zaghlulist in flesh and blood." 
The work of Makram Ebeid Pasha in 1942 (The Black Book) con- 
tained numerous cases of nepotism where he proved that appoint- 
ments were made and promotion were conferred on civil servants 
because of their relation to, or with, Wafdist Ministers. 
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"Director of the Political Cabinet" who usually acted as the 
,:inister's private secretary in the political domain.(1) The scope 
of the iiiinister's choice was not limited to the civil servants 
attached to the departments he supervised; it extended to other 
departments. So important was it that those working in the I,_inister' 
Cabinet should enjoy his confidence, that they were usually replaced 
by others whenever the person of the Minister changed. These 
'Cabinets' were of great importance because they provided the lin- 
ister with technical advice on different subjects and brought to the 
notice of the I,inister matters which required his decision. It is 
interesting to point out that these 'Cabinets' enjoyed prestige and 
authority in governmental circles. This prestige was derived from 
that of the iinister to whom they were attached; thus it fluctuated 
in strength according to the influence of that ïanister in the Cabinet. 
In a few cases a Parliamentary Under - Secretary of State helped 
the iinister. Parliamentary Under- Secretaries were appointed for the 
first time in 1936. Since there was no provision in the Constitution 
about their status, and the electoral law exempted only the Ministers 
from the rules of incompatibility, a decree defining their functions 
was issued, and the electoral law was amended. A parliamentary under - 
secretary was designated to help the Iinister to whose portfolio he 
was attached, to represent him in Parliament, and to take part in the 
preparation of all bills and parliamentary activities relevant to the 
Ministry to which he was attached. (2) The appointment of parliamentary 
(1) Notice should be taken that a 'private secretary' acting in the 
full sense of the term was attached to the 'Cabinet' of every 
Minister. 
(2) Ra'fat and Ibrahim: op.cit. pp.489 -491; Sabri: op.cit. pp.591 -594 
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under -secretaries was criticised on the basis that it originated in 
England where the Minister is only allowed into the House of Parlia- 
ment of which he is a member, and a parliamentary under- secretary of 
State, who should be a member of the other House, is indispensable 
as he represents the Minister and defends his policies in that latter 
House. In Egypt where Ministers had the right to attend sittings of 
both Chambers of Parliament, parliamentary under -secretaries would 
not contribute to the political system but only would complicate it. 
Their functions would be identical with those of the Ministers and the 
permanent under -secretaries. Moreover, the existence of the posts 
of parliamentary under- secretaries would cause competition among 
members of Parliament; and in filling them the Cabinet would be in- 
fluenced by partisan spirit.(1) 
Parliamentary under -secretaries of State were appointed only by 
the T:.afdist Cabinet in 1936 and 1950. Attention should be paid to 
the fact that they were not members of the Cabinet. However, despite 
all criticism, it seems that their appointment was a successful move. 
Not only did they help the Ministers in facing Parliament, but they 
proved to have benefited from their posts by making good Ministers in 
the following years.(2) Therefore, if the system of parliamentary 
under- secretaries had done nothing more than produce efficient 
Ministers, it seems that it would have contributed tremendously to 
the system of government in Egypt. 
1 Madkúr and G 1:ï: op.cit. pp. 133 -134; '1l bd: op.cit. p. 135. 
(2) All four parliamentary under -secretaries of State appointed in 
1936 became Ministers in the following years. It was the same 
with the parliamentary under -secretary appointed in 1950; he 
became a Minister in 1951. 
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Ministers did not only function individually, but they also had 
collective functions which they practised in the Council of Ministers. 
Theydecided individually on minor matters, but if the issues were of 
some importance or were relevant to more than one Ministry, it was 
the Council of linisters which was competent to decide on them. 
Before proceeding with a study of the functions of the Cabinet, it 
seems important to point out that the deliberations of the Ministers 
in their Council were secret. This would lead to difficulties 
whenever the actual responsibility for a decision was to be ascer- 
tained. It seems that since the Council of Ministers made its 
decisions as a whole and was jointly responsible to Parliament, the 
determination of responsibility of individual Ministers was not 
necessary. The result, however, was that one or more Ministers were 
forced to resign at inopportune times when they disagreed with the 
majority of their colleagues on an important issue. (1) Moreover 
depending on the secrecy of the deliberations, Ministers felt free to 
voice their opinions without reserve on all subjects which came up 
for discussion; the motives which influenced the Cabinet in coming 
(1) The resignation of the Liberal Constitutionalist Ministers in 
1925 from the Ziwar Cabinet, and in 1928 from the Nahas Cabinet 
is recalled here. See supra Chapter I, pp. 53 & 55 -56. Also 
the resignation of the Saadist Ministers in 1940 from the Sabry's 
Cabinet is recalled; see supra Chapter II, pp.116 -117. All these 
resignations were the outcome of differences between this group 
of Linisters and their colleagues in the Cabinet. moreover, the 
resignation of the Wafdist Block Ministers in 1946 when they 
differed with the Saadists and the Constitutionalists provides 
more evidence. This divergence was on the policy of the Cabinet 
towards the achievement of the national demands and its policy 
towards some demonstrations of students which resulted in some 
casualties. 
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to its decisions were not disclosed. The secrecy of these delibera- 
tions were, generally speaking, preserved although some unscrupulous 
or careless Ministers were the source of occasional leakages. (1) 
The most serious incident where the secrecy of the deliberations 
of the Council of Ministers was not observed was in 1937. In. that 
year, the Wafdist Prime Minister took the opportunity of the coming 
of age of Icing Farouk to resign and reorm his Cabinet after dropping 
three 1 nisters. 
(2) 
His motive was his desire to maintain ministerial 
harmony. One of these three ministers, Mahmud Ghalib Pasha, issued 
a statement in the newspapers showing that the real motive behind the 
elimination of him and his colleagues from the Cabinet was that they 
had threatened to resign their ministerial posts if the scheme for 
the electrification of the Aswan Dam was carried out in the manner 
which had been suggested in the Council of Ministers. In this state- 
ment, and in order to re- inforce his arguments, Ghalib Pasha disclosed 
the details of the deliberations in the Cabinet on that matter. (3 ) 
The outstanding duty of the Cabinet was to furnish initiative 
and leadership, to provide the country and. Parliament with a national 
policy and to devise means for coping with different needs and 
(1) Cf. The case when in 1937 Makram Ebeid Pasha, the Minister of 
Finance defended his position against some allegations that the 
Ministry of Finance was opposing the new arrangements for the 
salaries of teachers. He held a Press Conference and in explain- 
ing his viewpoint he disclosed some of the deliberations in the 
Council of 'Ministers. Ra'fat and Ibráhim: op.cit. p. 493. 
(2) See supra Chapter II, p.107 -108 
(3) Ra'fat and Ibráhim: op.cit. p. 493; Al- Ahram, August 11, 1937. 
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emergencies. Minor matters were the concern of the departments 
affected, and the i4inister who supervised them could, alone, decide 
on them; but as the importance or scope of the issue increased, it 
became more and more a matter for the whole Cabinet which, after 
long deliberations and discussions decided on the policy of the 
government. Although the Cabinet held at least one meeting every 
week, such important issues of policy very rarely appeared on its 
agenda. A glance at the decisions it took and the subjects it dis- 
cussed shows that the Cabinet did not pay much attention to the 
general _policy of the government. On the contrary, it busied it- 
self with less important matters on which individual i,linisters could 
have acted. It neglected its fundamental function of framing the 
policy of the country and proceeded to act on such subjects as 
appointing, promoting, transferring and dismissing civil servants, 
leasing government property for a nominal rent to benevolent assoc- 
iations, the confiscation of newspapers, ... and other innumerable 
subjects.(I) 
One should wonder about the causes of the inefficiency of the 
Cabinet to provide general policies for the country to meet the 
deteriorating social and economic conditions. First of all, it seems 
that the party system in Egypt had much to do in causing the in- 
efficiency of the Cabinet in that sphere. Political parties, as shown 
before, never had solid social or economic policies; whether in power 
or in opposition the parties attracted the people with sugary promises 
which were never seriously meant. In the second place, the fact that 
between 
(1) Cf. Madkur and Gbál i : op.cit. pp.146-14$ 
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1924 and 1952 coalition Cabinets, with not only members of different 
political parties, but also Independent participants, were continually 
in control of the country adds up to the causes of that inefficiency 
of the Cabinet. If it was difficult for one political party, such as 
the dafd, 
(1)to 
enforce a social or economic policy of its own, it 
was impossible for coalition parties to decide on policies to satisfy 
the different inclinations and interests of these parties. The short 
life of the different Cabinets was another factor. The Cabinet in 
Egypt lived, not as in other parliamentary countries subject to the 
control and supervision of the people and their representatives who 
alone should decide on its future, but under the threat of being 
dismissed or forced to resign. 
This does not mean that Cabinet did sketch, discuss and 
present to the country and Parliament some policies. There were 
policies of education, social welfare, rural development, public 
health, and many other policies, but generally speaking, these 
policies lacked serious research. There is no better evidence for 
this argument than the "five years plan." This plan was initiated by 
the Cabinet in 1946. Despite the criticism in Parliament that the 
scheme as presented by the Cabinet was not comprehensive and was 
merely a collection of some public works which the Budget could not 
face 
(1) After the breakdown of the W afdist- Constitutionalist coalition 
in 1928, the Wafd refused to participate in coalition Cabinets 
except that of Sirry Pasha in 1949 which was supposed to run the 
general elections. This coalition Cabinet did not last more 
than three months. Apart from that, the Wafd insisted on 
coming to power with an all Wafdists Cabinet. 
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when in its normal shape, Parliament accepted the plan. However, 
after four years the execution of the plan proved to be a failure. 
In its report in 1950 the Committee of Finance in the Chamber of 
Deputies attributed that failure not only to the inefficiency of the 
administrative machine, but also to the fact that the plan and the 
estimates required for its execution were not considered on bases of 
scientific and accurate research.(1) 
It is important to notice that the Cabinet had the right, accord- 
ing to the Constitution, to assume the King's powers and to exercise 
them in the name of the Egyptian people and on its own responsibility 
in the period following the death of the King until his successor or 
the Regents took the oath.(2) This was the case when the k,iaher 
Cabinet acted in the place of the King in 1936 after King Fuad I had 
(3) 
died and in 1952 after the abdication oí:' King Farouk. 
Besides its executive duties, the Cabint had some legislative 
functions. These functions involved the close relations which existed 
between the Cabinet and Parliament and particularly between the 
Cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies. Only one side of this relation 
will be considered here, namely, the influence of the Cabinet on the 
Chamber; the other side, that is to say, the ways in which Parliament 
questioned, attacked and criticised the Cabinet will be discussed in 
the following Chapters.(4) 
1 The report of the Committee of Finance on the execution of the 
five years plan, cited in Majlisu°n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. X -i., S.29, 
p.55. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, ^_rt. 55. 
(3) See supra Chapter III,pp.156 -157 
(4) See infra Chapters VI and VII. 
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Cabinets were made and unmade not in consequence of conflicts 
between Parliament and these Cabinets, but, as was indicated, as a 
result of the working of some other factors. However, when a new 
Cabinet was formed, it had to appear before Parliament and declare 
its policy to the representatives of the people. If the formation of 
the Cabinet was the consequence of general elections, this explana- 
tion of policy composed the main body of the Speech from the Throne 
on the occasion of inaugurating the new Parliament. 
(1) 
When a new 
Cabinet came into power during a parliamentary session, the Pri-e 
Minister in addressing each of the two Chambers of Parliament ex- 
pressed the policy of his government. This address was usually 
followed by a discussion in the Chamber on the position of the new 
Cabinet.(2) Such discussions developed, in certain cases into a vote 
(1) About the Speech from the Throne, see infra Chapter VII, rp.40.A 
(2) Cf. The case when Sirry Pasha formed his first Cabie t in 1940 
after the sudden death of his predecessor, Hassan Sabry Pasha. In 
spite of the fact that this occurred at the beginning of the par- 
liamentary session -Sabry Pasha actually died while reading the 
Speech from the Throne - Sirry Pasha laid an emphasis on the policy, 
of the new Cabinet. La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VII -iv, 3.4, 
p. 11. There are other cases where such addresses were delivered 
and discussions on them took place. See Ibid VII -iv, S.77, pp. 
490 -499 on the occasion of the reshuffle of the Cabinet; and x.71, 
pp. 589 -591 on the occasion of the formation of the second Cabinet 
of Sirry Pasha in 1941. See also Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. IX -v, 
S.38, p. 2546 and S.39, pp. 2663 -2665 where Sirry Pasha on his 
coming to office at the head of the all- parties coalition Cabinet 
in 1949 explained the policy of his Cabinet. Similar situations 
were found when Sidky Pasha formed his Cabinet in 1946; La Chambre 
des Députés: op.cit. IX -ii, S.15, pp. 148 -175. When El Nokrashy 
succeeded Sidky Pasha in December 1946, he outlined the policy of 
the new Cabinet. Ibid IX -iii, S.6, pp. 17 -24. Also Ibrahim Abdel 
Hady Pasha gave an address in 194$ in the Chamber sketching his 
policy, Iv a j li su -h- Nuwwáb : op.cit. IX -v, S.9, p. 157. So too with 
Aly Maher Pasha when he came to power in 1952. Ibid I -iii, S.11, 
pp. 2 -4. 
25!. 
of confidence in the new Cabinet being taken in the Chamber. 
(1 ) 
It is interesting to notice that in 194ô when Sidky Pasha 
presented the policy of his government, to the Chamber of Deputies 
asking its confidence, two theories emerged about the constitutional 
status of the Cabinet, and whether it was vested with all power and 
authority prior or after acquiring the confidence of the representa- 
tives of the people. Makram Ebeid Pasha preached that since the con- 
fidence of Parliament in the Cabinet meant giving a mandate or con- 
ferring powers on the government to allow it to practise its functions 
and duties under the control of Parliament, the new Cabinet should 
not be considered installed before the Chamber had voted confidence 
in it. 
(2 ) 
In opposing this theory, Aly Bey Ayoub explained what was 
meant by a vote of confidence in the Cabinet, and showed that the 
Constitution and the Standing Orders of the Chamber would be violated 
if that theory was accepted.(3) The Chamber, nevertheless, did not 
pass any resolution with regard to these conflicting points of view. 
All governmental bills were the joint product of the Cabinet and 
the civil service. The initial inspiration or impulse might have 
originated with an individual minister or the Cabinet. Although a 
good deal of government measures were drawn up by the permanent civil 
servants, a governmental bill was never presented to Parliament 
without the approval of the Cabinet. There is no need to emphasise 
again that the King had an upper hand with regard to the presentation 
1 This was the case when the Chamber discussed the address of Sidky 
Pasha in 1943. La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. IX -ii, 3.l5, 
p. 153. 
(2) Ibid. p. 153. 
(3) Ibid. p. 154. 
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of governmental bills to Parliament. Governmental bills were 
numerous and exceeded in their importance those initiated by private 
members. The influence of the Cabinet over Parliament to enforce the 
passage of its measures characterised the working of both the Cabinet 
and Parliament. Moreover, the private members' bills which found 
their way through Parliament, were approved by the Cabinet, or at 
least there was conviction that the Cabinet did not object to them, 
before they were passed in Parliament.(1) 
With regard to the responsibility of the Cabinet and Ministers, 
it should be noticed that it was the Constitution which provided that 
"the Ministers are collectively responsible to the Chamber of 
Deputies for the general policy of the government and each is indi- 
vidually responsible for the acts of his own Ministry. "(2) This rule 
of the Constitution established the political responsibility of the 
Cabinet and its members before the Chamber of Deputies. Although the 
Senate did not have the extensive authority of the Chamber given by 
its vote of confidence in the Cabinet, the Upper House practised some 
control over the executive by addressing' questions and interpellations 
to the Cabinet arid linisters. How far both Chambers succeeded in 
practising their rights to control the executive will be shown in the 
following Chapters. However, the domination of the Cabinet on Par- 
liament and its members was obvious. Parliament failed to exercise 
an effective control over the Cabinet, and very seldom was the Cabinet 
faced, in any of the two Chambers, with criticism of its policy or 
administration. (3 ) 
TIT-These points will be elaborated in the following Chapters. See 
infra Chapter VI, pp. S'44 1 and Chapter VII, pp. It o +. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 60. 
(3) See infra Chapter VI, pp.'6I and Chapter VII, pp. Ot.k ., 
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Although the Constitution provided for a Special Court of 
Justice to try Ministers impeached by Parliament, (1) these con- 
stitutional provisions were never in practice. Moreover, the 
bill which the Wafdist Cabinet intended to present to Parliament 
in 1930 and which provided for certain criminal responsibility of 
the Cabinet proved to be an abortive measure.(2) After the 
refusal of that bill by the King, there was no attempt, even by 
the Wafd, to revive it, and the constitutional rules of the im- 
peachment of Ministers continued to be in force. 
Now one should wonder about the reasons of the domination of 
the Cabinet. First of all, members of Parliament were induced to 
follow a moderate rather than extreme course on matters of Cabinet 
policy by the knowledge that the government could bring the par- 
liamentary term to an abrupt close. This condition was manifest 
in the case of anti- Wafdist Cabinets. A mere hint of the possibil- 
ity of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies had a marked effect on 
any member of Parliament who had shown signs of restiveness. On 
the other hand ïafdist Cabinets usually resorted to the party 
organisation and used the majority the party commanded in Parlia- 
ment to overcome any difficulty. Whether there was a Wafdist 
Cabinet or not, the weakness of Parliament encouraged the success- 
ive Cabinets to enjoy a wide authority. 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 66 -72. 
(2) On that bill see supra Chapter T, p.60, and Chapter II, 
pp. 103-104 
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However, although the Cabinet was dominating the representat- 
ives of the people, the King had the upper hand in directing the 
Cabinet. If the Cabinet threatened the Chamber with using the 
King's right of dissolution, the King possessed within the reach 
of his hand the right to dismiss the Cabinet. 
CHAPTER V 
The Electoral System 
The principal symbol of representative institutions in Egypt was 
Parliament. Therefore, before proceeding with the study of the 
functions and working of both Chambers of Parliament, it seems that 
since there is a strong connection between the electoral system and 
Parliament,(1) an examination and survey of the electoral system 
according to which members of that representative body were elected, 
is necessary. 
After the promulgation in April 1923 of the Constitution, which 
provided for a Parliament elected by the people (Arts. 74 and $2), 
there was nothing of greater importance to be settled with regard to 
its working than such questions as who should be permitted to vote, 
how the elections should be conducted, and the electoral constituencies 
to be adjusted. Since these matters would obviously have required 
re- adjustment from time to time, the Constitution laid down only the 
broad lines and the main principles of the electoral systerL, leaving 
the elaboration of such details to ordinary legislation. 
The Committee of the Thirty which undertook to draft the 
Constitution, however, along with stipulating in the Constitution for 
the principle of universal suffrae, (Arts. 74 and 82), expressed 
the view that because of the social conditions prevailing in the 
country and the standard of education among the people, it was 
(1) Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, p. 924. 
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preferable that an indirect electoral system should be adopted.(1) 
Therefore, the electoral law which was promulgated on April 30, 1923, 
stipulated that every male Egyptian should have a vote once he reached 
the age of twenty -one. The vote of the people, however, was for the 
selection of another group of citizens, namely, delegates who in their 
turn elected members of Parliament. The system was that every thirty 
voters selected from amongst themselves, a delegate. The mandate of 
delegates was five years and no one under the age of twenty -five years 
could be selected as a delegate. These delegates formed the body 
competent to elect the members of the Chamber. of Deputies.(2) Here it 
should be pointed out that this electoral law required the age 
qualification only in both electorate and delegates.(3) 
This electoral law did not live long as Parliament passed another 
which was promulgated on July 29, 1924 (No. 4 of 1924). Although it 
was suspended and dispensed with, at times, this new electoral law, 
which introduced a direct electoral system, continued to be, with 
slight changes every now and then according to the needs of the time, 
the one in operation. 
(1) Sabry: Le pouvoir executif et le pouvoir legislatif en Egypte, 
pp. 96-97; `Id: op.cit. pp. 39 -40. 
It is worth noticing that Art.89 of the Constitution which pro- 
vided for the regulations to be followed in case of the dissolu- 
tion of the Chamber of Deputies referred to "the invitation of 
delegates to hold new elections." (See Appendix I). The use of this 
word, delegates, indicates that the intentions of the Committee of 
the Thirty were tending to the establishment of an indirect 
electoral system. Moreover, in spite of the different changes 
introduced into the electoral law founding direct electoral system, 
this word, "delegates," was never changed or omitted 
from the 
Constitution. 
(2) In the case of the election of Senators, every five 
delegates were 
to select one of themselves, of a minimum age of thirty 
years. 
latter delegates were entitled to elect Senators. 
A'r- cafi`i 
op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 117 -118. 
(3) `Id: op.cit. pp. 40 -41 & 45. 
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The first real blow which this electoral law suffered was in 1924 
after the resignation of Zaghlults Cabinet. The new Cabinet presided 
over by Ziwar Pasha, and supported by the Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party and the newly formed Unionist Party,rescindedthat electoral law 
and restored the older one. The restoration of the indirect electoral 
system was because of the common belief which prevailed that the 
direct elections were in favour of the Wafd since the masses of the 
electorate were its supporters. 
As one technique may not produce what is intended, or may do so 
with waste of energy and resources, and may even have results which 
are meant to be avoided, that blow against the direct electoral system 
did not stop at this stage. The newly elected Chamber of Deputies 
which was elected according to the indirect elections, was dissolved 
on the very day of its first convocation, and preparations started for 
a new election to be held with the aim of securing a majority for the 
Government. The researches of the Government and its study of 
different electoral systems resulted in a new system being adopted for 
Egypt. Although this system, which was established by a decree pro- 
mulgated on December d, 1925, did not come into operation, it was the 
basis on which the electoral law promulgated with the Sidky Constitu- 
tion in 1930 was framed. 
This new electoral system raised the age qualification of the 
voter to thirty years, and gave the privilege of reducing this age to 
twenty five to certain classes of people: proprietors of real property 
on which a minimum tax of £E.l was levied; proprietors who let their 






their families or occupied for the practice of their pro - 
house whose annual rent was at least £E12; tenants of 
land on which a minimum annual land tax of ;E12 was levied; 
who had finished their secondary school study.(1) 
The application of that electoral system would have resulted in 
the creation of class distinctions and discriminations, and of a 
representative body mainly embracing rich and privileged people and 
their interests. Moreover, the electorate would have been very small 
as a result of raising the age qualification. This point was the 
scope of much and bitter criticism as it meant that a proportion of 
the adults in the country could not have any political rights under the 
same conditions which recognised them of being of full age in relation 
(2 
to civil rights and required their participation in military service. 
The second blow directed against the electoral system of 1924 
establishing direct election came with the newly introduced Constitu- 
tion Of 1930. It has been previously mentioned. that this Constitution 
aimed at re- enforcing the executive power at the expense of and mini- 
mizing the authority of the people and their representatives; and it 
seems that the electoral law (No. 38 of 193 0) which accompanied that 
Constitution was framed on the same lines to serve. the same ends. In 
the explanatory note to the 1930 Constitution, it was stated that: "The 
Cabinet tries to retain the principle of universal suffrage, as it 
finds it the means through which the electorate could gain some 
(1) `Id: op.cit. p. 42. 
(2) Ibid: p. 45. 
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political instruction. Yes, it is the function of the voter to elect 
a delegate and not the Deputy as this is the concern of the delegate; 
but by taking part in the'election, the voter will raise his standard 
and will come to know what the delegate knows. To be sure that 
the delegates are drawn, on the whole, from categories which are best 
able to judge the qualifications of candidates, it has been decided 
that it is not sufficient for them to be the choice of a certain 
number of voters - and consequently the best of them - but the con- 
ditions and requirements in connection with their position in life, 
their standard of living, and their standard of education, which 
indicate their right judgment and honest choice, have been laid down.( ") 
Therefore, the minimum age of the, elector was raised to twenty -five 
years and some property and educational qualifications were required 
of the person to entitle him to have a vote.(2) 
Although, apparently on the surface, this could be considered as 
a means of raising the standard of the electorate and of improving 
the representative system and institutions, it actually, at the same 
time, limited the number of people qualified to vote and entitled to 
participate in choosing the government. In other words, it was an 
attempt to deprive the people of the natural right they usually enjoy 
in a democracy, namely the right to govern themselves for their own 
good; and to create a kind of representation which was hoped to 
result in representative bodies capable of coping with the pro- Palace 
1 Ma jlisu'n- Nuwwáb : A d- dusturu'l -Misri wa Qdh nu'l- Intikhâb, 
(October 22, 1930, )p 35 _ 
(2) Ibid, ,pp. 73 & 79- Hocking: op.cit. p. 151; Qanunu l- 
Intikhab Ragm 3 $ Li Sanat 19 O Arts. 1 & 20. 
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and reactionary tendencies of the Cabinet. This electoral law was 
similar to the first one of 1923 in stipulating for an indirect 
electoral system. Every fifty of the enrolled voters were entitled 
to elect a delegate, and these delegates to elect members of 
Parliament.(1) 
Democracy is most fully realised when the largest possible number 
of persons share directly or inderctly in the determination of public 
policy. Therefore, an important question has to be faced: Who is 
to be entitled to participate and vote in the elections, and upon what 
terms: Voting is an ancient device, but the terns upon which persons 
were allowed to vote, and the manner in which the vote was cast 
varied widely. The right to vote developed from being an attribute 
of citizenship in the Greek and Roman institutions, to being considered 
a privilege associated with the individual's status in society. 
Suffrage was regarded as being a prerogative of those who held pro- 
perty in the 'Middle Ages. According to the theory of modern 
political science, voting is considered to be a function of government, 
and the voter, in casting his ballot, performs a public office. (2) 
The electoral law which was restored in Egypt in 1935, with the 
restoration of the 1923 Constitution, was largely based on the 
principle that "every sane male citizen has a natural right to 
participate in the government; this right is normally represented 
by the right to vote for the respresentative bodies, and that all are 
entitled to equal votes, no more, no less,"(3) "making the right of 
7777-171.7. Arts. 19 éc 25. 
(2) Shepard, -:.J.: "Suffrage,?' P. 447 




election a function no loner of property or class but of 
personality."(i) 
Every Egyptian male acquired the right to participate in 
electing members of the Chamber of Deputies *once he reached the age 
of twenty one.(2) This age seems to be a reasonable one, as it 
enabled the man who had attained adulthood and the privileges of 
maturity to assume the responsibility of voting.(3) The right to vote 
was the means through which the voters expressed their will by 
designating those who would constitute the legislature, as well as by 
passing judgment on the different policies put forward during 
elections. Therefore, it could be said that elections were official 
opportunities provided for recording the public will on political 
matters. 
Although no property qualifications were required to get a vote, 
the necessity of imposing certain limitations upon the formation of the 
electorate is apparent. Certain categories of people were disqualified 
from voting. Persons convicted of felony were debarred for periods 
ranging from five years.to a life -time deprivation of electoral 
rights according to the type of felony committed. Convicted smugglers, 
for example, were debarred for five years; those condemned for 
forgery or desertion from military service for fifteen years; and 
those convicted of a serious crime, for life. Naturally, lunatics 
(li McIver: op.cit. p. 199. 
(2) Qànúnu 1- Intikháb, Art. 1; To participate in electing Senators, 
one should be twenty five years at least. 
(3) Cf. CId: op.cit. pp. 75 -77. 
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and idiots were disfranchised during the time of their iilness.(1) 
All these exclusions from the body of the electorate were "built on 
the simple ground that the attainment of a best self is, in any sense 
implicit with social meaning, impossible. "(2 ) 
The electoral rights of officers and soldiers of the armed 
forces on active service, were suspended for the duration of their 
service.(3) The reason given for the deprivation of members of the 
armed troops of their electoral rights as being the necessity of 
avoiding their indulgence in political differences,(4) is not convinc- 
ing. Since the function of the electorate should be higher than the 
mere choice between two or three broad alternatives put before it in 
the form of candidates,(5) it seems that the precedent of the United 
Kingdom of conferring electoral rights on "naval and military voters, 
should have been followed in Egypt especially after the imposition of 
obligatory military service. 
One striking feature of the electoral law was that only males 
were entitled to vote and choose representatives entitled to govern. 
This was a clear deprivation of half the population, the feminine 
half, of the right to vote. In other words, using Aristotles terms, 
(1) Qánúnu'l- Intikháb, Arts. 4. &5. 
(2) Laski: A.:gramrner of politics, p. 312. 
(3) Q nain21- Intikháb, Art. 6. 
(4) LId: op.cit. pp. 86 -$7. 
(5) Representation of the People .Acta 1918, Section 5, pp. 
(6) Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 173. 
i 
266. 
women were considered non -political animals. It might have been the 
line of thought that voting was a privilege and not a right, that 
resulted in the fact that women had no power to possess or practise 
any political right; and so far as the right to vote was concerned 
they were classed with idiots, imbecils and criminals. (1-) Parliamentar3 
assemblies are said to represent the whole body of citizens, con- 
sidered as equally entitled to representation, and miniatured in the 
electorate;(2) but, surely the deprivation of women of their right to 
vote distorted that picture and caused the incomplete representation 
of the country by the electorate especially at a time when it was 
taken "for granted that popular control should be as wide as possible 
and that free universal suffrage is unquestionably desirable."' 3 ) 
It could be said that the suffragettes in Western countries did 
not succeed in attaining their political rights until after the rapid 
social evolution which followed the First World War. This success 
was a natural reaction to the fact that women had taken their place 
in the working corps, replacing men workers in different industries, 
undertaking various kinds of work in ministries and offices, and 
participating without any hesitation in any kind of work. Consequently, 
since the Egyptian nation was just at the beginning of such a social 
evolution, and Egyptian women had not effectively participated in 
the 
social progress of the country, there might be some justification 
for 
(1) Cf. Bryce: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 54 -55, where he shows teat 
the 
new generations consider the electoral franchise a natural 
right. 
(2) Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 398. 
(3) Dimock: op.cit. p. 101. 
f 
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were entitled, under certain conditions, to have votes. The Con- 
stitution was ambiguous, or even silent, about the right of women to 
vote and could be interpreted in such a way as to satisfy and approve 
of the claims of the Egyptian feminine movement.(1) In Article. 23, 
the Constitution proclaimed that, without making any distinction of 
sex, the people were the source of sovereignty and that all powers 
emanated from them. Moreover, in Articles 12, 13 and 14, it pro - 
tected and guaranteed individual freedoms, and again without any 
prejudice against either of the sexes. That is why it was believed 
that granting women their political rights required only the amendment 
of the electoral law. In addition to that constitutional inter- 
pretation, Human Rights have entitled every person to freedom and 
equal rights with no distinction because of sex.(2) 
Some opposition to women's political rights in Egypt was based 
on the fact that women are usually greater in number than man; 
consequently, if they were given a vote, according to democratic 
principles they could dominate representative institutions and would 
gain the upper hand in political manoeuvering.(3) A glance at the 
estimates of the population classified according to sexes, shows that 
the excess in the number of females had not been so great as to 
(1) El- Emary: op.cit. p.3. 
Ali Zakk El Urabk Pasha, in a proposed legislation presented to 
the senate in 1947 voiced a view that the deprivation of women of 
their political rights was unconstitutional because it was not 
within the lines of Article 3 of the Constitution which had 
not 
descriminated between both sexes. This view is cited in Mitwalli, 
`A.H.: Muhadarát An Mushkilati Isláh Nizámu'1- Intikháb fi Misr, 
pp. 30 -31. 
(2) Universal declaration of Human Rights, Art.2 (Approved 
by the 
United Nations General Assembly in Paris, December 
10, 1948). 
(3) 'Id: op.cit. p. 74. 
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frighten men from feminine domination in political lif e.(1) It is 
true that because of woman's natural gift of a longer life -span than 
man'sof their endurance and resistence to illness and disease, and 
their passive róle in wars, they are usually greater in number than 
men. But this fact did not cause any deprivation of women of their 
political rights in European countries where the disproportionate 
sex ratio is more acute. It is interesting to notice here that in 
the countries where women have the right to vote, the proportion of 
feminine abstention from voting is greater than the masculine. More- 
over, in spite of the political rights granted to women which are 
equal to those of men, it is noticed that their participation in 
(1) The estimates the population did not show any remarkable 
difference between the number of males and females. The 
following table shows the relative figures for election years 
since 1927. 




































Sources: Almanac 1946, p. 26; 1947, p. 27; 1949 -50, p. 35. 
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governmental appointments is still very infrequent and that the 
political direction is still a masculine monopoly.(1) Therefore, it 
is quite safe to say that according to precedents 'in other countries, 
Egyptian men fearing the overwhelming influence and political power of 
Egyptian women if they were granted their political rights were 
unnecessarily alarmed and ought not to have exaggerated their fear of 
women as active political participants. 
The main reason for the vigorous opposition to women's political 
rights when a claim for them was being made, was the allegation 
that Islam, which according to Article 149 of the Constitution was 
official religion of the State,(2) does not permit women to participate 
in political and public life. This idea is disputed, and had been, 
and still is the centre of many discussions. The pros and cons are 
purely religious and all disputing groups have been giving evidence 
and proofs in support of their views. (3 
) 
The scope of this work does not comprehend the discussion of 
these opinions. It is important, however, that one should consider 
the attitude of and the ideas and reasons which influenced those who 
opposed the legitimacy of women's political rights and that in spite 
of the fact that women had previously participated in public life, 
had taken part in every nationalist movement after the end of the First 
(1) Duverger, ICI.: "Rapport general sur la participation des femmes 
a la vie politique," pp. 3 & 8 et seq. 
(2) See Appendix I. 
(3) Ittilhadu Bintu> n -Nil : Al- Kitábu7 l- Abyaçl Li- huqügi'l- I'Iar' ati's- 
SiyásIyah, contains these different views. 
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World. ;ar, had shared seats with men in different schools and 
facilities- of the universities, and had joined the civil service in 
various branches and departments. (1) One should emphasise here that 
religion ought not thus to have stood as an insurmountable obstacle 
in the way of the evolution and development of the country especially 
after the precedents established in Islamic countries, such as Turkey 
and Syria;(2) and that "the liberal and rational mind could not help 
in the long run, admitting the right of women to political power. "(3 ) 
And last but not least, "female disenfranchisement arose out of 
no consideration of woman's need to participate in political activity, 
but out of the general special position of women as determined by 
sexual passion, family life and religious tenets."(4)In various 
countries where women have succeeded in making their way into 
political and public life, they have found opposition, as Egyptian 
women have, because of the belief that a woman's place is the Thome'; 
and that since the man is, or should be the head of the family and the 
(1) El- Emary: op.cit. p. 4, mentions that women in Egypt participated 
in every kind. of work. Some of them occupied high positions in 
the civil service, as well as on university staffs. According to 
1950 statistics, female students in the universities numbered 
1,500; and in different schools 500,000. Women occupied in the 
teaching profession were 26,000; in connection with medical 
services 3,000; in the judicial domain 150; in commerce 5,x::0; 
and, in industry 11,000. Besides, some were working in aviation 
and laboratories of research whose numbers were not given. 
(2) Tukey adopted the universal suffrage system in 19J4; about the 
political status of Turkish women, see Celikbas, F.: 'La 
participation de la femme a la vie politique eh Turquie," Syria 
granted the women their political rivhts in 1950, about that see 
Zahi da, H.2.: "The political rivhts of women in Syria." 
(3) Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 152. 
(4) Ibid. p. 412. 
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lord of the woman, women are represented in politics by their husbands 
and fathers.(1) In spite of such opposition which varied in its 
strength in different States, the enfranchisement of women has been 
accepted in most. Western .countries. Therefore, those who insisted 
on the exclusion of Egyptian women from the political arena had no 
solid grounds for their arguments since, as indicated above, neither 
the Constitution nor religion debarred women from enjoying their 
political rights. In fact they were of the category which Professor 
J. Laird described as "anyone who defends the 'natural' political 
subjugation of women is far more likely to be voicing a prejudice 
than to be enunciating a law of nature flouted by his contemporaries (2) 
Clearly then the electorate was composed of all Egyptian males 
-one more, and not above 
tioned categories. Practically, it was formed only of those persons 
who came within the boundaries of the electoral law on condition that 
their names were on the electoral register. 
It was the business of the State to see that every qualified 
person was registered in the proper constituency, and to keep the lists 
up to date with meticulous care and thoroughness. Committees, each 
composed of three members, actually under the influence of the 
administrative authority, in every village and city were charged with 
the duty of cómpiling and revising the lists of electors. The in- 
fluence of the administration, especially the hinistry of the 
(1) Odegard, P.H. and Helms, E.A.: American politics, a study in 
political dynamics, p. 375. 
(24 Laird, J: The device of government, p. 27. 
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Interior, was quite apparent since the ` Umdah of the village was 
chairman of the committee ex- officio; and no one could deny the 
inter -relations between the c Umad and the Ministry of the Interior to 
which they were attached. Moreover, one of the two members was 
appointed by the ha'múr (the police commandant of the district to 
which the village was attached), who, also, had the right to appoint 
a person to deputise for the i aid n(1) i.e. the other member, in 
case of his absence. In cities attached to the Governorates,(2) the 
influence of the Ministry of the Interior was even clearer. The chair - 
man of the committee was the commandant of the police of the district, 
i.e. the MarmÜr, and both members of the committee were appointed by 
the Governor. (3 ) 
In December of every year the Committees revised the lists by 
adding the names of those who had newly acquired the qualifications 
for having a vote, and those who had been overlooked in the previous 
(4 
revision; and by removing the names of the dead and the disqualified. 
A man with more than one place of residence, could choose the place at 
which he would vote; no one was permitted to vote in more than one 
constituency and not more than once.(5) The electoral lists, which 
) 
(1) The Man is a religious official appointed by the Ministry of 
Justice to perform marriage and divorce procedures. 
(2) The administrative division of Egypt has been to Governorates 
(Muhàfazat) which have numbered five and have been governed 
by 
Governors appointed by the hinistry of the Interior, and 
to 
Mudiriyát. 
(3) (.4änünu'1- Intikháb, Art. 7; Ayrout, H.H.: 
Moeurs et coutumes 
des fellalahs, pp. 53 -54, gives an account 
about the positions 
of these officials and their influence on the 
mass of the people. 
(4) .0tanúnu'1- lntikháb, Art. 7. 
(5) Ibid. Arts. 2 and 3. 
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had to include the full names of the electors, their professions, ages 
and addresses in alphabetical order, were placed on exhibition in every 
village, town and district of the big cities. This exhibition which 
lasted from the first to the fifteenth of January every year, was 
meant to give anybody who had been missed, a chance to discover and 
report that fact, as well as any other error that might have been 
noticed.(1) Appeals for any correction or modification of the lists 
had to be handed in writing to the Governor or the Mudir(2) not later 
than the end of January. Special Committees presided over by the 
Governers in the Governorates, and the Mudirs in the Midiriyat, and 
composed of a judge and a member of the parquet adjudicated on these 
appeals by the fifteenth of March in every year.(3) 
That was the procedure for arranging the electoral lists. It is 
obvious that there were insufficient guarantees that the lists would 
be drawn up in an impartial way, since the Ministry of the Interior, 
which was not beyond suspicion, had its representatives on every 
committee in connection with their preparation.(4) The abuse of the 
authority of the administrative representatives can be proved by the 
fact that the electorate in 1938 jumped to 3,003,328 showing an 
increase of 8$2,$49; something then accepted as a natural consequence 
of the 1937 census which had proved an increase in the population. 
But in 1942, the electoral register showed that the electors' number 
(1) Ibid. Arts. 10 & 12. 
(2) The hudir is the administrative head and director of a Mudirïyah 
(Pro rince). He is one of the high ranking civil servants 
attached to the Ministry of the Interior. About his status, see, 
Ayrout, op.cit. p. 53. 
(3) Qánúnun- Intikhgb, Arts. 12 x 13. 
(4) Ibràhim, .: 'EMa' Alladhi Yuràdu bi änúnu`'1 Intikháb." 
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dropped sharply to 2,234,647 w,ich was a figure nearer to that of 
the electorate in 1936.(1) Later, that increase in the number of 
voters in 1938 was linked to the influence of the Ministry of the 
Interior, which in order to achieve a certain objective of the 
Cabinet, namely to bring about a proposed and planned result of the 
elections, added to the lists some imaginary persons and the names of 
some dead people, and even repeated the registration of others.(2) 
This example along with the criticism of the electoral register in 
March -May, 1952 by the different political parties which was the 
grounds on which the proposed general elections were postponed,(3) 
shows up and proves the defects in the system of preparing electoral 
lists. One can, therefore, suggest that the preparation of electoral 
registers and their yearly revision should have been entrusted to an 
independent institution over which none of the ministers nor the 
Cabinet could have exerted any influence. 
Since the Constitution stipulated that every 60,000 inhabitants 
were represented by a Deputy,(4) members of Parliament in Egypt were 
elected by voters grouped in constituencies arranged on a geographical 
basis. According to the Constitution, the division of the country 
(1) Figures obtained from the Department of General Elections and 
Secretariate, Ministry of the Interior, Cairo. Cf. Sabre:: 
Al- Qánünul - Dustúri, p. 718. For detailed figures showing the 
changes in the number of the electorate see Table No. I, 
A 
c--rd: 
No. II , p. 140 . 
(2) d op.cit. p. 120; Bah- u'd -Din: op.cit. p. 34. 
(:) Al- Ahram, April 28, 1952. 
(4) 1923 Constitution, Art. $3. The electoral constituency eligible 
to elect a Senator was composed of 180,000 inhabitants; Art.75. 
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into electoral constituencies and their demarcation should have been 
determined by law.(l) However, "a constituency is not such a 
community with a distinctive unity of its own. Constituencies are 
now strips of territory in which so many voters live, and their 
boundaries are always being readjusted so as to give representation 
by population. "(2) Therefore, it seems that the Constitution 
necessitated the re- appointment of electoral constituencies by a law 
to guarantee impartiality in that matter, since such rearrangement was 
frequent and followed the change in the number of the population; and 
to avoid the probability of abusing such power so as to weaken an 
opposing political party by dispersing its adherents, if that re- 
distribution of seats were left in the hands of the executive power.(3) 
In all the elections held in Egypt after the restoration of the 
1923 Constitution in 1936, electoral constituencies were fixed by the 
Cabinet, or even by the Minister of the Interior, without any 
participation or control from Parliament. (4) No one could try to 
(1) Ibid. Arts. 7ô & 84 It is interesting to notice that the 
re- appointment of electoral districts and constituencies in 
Britain is by an Act of Parliament and have occurred very seldom 
at very irregular times. In the U.S.A. legislatures are the only 
competent authority to alter congressional districts and accordin,_ 
to the American Constitution a re- appointment must be carried out 
after every decennial census. In France there is a distribution 
at least every five years. Ogg, F.A.: European governments and 
politics. p. 170. 
(2) Corry, J.A.: Democratic government and politics, p. 174. 
(3) cÌd: op.cit. pp. 164 -165. 
(4) Ibid, pp. 162 -163;. Haykal, N.H.: Mudlaakkirah Tafsirfyah 
an 
Tafsirid- Dustúr fi Tatbia :awáddihi 76, 79 & $4, pp. 1-2. 
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defend the different Cabinets responsible for the delimitation of 
electoral constituencies through this unconstitutional process, by the 
allegation that their actions were simply directed to the general 
good of the country and the desire to attain a true and real 
representative body. It is not easy to overlook the repercussions 
of the re- distribution of electoral constituencies in l938 by the 
Piiinister of the Interior. It resulted in deep feuds and contro- 
versies between political parties to the extent that the Wafd 
criticized, and even accused the Cabinet of acting in defence of the 
interests of the political parties co- operating with it.(1) No better 
proof can be advanced to illustrate the vital nature of the re- 
demarcation of electoral constituencies and its effect on the results 
of the elections than the fact that differences about the delimitation 
of electoral constituencies in preparation for a forcasted election 
were some of the main factors leading to the collapse of the Saadi.st- 
Constitutionalist coalition in 1949. Moreover, such differences 
were the main reason for the failure of the all- parties coalition 
Cabinet and its resignation in the same year.(2) 
The object of the re- appointment of electoral constituencies 
"is to keep electoral units (in terms of the number of votes) sub - 
stanially equal, so that a vote will count for as much in one place 
(1) LId: op.cit. p. 165; The Times, March 15, 193$; Cf. Great 
Britain and the East, Vol. L. No. 1395, p. 273. 
(2) A'r- Ráfii: op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 256 -257; Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, Vol. VII, (1945 -1950), p. 10126. La 
bourse yctienne, duly 26, and November 3, 1949. 
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as in another, and such equality (at least a reasonable approximation 
of it) seems to most people an indispensable condition of true 
democracy."(1) Therefore, if the re- appointments of 193e and 1950 
could be accepted as attempts to fulfil the object of the re- adjustment 
of electoral constituencies after the declaration of the results of 
the general censuses of 1937 and 1947, no justification of the re- 
appointments of 1942 and 1945 can be found except in the desire of 
the executive to attain certain results. 
The facing plate shows the changes of the electoral divisions 
which one of the provinces in Upper Egypt endured between 193e and 
1950. The choice of this particular Province,3anils- Sway :, is due 
to the fact that its population had not been increasing so sharply as 
other provinces and governorates.(2) A glance at the plate shows the 
instability in the formation of electoral constituences, and the 
disregard paid to the historical boundaries, administrative divisions 
and physical features. 
It is well known that the elections of 1938 and 1945 were run by 
anti- afdist governments, the 1942 elections by a Wafdist government, 
and, the 1950 elections by a neutral one. Therefore, one should 
expect the changeable results of these different electoral re- 
appointments. In that province, in the 1942 elections, five Uafdist 
(1) Ogg: op.cit. p. 170. 
(2) The population of that province, according to the 1937 census 
was 561,312. It became 613,365 in 1947 showing a rate of 
increase of the population in the particular part of the country 
as 9.3 per cent for every ten years; while that rate of the 
whole country was 19.8 per cent. Almanac 1949 -50, pp. 4,10 & 1. 
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candidates did not face any contest, while they themselves, did not 
participate at all in the 1915 elections. The changes in the results 
of the two constituencies No. 5 and No. 6, which had undergone many 
changes, are of some interest. The anti - afdist candidate (Saadist), 
in the former constituency secured his seat in the Chamber of Deputies 
with a majority of 53.1 per cent of the votes cast in 1938,and in 1945 
with a majority of 60.$ per cent, while in the 1942 elections he lost 
his deposit as he did not secure more that $.4 per cent of the votes, 
and in 1950 did not get more than 34.9 per cent of the votes. As 
regards the constituency No. 6, the Wafdist candidate did not secure 
the required majority in 1933 as he got only 42.3 per cent of the 
votes; in spite of that he was uncontested in 1942, he did not 
participate in the 1945 elections. In the 1950 elections he 
obtained 66.2 per cent of the votes. On the other hand, the anti - 
Wafdist candidate (Liberal Constitutionalist) was the only opposing 
candidate in the four general elections.(1) 
Although there were different factors which influenced the 
results of elections, yet the exposition of the conditions in the 
Province of Banis- Swayf, shows clearly how the re- appointment of 
electoral constituencies affected them, and moreover, how it was 
manipulated to serve the interests of different political parties. 
In criticism of the system of the delimitation of electoral con- 
stituencies, it was said in the Chamber of Deputies that "it is not 
(1) The figures and the plate were obtained through personal 
investigation in the Department of General Elections and 
Secretariate, the Ministry of the Interior, Cairo. 
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the voters who elect the candidates, but instead, it was the 
candidates who chose their electors. "(1) Therefore, opinions were 
expressed in favour of the fixation of electoral constituencies to 
eliminate any need for their modification with every change of the 
population.(2) 
A Royal Decree fixed the polling day, and within ten days from 
the date of the proclamation of the decree each application for 
candidature had to be forwarded to the province or the governorate to 
which the constituency in question was attached. Candidates having 
a particular party colour were nominated by their parties, and about 
the responsibility of both the parties and candidates in that concern, 
it has been rightly laid down the principle that: "In choosing a 
candidate the party is careful to pick, among other things, a sound 
party man, one who is loyal to the leadership and principles of the 
party. In recommending the candidate to the constituency, the party 
always justifies him by reference to the statesmanlike leadership and 
sound platform of the party. The candidate himself modestly sub- 
ordinates his own claims to merit and preferment to his praise of the 
party." (3 ) However, in practice, "party selection is far from being 
a democratic process. It is influenced by considerations of service 
rendered, financially or otherwise, to the organisation; of the 
prestige attaching to well known family groups; of the readiness of 
(1) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VII -iv, S.21, p. 165. 
(2) Haykal: op.cit pp. 10 -15; - Allúbah, M.A.: Mabádi'fi >s- 
S yäsati .1 =Ei riyah, pp. 107 -l08; Ibrahim, "Ta" dilu 
Q nüni1 intikháb." 
(3) Corry: op.cit. p. 101. 
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the candidate to obey the party behests; and of the ambitious of the 
inner circle which controls the machine .'T (1) As an exa, rple from 
Egyptian political life, one could provide the incident of the Deputy 
Who represented a particular constituency in the Chamber of 1945 -49 
as a Saadist, and in the 1950 elections was nominated a Wafdist 
candidate for that same constituency; he retained his seat in that 
last election in spite of the change of his party label. Moreover, 
it might be of some interest to point out that in order to secure his 
nomination as a Wafdist candidate for that constituency in 1950, as 
the popular trend at that time was pro -':' afdist, this ex- Saadist Deputy 
paid to the treasury of the .vafd a sure of some thousands of pounds. 
On the face of it, the process for candidature was exceedingly 
simple. All was required by law was that person who aspired 
to become a candidate should file with the authorities a written 
application for candidature; and no one had the right to stand for 
more than two constituencies.(2) Since there was no limitation of 
the relations between the member of Parliament and his constituents, 
and the member of Parliament represented the whole nation and not only 
his constituency, a constituency was not limited in choice to one of 
its own residents.(3) One other thing was required of the candidate, 
namely a deposit of S.E.150, to be forfeited unless the candidate 
proved to be unopposed or received at least one tenth of the total 
vote cast in his constituency on the polling day.(4) Although this 
(1) McIver: op.cit. p. 194. 
(2) Qárnvn0l-ï.ntikháb, Arts. 27 & 25. 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art. 91. Çf. Laski: op.cit. p. 318. 
(4)G?ánúni?l-Intikháb, Art.23; Sabri: op.cit. 696-699 
2$2. 
latter condition was a guarantee of serious intention and a safeguard 
from frivolous or useless candidatures, one must make the criticism 
that the set amount of the deposit of one hundred and fifty pounds was, 
a sum of money which could not be afforded by every one who felt com- 
petent to stand for election. The increase in the number of candidates 
in the 1915 and 1950 elections - which took place at a time when people 
were better off because of the Second World tar - to 779 and 977 can- 
didates respectively, giving an average of about three rival candidat- 
es in each constituency, after it had been less than two,(1) proves 
that the requirement of that deposit was a handicap to those who were 
willing to participate as candidates in the elections. Therefore, 
since "limitation, if limitation there is to be, must be so safe- 
guarded that it excludes in general terms, and does not weigh the 
scales against any special class of citizens, "(2) it would appear that 
in all fairness the amount of that deposit should have been reduced to 
an extent that willing competent people could have got the chance to 
stand for election. 
(3 
) 
Electoral campaigns in Egypt extended usually from the day of the 
proclamation of the decree fixing the polling day until the time when 
the voters went to the polls. A campaign was usually carried on by the 
candidate and his agents assisted by his local supporters and friends, 
and financed from the candidate's own resources. Every candidate was 
(1) Figures obtained from the 'department of General Elections and 
Secretariate, The lanistry of the Interior, Cairo. For detailed 
figures about Candidates, See Appendix II, Table No. II. 
(2) Laski: op.cit. p. 340. 
(3) Id: op.cit. p. 146. 
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entitled to issue his own address or manifesto to the people of the 
constituency for which he was standing. This manifesto, sometimes, 
differed appreciably from general statements issued by the party to 
which he belonged, and from the addresses of other candidates bearing 
the same party label. In that manifesto the candidate usually 
stressed issues or arguments which he thought would appeal most to the 
people whose votes he sought; and in doing so he often wandered far 
from the principles or programmes of the political group in Cairo 
with which he was ostensibly identified. Here oremight notice that 
a member of Parliament should only be returned as a member of some 
party or group, since the life of a parliamentary State is built Upon 
the party system.(l) Consequently, parliamentary candidates in Egypt 
should have carried out their campaigns in harmony wits, and not in 
contradiction of the policy and programme of the political groups to . 
which they were attached. 
The country was more wrought up at some elections than at others, 
and contests were keener in some constituencies than in others. But 
even in the most one -sided fight in the most apathetic of elections, 
the appeal to voters was apt to be of the whirlwind variety. In the 
course of it, every reputable means known to politicians, the world 
over, was employed. Meetings were held in halls and on street corners. 
Candidates were floated in floods of oratory, especially in the rural 
districtis. Along with the Press, which was used extensively, a 
favourite method of appeal to voters was the placard or poster. 
(1) Laski: op.cit. p. 312; Mclver: op.cit. p. 197;; Barker: 
op.cit. pp. 37 -38. 
2&4. 
Because there was no definite law or regulation to govern this method 
of appeal, the humbler posters of poorer candidates were plastered 
over or torn from their places. That situation should certainly have 
been remedied through the promulgation of a law to equalise oppor- 
tunities for every candidate to appeal to the electorate. r'urthermore, 
electoral meetings were subject to the law organising public meetings, 
which required the previous notification to the administrative 
authorities of the date and place of the meeting. In spite of the 
exemption of electoral gatherings from some of the conditions required 
in connection with other public meetings, it was rightly observed that 
the necessity to notify the administrative authority of the intention 
of holding a meeting was a restraint on the freedom of the candidates 
and the electorate which should have been absolute and completely 
guaranteed during electoral campaigns.(1) 
The art of campaigning is largely the same everywhere, yet with 
interesting national variations. In canvassing, it was said that in 
some places, when electoral agents succeeded to persuade any of the 
electorate to promise his vote for a particular candidate, they made 
sure of it by forcing the voter to give an oath. That oath was 
usually that if he did not vote for that candidate, his wife would be 
divorced.: According to the customs prevailing amongst the masses of 
the people, that statement would have effect; and therefore, if the 
poor wretch did not vote for that candidate, his wife would 'ipso facto' 
be divorced.(2) 
11) Id: op.cit. pp. 253 -254. 
(2) The Manchester Guardian, January 7, 1925. 
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Money played such an important róle in Egyptian elections that 
it can hardly be overlooked. "Money is of vital importance, and its 
possession has given the richer classes the power to nullify hostile 
votes.t'(1) Not only did candidates use money in a disguised manner 
to influence the electorate, i.e. through holding parties and offering 
food and clothes along with electoral promises - but it had been used 
openly to buy votes. It is difficult to find an Egyptian who does 
not know about the candidate in one of the Cairo constituencies during 
1915 elections, who along with his electoral agents would buy the 
electorate's votes so as to guarantee the defeat of his opponents. he 
used to divide the pound note into two halves, one of which the voter 
got before going to the polls, and the other after he had proved that 
his vote was cast in favour of that candidate.(2) The laws were com- 
pletely silent as to how much money a candidate could spend, or allow 
to be spent, in advancing his cause. It is, therefore, impossible to 
give an estimate of the expenses of an Egyptian election. However, 
reforms in the Egyptian electoral law were urged through regulations 
and stipulations not only limiting the expenses of electoral campaigns 
in order to give equal chances to poor and rich candidates, but also 
defining and penalizing corrupt and illegal electoral practices, i.e. 
(l) Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 489 
(2) Cf. The so- called "Nabobs," who after making some money in the 
East returned to England and tried to use their wealth for 
political ends during the reign of George III. Bryce: op.cit. 
Vol. II, p. 532 states that 'tthey bought electorate, and formed 
a group which had vanished long before the Reform Act of 
1832." Cf. iïarriott, J.A.R.: The mechanism of the modern State, 
Vol. I, p. 477. 
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bribery, threats, intimidation, personation, falsifying the count, 
and all forms of acts involving moral turpitude as well as other acts 
which, while not inherently immoral, were deemed contrary.to good 
electoral practice.(1) 
The election day, when it fell to every voter to give his vote to 
the parliamentary candidate whom he judged the best to represent him, 
was fixed by a royal decree which was proclaimed and made known to all 
voters in all electoral constituencies, along with the names of the 
competing candidates for each particular electoral division. The 
polling process was performed by committees each of which was com- 
posed of a chairman who was either a judge, a member of the Parquet or 
a civil servant appointed by the Minister of justice; a representative 
of the Ministry of the Interior; and voters who were not less than 
three.(2) These latter should not have been candidates and were 
chosen in the following way: every candidate, on the day preceding 
the election day, designated, in writing, two voters - one of whom was 
to be provisional to replace the original in case of the latters 
absence or delay; these designated members composed the electoral 
(1) Mittwalli: op.cit. .pp. 54 -55. Cf. Conditions in the United 
Kingdom where a 'Corrupt and Illegal Practice Prevention Act' 
defines all corrupt and illegal electoral practices and regulates 
campaign expenditure and electoral manners generally. Ogg: op.cit. 
pp. 194 -195; Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 499 -500. In India, the 
law does not only limit the expenses to about 22,000 per candidate 
in a single member constituency, but also prohibits the use of 
transport to take voters to the polling centres. Morris- Jones, 
.H.: "Indian elections," pp. 238 -239. Bryce: op.cit. Vol.II, 
P. 499 gives an account of the extent of the power of money in 
different countries. He classifies the U.S.A. and France at the 
top of his list as the two countries where money plays the most 
effective róle in politics. 
(2) Q núnu >l Intikháb, Art. 34. 
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committee. If they did not reach three in number because of a delay 
of more than half an hour, or because of the fact that the candidates 
in a constituency were only two, a third member was appointed by the 
chairman of the committee in the first circumstance, and elected by 
the two designated members in the second. In all cases members of 
these committees had to be literate.(1) Moreover, every candidate, 
had the right to have an agent present throughout the polling for the 
purpose of checking off the names of those who would vote, watching 
for attempts at fraud, challenging persons who were suspected of 
trying to vote under false names or more than once, and in general, 
took note'and expressed remarks about what might have happened during 
the process of the polls.(2) 
Voting was by secret ballot, and usually took place in all parts 
of the country on the same day from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. (3) In spite of 
the Clear provision to that effect in the electoral law, the 1938 
elections were not held throughout the country on the same day. There 
was a division into Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt and elections all 
over were carried out on different days within a week's time. Surely 
that procedure was a deviation from the rule that elections should 
have been in all constituencies throughout the country on the same 
day, and was one of the means by which the government interfered in 
the running of the elections in favour of the anti -Wafdist political 
parties. (4) 
(1) Ibid. Art. 35. 
(2) Ibid. Art. 35; Sabri: op.cit. pp. 700-701. 
(3) Q núnu' l Intikháb, Art. 39. 
(4) Graves, P.P.: "The Egyptian elections," pp. 5a2 -583; The Times, 
April 5, 1938. 
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Polling centres were usually few and far from the people. That 
is why it is a well known fact that candidates who acquired, by hire 
or otherwise, the most lorries and other means of transporting the 
voters to polling centres, were usually the ones most likely to get 
seats in Parliament. This is an additional proof of the inequality 
of chances for rich and poor candidates, and gives weight to the 
argument that electoral expenses should have been fixed, and trans- 
portation of voters by any means, by the candidates or their agents, 
should have been penalized to the extent that its commitment could 
have invalidated the candidacy.(1) 
Once a voter stepped into the polling booth, he showed the 
committee a certificate proving that he had been registered as a 
voter. If it happened that one had lost his certificate, he had to 
identify himself and provide evidence that his name was on the 
electoral register of that particular constituency. If there was no 
discrepency in the information provided by the voter and that on the 
registration list, the chairman handed him a ballot.(2) This ballot 
was a simple affair: a bit of white paper no larger than an ordinary 
postal card, bearing an official stamp, the name of the constituency 
and the date of election on the back, devoid of party names and 
emblems, containing nothing but the names of the candidates arranged 
in alphabetical order on the front. Taking this paper to a screened 
compartment, the voter made a mark in the space to the left of the 
name of the candidate of his choice; and then folding the ballot so 
Sabri: op.cit. pp. 714 -715; Mitwalli: op.cit. p. 54; 
Ibrahim, ..: E2. llaç i Yurádu bi ánúni "l Intikháb r' 
(2) Qánünu l-Int ikh°áb, Arts. 40 óc 41. 
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as to conceal the marking, but exposing the stamp, he dropped it in 
the ballot box and went his way. If 'a voter was unable to mark the 
ballot himself, a member of the committee under the supervision of 
the chairman marked it for him.(1) 
Only 24 per cent of the electorate were literate,(2) and con - 
sequently could fulfil the conditions of casting their votes through 
a secret ballot which is a requirement for free elections.- ) The 
rest, i.e. 76 per cent of the voters, had to depend on officials and 
members of the electoral committees in casting their votes for electing 
representatives who decided on political, civic and social matters in 
Parliament. As parliamentary majorities usually fluctuate, so that 
every vote in the representative assembly becomes of consequence and 
significance to ministers, the latter exerted themselves in Egypt not 
only to secure the election of their proposed supporters, but to 
propitiate as many deputies as possible. Officials in different 
electoral constituencies were made to understand the wishes of the 
government, and they, whether expressly instructed or not, did their 
best to promote the candidature on whom the ministry counted.() On 
the whole, Egyptian elections were subject to panic, not that of the 
electorate but of those persons who were able to decide which way the 
voters were to vote.(5) However, since the impartiality of those who 
Trr Ibid. Art. 42. 
(2) $abri: op.cit. p. 743. 
(3) Barker: op.cit. p. 42. 
(4) Ibráhim: " op.cit." 
(5) That point was clearly expressed in the Chamber of Deputies after 
the return of the Wafd to power in 1950. Majlisu.)k- Nuwrlb: op. 
cit. X -i, S.3, pp. 20 -21. The influence of the administration 
and the simultaneous actions of influential civil servants to 
direct elections towards a particular trend was frankly expressed 
in one of the reports of the Standing Committee of the 
Verifica- 
tion of Membership in the Chamber of Deputies. It showed 
that in 
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were delegated by most of the voters to express their will, which was 
to result and feature the common will, was not guaranteed, a system 
securing the free expression of these illiterate masses of the 
electorate was urged.(1) 
It is not an easy task to find a simple method to enable illiteratE 
people to express freely their political views in an election, and at 
the same time be within the bonds of democratic principles and 
traditions. Some critics,(2) who weighed the benefit which a voter 
could derive from voting by his ability to distinguish between various 
policies and different candidates, stressed the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of the vote of the uneducated. They continued their 
arguments showing that the unrestricted universal suffrage systems 
applied in different European and Western countries have been the 
result of the socio- political evolution of the people, and therefore, 
because of the social and political conditions in Egypt, the 
universal suffrage system there required some modifications. Accord- 
ingly some of them suggested the disenfranchisement of the large masses 
of illiterates,(3) while the others proposed the plural voting system 
as an alternative method for electoral reform. 
(4) 
= a by- election where a candidate was a relative of the Prime 
Minister, some officials initiated actions to force voters to 
cast their votes in favour of that candidate. Ibid. IX -v. S.11, 
Pp. 253-255. 
(1) Ra'fpt, W.: "Al Isláhul- Intikhábi" 
(2). Sabri: op.cit. pp. 710 -716; q7377-op.cit. pp. F9 et seq. 
Mitwalli: op.cit. pp.dYLL5 et seq. 
(3) Ibid. pp. 
48. 
-51; Sabri: op.cit. p. 715-716. 
(4) Id: op.cit. pp. 103 -104, Al- 'Imari: 'fTangihu d- dustúri)l°` 
Misr li yatamshá rna a l mab 'd i,F 1 I tisádi ati ̀ l- hadithah, " 
p. 10. 
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It is undisputed that the more educated a democracy is, the 
better its government will be, but, nevertheless, one should be very 
reluctant to accept a suggestion for the disenfranchisement of the 
uneducated.(1) It is the defenders of the theory of the government 
by the competent who usually, and everywhere suggest the establishment 
of educational qualifications, but the device of a valid scheme on 
such bases proved practically impossible in almost all countries, and 
there has been, nearly everywhere, a complete surrender to the 
principle that mere citizenship qualifies the voter.(24 Moreover, in 
the words of Lord Bryce: "The voter who cannot read a newspaper or 
the election address of a candidate is ill - equipped for voting. But 
the real question is not whether illiteracy disqualifies, but to what 
extent literacy qualifies. How does the ability to read and write go 
towards civic competence ? "(j) Instead of depriving the masses of 
their electoral rights because of their illiteracy, one should try to 
elevate their standard of education and avoid the barriers which keep 
the people far beyond the reach of the lights of knowledge. Searching 
for these obstacles, one should remember the well known fact that all 
despotic governments have been "either indifferent or hostile to the 
spread of education among their subjects, because they feared that 
knowledge and intelligence-.would create a wish for freedo,l. "(4) More- 
over, as Laski powerfully and frankly expressed it, "all regimes built 
(1) aafat: " op.cit." 
(2) Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 410. 
(3) Bryce: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 80. 
(4) Ibid, p. 79. 
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upon inequality draw their strength from the ignorance of the 
multitude, and all such regimes seek to make their methods of education 
such as are least likely to injure their own foundation. " ( 1) Here, 
we recall Fineris theory that. "it is a fallacy to believe that the 
poorest, the most ignorant, ought not to vote because they will not 
know what to vote for - they }mow very well even too well . tt (2 ) 
Those who are acquainted with the troublesome problem of doing 
away with plural voting in Britain, might get rather a shock to learn 
that something of the kind was being proposed for Egypt. It was the 
aim of those who suggested a plural electoral system that in addition 
to the vote that a person acquired as a citizen, he would get the 
right of an extra one to three votes according to his standard of 
education. (3 ) The first difficulty which usually faces the applica- 
tion of such a system is the definition of "education". In Egypt, 
the concept of the word has been changing with the march of time; and 
what was considered two decades ago a high educational qualification 
has become much lower than that. If an hypothesis that a practical 
way for the application of this sytem is found, the main argument 
against that system of plural voting appears; namely, it helps the 
creation of class distinction and widens the gaps between them and even 
strengthens the bitterness and conflicts not only between different 
social classes, but also within the educated one. Moreover, it seems 
11) Laski, H.J.: Democracz in crisis, p. 73. 
(2) .Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 410 
(3) 'Id: op.cit. p. 103; Al- CImari: op.cit. p. 10. 
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that those who recommended the plural electoral system as a remedy 
for the electoral difficulties in Egypt, overlooked the fact that 
plural voting has been discarded in all democracies the world over, 
and that its existence was the remains of an electoral system which 
re q uired property, and. not educational , qualifications in the voters ) 
However, in order to raise the political standard of the elector- 
ate and induce the voters to choose between policies and to prefer 
parties to individuals, as was the case in Egypt, one would have 
suggested that on the ballot paper, along with the candidates name, 
a coloured sign identifying his party would have been attached to his 
name. The voter, and especially the illiterate one, who was to fill 
his ballot paper without any help from the electorate committee, 
would have chosen from amongst parties and not an individual 
candidate.(2) 
The count of votes, which took place within the three days 
following the election day, was made by a committee composed of the 
chairman of the central electoral committee and representatives of 
other electoral committees of the constituency.(3) Thereupon the 
results were certified to the authorities, i.e. the Ministry of the 
Interior, by whom they were announced. A. member of Parliament was 
(1) Ogg: op.cit. pp. 177 -178. 
(2) Cf. Oonditions in India where because of mass illiteracy, 
parties were distinguished by pictorial symbols, and each party 
had a ballot box marked with its symbol. The voter was only 
required simply to drop his ballot paper in the box of his 
choice. Morris- Jones: op.cit. p. 238. A similar method was 
applied in the Sudan in elections held in 1953. 
(3) anúnu' l- Intikháb, Arts. 44 -46 
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elected by the absolute majority of the votes cast.(1) In view of 
the multiplicity of candidates in some constituencies, it happened 
frequently that no one received that majority. Therefore, in such 
a case, a second ballot between the two candidates standing highest 
determined who would get the seat. The merit of a second ballot is 
usually that "it gives the people the opportunity of re- considering 
their vote when they know by the first result that certain candidates 
are out of the running and that their choice is now restricted. Many 
cannot have the man (or woman) they most prefer, they are given the 
opportunity of deciding which of the remaining candidates is nearer 
their first preference. "(2) The period between the two ballots, 
which was not to exceed five days, likely witnessed plenty of bar - 
gaining, as a result of which some seats were gained without any need 
for a second ballot. However, whether a second ballot was undergone 
or not, and in spite of the argument of Duverger that "it is prac- 
tically impossible to specify what are the effects of the second 
ballot on the representation of the parties, owing to the change of 
opinion in comparison with the first ballot on the part of the electors; 
who transfer their votes to the most acceptable rival, 
TT (3) usually its 
results could easily be predicted since the general will or at least 
its trend could be felt from the results of the first ballot. The 
(1) Ibid. Art. 47. Cf. Great Britain where only a simple 
majority 
is required for the election of members of Parliament and only 
one ballot. Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 911 -912. 
(2) Ibid, p. 912. Cf. Ra'fat: "op.cit." 
(3) Duverger, M.: "The influence of electoral systems on political 
life," p. 330. 
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election of members of Parliament in the second ballot was by 
relative majority of votes, i.e. the candidate who secured more votes 
without regard to its percentage to the votes cast, was elected.(1) 
Moreover, a second ballot meant some extra expense, which was con- 
siderable, and it seemed rather difficult to get the voters to go to 
the polls a second time within so short a period. There are no 
definite figures to show the abstention of voters in the second 
ballot, but surely many of them did not go, and for that reason it 
could be said that "the result of the second poll may not be a real 
r? 
expression of the feeling of the constituency."() 
The electoral process, already described in the previous rages 
of this Chapter, illustrates how constituents were assembled, 
and drilled in their constituencies to choose representatives 
1 Qanúnu 1- Intikhab, Art. 47. 
Although different human and social enviornments, greatly 
influence various institutions, it is a matter of interest to 
remark that criticisms of the second ballot system were officially 
presented to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1927: "(1) The 
respective situation of parties is falsified. It is impossible 
to gauge the importance of the various political groupings by 
reference to the results of the second ballot; the victories won 
in the second ballot are the product of a transaction most often 
obtained to the detriment of ideas and programmes; (2) It often 
happens that these bargains are arranged under conditions which 
have nothing at all to do with - political contest, .... (3) The 
possibility of a second ballot even falsifies the result of the 
first. A large number of the electors, in fact, use the .first 
ballot for manifestation of sympathy or personal rancour and 
wait until the second round to express their political sentiments. 
Others finally give their votes to such and such a candidate, 
solely to produce another election; (4) The second ballot 
engenders a recondescence of violence which is not calculated to 
heighten the morality of the election. Further, it is an extra 
source of expense and the prospect of a second round may suffice 
to keep out of the struggle candidates who are poor." Rapport 
No. 4625, cited in Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, p. 91. 
(2) Daniels, S.R.: The case for electoral reform, p. 32. 
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and politicians who would constitute the legislature, and through the 
same activity they judged the different policies in dispute at the 
moment of election. The object of this part of the work is to study 
the working of that electoral system and its results. 
The use of the franchise was disappointing; in Egypt, as it is in 
other countries. (1) To begin with the discussion of the non- voting 
problem and its effects and repercussions on the parliamentary and 
democratic system in Egypt, it is useful first to have a look at Table 
To. I.(2) From that table a notable phenomenon, namely the steady 
increase of abstaining or non -voting voters, is evident. .z continuous 
decline in the percentage of those who used their right to vote is 
noticeable. It was only in the 1931 elections that this percentage 
rose high, and this was due to different causes: the newly introduced 
indirect electoral system, administrative interference, the fabrication 
of the results of the elections in order to show the satisfaction of 
the people and their acceptance of the new Constitution (i.e. the 1930 
Constitution) and the electoral law. The increase in the number and 
percentage of the voters who participated in the 1950 elections may 
be explained by the feeling which had existed and was very apparant 
from the end of 1948 against the governing coalition parties when the 
prime Minister was assassinated and concentration camps and prisons 
Were opened to receive every political suspect. (3 ) 
(1) Gosnell, H.1}'.: "Votin,," p: 2`'9; Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, tip. 941. 
(2) See Appendix II, 45(4- 
(3) For indications abut that situation see A'r -Räfic : op.cit. 
Vol. III, pp. 262 et seq. Cf. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
Vol. VII, 1948-1952, P. 9712. 
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In spite of the limited material available in connection with 
the participation of voters in elections, it is an obvious fact that 
the percentage of abstention from voting in urban constituencies was 
higher than in the rural areas. 
(1) 
_:oreover, it was noticed that 
the percentage of votes which placed a parliamentary candidate in a 
seat in the Chamber of Deputies in relation to the total registered 
votes in different constituencies, was much higher in the rural than 
in the urban constituencies.(2) However, despite the inadequacy of 
the data to give an exact analysis of the reasons which caused the 
abstention of such a high percentage of the qualified voters, it is 
well known that "some of them were deterred by sickness, others by 
their occupation, absence abroad, ignorance, apathy, general disgust 
(1)Sabji, E.: ttMajlisn- Nuwwáb lá Yumathilu0l- Ummati tamthilá 
Sa(.iha" . 
(2) ttIbidtt Without giving any figures about the rural constituen- 
cies, the following examples are mentioned: 
In the. 192$ elections in Cairo, Deputies for the constituen- 
cies oo "Búlis Rúdi l- Fara.1tt, t'Nugtat and 
7tShubra" gained their seats in the Chamber by securing only 
12,_, 10% and 14% of the registered votes in these constituencies 
respectively. In Alexandria, this percentage was 11% anda 5 
in the constituencies of "Al- Manshivahts and ttNugtat Búlisi 1- 
Innab tt. 
In he 19.42 elections, the Deputy for the constituency of 
ttQismi' l- IsmaCilivahtt of the Suez Governorate secured only 16% 
of the registered votes. 
In the 1915 and 1950 elections the same phenomenon is found. 
In the,foimer, the Deputy for the constituency of ttNuatat 
~ Blisi 1- Innabtt Alexandria, acquired only 5% of the registered 
votes; and -,in the lattex, the Deputy for the constituency of 
trNugtat Buiisi'sh- Shuenivah" Cairo, had only 10%. 
Cf. The conclusion to which Gosnell reached that there is 
usually more voting in the urban than the rural constituencies. 
Finer: op.cit. Vol.II, p.945; Nïerriam, C.E. and Gosnell, R.F. 
Non votinz, causes and methods of control, p.253. 
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with politics or disbelief in their efficacy, and in some cases by 
a dislike of the candidates available. "(1) In addition to this 
because of the extensive areas of electoral constituencies and the 
distance separating their places of work from their electoral 
residence, voters might have been obliged to travel a good distance 
to cast their votes at too great exertion. Although the fares; of 
such journeys were paid by the State, voters did "show no sign of 
wishing to reduce their standard of living by absence from work for 
the sake of 'politics. "(2) 
This was an acute problem. "Non -voting is a symptom: it points 
to something basically wrong or to the fact that people do not con- 
sider the stakes important. "(3 ) However, the imposition of a com- 
pulsory voting system was the only way through which this problem 
could have been solved. Such a system has been successfully used in 
different countries,(4) where the notorious abstention from voting 
before the introduction of "Le vote obligatoire" (compulsory voting), 
was overcome and replaced by the participation of most of the voters 
in elections.(5) The success of these experiments(6) should have 
(1) Robson, .A.: "Compulsory voting:," pp. 569 -570. 
(2) Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 418. Cf. Merriam and Gosnell: op.cit. 
pp. 86 -95. In spite of differences in the social and economic 
conditions in the U.S.A. and Egypt, it is important to point out 
that in the U.S.A. the non -voting because of economic pressure and 
fear of loosing earnings or wages is more apparent in the poor 
districts. Ibid. pp. 90 -91 &i 253. 
(3) Dimock: op.cit. pp. 105 -106. 
(4) Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, and Australia adopted the com- 
pulsory voting system, the highest voting records in democratic 
countries were found there. 
(5) Ibid, p. 105; Robson: op.cit. p. 573, Gosnell: op.cit. p. 289. 
(6) For the extent of the success of the compulsory voting in these 
countries, especially Belgiun, See Gosnell: op.cit. pp. 289 -290, 
Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, p. 943. 
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encouraged the suggestion to introduce a compulsory voting system into 
Egypt with the imposition of some slight penalties for failing to vote 
without a good reason.(1) A legislation to that effect was initiated 
in the Chamber of Deputies but it was rejected.(2) 
These penalties might have not been severe and might have not 
been inscribed in the police records as offences. They could have 
been framed on a progressive scale for those who repeatedly abstained. 
The type of penalty recommended in such cases might be a reprimand 
or a fine,the exhibition of the abstaining voters' names on a placard 
for some time in some locally prominent place, and in the most serious 
cases could be the suspension of electoral rights by the removal of 
their names from the electoral register for a limited period during 
which they would receive from the State no promotion, distinction or 
nomination to any office.(3) 
At the same time when one suggests the introduction of compulsory 
voting to Egypt, one should insist on the facilities required for every 
voter to express his political views freely, that is to say without 
any suppression or interference from anybody or any institution, and 
also on guarantees for the safeguard of his social and economic status. 
In other words, the secrecy of the ballot should be safeguarded, 
especially for illiterate voters, no economic sacrifice should be 
required of the voter, in the sense that everyone should be given 
sufficient free time from his work to go to the polls. Such an 
(i) Cf. Sabri: "op.cit." ; Sabri: 11-íánúnu'dDustúri, p. 747. 
(2) Majli.su?n-Nuwwáb: op.cit. IX-v, S. 11, p. 275. 
(3) Ral fat : "op.cit." ; op.cit. IX-v; S.11. 
p.275. Cf. Belgian system analysed by Robson: op.cit. pp. 573 
et seq. 
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arrangement could be maintained by obliging employers to grant the 
voters, as a paid holiday, the time necessary for them to cast their 
votes; by extending the polling time, say from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.; 
and by the promulgation of a law condemning corrupt and illegal 
electoral practices. One might ask what advantages representative 
institutions would gain through the imposition of the compulsory vote. 
In Fir er's words, "it enables the politician to say with conviction 
(and demonstration) that he represents _.a majority of the people. It 
makes it easier to get people to the poll. In some a political 
consciousness will be awakened. "(1) 
The study of the problem of the abstention of voters led some 
writers to draw the conclusion that only a very small minority had 
been governing the country.(2) This theory is based on the fact that 
that Parliament's decisions and resolutions were valid if they had 
been passed by an absolute majority of the members present, and that 
the sittings of Parliament were constitutional if they had been 
attended by an absolute majority of members. Therefore, the power, it 
was said, was held by only a very small minority, especially since the 
abstention of voters was very high and all votes not given to the 
successful electoral candidate simply did not count at all, exercising 
no influence whatsoever upon the composition of Parliament or the 
course of events.(3) Actually, the problem here could be divided into 
(1) Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, p. 944. 
(2) Sabri: op.cit. pp. 716 -720. 
(3) Ìbid. p. 720. He tries on these bases to show that Parliament's 
decisions were valid although they might have been approved by 
only 10.75, 9.75 %, 9.25%, 11.75 %, 9.75iß and 10.25% of the 
electorate in 1926, 1929, 1936, 1938, 1942 and 1945 respectively. 
301. 
two parts: the first is that Of the abstaining voters, which has 
just been discussed. The second is that of those voters who voted 
for the unsuccessful candidates and their non -representation in 
Parliament. Here, one should bear in mind that these voters were a 
minority, and that democracy and representative parliamentary govern- 
ment is a kind of government where normally the minority should accept 
the rule of the majority. 
Duverger said: "There seems to be a very simple method of 
assessing how accurate representation.is:to compare the percentage of 
the seats and the percentage of the votes gained by each party. If 
the two coincide, it will be taken that the representation is accurate; 
the first higher than the second, we shall have 'over -representation'; 
if it is lower, 'under- representation.'"(1) Table No. II(2)is an 
attempt to apply this method to the results of the Egyptian general 
elections. From the table, it could be correctly inferred that the 
proportion of seats obtained by the different parties in the Chamber 
of Deputies did not correspond to the proportion of the votes cast for 
their candidates: Therefore, the electoral system did not really 
produce a representative Parliament; and since the majority party 
acquired more strength and was usually over -represented, whilst the 
minority parties remained weak and under -represented, landslides were 
encouraged. 
The extraordinary nature of the results produced by the electoral 
Duverger: ópocit. p. 328. 
( 2) See Appendix II, pp. ¿p 4 0_ { 
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system is brought out by an analysis of the election results. It is 
rather difficult to trace the distortions which were due to the casting 
of votes under some sort of influence or suppression such as those 
already described. But even on the assumption that all votes were 
honestly cast, and that every voter had a real chance of expressing 
his true opinion by his vote, the results, in every case, show the 
incredible distortion of the facts and the trend of the common will. 
While the votes which a party received should offer a sure sign of 
its popular strength, the number of the seats acquired by each party 
provided a very unreliable guide. A glance at the right hand column 
of the table - which provides detailed figures about the operation of 
the representative system in Egypt at every election held between 1924 
and 1952 - shows the divergence between the seats a party actually 
obtained, and those to which it would be entitled. Moreover, a some- 
what detailed survey of these figures might show the misrepresentation 
of public opinion by the different ,Chambers of Deputies. It seems 
preferable, in order to produce a fair assessment of the situation, 
to standardize the means of comparing the accuracy of representation. 
The results of the elections of 1924, 1925 and 1931 will therefore be 
disregarded in this survey as they were conducted according to the 
indirect electoral systems. 
The Wafd which struggled against the despotism of the Palace and 
the reactionary elements during the first constitutional crisis 
through its appeal to the people for their support obtained in the 
1926 elections what was regarded as a smashing victory, that is to say 
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171 seats out of a total of 211 in the Chamber of Deputies. This gave 
the Wafd a strength in the Chamber of more than 4 to 1 against other 
parties, while it had only 68.0 per cent of the votes cast. The same 
picture in a clearer shape appeared in the results of the 1929 
elections. They were carried out after the collapse of the "iron 
hand" and the success of the Wafd, by the support of the masses, in- 
quelling the absolutism of the Palace and the Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party. In these elections, the Wafd secured 93.1 per cent of the 
seats with only 6C.9 per cent of the votes cast. 
If the 1926 and 1929 elections provide evidence of the popularity 
of the Wafd as the party which sought the preservation of the Con- 
stitution and parliamentary life, the 1936 elections could prove that 
this particular party had derived its popularity because of its 
attitude towards Britain in connection with the National Demands ". 
These elections were carried out after the success of restoring the 
1923 Constitution, and in an atmosphere in which every person felt the 
need for a settlement of Anglo- Egyptian relations. That might have 
been the reason why the Wafd had 81.9 per cent of the seats with 62.1 
per cent of the votes. Again the same conditions were found in 1950 
when the internal situation was very complicated at the end of a five 
years old anti-Wafdist Parliament, and when relations with Britain 
were somehow unstable because of the revision of the 1936 Treaty and 
the position of both Egypt and the United Kingdom towards the Sudan. 
This could be the reason behind the sweeping success of the Wafd in 
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gaining 70.$ per cent of the seats 1Nith only 54.5 per cent of the 
votes. In spite of the fact that the 1942 elections were carried out 
during the Second World War when the country was passing through a 
very critical phase of its history as German and Italian troops were 
actually in Egyptian territory, and despite the fact that parties other 
than the ,'afd and the National party boycotted these elections, the 
former party had 87.9 per cent of the seats with 58.3 per cent of the 
votes. 
On the other hand, one should consider the position of the other 
parties, especially the Liberal'Constitutionalist Party and the 
Saadist Party, which were recognised as the major parties other than 
the Icafd. The Liberal Constitutionalist Party suffered from under- 
representation in the Chamber, in all elections but one, in which it 
participated. The extent of this under -representation differed from 
one election to another, but its worst conditions were in 1929 when 
the party possessed only 2.2 per cent of the seats in the Chamber while 
it secured 18.8 per cent of the votes cast. The under -representation 
of that Party in the 1926 and 1929 elections could, one might say, be 
due to its policy, and responsibility for the two constitutional crises 
of 1925 and 1928. One can hardly find another reason for its under - 
representation in the 1936 elections, which were carried out after the 
restoration of the 1923 Constitutioniandthe róle of the Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party in the struggle for its restoration did not 
differ from that of the °afd, the over -represented party, except that 
under the single member constituencies system with two ballots which 
the Egyptian electoral system established, the majority party usually 
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acquires more strength and the minority parties remain weak even to 
the point of losing some of their strength. The under -representation 
of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party was due to the overrepresenta- 
tion of the majority party, the Wafd. The single occasion when this 
Party was over -represented was in the 1945 elections, and that might 
have been because the Wald boycotted them. Moreover, this over- 
representation of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party came about 
through the under -representation of another political party, namely 
the Independent :dafdist Block (Al- Kutlat0l Wafdiyatul- Mustagillah) , 
which had been considered minor to the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. 
The Saadist Party, during its short life, was over -represented 
in two elections, i.e. the 1938 and 1945 elections out of the three 
in which it participated. The over- representation of that party might 
be due to its youth, and the policy and programme it presented. But it 
should be noticed that the over- representation of the Saadist Party 
was countered by the under- representation of the other minor parties. 
In the 1950 elections, this party suffered from under -representation. 
It had only 8.8 per cent of the seats in the Chamber while it secured 
16.3 per cent of the votes cast. This situation was due to the fact 
that the Saadist Party was held responsible for the political upheaval 
which had occurred during its term' of office, and resulted in its 
unpopularity. 
An interesting point might be raised here: What were the effects 
of the inter -relationship of the parties: cthe outcome of the elections 
and the conduct of the political events to follow? "The problem of the 
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inter -relationship of the parties, and of the alliances they may form 
among themselves, has so far scarcely been studied systematically. It 
is, however, of great importance under a multiparty system, as only 
by contracting alliances is it generally possible to secure a 
sufficient majority to form a government . "( 1) 
The first clear alliance between political parties in Egypt for 
the purpose of undertaking a general election as a united front was in 
1ß3e. The Liberal Constitutionalist Party, the National Party and the 
People's Unionist Party entered into alliance and participated in the 
elections under the name "Qawmiyun ". The Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party was the strongest of the three, and was trying to gain a 
sufficient majority in the Chamber of Deputies to form a government. 
For that reason, and in order to challenge the Wafd, all throe parties 
agreed to surrender their political identities, and nominated their 
candidates under the newly invented name. "Qawmiyún ". 
Another electoral alliance appeared in the 1947 elections amongst 
the Sáadist, the Liberal Constitutionalist, the National and the 
Independent ':afdist Block parties. In this case, each party retained 
its name and nominated its candidates, but an argument amongst them for 
the division of the electoral constituencies in a particular way was 
reached. The constituencies were divided into so- called "closed" and 
"opened" constituencies. The latter were opened for any candidate of 
any party colour nominated by this party, while the former were so 
designated that only one party of the four coalitioned parties was 
(1) Duverger: op.cit. p. 324 
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entitled to nominate candidates to these constituencies. In other 
words, the parties agreed to divide a certain number of the con- 
stituencies amongst themselves, each party getting a quota of these 
constituencies in which his candidates were not to be contested by any 
nominee of the other three parties. It is important to notice that 
the parties did not stick to that agreement, and in the trclosed?? con- 
stituencies candidates of different parties were found contesting each 
other under a disguised independency. This might have been the 
reason for the instability of the coalition and the withdrawal of some 
of the parties from the Cabinet thus breaking the theory that electoral 
alliances tend to continue, being converted into governmental ones.(l) 
In the previous pages, the defects of the electoral system have 
been discussed. These defects, and especially that of the under - 
representation of the minorities could have been amended by some system 
of proportional representation - some method of ensuring that every 
substantial body of political opinion in the country should have been 
represented in proportion to its strength.(2) 
There are many schemes for proportional representation, but there 
are two main types: first, the single transferable vote, and second; 
the list system.(3) Since the Hare system, i.e., the single trans- 
ferable scheme is somehow complicated and requires an educated and 
intelligent electorate, the list scheme in view of the economic and 
social conditions of Egyptian voters, seems to have been the most 
suitable one for adoption in Egypt. The detailed description of such 
(1) Ibid. p. 324. 
(2) SabrT: op.cit. pp. 746-747; Cf. Mitwalli: op.cit. pp. 41-48. 
(3) Corry: op.cit. p. 179; Field: op.cit. pp. 133-137. 
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a scheme is unnecessary. Its object is to deal with an important 
problem, namely that of ensuring that every citizen shall be able to 
feel that his vote is counted, instead of merely thrown away unless he 
gives it to the candidate who happens to be elected. This problem has 
been the subject of much research and discussion since J.S. Mill 
pointed out the dangers of the single member constituency. Mill 
showed how this system deprives the electors of the means of expressing 
their opinions, and puts them at the mercy of organised partiee,which 
might by skilful handling of the electoral machine secure unreal 
majorities that would place the destiny of the nation at their mercy. 
He explained that the real danger of democracy lies, not only in the 
possible misuse of power by a majority, but in the obtaining of a 
majority power by an organised majority. Therefore, the only safe- 
guard against this danger is to make sure that all solid and sober 
bodies of opinion are fairly represented. (1) 
The fair representation of minorities is essential not only for 
their protection, but also for the well being of the whole. Therefore, 
proportional representation based on the following principles would 
have been suitable. The country would have been divided into two or 
three gigantic constituencies; any organised party could put forward 
a list of candidates for every constituency, and the electorate would 
vote on the party lists. Each party would obtain one seat for every 
electoral quota it should receive, (2) and seats would have been 
(1) Mill, J.S.: Considerations on representative government, 
Chapter VII. 
(2) This quota would have been the result of the total number of the 
votes divided by the number of the representatives entitled to 
be elected. 
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alloted to the candidates in the order of their priority on the 
official lists of the parties.(1) 
The system of proportional representation advocated for Egypt 
would have yielded more accurate reflection of the mind of the country. 
It would have given to every voter a real liberty of choice among the 
parties without any pressure from influential individuals. It would 
have discouraged dishonest voting, for when every elector knows that 
his vote would not be wasted, he would vote according to his 
conscience. It would have encouraged political parties to elaborate 
their programmes and policies, and to establish and carry on educa- 
tional work everywhere because every convert's vote would count. It 
would have facilitated self -respecting and open agreements or arrange - 
not 
ments between parties because they could /co- operate Parliament 
without slackening their propaganda in the country. It would have 
ensured to every solid and reasonable body of opinion representation 
in proportion to its strength; therefore legislatures thus elected 
(1) Cf. The German scheme of proportional representation, Finer: 
op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 915 -917; Corry: op.cit. p. 180; Field: 
op.cit. p. 134. 
It is worth noticing that in consequence of the First World 
" ar, the newly created States adopted proportional representation 
almost without discussion. Also Germany, Austria, Holland, the 
Irish Free State, Poland and Norway adopted that system. This 
might be because proportional representation has been claimed to 
enhance the claims and powers of the electorate. In the United 
Kingdom, the United States and France, there were agitations in 
favour of that system, but it did not find any success until after 
the Second World War in France when the Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic stipulated for proportional representation. Gos:nell, 
H.F.: t'Proportional re resentation,41 pp. 542 -544; Barker: op. 
cit. p. 7$; Article 6 of the Constitution of the French Fourth 
Republic; Thomson, D.: Democracy in France, pp. 251 et seq; 
Duverger: op.cit. p. 317. 
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would have truly mirrored the political composition of the people. In 
other words, quoting Professor Barker on the proportional representa- 
tion system Tithe electorate will no longer speak, as it were, in a 
thick husky voice; it will speak in clear and distinct accents, which 
can be nicely calculated and exactly recorded. Just for that reason, 
its verdict will carry a greater weight and exercise more decisive 
(1) 
influence." 
Proportional. representation has been riddled with criticism. 
The first argument against the system is that it "destroy(s) any 
prospect of personal relations between the member (of Parliament) and 
his constituents, "(2) and consequently "prevent(s) that contact and 
interplay of the different grgans which is part of the system of 
government by discussion. "(3 ) Actually a member of Parliament in 
Egypt was exposed to the pressure of his constituents, something which 
was considered a defect in the parliamentary system. Accordingly, 
since members of Parliament elected by proportional representation 
are usually less dependent upon their electors than in the case of the 
single member constituency system, the introduction of proportional 
representation system would have resulted in many Deputies coming 
under no obligation to any constituency. Consequently, they would be 
free from the burden of personal gratitude towards their electors, 
they would not be obliged to pledge themselves to the particular 
demands of their constituencies, or even to the purely personal wishes 
(1) Barker: op.cit. p. 79. 
(2) Laski: H.J.: A grammer of politics, p. 315. 
(3) Barker: op.cit. p. 81. 
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of their constituents in so far as these corne into conflict with con- 
siderations affecting the whole State. Such members of Parliament, 
being less tied to their constituents, would have been better able to 
attend to the ,affairs of the country as a whole. 
In the second place, it is argued that the attempt to secure an 
exact representation of the electoral opinion, would result in the 
increase of the number of political parties. Since the system gives 
a chance for every opinion to be represented, it is believed that it 
tends to encourage splits in the big parties and the formation of new 
minor ones.(1) In fact, this might well be considered to be a dis- 
puted point since Duverger noticed that the proportional representation 
system adopted in France after the Second 'iiorld War has resulted, if 
not in a tendency towards a decrease in the number of the French 
political parties, at least to a stabilization of their number. If 
this proof be unconvincing because of the short life of the experiment 
in France, the case of Belgium is more striking. In the fifty years 
during which the proportional representation system has been in opera- 
tion in Belgium, this country has had the same three political parties, 
ith scarcely an alteration in the political situation through the 
presence of the weak Communist Party.(2) Here a point of importance 
should not be overlooked. Those so- called independent candidates who 
contested elections and secured seats in Parliament, and who were in 
part responsible for the instability of the parliamentary system in 
(1) Laski: op.cit. p. 316; Corry: op.cit. pp. 1£31 -182. 
(2) Duverger: op.cit. pp. 317-319. 
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Egypt, would have had no chance of securing any success in an electoral 
contest under proportional representation. They would have been 
eliminated from the political arena. 
In the third place it is objected that the voter under a pro- 
portional representation system has to select a list of candidates and 
may not vote for individual candidates. He must choose a group of 
people, in the order in which they are set forth by the party organisa- 
tion. Thus if an elector wants to support a particular party, he may 
often have to vote for some candidates with whom he lias little sympath3 
In such a case the elector has no alternative but to return a party of 
his liking; and thereby mechanically gives his approval to a number of 
personalities whose names have been placed by the party at the head of 
the list. Failing this, he could either vote for another party or 
return a blank and invalid ballot paper. On these grounds proportiona 
representation is attacked as giving a very limited freedom to the 
electorate, and as empowering the political parties and the control 
practised by their central organisations over the legislature. and its 
members.('} Truly an elector voting according to a proportional 
representation system will not be in a position to select individual 
men, but he will make a free choice among a number of programmes 
presented to him by various political parties. In addition, in a 
single member constituency system, party candidates are pre- appointed 
by their parties before' contesting elections, and voters are supposed 
to choose between parties and the programmes of these parties 
while 
(1) Laski: op.cit. p.316; Corry: op.cit. p. 184. 
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exercising their selective function. 
(1) 
In a democracy, and for its 
working, programmes and policies should have greater value than 
individuals. Therefore, the application of proportional representa- 
tion in Egypt would have obliged the electorate to weigh the different 
policies, programmes and promises of the various parties before cast- 
ing their votes; and in the meantime it would have ridden them of the 
personal influence of some candidates who practised economic pressure 
on the voters to get their votes, and of the pressure of administrative 
officials.(2) On the other hand, one cannot deny the influence of 
parties in a proportional representation system over the electorate 
and in the preparation of the lists. This was the main argument of 
the defenders of the single member constituency against proportional 
representation in Egypt. (3 ) But this defect of the application of 
the proportional representation system in Egypt would have been offset 
by the benefit that should accrue by the parties being obliged to 
present clear, precise and practical programmes, of both their 
internal and external policies, in order to gain the support and 
sympathy of the people. 
(1) Barker: op.cit. pp. 41-42. 
(2) Cf. The arguments for. the "scrutin de liste" in 
France throuìoat 
the existence of the Third Republic. Thomson: 
op.cit. p. 94. 
(3) Rafat: "op.cit."; Pflitwalli : op.cit. pp. 41 -48. 
CHAPTER VI. 
The Senate. 
The foundation -stone of the political structure in Egypt was 
what the Constitution laid down, namely that the "Government is a 
hereditary monarchy having a representative form. "(1) This form of 
government, i.e., parliamentary government, has seemed since the dawn 
of the twentieth century to be the most suitable way towards national 
growth, liberation and stabilisation.(2) A freely, popularly elected 
legislature is an essential criterion by which to distinguish between 
democracy and its rivals. Although the enactment of laws belongs to 
a relatively late stage in political development, the law making body 
takes over those which are concerned with their execution, 
,¡ 
administration or interpretation in the mechanism of the modern StatP ) 
Parliaments have been functioning in regard to vital matters. In 
addition to the enactment of substantive laws, all democratic represent 
ative institutions have exercised such functions as these, to authorise 
taxation and expenditure, to control the executive power, to remove 
grievances, and to interpret public opinion. So important are the 
functions of Parliament that it should stand as a whole in absolute 
sovereignty.( ) While the indispensability of parliaments to demo- 
cratic systems is taken for granted, in some individual cases 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art.l; see Appendix I. 
(2) Laski, H.J.: Democracy in crisis, p. 31. 
(3) Marriott: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 389; Dimock: op.cit. 
p. 132. 
Cf. Laski, H.J.: Studies in law and olitics, pp. 109 
-113; 
McIver: op.cit. pp. 367 -36 
(4) Barker: op.cit. pp. 45 -48. 
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legislatures have declined in effectiveness and reputation because of 
the existence of "a wide gulf between the importance which attaches 
to democratic legislatures in virtue of their functions and the repute 
which many of them actually enjoy among those they represent and 
serve." 
(1) 
The Egyptian Constitution, as in modern democratic constitutional 
States, benefited from the English precedent of the bicameral par- 
liamentary system and from the conclusion which most political 
scientists have reached: A single chamber legislature is dangerous 
to liberty and is not conducive to efficiency of government. It migh 
act rashly and inadvisedly. A second chamber is a checking power, 
an additional security for the maintainance and preservation of freedom. 
It facilitates the representation of different interests, and enables 
eminent personalties to enter Parliament and it checks any hastiness 
and possible bad judgment of the Lower House.(2) Although the idea 
of establishing a unicameral legislature was considered during the 
drafting of the Constitution, the Committee of the Thirty rejected it 
and adopted the principle of a bicameral legislature. 
The Constitution set forth the principle that Parliament com- 
prised two Chambers.(3) The Upper House, i.e. the Senate (Ma,jlisu'sh- 
ghu ú ), was a body composed of members whose number fluctuated 
(1) Lipson, L.: The Politics of e ualitv, p. 315. 
(2) Marriott: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 4Q1 -402; Bryce: op.cit. 
Vol. II, 
pp. 437 et seq.; Dimock: op.cit. pp. 
139 -140; McIver: op.cit. 
pp. 3$1 -382; Majumdar, B.B.: Prnçiples of -olitical science 
and government, pp. 213 -214. 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art. 73. 
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according to changes in the population.(1) This was due to the fact 
that the Senate was formed on a representative basis of one Senator to 
one electoral constituency of 90,000 to 180,000 inhabitants according 
to manhood suffrage.(2) The Senate was charged with the task of legis- 
lative and administrative revision, a task which necessitates that the 
revising Chamber should be in relation to the Lower Chamber manageably 
small, and it may be because of this that one electoral constituency of 
the Senate comprised three constituencies of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Besides the elected Senators, the Constitution provided that two - 
fifths of the members of that legislative organ, which had power to 
delay the enactment of any legislation, were nominated by the King.(4) 
The nomination of Senators minimized the representative character of 
the Senate since "the more the choosing of the second Chamber is out 
of the popular control, the more it tends to become detached from the 
realities of politics, and thus loses its vitality. "(5) J.A.Marriott, 
classifying the essential attributes of a successful second chamber, 
mentioned that it should be "independent without being irresponsible. 0 
) 
Therefore, according to the situation which existed in the Senate, it 
could not as an institution claim to be independent as two -fifths of 
(1) The last Senate was composed of 180 Senators. 
(2) Ibid. Arts. 74 and 75. 
(3) Ibid. Arts. 83 and 84. 
(4) Ibid. Art. 76. It is worth noticing that the 1930 Constitution 
fixed the number of Senators at one hundred and granted the King 
the right to nominate sixty of them, i.e. three -fifths of the 
members of that legislative organ, an overwhelming majority. 
1930 Constitution, Art. 75. 
(5) Strong, C. F.: Modern political Constitutions, cp. 209 -210. 
(6) Marriott: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 421. 
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its members, who could gather and form a block, were nominated by the 
King. It could not claim to be responsible except to the authority 
which appointed the nominated members. 
In spite of this fact, the nomination of Senators found some 
sympathisers. While they admitted that the nominated element in the 
Senate affected its representative character, they insisted that the 
social conditions of the country necessitated the adoption of that 
system. They argued that only through nomination could the intellect- 
uals and the enlightened classes who were concentrated in big cities 
and towns, and who could not for financial reasons contest elections, 
reach the seats of the Senate.(1) In fact, as will be shown later, 
members of these classes could not attain seats in the Senate unless 
they were elevated to an upper social class which would provide 
sufficient financial backing for them to contest elections, and which 
was already adequately represented in both Houses of Parliament. 
There is no doubt that the Egyptian Senate being partially 
elected, was, to a certain extent, more representative than the 
hereditary type of second chambers where the hereditary peerage is 
handed down from father to son. It is true that the office of a 
nominated Senator was terminable on his death, on the expiry of his 
mandate, or earlier if he so desired. However, there is no escape 
from admitting that the proportion of nominated Senators was somewhat 
high, and while the second Chamber in Britain, i.e., the House of 
(1) Sabry: op.cit. p. 100; Ra) fat, W. and Ibrahim, 'J. : 
Al-Qánúriu'd-Dustúri, p. 615.. 
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Lords, has become of secondary importance and while a tendency to 
(1) 
suppress it altogether has even been observed, the Senate in 
:: gypt had almost the sane functions as had the Chamber of Deputies 
which was wholly elected by the people. It was thought and it seems 
as though nominated members of the Senate could raise obstacles in 
the face of any motion, usually such obstruction would be most 
apparent when a certain majority other than an absolute one was 
required. Thus, under the 1923 Constitution where in many cases a 
majority of two thirds of each chamber of Parliament was required for 
the ratification of certain bills and the passage of particular 
(2) 
resolutions, and where the nominated two -fifths of the Senators 
might be influenced by the authority which nominated them, or by 
personal class interest, the legislative functioning of the Senate 
could have been seriously retarded. (3) Critics, therefore, demanded 
the reduction of the proportion of nominated Senators, to, for example, 
one fourth. (4) However, and in spite of the defects of a wholly 
elected second chamber stressed by Lord Bryce as creating a competitive 
claim of equal authority and equal representative quality as the lower 
house(5 )_ the Senate in Egypt, if there should have been one at all, 
(1) Corry: op.cit. pp.99 -102; Ogg, F.A.: English government and 
politics, pp.317 et seq. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 36, 53, 54 & 157. 
(3) The influence of the nominated Senators was more powerful under 
the 1930 Constitution as they formed sixty per cent of all the 
members, and, the majority of two- thirds of each chamber of 
Parliament was required in more cases than ?it was in the 1923 
Constitution. Raafat, W.: La crisp du regime parlementaire 
en Egypte et le renforcement de l'executif, pp.15 -19. 
(4) Sabry: op.cit. pp.101 -102; 4abri: op.cit. pp.371 -374; 
Cf. Saleh: op.cit. pp. 405 -407. 
(5) Bryce: op.cit. Vol.'', pp.442 & 444 -445. 
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ought preferably to have been wholly and directly elected by the 
people on the same suffrage as were members of the Chamber of Deputies 
but in and by larger constituencies. Under the Constitution the 
partially nominated Senate enjoyed almost all the functions of the 
lower House and was considered equal to it; it was constitutionally 
as representative an organ as was the Chamber of Deputies.(1) There- 
fore, the adoption of a wholly elected second Chamber in Egypt would 
not produce such acute problems as Lord Bryce visualised. It might, 
on the contrary, have benefited the country and enabled it to get rid 
of the nominated Senators through whom there were on occasion carried 
out violations of the basic principles of representative government 
and infringements of the Constitution. 
Nominated Senators seem usually to have been selected for party 
reasons, not only to secure for the government a majority in the 
second chamber, but also to reward elderly supporters of the party. 
It seems that Egypt was one of the countries where secretly rendered 
political services or liberal contributions to party funds opened the 
door of the second chamber to those whose merits the public had 
failed to discover.(2) A study of the parliamentary debates generally 
convinces a reader that the conflict which started in 1941 between the 
Wafd and its rivals concerning the nomination of Senators, although it 
appeared to be due to differences in the interpretation of the 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art. 91. Cf. Mclver: op.cit. pp. 3$3& 385. 
(2) Ra'fat and Ibráhim: op.cit. p. 615. Cf. Laski, H.J.: A 
grammer of Politics, p. 333, where it is stated that "the 
nominated second chamber suffers from the fact that if nominated 
on party principles it is entirely noxious, and, if on the 
principle of eminent service, it does not necessarily relate the 
service it distinguishes to the political process Every 
rich man on such a Senate would be merely a reprsentative of the 
interests of prosperity. 
r 
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Constitution and to be in defence of the constitutional system, was 
in fact concerned with the attempts of each side to re- enforce its 
position and nominate its adherents to the Senate.(1) 
A short survey of the history of that conflict may be of interest. 
It began when the renewal of half the Senators was due in 1941, and 
when the government of the day because of the situation created by the 
Second World War and the existence of martial law in the country, 
judged that it was impossible to hold free elections. It adopted the 
theory that in the meantime, as nomination to the Senate which was a 
part of its renewal was quite possible, there was no reason why the 
nomination should be postponed as were the elections. This theory, 
according to which twenty -nine Senators were nominated in March 1941, 
was based on an interpretation of Art. 115 of the Constitution which 
permitted the prolongation of Senators' mandates until the election or 
nomination of new members in case difficulties arose in the way of 
the achievement of either.(2) This viewpoint of the government was 
not approved by the Wafdist Opposition which declared that although 
nomination to the Senate constituted a part of its renewal, neverthe- 
less, it was complementary and should not take place until after the 
elected members had been chosen. By so acting the government could 
then more easily choose and nominate eminent personalities of brains 
and representatives of different interests which had either not 
received any or received inadequate representation through the 
(1) Ma jlisu'aia- Shuyültl: Maim catu'l- marásimi's- sádirah fi Sanawát 
1. 1 1 2 16 1 l O. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 2: -29; Cf. R.I.I.A.: Great Britain and Egypt, 1914- 
1951, p. 67. 
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elections. In a word, the Wafd considered as unconstitutional the 
action of the government in 1941 of proceeding with the nomination of 
Senators prior to holding the elections necessary for the renewal of 
the Senate. 
(1) 
It is therefore, no wonder that the Wafd, when 
returned to power in 1942, abrogated the decree of 1941 nominating 
the Senators, and proceeded with the renewal of the Senate by holding 
elections first and then filling the nominated seats. Differences 
between the Wafd and its opponents did not stop at this. Instability 
in the formation of the Senate continued. After the dismissal of the 
Wafd in 1944, the decrees of 1941 were restored on the allegation that 
it was they that were constitutionally sound. The Wafd insisting on 
its views did not approve that action and on its return to office in 
1950 the decrees of 1942 were again brought into existence.(2) 
As formerly indicated, the differences between the Wafd and its 
opponents were not basically due to a passionate struggle of either 
side in defence of the Constitution, but rather to party competition 
to hold as many seats as possible in the Senate. The party colour of 
those who were nominated by each side may prove this. Moreover, the 
deliberations in the Senate upon the subject confirm it. In the 
sitting of July 15, 1941, the leader of the Wafdist Opposition in the 
Senate demanded an explanation from the government as to the motives 
and reasons behind the fact that while the mandate of thirteen Wafdist 
nominated Senators was terminated only one Wafdist was re- appointed. (3) 
(i) Majlisu)sh-Shuyúkh: op.cit. pp.29-32 and 34-36. 
(2) A 'r-Ráfi' i : op. cit . Vol . iT.l, pp.109-110, 147 and 31$-329. 
(3) TUiajlisu'sh-Sbuyülch: op.cit. p.39; Sabri: op.cit. pp.380-381. 
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This idea, also finds further support in the fact that the Wafdist 
government in 1950 did not consider the unconstitutionality of the 
formation of the Senate until the appearance of somewhat powerful 
opposition when an interpellation calling for inquiry into scandals 
in connection with the supply of munitions to the army and irregu- 
larities in the administration was moved in the House. Colour is 
added to this by the fact that the government had accepted and 
approved the "unconstitutional" form of the Senate for about six 
months.(1) 
Although a second chamber entrusted with functions equal to those 
of the Lower House should be thoroughly representative in character, 
this rule was disregarded in the Egyptian Constitution. Not only did 
it state that the Senate comprised a nominated element, but it also 
required all Senators, whether elected or nominated, to belong to 
certain categories of defined social classes.(2) In other words, it 
laid down the rule that Senators should be representatives of the 
landed capitalistic aristocracy, and people of distinction and wealth, 
accepted as leaders of society. Actually literature arid science were 
represented in the Senate; and truly spiritual forces were also 
represented in that chamber as the material ones were; brilliant 
jurists, military personalities, successful administrators, experienced 
proconsuls along with feudal and capitalist representatives of 
agricultural, commercial and industrial interests were found in the 
Majlisu'sh- Shuytkh: op.cit. pp. 102 -103; A >r- Ráfi°'i: op.cit. 
Vol. III, pp. 31 -325; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1950- 
1952), p. 1080$. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 78. 
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Senate; but manual labour was not represented in that institution 
and could rarely find a spokesman. Therefore, the Senate did not 
represent the people on a proportional basis in accordance with the 
relative sizes of the different social classes of the population. 
The reason for this deviation from democratic principles seems to be 
the desire to maintain a representative body in which the bourgeois 
element would have more influence than other groups, a desire which 
is a paradox to the idea that a bicameral legislature gives a wide 
chance for real and more effective representation of different 
interests and classes in the State.(1) In fact, Ramsy Muirts term 
"the common fortress of wealth"(2) applies to the Senate in Egypt as 
it does to the House of Lords in Britain. That may be due to the 
fact that landlords and directors of public companies had more seats 
in the Senate than they usually held in the Chamber of Deputies and 
that there was no great national industry whose leadership, as far as 
its capitalist side was concerned, did not find its appropriate 
representation in the Senate. 
Eligibility for membership of the Senate began at the age of 
forty.(3) This resulted in an approximate average age of Senators. 
of about fifty -five; an age which made members of the Senate tend to 
conservatism, they having probably reached a certain standard of 
living and tending to adopt a particular way of life which they would 
not easily sacrifice. Moreover, as Senators were of a certain class, 
(1) ìflajumdar: op.cit. p. 213; Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 677. 
(2) Quoted in Laski, H.J.: Parliamentary overnment in 
England, 
p. 112. 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art. 79. 
1 
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they would naturally defend the interests of that particular class. 
That may be the reason why they did not usually desire revolutionary 
changes in the structure of society, even by gradual means, and 
insisted on the maintenance of the 'status quo' by energetic activity. 
Senatorial deputation was for ten years. The Senate was a 
permanent body never to be dissolved as a whole but to be renewed by 
half every five years.(1) The Senators long term of office usually 
led to the unpopularity of their views,and indeed the Chamber of 
Deputies whose members were elected for a period of five years only, 
may be considered as having corresponded more closely than the Senate 
to the immediate expression of the people's will. The Senate might 
have presented different moods and convictions throughout the ten years 
during which the mandate of its members lasted; again, the opinion 
of the Chamber of Deputies was not in exact accord with that of the 
Senate since each of the two chambers had been formed in a different 
manner. The length of the Senators' term of office would tend to 
separate the Senate from the electorate and its views to lag behind 
those of a contemporary Chamber of Deputies.(2) Attention should be 
paid to the fact that the renewal of half the Senators every five years 
operated effectively in helping towards an understanding between both 
chambers and in overcoming such divergences of opinion as arose between 
the two Houses of Parliament since the renewal usually resulted in a 
Senate of the same political colour and tendencies as the Lower House. 
(1) Ibid. Art. 79. 
(2) Cf. Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 692 -694; Laski: A grammer of 
politics, p. 342. 
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The Constitution clarified the procedure by stipulating that the 
choice of the retiring Senators at the end of the first five years was 
to be made by the drawing of lots, and it fixed the date on which the 
mandate of the retiring members should expire to be the same day as 
the expiration of the mandate of the first Chamber of Deputies 
(October 31, 192$).(1) By this was meant that in the first Senate 
the mandate of half of its members would last for five years and that 
of the other half for ten years, and that the renewal of the Senate 
would accompany the elections for the Chamber of Deputies which were 
to take place during a suitable period prior to the third Saturday 
of November, the Constitutional date of the convocation of Parliament. 
Naturally, these provisions were conditioned, and would be void if any 
authority interfered to cut short the Constitutional term of the 
Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, its meaning and purpose seems to 
have been that the renewal of the Senate would easily and automatically 
be achieved. However, the King's interference more than once, to 
dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and the suspension of the Constitu- 
tion in 192$ during the second constitutional crisis and the replace- 
ment of this Constitution with another in 1930 created difficulties to 
the fulfilment of that provision of the Constitution and the objective 
at which it was aiming.(2) 
In spite of the infringements of the Constitution in 1928 and 
1930, it had been possible after the restoration of the 1923 Con- 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art. 162. 
(2) Al cUräbi, A.Z.: Mic.âdu I,jräLi1179urcah li'1-tadidimn-ni$fi 
fi ma.jlisi'ah-s.huyüih, p. 1 
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stitution to accomplish automatically every five years the renewal of 
half the Senators; but as the Constitution required that the number 
of the Senators should be in proportion to the number of the popula- 
tion some other complications arose. They were the outcome of the 
fact that the general census in Egypt is carried out in the seventh 
year of every decade while the renewal of the Senate took place in 
the first and sixth years. Therefore, as the census may result in 
either an increase or a decrease in the number of the population, the 
number of Senators should vary accordingly. The two censuses which 
Egypt took after 1936 showed an increase in the population each time, 
and as the number of Senators should therefore be increased, the pro- 
blem of the length of the new Senators' mandate had to be faced. 
The choice lay between the following courses, viz:- (1) whether they 
would undergo the process of the following renewal, in which case 
their mandate would be shorter than the constitutional term; or (2) 
whether a special renewal would be held for the additional members, 
an action which would result in grave complexities; or (3) whether 
their membership would be extended until the renewal of the Senate 
taking place after they have fulfilled their legal term, in which case 
their mandate would exceed the term prescribed by the Constitution.OA 
No definite rule in that matter had been laid down. After the census 
of 1937 had taken place, fifteen new Senators, six of whom were 
nominated, joined the Senate in April 1938, and for the first time the 
problem of the mandate of these Senators appeared in March 1941 when 
(1) Ibid. p. 2. 
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the renewal of the Senate was due. A line of thought to distinguish 
between the two groups of Senators, the first, those whose membership 
started in 1936, and the second, the Senators whose mandate began in 
193E!, but it was not accepted. All Senators were considered as one 
group and underwent the drawing of lots for the renewal of the Senate. 
This resulted in the mandate of those who joined the Senate in 193$ 
lasting for either three or eight years only each a period less than 
the constitutional term.(1) On the other hand, the term in office of 
those Senators who joined the Senate in 1950 in consequence of the 
increase in population recorded by the 1947 census, was extended to 
last longer than the constitutional term. It would seem that the 
only solution capable of overcoming these difficulties lay in fixing 
the number of Senators.(2) 
As already mentioned,the Senate was considered to be a permanent 
legislative organ which would never be dissolved. Let us now consider 
the extent to which the permanency of that body was observed. The 
Constitution which provided for the permanency of the Senate seems to 
have overlooked that rule when it stipulated for the adjournment of 
the Senate during the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies.(3) 
(1) Abdu'l -Wahháb, I.: Mudhakkirah fi muddati 'acdái Ma 'lisi ''sh- 
ShuyúkJ ' ani, d -dawá' iri l -lati zidat tabac an li -tai` dádi sanati 
1947, p. 4.. 
(2) The 1930 Constitution adopted this idea and fixed the number of 
Senators at one hundred (Art. 75) and although the Constitution 
did not last long enough to prove the success or failure of the 
fixation of Senators' number, the only criticism of that rule 
was that the number of Senators was inadequate to represent 
different groups and interests. 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art. 31. 
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Moreover, in practice, the continuation of the people's representa- 
tion which was the object of considering the Senate a permanent organ, 
could be interrupted through the King's interference. This actually 
occurred in 192$ when both chambers of Parliament were dissolved and 
elections for their membership, as well as nominations to the Senate 
were postponed for three years, the proposed period for the sus- 
pension of representative institutions and the Constitution.(1) 
Although that banning of Parliament was considered a reactionary 
revolution from above, yet it cannot be denied that it presented an 
illustration of a power that could interfere with the permanency of 
the Senate in contradiction of the constitutional provision. Moreover, 
that incident might have encouraged the thought in 1939 to suspend, 
and even dissolve the Senate when it reached a deadlock with the 
chamber about the imposition of death duties.(2) 
Another point to be emphasised in connection with the formation 
of the Senate and one which had been the subject of much criticism, 
was the nomination of its President by the King.(3) No one can deny 
the importance of presidents of representative institutions being 
neutral so as to act as balancing powers without partiality towards 
any political party or organisation while presiding over sittings of 
their assemblies. In some democracies presidents of legislative 
organs are usually reputed to have moderate party tendencies, and in 
other countries political parties even agree on the persons who shall 
(1) A'r- Ráfiq: op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 50 -52. 
(2) Great Britain and the East, Vol. LII, No. 1470, p. 98. 
(3) Sabry: op.cit. pp. 103 -104. 
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hold the presidencies; nevertheless in Egypt, it was the King who 
appointed the President of the Senate without any participation of 
that body. The term of the President was two years.(1) It should 
be stressed that this much criticised method of appointing the 
President of the Senate was introduced by the governmental Consultative 
Legislative Committee. The Committee of the Thirty had provided for 
the right of the King to choose the President of the Senate from three 
candidates proposed by the Senate itself, a preferable system which 
the governmental Committee during its efforts to increase the royal 
prerogatives rejected.(2) 
It seems peculiar that a legislative chamber of a representative 
character had, at least in principle, no liberty in the hoice of its 
President. The recognised rule in most modern constitutional countries 
is that any legislative organ takes part in choosing its president. 
Even in Britain where the Speaker of the House of Commons was appointed 
by the King, a tradition has developed until it has become the right 
of the House to elect its speaker. (3 ) If justification was found for 
the appointment of the Speaker of the House of Commons as being the 
link between the King and the House and getting his emoluments from the 
King's purse,(4) it is difficult to find any justification for the 
King's right in Egypt to nominate the President of the Senate. It 
seems illogical that the King, who was the head of the executive 
(1.) 1923 Constitution, Art. 50. 
(2) Sabry: op.cit. p. 103. 
(3) Porritt, E.: The unreformed House of Commons, Vol. I, pp. 433- 
434; Ogg, F.A.: English government and politics, pp. 3$0 -381; 
Ogg: F.A. and Zink, A.: Modern foreign governments. 
(4) Porritt: op.cit. pp. 433 and 436. 
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power, should appoint the President of the Senate who presided over 
meetings of the two chambers of Parliament when they met in Congress.) 
Here we are faced with a case where the national sovereignty was 
hampered by the representatives of the people being presided over by 
an officer who held his office not according to the people's will, 
but according to that of the King which might not have been at all 
in agreement with theirs. In a word, the nomination of the President 
of the Senate by the King means that the former derived his authority 
from the monarch and not from the people and their representatives; 
therefore, it seems to contradict Article 23 of the Constitution which 
enunciated that "all authorities have their source in the people." 
what were the powers of the Senate? Considering that question 
the Committee of the Thirty found itself in a position to accept 
either one of two solutions: (1) to attribute more powers and 
authority to the wholly elected Lower House of Parliament (i.e. the 
Chamber of Deputies), or (2) to confer equal powers upon both the 
Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament. One group believed that the 
position of the second chamber is secondary to the Lower House and 
adopted the view that the Senate should not have the same powers and 
functions as those attributed to the Chamber of Deputies. It alleged 
that the róle of second chambers in modern constitutions should be a 
simple one and that they should only act as a moderating influence to 
minimise the violence of conflicts which might arise between the 
executive power and the Lower House. It demanded extended competency 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art. 121. 
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for the Chamber of Deputies and stressed the concept that it only 
should have (a) the absolute right to initiate, and to make definite 
decisions in cases of difference or deadlock with the Senate, and (b) 
priority to discuss and vote on all bills which, after being ratified, 
would be transferred to the Senate.(1) On the other hand, another 
group supported the principle of parity of both chambers of Parliament 
and denounced the concept adopted by the first group as applying only 
to republics and not to monarchies. Moreover, it believed that the 
parity of both chambers of Parliament would mean the responsibility 
of ministers to the Senate which would thereby establish a double 
control on the governments actions. On these bases, that group did 
not approve of the Upper House being granted inferior functions to 
those of the Lower House.(2) 
To illustrate the fallacy of the idea that the superiority of 
the Lower House only exists in republics: the House of Lords in 
Britain, which is considered the fortress of monarchy, has yielded its 
powers to the House of Commons. It has lost its authority on money 
bills in a manner that sharply curtails its power and illustrates the 
non -existence of parity between the two Houses of Parliament.(3) 
Nevertheless, the Committee of the Thirty disregarded that clear 
precedent and adopted the principle of parity and equality of functions, 
powers and authority of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
overlooking the fact that "equal powers make eventually for deadlock, 
(1) Maädir La 'natu'l- Thaláthn, p. 35. 
(2) Ibid. p. 45. Cf. Laski: Studies in law and politics, pp. 115- 
116 . 
(3) Ogg: op.cit. pp. 51 -52. 
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and a deadlock always involves an unsatisfactory compromise of 
principle. r: (1) 
Here attention should be paid to the fact that the Constitution 
did not regard the principle of parity of both chambers of Parliament 
absolutely. The Senate was deprived of the right to initiate money 
bills and to vote on confidence in the Cabinet, two functions which 
the Chamber of Deputies practised. It may be said that the Committee 
of the Thirty deprived both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of 
the right to undertake the creation of new taxes or the increase of 
existing ones, making it an abolsute right of the executive power, and 
that the governmental Committee introduced the system which was 
established by the Constitution. Although this objection may have 
some value, yet one ought not to forget that the Committee of the 
Thirty was wholly responsible for the provisions granting priority to 
the Chamber of Deputies to discuss and approve the Budget; a real 
(2) 
privilege as it comprised debates on the policy of the whole country. 
The Senate's constitutional powers can be divided into two 
functions: first, its primary function as a branch of the legis- 
lative power, and second, its control over the government. Now let 
us see how the Senate worked in each of its functions. 
I. The Legrislative Function. 
As explained in the third chapter of this work, the legislative 
(1) Laski: A grammer of politics, p. 228. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 139; Sabry: op.cit. p. 119. 
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power in Egypt was a compound one. The Senate constituted a branch 
of the legislature possessing, in legal theory, co- ordinate authority 
with the other two branches of that power.(1) "The main end for 
which a Senate is constructed," said Henry Sidgwick, "(is) that all 
legislative measures may receive a second consideration by a body 
different in character from the primary representative assembly. "(2) 
The legislative function of the Senate in Egypt comprised its right 
to initiate legislation and to revise and amend bills emanating from 
the Chamber of Deputies and the executive power. 
It seems necessary before proceeding in our study of the legis- 
lative functions of the Senate to notice that in the Egyptian Parlia- 
ment (the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies), as in most parliamentary 
institutions of world democracies, the basic part of its function was 
carried out by standing committees. The growing amount of legislation 
which must be enacted to meet the demands of a modern State puts an 
increasing burdon on its legislature. Not only the question of time, 
but also the sheer size of the legislative organs have necessitated 
the formation of parliamentary standing committees. Moreover, parlia- 
ments being too large for effective deliberations, an increasing 
reliance on standing committees, not only to divide the labour and 
save time, but also to provide for more effective discussions has been 
noticed. (3 ) 
(1) Sabry: op.cit. pp. 41 and 91 -96. 
(2) Quoted by Marriott, J.A.R.: Second Chambers, p. 227. 
(3) i,larriott: The mechanism of the modern State, Vol. I, pp. 578- 
579; Corry: op.cit. p. 109; Barker: op.cit. 
pp. 212 -214. It 
is interesting to note that the standing committees system in 
Egypt was similar to that introduced into the House of Commons by 
the end of the nineteenth century, see Finer: op.cit. 
Vol. II, 
pp. 804 -810. 
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In Egypt, in both chaibers of Parliament, standing committees 
for each of the important recurring subjects of legislation were found. 
Their number in each chamber varied from time to time as the legis- 
lative organ itself had the authority to create new standing 
committees, dispense with older ones and amalgamate two or more into 
one. 
(1) 
In the Senate each of the standing committees was made up of 
eleven members except the standing committee of finance which wad . 
composed of nineteen; and again, the Senate could introduce any mod- 
ification of that number. (2) The term of the membership of standing 
committees was five years and the election to one took place after 
every renewal of the Senate. Every senator was entitled to become a 
member of any standing committee he liked on condition that he did 
not join inore than three, and those who participated in the standing 
(1) Majlisuash- Shuyúl : AI- Lá'ikiatu kl- dEkhilivah, Art.59; Majlisu'n 
Nuwwáb: -11 -Lá sikzatuad- dachilivah Art.48. According to these 
two articles, nineteen principal standing committees existed in 
each chamber of Parliament. Cf. Majlisu'n- Nuwwäb: Mahádir0l- 
Jalasat, IX -i, S.3, p.l. 
(2) 1Ia jlisu 'sh -Shuyi kh: op. cit . Art.60. Although this part of the 
work is d voted to the second chamber, yet because of the simil- 
arity of the procedure used in the chamber of Deputies to that of 
the Senate, it is preferable to note here that the number of 
members of Standing committees in the Chamber of Deputies had Witt 
a few exceptions, been prior to January 1950, twenty -one. This 
exception includes the Committees of the Constitutional Affairs, 
Cotton Affairs, and the Sudan Affairs, each of which was formed 
of nine members, and the standing committee of Accounts which was 
formed of seven members. Majlisu'n- Nuwwäb: A1- Lá'hatud- da"khili- 
yah, Art.48.' When the number of the Deputies incrèased in accoru- 
ance with the increase of the population the number of members of 
standing committees was raised to be twenty -four. MajlisuPn- 
Nuwwäb: Mahádiru 3- Jalasat, X -i, S.3, p.9. 
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committee of finance could join only one other committee.(1) Like 
the French usage, and unlike the Anglo- American practice, each 
Committee at the beginning of every ordinary session elected its 
chairman and secretary.(2) They were usually members of the majority 
party, or independents known to support, and being backed by,the 
majority, and frequently the chairman was a member of the committee 
who had had a long membership in it. Although the minutes of such 
committees have not been made public, it seems that the chairman 
exercised a powerful influence on its deliberations. 
One of the important functions of a legislative organ is "the 
initiation of bills dealing with subjects of non -controversial 
character which may have an easier passage through the (other) House 
if they have been fully discussed and put into a well considered shape 
before being submitted to it. "(3) The initiative power of the Senate 
was equal to that of the Chamber of Deputies subject to one important 
exception: the initiation of laws creating new taxes or increasing 
existing ones was, as in every democracy, a reserved and absolute 
right of the King and the Lower House. (4) Although the Constitution 
(1) Majlisugh- Shuyúkh: op.cit. Arts. 59 &63. In the Chamber of 
Deputies the formation of standing committees occurred at the 
beginning of every ordinary session, and every Deputy was not 
entitled to be a member of more than two committees. Majlisu'nm 
Nuww b: Al -Lä ihatu'd- dàkhiliyah, Arts. 52 & 49 
(2) Majlisu'sh- Shuÿukh: op.cit. Art. 64; Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. 
Art. 52. Cf. Ogg: European governments and politics, p. 558. 
(3) Lees -Smith, H.B.: Second Chambers in theory and practice, p. 33, 
quoted from the report of the Conference on the Reform of the 
Second Chamber, p. 4. 
(4) 1923 Constitution, Art. 28; Cf. McIver: op.cit. p. 385; 
also 
the 1930 Constitution according to which the King only (the head 
of the executive power) had the absolute right to initiate 
financial legislation and money bills. 
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did not grant the Senators an initiative power regarding the creation 
or increase of taxes, it was disputeable whether or not they could 
acquire that right when it was aimed at reducing taxes.(1) Moreover, 
what were the powers of the Senate with regard to the bills emanating 
from the Chamber of Deputies or from the executive power creating 
taxes or increasing them? Could it introduce amendments to such 
bills? 
On that point two schools of thought existed. The first, which 
aimed at maintaining a weak Senate, inferior to the Chamber of 
Deputies, adopted the theory embodied in Article 2$ of the Constitutior 
which said: "To the King, to the Senate, and to the Chamber of 
Deputies shall be given the right to initiate all laws with the 
exception of those imposing or increasing taxation, the right of 
initiation of which shall reside in the King and in the Chamber of 
Deputies." (2) The Senate, therefore, should not participate in any 
action which had the character of initiation of new taxes or an 
increase in them. Considering the Senate's right to introduce 
amendments into bills which emanated from the other Chamber or the 
executive creating or increasing taxes, a right of initiation, this 
group did not accept the theory that the Senate could amend such bills. 
On the other hand, another group, in order to strengthen the authority 
of the Senate, interpreted the French text of Article 28 of the Con- 
stitution which ran: "L'iniative des lois appartient au Roi, au Senat 
et á la Chambre des Députés. Néamoins, la création dun nouvel impót 
(1) Sabry: op.cit. p. 138. 
(2) This is the translation of the Arabic text of that article. 
See Appendix I. 
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ou l'augmentation d'un impót existant ne pent avoir lieu que sur 
l'initiative du Roi et de la Chambre des Députés, "(1) to mean that 
the Senate had as much right as the Chamber of Deputies to amend 
bills concerning the imposition of taxes. 
This divergence of views occurred in 1935 when the Senate was 
discussing a governmental bill creating a new tax on the Returns of 
Personal (Moveable) Property and trying to raise the ratio of that 
tax. In spite of the opposition of the chamber of Deputies to the 
latter interpretation of Article 25 of the Constitution which gave 
the Senate the right to amend bills concerning taxation, the govern- 
ment supported that point of view; and since then the Senate had 
acquired the right to change the ratio of taxes proposed by the 
government or the Chamber of Deputies and to amend the bills dealing 
with taxation.(2) Moreover, the Chamber yielded and accepted the 
'de facto' status of the Senate which allowed that latter legislative 
organ to exceed the boundaries of its rights as laid down by the 
Constitution. In other words, the Senate acquired a new perrogative, 
namely to discuss and amend money bills. Examples to show the 
practice of that newly acquired right by the Senate are numerous. 
It is sufficient, however, to point out that after the passage of the 
following taxes in the Chamber of Deputies, they were amended by the 
Senate and returned to the Chamber for reconsideration, and that 
latter body accepted the views of the Senate. These taxes were: 
(1) See Davis: op.cit. p. 21. 
(2) A'r-Rifá`i, A.H.: Aki-dariïbu`1-mubáshirah, pp. 205-209; 
Sabri: op.cit. pp. 399-400. 
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the modification of the taxes on industrial and commercial profits 
in 1944, on the income from work in 1944,(1) the amendment of the 
additional tax in 1944, (2) and the progressive income tax in 1951.(3) 
"The rules of procedure of parliamentary bodies have a vital 
significance in the operation of democracy. They affect the 
whole process of democratic discussion in its most crucial stage - 
the stage of parliamentary debate and discussion. "(4) The purpose 
of the procedure is commonly to enable the will or the opinion of a 
parliamentary assembly to be focussed and clearly expressed. Let 
us now examine the procedure of initiating bills. It differed 
according to whether the proposal of legislation arose from the 
government or from a member of Parliament.(5) 
Governmental bills which derived their name in Arabic 
(Nashrú Q nun) from the French term "projet de loi" were always 
presented in the form of a decree signed by the King and counter- 
signed by the competent ministers to the President of either of the 
two chambers of Parliament who usually announced them at the follow- 
ing sitting. These bills were then transferred to one of the parlia- 
mentary standing committees to be examined and reported on before 
being put under consideration.(6) 
(1) La Chambre des députés: op.cit. VIII -iii, S. 33, p. )14. 
(2) Ibid VIII -iii, S. 54, P. 434. 
(3) Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: Mahädiru`1- Jalasát, X -ii, S.44, pp. 10 x 44. 
(4) Barker: op.cit. p. 210. 
(5) Although this Chapter is about the Senate, attention is drawn 
to the fact that the procedure in both the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies was alike, and therefore, the study of the 
procedure in this part is applicable to both Chambers of Parlia- 
ment unless otherwise mentioned. 
(6) 1923 Constitution, Art. 102; Niajlisu'shShuyúkb: op.cit. Art. 
127; Majlisu'n- Nuwwàb: Al- La'ihatu)d- dákhiliyah, Art. 94. 
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Private members' bills which got their Arabic name 
C Igtráh bi- Qänün) from the French "proposition de loi" followed 
another line of procedure. They were presented to the President of 
the chamber accompanied with an explanatory note. Such bills were 
transferred to a special standing committee (La.7natu)l- Igtr háti 
wa'l- (Ará'id, Committee of propositions and petitions) which examined 
their validity for consideration and presented its report on their 
adoption or rejection within fifteen days. If a private members' 
bill was judged valid and accepted by the chamber, it then followed 
the same procedure as any bill initiated by the government.(l) 
That difference in the procedure may be explained by the fact 
that governmental bills were usually profoundly studied and always 
deserved the attention of Parliament,(2) while those initiated by 
private members were deemed to be less thoroughly worked out and 
documented; and accordingly out to be examined by a competent 
committee prior to their submission for deliberation. Moreover, the 
government, which was considered to represent the parliamentary 
majority, should adopt the same political trend prevailing in Parlia- 
ment, and that consequently, governmental bills would follow that 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art. 103; Majlisu ash.- Shuyakh: op.cit. Arts. 
12$ & 130; Majlisu 'n- Nuw'wab: op.cit. Arts. 111, 113 & 114. 
(2) The Council of the State which is an institution formed on the 
French pattern of the "Counseil d'Etat" undertook to study and 
draft governmental bills in the legal and constitutional form. 
Besides its principal function of serving as chief administrative 
court, the council of the State comprises a department which 
provides technical and legal advice to ministers on matters 
dealing with orders and decrees. Khalil, U.: Al -^an nu l -Idári 
Vol. II, Ma.ilisu'd- Dawlah, pp. 16 et seq. Prior to the founda- 
tion of the Council of the State in 1946, the State Legal Ser- 
vices undertook to form and study governmental bills before their 
being presented to Parliament. Ra'fat, W.: Al- Qànúnu'l- Idári, 
pp. 490- 499. 
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trend; whereas a single member might be out of sympathy with the 
general policy of Parliament and opposition to his bill might pro- 
voke conflicts of opinion and fetter the working of the legislative 
organ.(1) Again that difference of procedure may be further ex- 
plained as being a means of proving the validity of the concept that 
"Parliament cannot properly legislate without the guidance of those 
(2) 
who are responsible for the execution of its legislation." 
A private members' bill should not be presented and signed by 
more than ten members of Parliament . (3 ) This provision seems to have 
been a precaution taken to avoid the moulding of an opinion about the 
bill prior to its adoption or rejection, and to recognise the influ- 
ence of a great number of members who might group together to defend 
the bill in an organised way before the deliberations about it took 
piace.(4) However, members of Parliament were usually influenced 
by the policy of the political group or party to which they belonged, 
and consequently their stand in Parliament was in compliance with 
such policy.(5) 
To complete the study of the right of initiative conferred on 
members of Parliament one notes that they had in addition to their 
(1) Kámil, F.: Al- awdá`u)l- barlamániyah, pp. 6e -73 & 7$ -$1; Sabry: 
op.cit. pp. 116 -118. 
(2) Barker: op.cit. p. 47. 
(3) Majlisu .'sh- Shuyukh: op.cit. Art. 12$; Majlisu)n- Nuwwáb: op. 
cit. Art. 112. 
(4) Kámil: op.cit. p. 72. 
(5) It is of interest to note that in July 1951 a private member's 
bill was presented to the Chamber of Deputies having the effect 
of restricting the freedom of the Press. In spite of the fact 
that the Wafd, the Party in office and holding the majority in 
the Chamber, was in favour of that bill, to the extent that 
gossip and rumours, which later proved to be true, were circulated 
that the leadership of that party was behind that bill, a grouping 
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right to initiate legislation, the competency to initiate resolu- 
tions. Resolutions did not have the effect of laws. They were 
adopted by a single chamber of Parliament once a majority of its 
members voted in favour of their adoption, while laws had to be 
ratified by both chambers and obtain the sanction of the King. 
Although resolutions were not, on the whole, of a legislative 
character, yet some important repercussions of resolutions could not 
be denied. Resolutions were usually either administrative or 
political. The administrative type were resolutions such as those 
concerned with the Rules of Procedure of the House of Parliament, 
and the validity and regularity of membership of members of Parlia- 
ment. Resolutions of a political character were for example the 
judgment that the Constitution required an amendment, a call on the 
government to carry out a certain function, the impeachment of 
ministers and the vote of confidence in the Cabinet by the Chamber 
of Deputies. The procedure of initiating resolutions was similar 
to that of initiating private members' bills.(1) 
Members of Parliament who presented private members' bills or 
initiated resolutions could withdraw them, even during the delibera- 
tions on them, unless they were held up by one or more of the other 
members. (2) The question which may arise now is: what was the effect 
= of some Wafdist Deputies opposed and succeeded to persuade the 
Chamber to reject the bill. Al- Ahrám, July 31 and August 1, 
1951; A ,,r- Ráfi "i: op.cit. Vol.. III, p. 302; Al- Baráwi, A.: 
Harakatu_ >1- Ingilábi'l -Akhir fi Misr, p. 171. 
(1) 1923 Constitution Arts 156, 157, 66 & 95; Kamil: op.cit. pp.58- 
59; Majlisu'sh- SSiuyil%11: op.cit. Art. 131; Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: 
op.cit. Art. 107; Shafiq: Háwliyát, Vol. I, pp. 18$ -190. 
(2) Majlisu sh- Shuÿükh: op.cit. Art. 134.; MajlisuOn- Nuwwáb: op. 
cit. Art. 115. 
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of the closure of parliamentary sessions, and the renewal of the 
Senate on bills and initiated resolutions presented to Parliament 
but not voted. In principle, they remained valid till they were 
voted, unless they were withdrawn by those who had presented them. 
Therefore, the closure of the session did not have the slightest 
effect on them. Each of the two chambers of Parliament resumed in 
the following session consideration of the bills and initiated 
resolutions which it could not examine during the past session. 
Parliamentary tradition necessitated that members who presented them, 
should confirm their intention to maintain them. On the contrary, 
as the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure were silent about the 
effect of the renewal of the Senate (and the dissolution of the 
Chamber of Deputies) the parliamentary custom was to consider bills 
and resolutions not voted before the renewal (and the dissolution) 
as non -existent and for their revival they needed to go through the 
. usual procedure. 
(1) 
The principal element in parliamentary procedure was that all 
bills must be referred to one or other of the series of parliamentary 
standing committees, and that no decisive debate was possible until 
the committee had reported.(2) All then depended on the standing 
(1) ivajlisu'sh- Sruyú.kh:_op. cit. Arts 59 & 159; Idajlisu n- Nuwwáb: 
op.cit. Art.115; Kamil: op.cit. pp.75 -78; Sabry: op.cit. pp. 
1l8-119. Cf. La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VIII -i, S.l, p.4. 
After the return of the ráafd to office in 1942 "all bills which 
were not definitely voted by the two chambers of Parliament 
were withdrawn." The renewal of the Senate or general elections 
usually resulted in political bodies different in partisan :colour 
and tendencies than those which preceded them. Therefore, the 
withdrawal of un -voted bills might be explained as being an 
attempt to avoid critical clÿshes and differences in the legis -' 
lative organs. Also viajlisu n- Nuwwab: Mabádiru l- Jalasát, 
IX-i, S.6, p.2. 
(2) It is worth noticing that in cases of urgency this step of the 
procedure to refer a bill to one of the standing committees was 
3 43 . 
committee, and the power of the cliamber to compel it to present its 
report on the matter. The rules of parliamentary procedure allowed 
the maximum time of a month for any standing committee on any matter 
which was remitted to it for examination, unless otherwise decided. 
If a committee did not present its report within the fixed period, 
it was the President's right to enquire into the reasons for the 
delay and to let them be known to the House which had the right to 
extend the period. After the expiry of the extension, any member of 
Parliament could demand the matter to be put on the Order of the Day; 
and parliamentary usage was to count the lapse of time starting from 
the date when the committee could actually begin its work. 
(1) 
Here, 
it can be noticed that the inability of committees to attend to 
every bill that came before them because of their large number 
dispensed with, I ajlisu'sh- Shuyïzh: op.cit. Art.127. It was 
the President who could judge the cases of urgency, and so often 
he decided that. Some criticism was raised but it did not 
reach any effective result. ,abr, A.: p'Ta dlu nizámi 
ma.ilisu'd- dawlah." 
Cf. The case when in the Chamber of Deputies in February 1945 a 
proposed resolution of non -confidence in the Wafdist President 
of the Audit Department was discussed. In spite of some weak 
opposition against the attitude of the majority and the govern- 
ment, the Chamber decided to discuss the matter without referr- 
ing it to any of the standing committees. La Chambre des 
Députes: op.cit. IX -i, S.6, pp.2 -3. 
(1) Majlisu'sh- Shuyükh: agp.cit. Art.153 ;. Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: 
Al- Là7ihatui.- dákhilivah, Art.66; Kamil: op.cit. p.107. 
Cf. I-ïajlisun- Nuwwáb: i ahadiru)l- Jalasat, IX -v, S.21, p.759. 
When a Deputy protested because of the delay of the Committee 
of Propositions and Petitions to report on a private member's 
bill which he had initiated, the only course taken by the 
Chamber was to ask that particular standing committee to 
explain the reasons for that delay. 
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offered a good opportunity to let the undesirable bills, especially 
private members bills, die. At the same time, however, any single 
member of Parliament could start a discussion about any delayed bill 
and bring it in front of the Chamber to be deliberated and a vote 
taken on it. 
One may now consider the competency of either of the two 
chambers of Parliament to compel the other to take urgent measures 
in discussing a certain bill. It was a constitutional principle 
that neither of the two chambers had any direct power to criticise 
the work, the procedure, or the members of the other.(1) The funda- 
mental principle of the Rules of Procedure was that the legislature 
had inherent power to preserve itself and to prevent interferences 
with its lawmaking process, dignity and independence. Therefore, 
either of the two chambers could exercise only the psychological 
power of demonstrations to influence the ministers who had the right 
to speak in both houses of Parliament. Such demonstrations might 
develop into a resolution passed by one of the two chambers begging 
the government to urge the other chamber to proceed in the discussion 
of a certain bill. One ought not to forget that a bill judged by 
either of the two chambers as being significant and urgent, could 
not escape the usual procedure unless a similar resolution was taken 
by the other chamber.(2) 
1 Kámil: op.cit. p. 2 4 
(2) Ibid. pp. 160 -165; Sabry: op.cit. p. 122. 
3f. The legislation regarding the foundation of the post of 
Commander -in -Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1951. It was 
discussed and voted as an urgent matter, on the request of the 
government, after a resolution to that effect had been passed in 
each of the two chambers. Majlisuan- Nuwwäb: op.cit. X -i, S.3, 
pp. 15 -17. 
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Once a bill, whether governmental or private members', was 
transferred to a committee, the committee proceeded to discuss that 
subject and ought to report on it, as explained above, within a 
month. It might happen that a certain bill was the subject of 
interest for more than one standing committee. In this case it was 
referred to the committee most closely concerned in the matter to 
be discussed and reported on, the other committees giving the 
chamber the benefit of their observations; or it was referred to 
all the committees concerned, which met as one committee electing 
its own chairman and secretary.(1) 
To facilitate its job, a standing committee could seek the 
advice and help of experts from outside, and invite competent 
ministers, their representatives and the author of a private members 
bill to attend its meeting in a consultative capacity. The author 
of a private member's bill could participate in the deliberations of 
the committee and explain his views, but should retire whenever the 
committee voted.(2) Although meetings of standing committees were 
usually held in camera, members of the chamber who were not members 
of the committee could attend its meetings on condition that, unlike 
the author of a private member's bill, they should not participate 
or interfere in the deliberations of the committee, and, like him, 
should retire whenever votes were taken.(3) For the effectiveness of 
a committee's decision, a quorum of five of its members was required 
NIa jlisu's.h-Shuÿukh: op.cit. 
Ibid. Arts. 145, 147 & 149; 
dákhiliyah, Art. 61. 
Itilajlisu'sh-huyükh: op.cit. 
op.cit. Arts. 60 & 61. 
Arts. 127 & 65. 
Niajlisu'n-Nuwwäb: A1-La'ihatu'd- 
Arts. 144 & 145; Nlajlisún-Nuwwáb: 
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at its meetings. Decisions were reached by absolute majority, and 
in case of equality of votes on both sides, the chairman of the 
committee gave the casting vote, on condition that this should be 
mentioned in the committee's report.(1) 
When a bill was taken up by a standing committee, the first 
step was to designate one of its members as the reporter whose duty 
was to shoulder the responsibility of preparing the committee's 
report on the bill and of defending and explaining it in the 
chamber.(2) This was similar to the method adopted in the French 
Parliament of the Third Republic, and unlike that adopted in the 
American Congress where the chairman of the committee undertakes to 
manage and report on every bill taken up by the committee. (3) In 
case the reporter was absent from the sitting of the chamber during 
which deliberations on the report took place, the members of the 
committee attending that sitting appointed one of themselves to 
replace the absentee. Although parliamentary traditions were that 
the reporter should represent the viewpoint of the majority of the 
committee, in certain cases where a powerful minority Was found two 
reporters were designated by the committee to represent the views of 
both the majority and the minority and expound them to the Chamber.4) 
(1) Majlisu'sh- Shuyükh: op.cit. Arts. 144 & 154. The quorum 
required for the effectiveness of the meetings of standing 
committees in the Chamber of Deputies was one third of their 
members. Majlisu°'n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. Art. 56. 
(2) Majlisush- Shuyukh: op.cit. Art. 156; Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: 
op.cit. Art. 65. 
(3) Ogg: European governments and politics, p. 559. 
(4) Majlisu''gh- huyu ,h: ,op.cit. Art. 156; Nlajlisu' h- ShuyUkh: 
Al- iláihatu'd- Dákhi.liyah ria` a >l- Mabádi1 wa't -t ligt, p7-262. 
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Meetings of standing committees were held, as mentioned above, 
in camera. A permanent staff was attached to each of these 
committees not so much in order that the public would be provided 
with full reports about the functioning of the committees, but 
because the presence of such a staff would fix responsibility,define 
arguments and stimulate a collective and personal interest in the 
work. However, the minutes of such meetings were kept secret, and 
the Public was not admitted to any meeting. Therefore, it is rather 
difficult to assess the inter- relations between the parliamentary 
standing committees and other official bodies especially the Cabinet 
and the chamber. Such inter -relations influence, and therefore, are 
important in the study of the working of parliamentary institutions. 
However, the reports of the standing committees may provide some 
source of information in that respect. These reports contained 
occasionally some indication of the influence exerted by the Cabinet 
(1) 
and individual ministers on the committees. As regards the 
relation between the chamber and its committees, it seems that since 
(1) (a) During the deliberations on the 1941 -42 Budget, there existed 
differences between the Chamber of Deputies and the Cabinet. 
The Committee of Finance supported the viewpoint held by the 
Cabinet, and to this fact reference was made in the address given 
by Abdul Rahman l- Bialy, the chairman of that committee. 
La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VII -iv, S.31, pp.241 -245. 
(b) See Ibid. VIII -ii, S.5, cp.57 -60. The Committee of Justice 
agreed to the viewpoint of the Cabinet with regard to legislation 
providing for the amnesty of Political crimes. Moreover, it 
insisted on these views in the chamber despite some opposition 
found in the chamber against the attitude of both the Cabinet 
and the Committee. 
(c) Very often the committees introduced some amendments into 
legislation presented to them. When these amendments were of 
significance, the report of the committee usually referred to 
them as had been approved by the Cabinet. For example: ibid. 
VIII -iii, 5.33, p.313. 
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the house of Parliament was the main legislative organ, and the 
committees were merely a means to facilitate the working of Parlia- 
ment, the dominant authority was, therefore, the chamber. 
When a committee completed its report on a certain bill, it 
presented that report to the President of the chamber who listed 
it on the Order of the Day of the next sitting. Once the committee 
stage of a bill was passed, the report along with the text of the 
bill and an explanatory note had to be distributed among members of 
the house forty -eight hours before the debate.(1) The reports were 
usually composed of the following elements: a written history of 
the problem, an analysis of the immediate social situation which had 
evoked parliamentary action, a critical description of earlier legis- 
lative proposals, a critical examination of the project before 
the committee, and its recommendations. There is no doubt that such 
a report in the hands of the member of Parliament, if he cared to 
make use of it, offered him a sound basis for participation in the 
debate. Therefore, it is no wonder. that frequently members of 
Parliament criticized the negligence, and the delay of the distribu- 
tion of these reports; and very often debates were postponed for 
that very reason. 
Before a debate on any bill was commenced, its text and the 
standing committee's report on it were required to be read. This 
part of the procedure was dispensed with, and usually it was con- 
sidered sufficient to cite the text of the bill and the report of the 
(1) PZajlisudsh-Shúyúkh: Al-T;-P:i:hatud-17àkhiliyah, Art. 162; 
Najlisu)n-Nuwwáb: Al-L'ä)ihatu ,d-J°akhiliyah, Art. 62. 
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standing committee on it in the minutes of the debates. Then, first 
of all, a discussion on the nature and objects of the bill in general 
took place. A vote on whether the chamber desired to proceed to 
discuss the bill article by article was necessary. If the vote was 
negative, the bill was dead until it would be renewed not earlier 
than the following parliamentary session.(1) If, however, the 
decision was favourable, consideration of the bill in detail proceed- 
ed. Even legislation required by the Constitution was not exempted 
from that part of the procedure which was considered a first reading 
of the bill, i.e., from a vote on the nature and objects of the bill 
in general. For instance, when the Senate began its discussion in 
May 1924 on .a bill fixing the emolument of members of Parliament, in 
spite of the fact that the Constitution in Article ll$ provided for 
such emolument being fixed in due course by ál.aw, the Senate, although 
there was some objection, voted on the bill in principle before 
proceeding to debate it in detail.(2) Precedents are found, how- 
ever, for the practice that in cases of urgency and according to 
decisions taken by the chamber, that particular part of the pro- 
cedure might be dispensed with.(3) 
Once the chamber had voted in favour of a bill on the first 
reading, it proceeded to examine, discuss and vote on it in detail, 
Ma j l i s u,s h- Sh uÿukYa : o. c it 
op.cit. Arts. 116 & 9. 




. Arts. 133 s 135; i:iajlisu n-Nuwwab: 
ihatud-dakhili ah 142. a`1-i,ïab.ádi 
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i.e., article by article. This was considered a second reading of 
the bill, and was in accordance with the provisions of Article 104 
of the Constitution, which necessitated for the passage of any bill 
that it should be voted on clause by clause. The ratification of 
any bill was definite after being approved in the third reading which 
could not take place before the lapse of three days after the second 
reading.(1) This provision seems to be both legitimate and prudent. 
Decisions of Parliament being applicable to all the people, they 
should be taken only after long and deep reflection and consideration. 
The interval between the second and third readings of a bill may 
appear as a guarantee against hasty decisions taken in Parliament, 
but it seems to be more effective in a unicameral parliamentary system 
than in a bicameral one, where the second chamber is considered to be 
a. check on and control over the hasty actions of the lower house. In 
cases of urgency, however, the Senate decided to proceed to the third 
reading of a bill without the lapse of the three days. Moreover, 
it carried on with the three readings or the last two of some bills 
at one sitting; examples of such cases are numerous in the parlia- 
mentary history of Egypt.(2) 
(1) Ma j li su' sh- Shuyúkh : Al -Lá' ilia tu 'd- dákhiliyah, Art. 175; in the 
Chamber of Deputies, bills were to be read only once unless the 
reporter of the standing committee or the cabinet asked for 
another.. The definite vote on a bill could not be taken except 
after the lapse of four days from the debate on it. Ma jlisu'n- 
Nuwwáb: op.cit. Arts. 95, 100 and 101. 
(2) Maj li su sh- uy íih: Al -Lä -i1atu `d- dákhiliyah Ma' a ' 1- Mabádi` wa=' t- 
ta ligat, pp. 341 -344. 
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It was only after the bill had been adopted, i.e., after being 
read for the first time, and not before, that amendments were in 
order. Amendments proposed by members of Parliament had to be 
presented in writing to the President of the chamber. Although some 
amendments might be discussed by the chamber without being referred 
to the standing committee which had examined and reported on the bill, 
a bill materially altered by amendments was likely to be sent back 
to the committee for examination and revision before it was finally 
passed. It is important to note that the reference of amended bills 
to the competent standing committees had to be recognised whenever it 
-,,as demanded by the government, the chairman of the committee or the 
reporter of that committee which had reported on the bill. The debate 
was usually suspended until the committee could consider the amend- 
ments, although sometimes, if the amendments affected only a minor 
part of the bill, the members could continue their debate.(1) 
Closure of the debate was pronounced by the President of the 
chamber when no member demanded the floor. When there were members 
who wished to express their views, the closure was not applied unless 
a motion was raised by the President or ten members, and the chamber 
by a majority of votes accepted it.(2) Some critics considered these 
provisions inadequate to guarantee the freedom of debate, and demanded 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art. 104; Majlisu sh- Shuyükh: Al- Lä'ihatu`d- 
dákhilivah, Arts. 157 and 165; Majlisu'n- Nuwwäb: op.cit. 
Arts. 97, 95 and 99. 
(2) Majlisu'sh -Shuyü h: op.cit. Arts. 176, 177 & 175; Majlisu'n- 
Nuwwáb: op.cit. Art. 42. Attention should be paid that twenty 
was the number of Deputies required in the Chamber of Deputies 
to move a motion for the closure of the discussion. 
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the application of the old French system which had required two 
persons of opposing views to have a chance to speak on the matter 
before the closure of the debate was pronounced as a measure of 
ensuring that different views would be heard in Parliament.(1) 
The closure of the debate on a bill was followed by the taking 
of a vote on it. The rules provided for three ways of taking a vote, 
all of which were directed by the President. The most common ways 
were the mass oral voting and the rising vote. Usually the oral vote 
was put into practice when the attitude of the chamber was clear. In 
case of doubt about the result of an oral vote, the vote could be re- 
taken according to the rising method voting being expressed by the 
sitting and standing of members. If there still existed doubt about 
the result reached through the sitting and standing of members, a vote 
taken in reverse manner was necessary to confirm the conclusion which 
the chamber had reached. Moreover, in case none of the above - 
mentioned methods of voting proved sufficient to show the will and 
real inclination of the chamber, and in cases stipulated for by the 
Constitution and the Rules of the Procedure, the third way of taking 
a vote, namely by calling the names, was necessary. It is important 
to notice that the Egyptian Parliament did not use as a means of 
(2) 
voting the lobby method, familiar in the House of Commons in Britain. 
1 Kámil: op.cit. p. l 0, Cf. Ogg: op.cit. pp. 502 -563. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 101; Majlisu'sh- Shuyukh: op.cit. 
Arts. 1$7 -191; Majlisu' n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. Arts. 12$ -131; 
Kämil: op.cit. pp. 223 -230. 
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Before discussing the consequences of the ratification or 
rejection of a bill by the Senate, one should notice that great care 
was taken to prevent the two chambers of Parliament debating one 
subject simultaneously. Moreover, synonymous or nearly synonymous 
resolutions concerning a bill under discussion in either of the two 
chambers could not be taken in the other until the first had concluded 
its debate on the bill.(1) After being voted by the Senate, all bills 
whether governmental or private members', were conveyed by the 
President to the President of the Chamber of Deputies if they had 
been (a) initiated by Senators, or (b) presented by the government 
to the Senate prior to their presentation to the Chamber of Deputies, 
or (c) amended by the Senate after being previously approved by the 
Chamber of Deputies. If a bill passed by the Chamber of Deputies, 
was ratified by the Senate without being amended, the President of 
the Senate conveyed it through the competent minister to the King to 
get the latter's sanction.(2) 
This was the procedure with a bill which had the ratification 
of both chambers of Parliament; but what would be the situation if 
differences occurred in the voting of the two chambers on a particular 
bill, whether because of the introduction of amehdments or its 
rejection by one of the two chambers? The principle was that the two 
(1) Majlisu'sh-Shuyúh: op.cit. Art. 163; Majlisun-Nuwtrräb: -, 
op.cit. kit. 140; Majlisu'sh-Shuyizkh: Al-há'inatu'd-däkhili Tat 
Ma` al-Mabádi' wat-ta liát, pp. 422 et seq. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 34 & 105; Ma j li su'sh-Shuÿúkh : Al- 
312ihatu'd-dákhiliyah, Arts. 195 & 196. 
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chambers of Parliament were equal in power and both should approve 
every bill before it became a law. Therefore, when a deadlock 
between the two chambers of Parliament occurred, some compromise 
acceptable to both was to be sought; otherwise the bill would die. 
In the Committee of the Thirty, two successive proposals to end 
deadlocks which might occur between the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies were presented. First, it was suggested that the Chamber of 
Deputies should have superiority over the second chamber and that once 
the two chambers disagreed on a legislative subject and the Chamber 
of Deputies re- considered it and approved it by a majority of two 
thirds, that subject should be considered ratified by Parliament. 
When this proposal was rejected, another was offered which aimed at 
giving the Chamber of Deputies the right to dissolve itself whenever 
it came to a deadlock with the Senate on legislative matters on 
condition that two -thirds of the Deputies should so demand. The 
matter under dispute would then be settled if a newly elected Chamber 
of Deputies ratified it in spite of resistance and objections in the 
Senate. Again this second suggestion was rejected on the same 
grounds as the first: they were considered to be contradictory to the 
principle of parity of the two chambers of Parliament and an attempt 
(1) 
to annihilate the power of the Senate. The attitude of the 
Committee of the Thirty was criticised because the application of the 
second proposal would not hamper the equality between the Sedate and 
the Chamber of Deputies. It involved the sacrifice of the Deputies 
p. 95. (1) MaháGlir La.inatu'1-Thaläth?ni 
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when they would prefer consulting the people on a vital bill to 
retaining their seats. In such a case, when a new Chamber of 
Deputies would give a definite vote on a disputed bill, the superior- 
ity would not be to the Chamber of Deputies, but to the people who 
expressed their will in the elections; nor would the Senate yield to 
the Chamber of Deputies but to the nation from whom all powers 
emanated. At the very time when the attitude of the Committee of the 
Thirty towards these proposals was being criticised, the proposals 
themselves were not accepted by those who criticised the Committee. 
They thought that the proposals were unpractical as it was hardly 
possible to imagine the Chamber of Deputies rushing to dissolve it- 
self over every difference with the Senate on legislative matters.(1) 
The usual device adopted however, was that each chamber appointed 
a committee to discuss with the other the points of difference. When 
the two committees met, the chairman of the Senatets Committee pre- 
sided. If either of the two chambers of Parliament refused to 
appoint the committee to represent it, or if the two committees failed 
to eleminate the differences, neither of the two chambers could 
discuss the bill again except after the lapse of a month beginning 
from the date of the last motion dealing with it in Parliament. 
(2) 
The question might arise: What would be the solution if the differ- 
ences continued after the expiry of the period? Here it should be 
remembered that no bill was definitely passed by Parliament unless it 
(1) Sabry: op.cit. pp. 12$-130. 
(2) Majlisu'sh-Shuyúkh: op.cit. Arts. 199-201; Najlisu'n=iüuwwáb: 
op.cit. Arts. 144-147. 
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had been ratified by both Chambers of Parliament. This, however, 
constituted a powerful stand for the critics who demanded more powers 
and authority for the popular representative assembly. While there 
was no solution except death to a bill rejected by one dhamber of 
Parliament and approved by the other, it was because of the importance 
of the Budget that the two chambers were required to meet in congress 
to discuss, settle and. approve any disputed part of it. 
(1) 
One good example of a "conciliatory solution of a deadlock 
between the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies was seen when the two 
chambers in 1950 voted on the legislation establishing the University 
of Ibrahim Pasha. It was on Article 14 of that bill, which dealt 
with the appointment of deans of the faculties in that university, 
that they differed. The Chamber of Deputies ratified the legislation 
giving the Minister of Education only the right of choice from among 
three candidates selected by the council of the faculty. On the other 
hand, the Senate accepted the viewpoint of the Cabinet and passed the 
legislation giving the minister the right to nominate the dean from 
among the five professors who should have had the longest term in the 
professorship. The Chamber of Deputies, however, insisted on its 
point of view, and accordingly each of the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies commissioned a special committee, each committee was com- 
posed of five members, to meet, to discuss, and to try to reach a 
compromise on the disputed point. The solution was found in that the 
committee representing the Chamber of Deputies was convinced by the 




views of the Senate, and recommended the amendment of the legislation 
accordingly. The'Chamber accepted that recommendation and approved 
the amendment introduced into the legislation by the Senate.(1) 
On the other hand, in 1939 the government initiated a fiscal 
reform which began by the imposition of certain taxes. One of the 
proposed taxes was the imposition of death duties (or the inheritance 
tax), which was approved by the Chamber of Deputies, dominated by non - 
Wafdists, while the Senate with its Wafdist majority rejected it. 
So a deadlock was created between the two chambers of Parliament, and 
attempts were made to seek a way out of the crisis. It was because 
of the difference of party colour of the majorities in both the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, that each of the two houses 
Insisted on its attitude. Moreover, the Cabinet did not wait for 
conciliation or compromise. to be reached between the two chambers, but 
rushed to incorporate this particular tax in the Budget law. This 
action of the government did not produce any effective change in the 
situation. On the contrary it worsened the position because as a 
result of the refusal by the Senate of that part of the Budget law 
containing the death duties, the government thought not of convoking 
Parliament in congress to discuss the disputed Part of the Budget, 
but of dissolving the Senate. It was not until after the resignation 
of the cabinet (because of the deterioration of the health of the 
Prime Minister) that the situation calmed down. The new cabinet did 
not press the imposition of that tax and Parliament went into recess 
(1) Majlisu'n- Nuwwäb: Mabaçliru)l- Jalasát, S.28, pp. 26 -27 & p. 53, 
S. 34, pp. 32-35. See also the report of the special committee 
cited in p. 127. Cf. The difference between the two chambers 
on the creation of the journalists' guild (Ordre des journalists) 
La Chambre des Depultes < :: op.cit. VII -iv, S.7, p. 26. 
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without making any attempt to settle the question.(1) The imposition 
of death duties was delayed until 1942 when it was approved by both 
chambers of Parliament. 
The relative success or failure of a representative institution 
is a matter of opinion. As regards the legislative function of the 
Senate in Egypt, one could say that this legislative body succeeded 
in attracting to itself wide popular attention and esteem. In spite 
of the fact that appointment to the Senate became largely a matter 
of preferment for party political services, it was commonly in the 
political limelight,on the headlines of newspapers, and often in- 
fluenced profoundly policies and legislation. 
As shown above, although the Constitution laid down the principle 
of parity between the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the former, 
theoretically speaking, seemed inferior to the latter because deprived 
as it was of the right to initiate bills imposing taxes, and of the 
right to vote in confidence in the Cabinet. The priority of the 
Chamber of Deputies in discussing and voting on the Budget further 
accentuated the difference. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the 
Senate extended its authority and was able to acquire the right to 
amend money bills in a manner which was equivalent to initiating their. 
Moreover, not only did the Senate amend financial legislation, ( ) but 
(1) Great Britain and the East, Vol. LIII, No. 1468, p. 40; No. 1470 
p. 98; No. 1474, p. 199. 
(2) See supra, p. '.3:")-For further proof: 
(a) The Senate did not accept the viewpoint of the Chamber of 
Deputies with regard to the imposition of taxation on moveable 
capital, industrial and commercial profits, and income from work. 
It amended the bill and returned it to the Chamber of Deputies 
which submitted to the Senate's opinion. Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op. 
cit. -i, S. App. 35 et seq. 
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it also introduced important changes in the Budget(1) and amendments 
into ordinary legislation.(2) To most of such amendments the 
Chamber of Deputies consented and accepted the Senate's viewpoint; 
illustrating thereby that the Senate had gained an effective and more 
powerful position in the political structure of Egypt than had been 
intended for it. 
II - The Control Over the Executive. 
The functions of parliamentary institutions are not exclusively 
legislative. "The practical supremacy in the State should reside in 
the representatives of the people; "(3) and therefore, representative 
assemblies should control the executive power in order to keep it 
within the limits of the policy they support. Nevertheless, the con- 
trol of the executive by Parliament should not mean its continuous 
(b) When the government in 1950 presented a bill regulating taxa- 
tion on places of entertainment, the Chamber of Deputies did not 
accept the whole bill as presented but introduced some amendments. 
These amendments were rejected by the Senate which accepted the 
Cabinet's views. Moreover, this attitude of the Senate persuaded 
the Chamber of Deputies to reconsider its attitude towards the 
bill and approve it as it had been framed by the Cabinet. Ibid X- 
ii, 5.34, 10.13* 
(1) Such changes were introduced into the Budget in different years. 
They covered different aspects and items of the Budget. See: La 
Chambre des Députés: op.cit. I X -ii2, S.LC,p.3$$; S.41,p.405; IX- 
iv, 3.34, pp. 1 -2; Majlisuan- Nuwwab: op.cit. IX -v, á.33,p.1773; 
5.34, pp. 1 890 -1$92, S.3 5, p.2143 ; X -i, 5.36, pp.12 -13 ; X -ii, 5.31, 
pp44 -46. 
(2) Examples of amendments introduced into ordinary legislation by the 
Senate and accepted by the Chamber of Deputies are the following: 
(a) The restriction of transactions in grains and cereals. La 
Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VII -iv, á.25,p.196; S.4$, pp.425 -426. 
(b) The creation of the "Barreau Charii" Ibid, S.34, p. 277. (c) 
The regulation of navigation in inner waters, Ibid, 8.34, pp.286- 
2$7. (d) The organisation of the individual's contract for work. 
Ibid. S.24,pp.274 -275. (e) The establishment of an 
association and union for medical professionals. Majlisu ->n- vuwwáb: 
op.cit. IX -v, 5.21, p. 753. 
(3) Mill, J.S.: Considerations on representative government, p. lò.5. 
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intervention in the administration and its positive participation in 
the execution of the law because Parliament "does not exist to govern, 
and if it assumes the character of a government, it will be going 
beyond the generality which is its nature and trespassing on the 
(1) 
sphere of the particular." Parliament should confine itself and 
act no more than as a judge and a corrector of the Cabinet and its 
administrative assistant because the "result of joint work of Parlia- 
ment and the executive is better than where Parliament attempts to 
interfere more positively." 
(2) 
The Egyptian Parliament derived its authority to control the 
executive power from its position as the representative of the people, 
who were considered the source of all powers in the State. The two 
provisions in the Constitution that "every member of Parliament has 
the right to address to ministers questions or interpellations, "(3) 
and that "each chamber has to institute an inquiry for its enlight- 
ment upon public matters coming within its competence"(4) formed the 
foundation of Parliaments right to control the executive. Let us now 
study the ways by which the Senate could exercise its control over the 
executive.(5) 
(1) Barker: op.cit. p. 46. 
(2) Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, p. $63. 
(3) 1923 Constitution, Art. 107. 
(4) Ibid, Art. 108. 
(5) The methods by which the Senate practised its control over the 
executive, and which form the subject of our study in this 
section, were shared with the Chamber of Deputies. In addition 
to them, this latter organ could exercise other methods by which 
it could keep the government under its control; they will be the 
scope of study in the following Chapter. 
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1. Questions. 
The right of members of Parliament to address questions to 
ministers is recognised in all parliamentary democracies. Questions 
are a form of procedure through which Parliament can exercise detailed 
control of administrative actions. They concern matters for which 
the government is responsible, and cover the whole field of the 
nation's life. Although their actual scope varies immensely from 
day to day according to the change in the atmosphere of public life, 
they turn a searchlight upon every corner of the public service. 
Although questions are ostensibly meant to elicit information, they 
are also used for a variety of other purposes: to expose abuses, to 
ventilate grievances, to extract promises, and to embarrass trie 
government. 
In the Parliament of Egypt, a question should be drafted in a 
summary form and to the point, concerned with facts and not opinion. 
It may demand information on action, but it must not repeat rumours 
nor newspaper gossip. The subject matter of a question should be 
in the sphere of ministerial responsibility. The question which 
should be addressed to the responsible minister, should not contain 
any imputation against a third party mentioned by name and should not 
be connected with a case in front of the judiciary. In general, 
questions should not contain anything which was not absolutely 
essential to the intelligibility of the subject; no names and no 
statements which could be left out, and particularly, no ironical or 
(1) 
hypothetical expressions were allowed to remain in the contents. 
Majlisu'sh- Shuyúkh: eop.cit. Arts. 203 & 205; Majlisu)n- Nuwwáb: 
Al- La)ihätu'd -dák iliyah, Arts. 148 & 119; Cf. Bryce: op.cit. 
Vol. II, pp. 510 -511 & 539. 
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The asking of a question was a personal act, and therefore, it 
could not be put in the name of more than one member. The procedure 
was very simple: the questioner should present his question in 
to 
writing to the President whose duty was /notify the questioned minister 
and put the question on the Order of the Day of the following sitting. 
The question could not be answered sooner than eight days after its 
presentation unless otherwise decided with the consent of the 
questioned minister.(1) Here attention may be paid to the differences 
in the procedure in Egypt, Britain and France. The system adopted in 
Egypt was similar to that which is in practice in Britain and which 
requires that the question be presented in writing. In France, 
according to the standing orders of the Third Republic, the presenta- 
tion of questions was permitted orally. Moreover, the question in 
France might not be put unless the questioned minister had accepted 
it, while in Egypt the member's right to put any question was 
absolute.(2) In Egypt however, if ministers felt that answering 
particular questions would create embarrassment to them and to the 
Cabinet; they could demand the postponement of delivering their 
answers. Precedents of that kind are innumerable, and usually the 
executive :managed to avoid answering undesirable questions altogether 
if it so desired, by the continual postponement of answering the 
question. 
(1) Majlisu'sla- Shuyakh: op.cit. Art. 204; Majlisu "n -Nuww b: op. 
cit. Art. 150. 
(2) Kámil: op.cit. pp. 238 -239; Finer: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 709- 
710; Vol. II, p. $65; Campion, G.: An introduction to the 
Procedure of the House of Commons, pp. 145 - 147. 
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It was the usage of the Egyptian Parliament to devote half an 
hour at the beginning of every sitting to answering questions; the 
remainder of unanswered questions proposed to be answered in an 
appropriate sitting was usually postponed and enlisted on the Order 
of the Day of the following sitting.(1) Proceedings upon answers to 
questions started, as in Britain, with the minister's answer. When 
the minister had answered a question, it was the questioner only who 
had the right, and for once only, to demand more elucidation or 
comment on the minister's answer on condition that he was brief and 
kept strictly within the limits of the original question. These 
limitations may be due to the attempt to avoid the transference of 
questions into interpellations which must follow certain procedure 
other than that appropriate to questions. Attention is drawn to the 
fact that, unlike the British tradition, no supplementary questions 
usually considered as giving a chance to a representative assembly to 
effectively exercise its control over the executive, could arise from 
questions in the Egyptian Parliament. Although the question excluded 
discussion by all members of Parliament except the questioner who 
could only take part in the process of its being answered, ministers 
other than the questioned minister might participate and give explana- 
tions after the questioner had commented on the answer. This could 
have established a method by which other members might take part and 
develop the question into something of greater significance; but 
again, it was the questioner only who had the right to answer and give 
(1) Majlisu'sh- Shuyúkh: op.cit. Art. 211; Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: 
op.cit. Art. 155. 
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his views, if he had any at all. (1) 
Tong with questions answered orally in Parliament, there were 
questions which could be dealt with in writing. (2) Although many 
questions were not suitable for this kind of treatment, it was 
however, practised when a trend of self- denial was found in members 
who were willing to forego the fame or pleasure of questioning 
ministers orally. The questioned minister had to send his reply to 
the Senate within a week, unless he asked for an extension which 
should not exceed one rlonth. 
(3) 
Questioned ministers might not 
answer written questions, or in certain cases might give unsatis- 
factory answers; in such circumstances the questioner had the right 
to convert his written question into an oral one or an interpellation. 
As the public should about of Parliament, all 
answers to written questions were published in the Official Journal. 
Jritt en questions, however, were of minor importance and small in 
number in comparison with orally answered questions. 
Although questions were of some value in revealing facts 
and actions which might be hidden they did not bring effective 
results as they did not give any opportunity for debating and taking 
resolutions on their subjects. If the significance of parliamentary 
(1) Kämil: op.cit. pp.240 -241; Cf. Finer: op.cit. Vol.II, p.865; 
Marriott: op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 571- 575. 
(2) Majlisus)- .- Shuyúkh: op.cit. Art.208; Jajlisun- ïvuwwafi: op.cit. 
Art. 152. Cr. The -1 unstarred" questions in the British Par- 
liament; Finer: op.cit. Vol.II, pp.865 -$66; Campion: op.cit. 
P.147. 
(3) In the Chamber of Deputies, the limit of time which the minister 
had to present his answer to a written question was a month. 
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questions in Britain lies in the fact that the, House of Lords can 
debate their subjects and that in the House of Commons supplement- 
ary questions can be an effective means of revealing defects in the 
working of the governmental machine, in Egypt, the sole significance 
was the revelation of unknown facts and the probability of their 
being a prelude to an interpellation.(1) 
2. Interpellations. 
The Constitution provided for another and more effective means 
through which the legislature could control the executive power.(2) 
This was the interpellation, which was like a parliamentary question 
in demanding from the government information, and unlike it, in 
giving rise to a debate and the taking of a vote. The main difference 
between questions and interpellations which were deemed to be 
immediate and fundamental implications of the principle of ministerial 
responsibility,was that the former commonly related to minor details of 
administration, while the latter bore directly on matters of policy. 
In general, as Finer defines it, "the interpellation is a kind of 
question, long and rather querulous, of the nature of the English 
vote of no confidence, and its purpose is to put the government to 
the trouble of explaining its objects and methods in the particular 
branch of its policy and administration which is attacked. "(3) The 
(1) Sabre ~op.cit. p. 567;1 K il: op.cit. p. 211; Majlisu'sh- 
Shuyútb: op.cit. Arts. 207 -209; Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. 
Arts. 153 & 154. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 107. 
(3) Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, p. $69. Cf. Kamil: op.cit. p. 244; 
also Hamid Gudah, President of the Chamber of Deputies, saying 
"an interpellation tends to demand from the Cabinet or from an 
individual minister to present an account for an action relative 
to the administration of public affairs." La Chambre des 
Deputes: op.cit. IX -i, 8.3, p. 10. 
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scope of the right of members of Parliament to interpellate ministers 
was so wide as to comprise any action of the executive power.(1) The 
subject matter of interpellations extended to include the appointment 
of particular ministers; but, notice should be taken of the fact that 
the nomination of the Prime Minister, which was one of the functions 
and rights of the Head of the State who was non - responsible for his 
acts, could not be the subject of an interpellation. On this basis, 
an interpellation about the circumstances leading to the appointment 
of Nahas Pasha as Prime Minister in February 1942 was rejected in the 
Senate.(2) 
The procedure of presenting an interpellation was similar to that 
of addressing a question. The member who wished to interpellate one 
minister or more, had to present his interpellation in writing to 
the President with a brief explanation of its subject and object. 
The President at once informed the government,acquá nt:ed the chamber 
with the interpellation presented and fixed a date for its discussion. 
The fixing of that date could not occur until after the views of the 
interpellated minister concerning the interpellation had been heard. 
The minister could ask for elucidation of the interpellation from the 
interpellator, and would not express his views until he had heard the 
interpellator's explanation. The discussion on the fixing of a date 
for the debate of an interpellation could not take place until after 
eight days from its presentation, unless the chamber with the consent 
(1) Majlisu'sh-Shuyúkh: op.cit. Art. 214; Majlisusn-Nuwwab: op. 
cit. Art. 157. - 
(2) Sabri: op.cit. pp. 267-268, Kamil: op.cit. pp. 245-246. 
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of the interpellated minister decided otherwise. 
(1) 
Although the debate on the question of fixing a date for the 
discussion of an interpellation ought to be solely devoted to that 
matter, this occasion might be used for the initiation of a short 
debate on the spot upon the subject of the interpellation. Here the 
President should use his authority to bring to an end such discussion 
and ask the chamber to confine its work to the fixing of the date for 
that discussion.(2) in the meantime where these provisions were 
found, and which may be considered a protection for the executive 
against hasty accusations from the legislature, and which may not be 
expected and consequently might lead to grave repercussions, there was 
some safeguard of the legislature in practising its right to inter - 
pellate the government against the attempts of interpellated ministers 
to escape the discussion of interpellations. In particular, a pro- 
vision that the discussion of interpellations relevant to the internal 
policy of the government should not be postponed for more than a 
month was laid down.(3) In spite of that clear provision, inter - 
pellated ministers could request the postponement of the discussion 
for more than a month, but the chamber alone was the competent 
authority to accept or reject that request. Incidents are found in 
the history of the Egyptian Parliament where the discussions of inter- 
pellations concerned with the government's domestic policy were post- 
poned for more than a month.(4) The failure of Parliament in Egypt to 
1 Frajlisu sh- Shuyúkh: op.cit. Arts. 215 & 216; MajlisuNn- Nuwwáb: 
op.cit. Arts. 158 & 159. 
(2) Kamil : op.cit. 4p. 247. 
(3) Ma j li su Shuyukh : op.cit. Art. 216; Ma j li su n- Nuwwab : op.cit., 
Art. 160. 
(4) Ma j l su' sh- Shuyúkh : Al -lä' ihatu> d- dakhili ah ma` a' 1- mabaiì )wa' t- 
ta°- ligát, p. 185. 
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put into proper practice this rule of the procedure was, more or 
less, due to the fact that the majority of members of parliament 
supported the party or coalition of parties in power; moreover, the 
domination of the legislature by the executive would provide a 
further explanation. 
It seems necessary to point out that while a definite maximum 
period during which an interpellation concerned with one aspect or 
another of the government's internal policy should be debated was 
provided by the Rules of the Procedure of both chambers of Parliament, 
such a limit in the case of foreign affairs was overlooked. This 
could have meant that the debate on an interpellation related to 
foreign policy could not take place within a month. This delay was 
perhaps due to the fact that in the realm of international relations, 
nations are exceedingly sensitive to any threat which might endanger 
them through the application of the foreign policies and plans of 
other States; and whereas interpellators, without the restraint of 
the responsibility of office, might make exaggerated statements or 
cause the premature divulgence of plans, it would surely be preferable 
to postpone indefinitely such interpellations until the interpella- 
tors could without risk be fully informed on the subject.(1) 
When the time arrived for the opening of the debate on an inter - 
pellation, the interpellator himself had the right to develop, 
reiterate and explain his interpellation. If several interpella- 
tions were judged to be on one subject, and consequently to be dis- 
cussed all together in one sitting, the interpellators spoke in the 
(1) Kamil: op.cit. pp. 248-249- 
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order in which their interpellations had been presented. The inter - 
pellator's speech usually contained expressions of criticism and 
inquiry and the interpellated minister had to reply to the points 
raised. On that point Makram Ebeid Pasha expressed that "interpella- 
tions should not be exclusively for members presenting them and 
ministers to whom they are presented. Therefore, when an inter - r 
pellation is presented, a date for its discussion should be fixed. 
For instance, if I myself, in my authority as a Deputy for my con- 
stituency or a representative of the nation, present an interpella- 
tion, and it shall be decided that it will be discussed within a week 
or two, it is supposed that I come in touch with the electorate 
during that time and get acquainted with their opinion about the 
subject of the interpellation. In that way the interpellation will 
have its popular value 
t'(1) 
Nevertheless, one could say that 
interpellations never acquired a popular value, and that they were 
merely used to embarrass the cabinet or individual ministers. In 
other words, they were mainly used by the Opposition in Parliament 
for partisan objectives, without, or at most with the slightest 
regard to the public opinion. 
After the government had replied, instead of the matter being 
closed when the initiator had commented on the government's reply as 
in the case of questions, a general debate was opened for as long as t 
members desired on condition that not more than four members took 
part in the discussion unless the chamber decided other ise.(2) 
wh en 
I4Tajlisu n -Nuwwa Alahädiru lJalasät, IX -v, S.5, p. 54.. 
(2) Majlisu'an- Jhuyúkh: Al -La ihatu'd- dakhiliyah, Art. 219. In the 
Chamber of Deputies there was no limit to the number of members 
who could participate in the discussion of an interpellation. 
îßa j li su: n- Nuwwáb : Al_ Lá' ihatu' d- dákhiliyah, Art .18 . 
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the discussion of an interpellation was over, the final stage of this 
type of control over the executive was reached. Several motions were 
pending, amongst which one had priority over any other motion. This 
was usually to the effect that the Chamber had discussed tiîe matter 
sufficiently and was ready to pass to the remainder of the Order of 
the Day. (1) The adoption of such a motion signified that the chamber 
would simply proceed to the next item on the Order of the Day, 
without recording any statement of its views. Usually there was a 
motion to that effect amongst others of different tendencies, and 
frequently interpellations ended at such a point. Therefore, one 
could say that interpellations never served as a measure of control 
over the Cabinet except theoretically and psychologically. In other 
words, it was only the fact that members of Parliament might inter- 
pellate ministers that induced the executive to be cautious in their 
administration. 
Although most of the interpellations discussed in the Egyptian 
Parliament ended with the decision of the chamber to pass to the 
Order of the Day, such discussions could end in a different way. The 
chamber could pass a resolution expressing its confidence in the 
government but with an adjuration to the Cabinet to take a certain 
action. Moreover, it could pass a resolution blaming the Cabinet 
for a part of its policy or administration. However, it is important 
to point out that such conclusion was never reached by either of the 
two chambers of Parliament. It is true that interpellations covered 
(1) Ma j li su'sh- Shuyú:kh : 
cit. Art. 114. 
op.cit. Art. 230; Majlisiz xn-Nuwwáb: op. 
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different aspects of life in Egypt, ranging from problems of local 
government to delicate foreign affairs. Nevertheless, whenever a 
hostile tendency was felt in the chamber the governemnt acted 
accordingly and through political manoeuvering mainly dependent upon 
the postponement of voting on the resolution to a further sitting, 
the cabinet would hopefully gain time for a change in the attitude 
of the members, and arrange that its supporters, who usually formed 
the overwhelming majority, would attend to counter -check the attack.l) 
What would be the situation of the Cabinet when a hostile 
resolution was adopted by the Senate as the outcome of an interpella- 
tion: Neither the Constitution nor the parliamentary annals in 
Egypt clarified this point. One can only say that as long as the 
Senate was considered assembly, its hostility 
to the government would mean the hostility of the people. Therefore 
it would seem that if the Senate were to adopt a hostile motion 
arising out of the debate on an interpellation concerning general 
policy, the Cabinet should resign.(2) 
The question which may present itself now is: What was the 
significance of interpellations as a means of control over the 
(1) Cf. The situation in April 1948 when the Opposition in the 
Senate initiated a resolution aiming at blaming the Cabinet be- 
cause of its policy towards Great Britain and its efforts for the 
achievement of the national demands. The Cabinet succeeded to 
postpone casting the votes on that resolution until the following 
sitting. Then the ministry mobilized all its powers to quell 
that resolution. La Bourse E yptienne, April 28, 1948. 
(2) In the Chamber of Deputies the hostile tendency of the represent- 
ative body could develop into a vote of no confidence in the 
Cabinet, in consequence of which it should resign. Majlisun- 
Nuwwáb: op.cit. Art. 163. 
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executive? No doubt they were a method of control which harassed 
and annoyed the government, and could be used to create variation 
in its policy, foreign or domestic, and in its administration. 
Although the interpellation represented some danger to the life of 
the government, one should not forget that it was not only the nature 
of interpellations which could destroy ministries, but the nature of 
the party system and the peculiar temperament of members of Parlia- 
ment could be the root causes of the fall of ministries. 
One wonders how effective the Senate was in controlling the 
executive. It seems that in both Chambers of Parliament the 
practice of the function to control the executive did not extend 
beyond the presentation of parliamentary questions and interpella- 
tions and their discussion. The of a Cabinet, or a change 
in its policy was never the result of parliamentary criticism. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that questions raised in the 
Senate were of more public importance than those brought up in the 
Chamber of Deputies. As witness, one recalls the attempts in 1942 
by the anti-Wafdist Opposition in the Senate to induce the government 
to reveal the circumstances which had resulted in the return of the 
Wald to power. Moreover, in 1950, through presenting an interpella- 
tion, some Senators brought to the public notice that during the 
campaign in Palestine 1948 -49, there had been corruption in the 
handling of the situation and in the provision of arms and munitions. 
It has been pointed out that the Senate gained more legislative 
powers than had been planned for that institution, and that it seemed 
373. 
more effective in controlling the executive. 1d4hat were the reasons 
for the comparatively strong situation of the Senate? Its structure 
was strengthened, first of all, by the presence 'in its membership of 
a number of men of great dignity and high experience, many of them 
belonging to the class of 'elder statesmen., In the second place, 
the Opposition in the Senate was strong, though sometimes not 
numerically strong (for example during 1950 -1952): Therefore, it 
was not strange that this Opposition would persist in maintaining its 
rights and proving its power. Moreover, the small number of the 
members in the Senate might have provided a calmer atmosphere than 
in the Chamber of deputies. 
C HA F T î R VII. 
The Chamber of Deputies. 
In Chapter V, the way in which the Chamber of Deputies was elected . 
has been examined, and as far as available material permitted, the 
outcome of these elections has been reviewed. Reasons for dissatis- 
faction with the electoral system, the electoral law, the running of 
elections and their results have been found and expressed. The 
possibility of a better method of representation has been discussed. 
The aim of this part is to examine how the Chamber of Deputies per- 
formed its vitally important functions of exercising on behalf of the 
people a supposedly prudent legislative work and an effective control 
In other words, study of and 
duties of Deputies, the procedure of the Chamber, and the working of 
that representative body.(1) 
To begin with, what sort of people found their way into the 
Chamber? This question will be answered in two ways. Deputies will 
be looked at, first from the point of view of their education, and 
secondly, from that of their profession or occupation. 
It might seem a simple matter to classify members of Parliament 
according to the type of education they have had; but actually it is 
by no means easy to find a satisfactory method of doing so. Element- 
ary education, which was compulsory and free for all children as 
embodied in the Constitution,(2) was concerned only with the four DTs 
(1) The study applies also the Senate unless otherwise mentioned. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 18 & 19. 
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(religion being the fourth). Since pupils who finished the course 
of elementary education were regarded as being literate and no more, 
they could not enter secondary schools nor even technical or 
vocational schools before passing the stage of primary education. 
Secondary education prepared the pupils for university study, while 
technical and vocational schools prepared them for craftsmanship. 
One should notice that no universities but Al- Azhar, were found in 
Egypt before 1906, and that this classification of types of education 
had been changing from the close of the nineteenth century, because 
of the different policies of the various governments.(1) This insta- 
bility in the classification of the types of education could act as 
a sufficient handicap in interpreting the education of the members of 
Parliament. Moreover, widely at which the mem- 
bers had received their education would arouse suspicious against the 
exactness of such a classification. Nevertheless, one could try to 
find a classification of members to show the general tendency and the 
significant categories of education among members. Therefore, the 
classification of Deputies according to university- educated Deputies 
and non -university educated ones, would fulfil the objective. Atten- 
tion should be paid to the fact that in a country like Egypt, where 76 
per cent of the population were illiterate, one could expect to find 
some members of Parliament who were illiterate; but since the Con- 
stitution and the electoral law required the literacy of members of 
Parliament,(2) this probability is overlooked. Such Deputies, who 
(1) Issawi: op.cit. pp. 19 -21, 40 -42 &179. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Arts. 77, 7$ & 85; Qánúnu'l- intikháb, Arts. 
23 & 35. 
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were very few, are considered to have had a minimum of an elementary 
education and are added to the non -university educated group. 
Table No. III is arranged according to these principles.(i) 
From that table one can observe that the university educated members 
started with a somewhat law percentage in 1924 (37.4 %). This per- 
centage tended to increase till it reached 44.0 per cent in 1929. 
But a setback to the raising of the standard of education appeared 
with the reactionary Constitution of 1930, for the non -university 
educated Deputies formed 74.0 per cent of the Chamber in the Parlia- 
ment constituted in accordance with that Constitution. Since the 
1938 elections an obvious, though slight tendency towards a decrease 
in the percentage of the non -university educated members can be 
Most people were aware that land owners and lawyers constituted 
the majority of the Chamber of Deputies, but few people knew much 
more than that of the distribution of occupations amongst members.(2) 
It is the business of this part to attempt to supply in as much detail 
as possible, the facts about the occupations of the members. It 
seems essential to recall the social structure of the Egyptian nation. 
The basic class in the society has been that of the peasants and the 
manual workers. None of this class has attained a seat in Parliament. 
Up on the social scale comes the middle class which has been mainly 
formed of the professionals, i.e. lawyers, doctors, civil servants 
and on the whole university graduates, and which was adequately 
(1) See Appendix II, p. á 
(2) Subhi: op.cit. Vol. VI, is confined to the names and occupations 
of Deputies and Senators. This classification seems to be 
inadequate. 
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represented in the Chamber of Deputies. Another class is that of 
landlords,(1) and it seems that it was the dominating class in the 
Chamber as they used to "wield a considerable political influence in 
their district but their pressure (made) itself felt mainly at 
election time. "(2) 
Table IV provides some illustration of the different occupations 
in the various chambers.(3) The first observation about this table is 
that constant increase of the number of landlords, though their per- 
centage to the total members was unstable. A relationship between 
the landlord's members and the non- university educated members could 
be observed.( ) The business group had a weak representation compared 
with that of the landlords and the professionals as a whole. This 
(1) In this work, the person who possessed more than fifty feddans is 
considered a landlord. This figure seems to be acceptable because 
of the scarcity of cultivated land in comparison with the popula- 
tion. Official statistics for 1949 give the number of land- 
owners to be 2,731,120 and the area of the cultivated land as 
5,948,134 feddans with an average of land- holding of 2.l feddans 
each. These figures disregard the fact that there are millions 
who work and live from cultivating the land. Almanac, 1951.p.101. 
(2) Issawi: op.cit. pp. 149 -150. 
(3) See Appendix II, p.0/ 
(4) This relationship could be estimated through the co- efficient 
correlation which "measures the odds or chances that any specified 
value of one character will be persistently associated with a 
specified value of the other character observed in any other item 
the chances of agreement with or deviation from some tendency 
or law of relationship or co- variation." (Florence, P.S.: The 
statistical method in economics and olitical science p. 13777 
Mathematically, the co- efficient correlation between the two 
variables, i.e. the number of the non -university educated members 
and the number of the landlords in the Chamber of Deputies was 
0.9, which is very high and proves a close relationship between 
both. (Bowley, A.L.: Elements of statistics, pp. 350 -355). 
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might be due to their weak stand in society and to the fact that 
Egyptianised industry and commerce have flourished only after the 
elimination of the Capitulations in 1937. Again, this could explain 
the doubled increased representation, which this group got in 1938 
elections. The appearance of the Saadist Party in the same year 
could be another reason. This latter argument is strengthened by 
the observation that the number of business men who entered the 
Chamber, and their percentage to the total membership decreased in 
1942 when the Saadists boycotted these elections. The middle class 
was represented sufficiently in the different Chambers by the pro- 
fessionals, i.e. lawyers, doctors and ex -civil servants. They were 
usually self -made men who had achieved some distinction in their 
professions. Lawyers usually formed the largest professional group. 
One should notice that they usually had more representation in the 
Wafdist dominated Parliaments, while ex -civil servants were more 
represented in those dominated by the anti- Wafdist parties. 
The Chamber of Deputies was elected for a period of five years.l) 
The determination of this length of term for this organ of the 
legislature seems to be a means of making it necessary for the govern- 
ment to appeal to the people and for the party in power to secure 
their confidence by the re- election of its members or be turned out of 
office to let another step in.(2) But no newly elected Chamber could 
look forward with assurance to completing its full term. This was 
due to the fact that theoretically the King had the right to dissolve 
(1) 1923 Constitution Art. $6. 
(2) McIver: op.cit. p. 201. 
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the Chamber. In practice, this right of the King was actually 
exercised so often that, with one exception, all the Chambers that 
Egypt had were dissolved by the King before the expiration of the 
term of the constitutional mandate of their members. In a former 
(1) 
part of this work the dissolution of the Chamber has been discussed. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out here that the frequency of the 
use of the right of dissolution by the monarch resulted the weakness 
and degradation of the Chamber of Deputies.(2) 
Article 86 of the Constitution which stipulated that "the dura- 
tion of membership as a Deputy shall be five years" underwent differ- 
ent interpretations in 1949 when the term of the Chamber of Deputies 
was due to expire. The coalition government of the Saadists and 
Liberal Constitutionalists and other anti- íafdist parties insisted on 
the literal interpretation of the "five years" and claimed that that 
Chamber should last for five Gregorian years. The Wafdists, on the 
other hand, held the theory that the five years really meant five 
parliamentary sessions, and since the duration of the Chamber of 
Deputies for five Gregorian years would mean that it had to be con- 
voked for a sixth session, they refuted the governments viewpoint. 
This was the precedent which gave an opportunity for the discussion 
of a definite length of the Chamber of Deputies' term of office. 
However, no concrete and decisive result was reached but instead, a 
compromise between the two viewpoints was accepted by the all Inde- 
pendents Cabinet. This was the dissolution of the Chamber on the same 
(1) Chapter III, see supra,pp.16$ -173 
(2) Sabri: op.cit. p. 629. 
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day on which it was due to be convoked and the holding of the general 
elections for the new Chamber on a date that would give it no chance 
to meet before the expiration of the five years.(1) 
It has been previously mentioned, as well, that Parliament was 
to be convoked, according to the Constitution, by the third Saturday 
of November every year. When the Chamber of Deputies met at the 
beginning of a session, its first business was the election of a 
Bureau, which was the institution to be charged with presiding over 
the debates and organising the different departments of the Chamber. 
Some authority, however, was needed to control the sitting, or 
sittings, during which the elections of the members of the Bureau 
took place. For this purpose, a temporary Bureau, known as the "Age 
Bureau," consisting of the oldest Deputy as President, and the four 
youngest Deputies as Secretaries, was provided for by the Rules of 
the Procedure of the Chamber.(2) The oldest Deputy, who'was invariab- 
ly well known, took the chair at once at the first sitting and declar- 
ed it open. The powers of the "Age Bureau" were the same as those 
of the regular Bureau. Its functions, however, were, in principle, 
limited to conducting the sittings during which the regular Bureau 
was elected. (3 ) 
An important and interesting point is whether the Chamber could 
(1) The elections were held on January 3,1950, and the new Chamber 
was convoked on the 16th. Cf. A'r- Rafi`i: op.cit. Vol. III, 
pp. 283-290. 
(2) Majlisu3n- Nuwwab: op.cit. Art. 1. In the Senate, since the 
President was appointed by the King for two years, only the four 
youngest Senators usually acted as provisional Secretaries until 
the election of the regular ones. Majlisu >sh- Shuyú:kh: op.cit. 
Arts. 39, 43 & 44. 
(3) Majlisu'n- NuwW -ab: op.cit. Art. 1. 
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proceed with debating a bill or discussing an interpellation before 
the election of the regular Bureau. As has just been indicated, 
the functions of the "Age Bureau" were confined within the bounds of 
carrying out a particular task. Therefore, it was the Chamber it- 
self which would decide whether any debates, other than those 
connected with the election of the regular Bureau, could be carried 
on prior to that election. That rule was established in 1925 when 
the discussion of the resignation of Zaghlul's Cabinet and a vote of 
confidence in it, had been taken prior to the election of the Bureau 
and according to a resolution reached by the Chamber. 
(1) 
The elections of the Bureau were by secret ballot and followed 
in a sequence for the President, the two Vice -Presidents the four 
Quaestors whom it was formed.(2) The 
election of the Bureau anew at the beginning of each session might be 
interpreted as a kind of distrust of constituted authorities.(3) The 
President and the two Vice -Presidents were elected by an absolute 
majority of the votes cast. If no candidate obtained that majority, 
a second vote had to be held, and in this case the candidate securing 
the largest number of votes was elected.(4) The elections of the 
(1) Kainil: op.cit. pp. 19 -22. 
(2) Majlisu`n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. Arts. 2 -4. The Senate's Bureau was 
composed of the President who was appointed by the King for two 
years, two Vice -Presidents elected every two years, and four 
Secretaries and two Quaestors elected at the beginning of every 
ordinary session. Majlisu'sh- Shuyú1 h: op.cit. Arts. 39 -41. 
(3) Cf. Finer: op.cit. Vol. II, p.'790.- 
(4) At the beginning of the 1940 -41 ordinary session, there were four 
candidates for the Vice -Presidency. The results of electing the 
two Vice- Presidents were as follows: Mohamed Ragbib Attiyah ob- 
tained 131 votes and was elected; Mohamed Tawfik Khalil secured 
86 votes, Abdul Hamid Abdul Haqq ó9 and Abdul- Rhaman El Biyaly 52. 
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other members of the Bureau, i.e. the Secretaries and the Quaestors, 
were by a simple relative majority of votes.(1) Candidates for the 
membership of the Bureau were usually selected by their parties, and 
the party having a majority in the Chamber, usually held the main 
offices of the President and the Vice -Presidents. Members of the 
Bureau were usually "well known for their merits) their sensible 
views, the glorious part they took in the nationalist movement, and 
their struggle for liberty and the Constitution.''(2) Nevertheless, 
it should be pointed out that the government could influence the 
Chamber in its choice of the members of the bureau.(3) 
hhat were the powers and functions of the Bureau? A distinction 
should be drawn between the powers of the Bureau as a collective body 
and the functions of its members individually. The powers and duties 
developing upon the Bureau collectively seemed to be of less importance 
Therefore, a second ballot for the election of the second Vice 
President was necessary and the contest was between Khalil and 
Abdul Haqq. The former was elected. La Chambre des Députés: op. 
cit. VII -iv, 5.3, p. 9. 
(1) h'ia.jlisu ' n- Nuwwab: op.cit. Arts. 3 & 171; Kamil: op.cit. pp.23 -25. 
(2) From the address of the Prime Minister, Dr. Ahmed Mahir Pasha after 
the elections,of the members of the Bureau in January 1945. La 
Chamber Des Députés: op.cit. Ix -i, 5.2, p.3. 
(3) In his comment on the election of Dr. Ahmed Mahir Pasha for the 
Presidency of the Chamber in November 1940, Sheik Mustafa Abdul 
Raziq, the Minister of ?`'akfs, representing the Cabinet said: t'the 
government has adopted a neutral attitude towards the election of 
the President of the Chamber, because it estimates that it con- 
cerns a question of your exclusive competence. It makes no dis- 
tinction between one member and another, and it is you alone who 
have the right to elect whoever you consider the most qualified 
for the presidency of your assembly. Moreover, the government 
finds in the honourable new President, a sincere friend whether 
in the Opposition or amongst its supporters. Ibid, VII- iv..l, 
p.6. 
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than those imposed upon its individual members. It was the Bureau 
which considered the applications of members for leave of absence and 
discussed the reasons for such absence; it represented the Chamber 
while it was in recess and whenever otherwise required; and it 
appointed, promoted and dismissed clerks, stenographers and other 
paid employees. 
(1) 
On the whole, it had full power to preside over 
the debates of the Chamber and to organise and direct all departments 
under the conditions laid down by the rules of the Chamber. ('There 
is every reason to hope," said Dr. A. Mahir, "that the members of the 
Bureau shall be of great help in organising the work of the Chamber 
and realising its aspirations, and thus the task of the assembly will 
be facilitated.tt(2) This shows how important and effective in the 
working of the Chamber the Bureau could be. 
The Bureau conducted its affairs during the ensuing year after 
its election. In other words, it functioned during the ordinary 
session in which it was elected and throughout the time until the 
following session, when the new Bureau was elected. (3) Under its 
direction, the numerous and various tasks which went to the smooth 
running of a parliamentary assembly were carried out by a large staff 
of permanent officials. At the head of these officials in the 
Chamber was the Secretary- General, whose position corresponded to 
that of the Clerk of the House of Commons. Under him, various 
departments dealt with the preparation of the "Orders of the Day," the 
(1) i,ajlisu")n- Nuwwäb: op.cit. Arts. 185_1 214, 223 & 224; IIajlisu -)sh- 
ShuyLúkh: op.cit. Arts. 55 & 5`7; Kamil: op.cit. pp.31 -32. 
(2) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX -i, 3.2, p.3. 
(3) Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. Arts. 6 & 221. 
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drawing up and the keeping of the various records of the Chamber, 
the provision of secretaries to the different parliamentary committees 
(1) 
and the giving of technical advice. 
In the main, however, each group of the Bureau had its own 
special tasks. As would be expected, the President was by far the 
most important official. He was thé product of the system in which 
the guiding and controlling authority was a responsible ministry. 
The Presidents of the Chamber were an integral part of the regular 
machinery of the State. They were in politics, and they were usually 
elevated to the chair more for their political attitude than for 
their technical competence.(2) They met opposition in their con- 
stituencies, remained attached to their parties, co- operated at group 
meetings and sometimes entered into Press controversies. The 
impartiality of the Speaker of the British House of Commons was not 
found in the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies, since the 
latter was not expected to maintain the completely non -partisan atti- 
tude of the Speaker. On more than one occasion a President was seen 
descending from the chair and giving the Chamber the benefit of his 
views on any issue under discussion on which he cared to speak.(3) 
(1) Ibid. Arts. 222 & 224; MajlisOsh- Shuyúkh: op.cit. Arts. 79 & 
80. 
(2) The election of the Wafdist leader Saad Zaghlul Pasha as President 
of the Chamber of Deputies in 1925, and the governments inter- 
pretation of that incident as being a defiant attitude on the part 
of the Chamber is to be recalled here. 
(3) For example when discussing the Budget in 1919, Hamid Gouda the 
President of the Chamber left the chair to express some opposition 
and criticize the item concerned with the Ministry of Education. 
Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: Mahädiru "1- Jalasat, IX -v, S.25, pp.1175 -1178. 
Again in 1950 when the Chamber was considering the elimination of 
the tax on exceptional profits, its President, Abdul -Salam Gomaa 
Pasha took part in the discussion. Ibid. X -i, S.2$, pp. 13 -14. 
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Moreover, Presidents often passed to the Presidency of the Chamber 
from being ministers, passed again to ministerial office and then 
back to the chair. Generally speaking, however, once a suitable 
person reached the chair, he was likely to be re- elected as long as 
the party to which he was attached dominated the Chamber.(1) 
As defined partly by law,(2) and partly by the Rules of Pro - 
cedure,(3) the duties and powers of the President were to direct the 
Chamber's sittings and regulate the debates. He recognised members 
who desired to speak, interpreted the rules, put questions to a vote, 
announced the results, signed records of proceedings, received 
memorials and other communications addressed to the Chamber, and 
represented it in its dealings with the other chamber and with the 
executive authorities.() In particular, the President was charged 
(1) For instance, Dr. Ahmed Mahir Pasha, who was elected President of 
the Chamber for the first time in 1936, had been a former Wafdist 
minister, and was re- elected in 1937. In June 1938 he was appoint- 
ed Minister of Finance, but in November 193$ he passed back to the 
Presidency. He was re- elected by the same Chamber in every 
session till its dissolution in 1942. Abdul Salam Gomaa Pasha, 
the Wafdist Minister of Agriculture in 1942, was elected Presi- 
dent of the Chamber in March, and was re- elected every session 
until the dissolution of the Chamber 1944. In the Chamber elected 
in 1950, where a Wafdist majority was found, the same person was 
elected President, and he was re-elected again in November 1950, 
1951. Again Hamed Gouda who had been Minister of Supply 1941-1942 
was elected President of the Saadist dominated Chamber in 1945. 
He was also re- elected in the five sessions through which that 
Chamber lasted. A'r- Rafi`i: op.cit. Vol.III, pp. 14,62,7576,96, 
10$, 110,14$. Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. IX -v, S.l,p.3;; X_- i,S.l, 
p.3; X -ii, 5.1, p.3; X -iiì, S.1, p.3 ; La Chambre des Jéputes: op.cit. 
VII- iv,S.1,p.5; VII- v,S.1,p.4; VIII- i,S.l,p.3; VIII- ii,p.3;VIII -ii, 
IX -iv, S.l.p.3 . 
(2) Sabri: op.cit. pp.445 -446. 
(3) Majlisu n- Nuwwáb: Al- La ''ihatu "d- dakhiliyah, Art.$; Majlisu''sh- 
Shuyúkh: op.cit.Art.51. 
(4) See also Gomaa's views on the Presidents powers, La Chambre des 
Deputes: op.cit.VIII- ii,S.33, pp. 226 -22$. 
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with maintaining parliamentary decorum; and when passions run high, 
the President's courage and tact were tested. When disputes became 
heated, the President could intervene with a judicious observation, 
by which he' might be able to restore a semblance of calm.(1) Failing 
this, he might get results by ringing a hand bell. As a last resort, 
he might threaten to exercise his uncompromising right of suspending 
the sitting unless order was restored. Such suspension was necessary 
at times as a means of bringing excited members back to a frame of 
mind enabling business to proceed.(2) Moreover, one should not over- 
look the President's right to prevent any motion from being put on the 
Order of the Day, if he judged it to be contrary to the law of the 
Constitution and the Rules of Procedure. The practice of that right 
by the President enabled the Chamber to avoid many critical situations 
and hot discussions. 
(3) 
(1) Kámil: op.cit. pp. 27-29; 
Milan, pp. 40 -45. 
(2) For instance during the discussion in 1950 of an interpellation 
about the government's policy with regards to food supply and 
the checking of the increasing cost of living, when controversies 
between the Minister of Industry and Commerce, and the leader of 
the Saadist Opposition became sharp, the President interfered to 
restore calm conditions in the Chamber. Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: 
Mahädiru ' l- Jalasat, X -i, S.14, P. 35 
(3) For example when a motion was raised in June 1942 to express the 
appreciation of the Chamber to Makram Ebeid Pasha, the President 
refused to put that motion on the Order of the Day. According 
to his views, since Makram Pasha had been dropped from the Cabinet 
in May 1942, the approval of the motion would create a critical 
position for the Cabinet, and its refusal would hurt the dignity 
of Makram Pasha as a Deputy. La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. 
VIII -i, S.11, pp. 11$ -119. See also Rvïajlisu n- Nuwwab: op.cit. 
X -ii, S.40, p. 4 where the President explains that right; also 
X -i, S. 23, p. 23, where he used that right to prevent the dis- 
cussion moved by a member of the Opposition. 
s-Sawádi, M.: Al-Barlamänu Fi 1- 
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When the President was absent, one of the two Vice -Presidents 
took the chair, and that was in turn.(1) When in the chair, the 
Vice -President was invested with the same powers and obligations of 
the President in directing the sitting and conducting the debates. 
When not in the chair, however, the Vice- President was free to act 
as an individual Deputy and as an ordinary member of a party, and was 
under no greater obligations than those imposed on other members of 
the Chamber. 
(2) 
The special task of the Secretaries was to supervise 
the stenographic reports, to see to the taking of votes and their 
counting, and to check the votes given.(3) The Quaestors were to look 
after the accounts, the payment of salaries, members' attendance, the 
archives, admission to the galleries and the like, and the adminis- 
trative and financial' arrangements of the Chamber.( ) On the whole, 
the Secretaries and Quaestors were to perform these functions, and 
any others which the President might require of them. 
It has been mentioned above, that any person who paid a deposit 
of £E150 could become a candidate for membership of the Chamber of 
Deputies. This was not the sole condition, as in addition, a Deputy 
should be of a minimum age of thirty years,(5) and should have "a 
fair knowledge of reading and writing. "(6) That latter qualification 
(1) Nia jlisu *' n- NumAráb: Al -Lá -'ihatu d- Dakhilivah, Art. 9; Najlir su7, - 
buyul h : op.cit. Art. 52. 
(2) Káinil: op.cit. pp. 29 -30. 
(3) Majlisu'n- Nuwwâb: op.cit. Art. 9; NIajlisu'sh- Shuyukh: op.cit. 
Art. 531 Kámil: op.cit. p. 30. 
(4) Niajlisu n- Nuwwab: op.cit. Art. 10; Majlisu sh- Shuyukh: op.cit. 
Art. 54; Kamil: op.cit. p. 31. 
(5) 1921 Constitution, Art. $5. 
(6) Qanunu l- Intikháb, Art. 22. 
355. 
was rather vague; and although such a condition was not required of 
a voter, it was indespensible for a member of Parliament who had an 
(1) 
effective part in legislating and in controlling the executive. 
Actually, no precise definition was found for the phrase "a fair 
knowledge of reading and writing." Whether it meant that a member 
of Parliament should be literate, or something more was an unsettled 
point, and differences in interpreting the phrase and judging the 
'knowledge' arose. As will be shown later, it was the Chamber which 
was competent to judge the qualifications of its members, and usually 
party prejudice played an effective röle in the decision of the 
chamber. In February 16, 1931, a Senator's membership was invalidat- 
ed because "although he could read and write it was in ah unsatis- 
factory way On the other hand, in the Chamber of Deputies in 
June 1935, a definite meaning for the "fair knowledge of writing" was 
difficult to find when a Deputy had to prove his ability to write. 
In spite of the fact that this Deputy had made mistakes in writing 
twelve words out of twenty two dictated to him, neither the Committee 
competent to decide on the matter, nor the Chamber itself could reach 
a definite conclusion on the question. The time factor was the only 
way out of the problem. Another two tests were held to estimate the 
ability of the Deputy to read and write. Although the committee 
investigating the matter recommended to the Chamber that the member- 
ship of that Deputy should be invalidated, the Chamber repeatedly 
postponed the matter until under the influence of partisan spirit the 
(1) ('Id: op.cit. p. 133. 
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Chamber passed a resolution in favour of the Deputy. 
(1) 
The 1923 Constitution itself contained very few clauses on 
incompatibility. It was unconstitutional for any person to be a 
member of both Chambers of Parliament at the same time, (2) and for 
princes and kinsmen to be elected to either of the two chambers 
though they might be nominated to the Senate . (3) That was all that 
the Constitution said, leaving to the electoral law the determination 
of the rules of ineligibility and incompatibility. ) It is our 
concern-now to discuss the question of incompatibility. 
The principle underlying the conditions of incompatibility was 
that the holding of any office which was paid out of the Treasury or 
State funds, was incompatible with the holding of an electoral mandate 
as a member of Parliament. Members of the Government, (i.e. misters 
and Parliamentary Under -Secretaries of State) , however, were exempted 
from the rule; and in practice, ministers were generally, though not 
necessarily, appointed from among members of Parliament. The rule 
covered the whole civil service; and in consequence, any civil servant 
who was elected to Parliament was considered to have given up his post, 
unless he declared otherwise within eight days after the verification 
of his membership in Parliament.(-) This rule found its basis in the 
fact that civil servants had to obey the executive power in general, 
and the minister to whom they were attached in particular. 
(1) Ibid. lro.l34-136. Cf. Le Temps, July 20, 1933. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art.92. 
(3) ibid. Art . 93 . 
( 4) Sabri : op.cit. Dp. 443 & 446 et seq. 
(;) Crlaunu'1-Intikháb: Arts. 60 %c 61. 
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Therefore, as members of Parliament, civil servants could not effect- 
ively control the executive from which they got orders.(1) Although 
the electoral law was very clear that a civil servant who was elected 
a member of. Parliament should give up his post in the civil service or 
his membership in Parliament temporarily till the verification of his 
membership, exception to this rule was often met with. The direction 
of the executive to such members was quite obvious as well as the 
material benefit these members usually obtained.(2) That fact would 
induce one to suggest that once a civil servant had decided to contest 
a parliamentary election, he should resign his official post before- 
hand without regard to the possibility that he might or might not be 
elected. The application of such a principle in connection with the 
judges who participated in the contest of the 1ß50 elections, (3) would 
give the suggestion good grounds, since judges were civil servants, and 
(1) Sabri: op.cit. p. 444. 
(2) in the Chamber of Deputies elected in January 1945, there was a 
Deputy who was at the same time a civil servant attached to the 
Ministry of Health who kept both the membership of Parliament and 
the post he held (in the private secretariats of the Minister) till 
1949. A protest against the regularity of the election of that 
Deputy was presented to the Chamber on August 13, 1945. Despite 
the priority of examining protests against members holding posts 
incompatible with the membership of Parliament, the Chamber did 
not decide on that case until February 21, 1949. A week later, 
the Deputy resigned preferring his governmental post. Majlisu'n- 
Nuwwo.: Nahádiru >l- Jalasat, DL -v, S.16, p. 532 and S.17, p. 569. 
Cf. Sabri: op.cit. p. 449. Another case where a member of the 
Chamber benefited by being a Deputy and a civil servant was in the 
Chamber elected in 1938. He was attached to the Ministry of 
Commerce and industry, and through his influence as a member of 
Parliament, obtained several promotions and reached a high 
ranking post. 
(3) La Bourse Egyptienne, December 5, 1949. 
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there should be no discrimination in the civil service. 
To become eligible for membership of Parliament, a person had to 
acquire certain qualifications such as have been previously mentioned.' 
Persons lacking these qualifications were ineligible for the member- 
ship of Parliament, and could not and should not stand in a contest 
for such membership, If such a person were found to have stood as a 
candidate and to have been successful, it was the business of the 
chamber to which he belonged to invalidate his election. Furthermore, 
the chamber forfeited the membership of any member if it so happened 
that he became ineligible during the course of his mandate. The 
majority required for such a forfeiture of parliamentary membership of 
(1) 
a Deputy was the absolute majority of votes. 
Each chamber of Parliament had to verify the validity of the 
mandate of its members and the regularity of their election.(2) This 
fact did not mean the deprivation of those members whose membership 
was not verified of the rights and duties of a member of Parliament.3 ) 
However, every chamber had to give priority to the examination of the 
validity of the membership of those members who held posts incompatiblE 
with their membership, and of those members against the regularity of 
whose election or acquirement of qualifications, a protest had been 
(1) It should be noticed that the Chamber of Deputies did not consider 
the forfeiture of a Deputy's membership in such a case an applica- 
tion to Article 95 of the Constitution; while it was so con- 
sidered by the Senate and consequently that latter institution 
required the majority,of two- ,thirds of the votes. Majlisu n- 
Nuwwab: Al -Lá ihatu d- Dákhiliyah, Art. 93; Majlisu) h,- Shuyükh: 
op.cit. Art. 17; Qabri: op.cit. p. 451. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 95; Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. Art. 77; 
Mla j li su' sh- ,huyúhh : op.cit. Art. 14. The 1930 Constitution con- 
ferred this power to the judiciary; Art. 90. 
(3) Kamil: op.cit. pp. 33 -36. 
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presented to the chamber. 
(1) 
If the protest was concerned with 
irregularity in the process of election of the member, it was only 
accepted from electors of the constituency which had elected him, and 
from opposing candidates; but if the protest was concerned with the 
lack of qualifications, it could be presented by anybody. (2) Moreover, 
the first kind of protest had to be presented within the fifteen days 
following the declaration of the election results; the second could 
be presented at any time without limitation.(3) 
Any protest was referred to a special parliamentary committee to 
examine and report to the chamber,(4) which discussed and decided as 
to the validity of the mandate of the member concerned. The chamber 
could not invalidate the membership of a member of Parliament except 
by a two- thirds majority of votes.(5) One should note carefully that 
in. so. functioning, the chamber was performing a judicial task which 
ought not to be affected by party partialities. Nevertheless, it was 
noticed that political motives were behind numerous resolutions 
concerning the validity of the mandate of members of Parliament. 
0 
) 
(1) Majlisú n-Nuwwab: op.cit. Art. $5; Majlisu)sh-huyúkh: op.cit. 
Art. 1 . 
(2) anunu l- Intikháb, Art. 57; Kamil: op.cit. p. 41. 
(3) Ibid. p. 44. 
(4) ,,Iajlisu4'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. Arts. 7e -92; Majlisu sh- Shuÿukh: 
op.cit. Arts. 10 -14. 
(5) 1923 Constitution, Art. 95. 
(6) This accusation against the Chamber .originated in 1924 when the 
Wafdist Chamber of Deputies invalidated the membership of most the 
ardent rivals of the Wafd who had succeeded in the elections. 
Haykal: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 87. See also Raafat and Ibrahim: op. 
cit. p. 6$1 et_segs. where examples are found; Sabri: op.cit. 
pp. 447 -450; Id: op.cit. pp. 298 et seq. 
Cf. The incident of the invalidation of the membership of Abdul - 
Moneim Hashish in 1951, and how the difference of his -political 
colour from the majority affected the course of the discussion and 
the decision of the Chamber. Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: Mahádiru'l- 
Jalasá,:X -ii, S.19 pp. 14 -18; S.20 pp. 28 et seqs.; S.21, p.10. 
PROA, 
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This fact plus the lengthy procedure and the time the chamber 
devoted to verifying the mandates of its members induced many critics 
to advocate the application of the clause of the Constitution which 
authorised Parliament to "confer this power on another authority."(1) 
Many attempts were made, but in vain, to transfer the competency of 
judging the validity of these memberships to the judiciary in applica- 
tion of the principle of the separation of powers and in order to 
safeguard the minorities in Parliament against the omnipotence of the 
majority.(2) It was not until late in 1951, that Parliament conferred 
its authority in that matter to the High Court of Appeal (Nahkamatu)l- 
Nag diva °1- Ibram). This court was only competent to judge the 
validity of the mandate of those members against whose membership 
protests were presented. The Chamber was still the competent judge 
of all other cases of verification of parliamentary membership. (i ) 
It should be noticed that the conferment of this very limited 
authority on the judiciary did not occur until after decisions had 
been taken on most of the protests against the regularity of election 
of Deputies composing the Chamber which agreed to that conferment. 
c 
Cf. Also the report of the Committee Legislative Affairs in the 
Chamber of Deputies on the private memberts bill_ concerned with the 
conference of the authority of the Chamber to pass judgment on 
protests against the regularity of the election of members to the 
High Court of Appeal where a similar viewpoint was expressed. 
Ibid. X -ii, S. 39, pp. 121 -122. 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art. 95: 
(2) Qabri: op.cit. p. 449. 
(3) Majlisu >n- Nuwwab: op.cit. X -ii, 5.39, pp. 123 -124. 
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Therefore, the High Court had no chance to exercise its new power 
since the dissolution of that Chamber in 1952 marked the end of that 
parliamentary experiment in Egypt. 
It was the Chamber itself which could dismiss its members; and 
in this matter the Constitution was clear that no member of Parliament 
could be dismissed except by a resolution passed by the chamber to 
which he belonged with the majority of three -fourths of the members 
composing the chamber.(1) It seems that the exclusive right of Parlia- 
ment to dismiss its members was a means of safeguarding the legis- 
lative from the influence of the executive power. Moreover, the 
requirement of a majority of three - fourths of the members was meant to 
minimize party partialities and feuds which might be behind a resolu- 
tion of dismissal of members of Parliament. However, this right of 
Parliament was exercised only once when the Wafdist dominated Chamber 
of Deputies resolved on the dismissal of Nakram Ebeid Pasha on July 13, 
1913. This single precedent in the parliamentary annals of Egypt of 
dismissing a member of Parliament arose because of party differences 
which led the above mentioned Deputy to make specific accusations 
against the Wafdist Government and publish in a book to which he gave 
the name of "The Black Book." These accusations became the issue of 
an interpellation in the Chamber, but the government refuted them and 
secured the confidence of the Chamber.(2) Although this was the 
alleged reason for the dismissal of that Deputy, who had been a figure 
(1) 1923 Constitution, Art. 112. 
(2) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VIII -ii, 3.40, pp. 322 et seqs.; 
S.41, pp. 335 -342; S.42, PP. 343 et seqs; Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, Vol. V, (1943 -1946), p. 6015; Colombe: op.cit. pp. 
10$ -112; Sabri: op.cit. pp. 454 -455. 
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head in the Wafd, who occupied for a long time the position of the 
Secretary- General of the party, and who had more than once been an 
important minister in every -Jafdi.st Cabinet, one can hardly be con- 
vinced by it.(1) It seems that his split from the party was the real 
reason, coupled with the fact that his strong position in the Chamber 
might have been dangerous for the governing party. This argument 
could be emphasised by the fact that when the split occurred in the 
ranks of the Wafd, measures were taken against some members of Parlia- 
ment who had adhered to Makram Pasha. (2) Moreover, after his dismissal 
from the Chamber, the Cabinet could not endure his opposition outside 
Parliament, and put him with some of his adherents under arrest. (3 ) 
On the other hand, when a member of Parliament wished to resign, 
as he could do, he had to tender his resignation to the President of 
the chamber to which he belonged. In his turn, the President had to 
announce the resignation to the chamber and it was not effective until 
the chamber accepted it. (4) In theory, the chamber had the right to 
accept or to refuse a resignation, but the right to refuse was not 
likely ever to be practised.(5) 
1 Cf. The President's talk on that matter, La Chambre des Députes: 
op.cit. VIII -ii, 5.47, P. 470; also the confirmation of the Presi- 
dent on that subject. Ibid. p. 471. 
(2) For example after the Chamber of Deputies had resolved on the valid- 
ity of two Deputies in 1942, the Wafdist majority revived that 
matter after their adherence to Makram Pasha's group. The Chamber 
eventually invalidated their membership. Ibid tiIII -i, 5.32, p.3 3 ; 
8.35, Jp.39E -413. 
(3) Ar -Rafit i : op.cit. Vol. III, pp. 117 and 120. 
(4) Pi a jli su >n- Nuwwab : Al -Lá ilatu'd- Dákhilivah, Art. 212; Ma j li su - 
Shuyúkh: op.cit. Art. 36; ©,án ntr'l- Intikháb, Art. 63. 
(5) Cf. The case when Mohamed Mahmoud Galal tendered his resignation 
in l948. Before announcing it in the Chamber of Deputies, the 
President tried to persuade him to withdraw it. Nevertheless, the 
Deputy did not accept that mediation of the President and insisted 
on his resignation. when this was made known to the Chamber, it 
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Once a person was elected a member of Parliament, he was entitled 
to certain privileges and immunities to enable him to carry his duties 
be 
as a representative of the people. A Deputy had to /free to say what 
he liked in Parliament, and to vote as he liked without being liable to 
legal action, and generally to conduct his political life without fear 
of any consequences other than such as must come upon him, as upon any 
other citizen, should he break the law. Some special protection of 
t his kind has been claimed by legislative bodies for their members the 
world over; and in the House of Commons, the oldest in the world of 
legislatures, such privileges " are part of the unwritten law of the 
land, to be collected out of its own records and precedents only to be 
(1) 
interpreted by itself." In Egypt constitutional validity was given 
to parliamentary immunity. Articles 109 and 110 of the Constitution 
laid down the principle of the non -responsibility of members of Parlia- 
ment for the views they expressed in Parliament, and their immunity in 
the course of performing their duty from arrest and attempts to take 
legal action against them without proper grounds. 
The so- called parliamentary non -responsibility was destined to 
safeguard members of Parliament against prosecution, arrest, detention, 
or being brought to trial on account of opinions expressed or votes 
given by them in the course of the exercise of their functions. Conse- 
quently, it enabled them to act freely within the powers they acquired 
as representatives of the people. While fulfilling their mandate, 
decided to try once more, through its President, to convince the 
Deputy to withdraw that resignation; and actually he did. TUlajlisu- 
Nuwwab: Mahádiru'l- Jalasat, IX -v, 5.4, p. 39. As an example of 
the normal course of resignation see ibid. X -i, 8.35, p.6. 
(1) Campion: op.cit. p.63. 
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members of Parliament were amenable only to the disciplinary power of 
the chamber itself. However, this principle was only applicable to 
the members' action inside Parliament. Therefore, any action, even 
political, (for instance the writing of an article or pamphlet, or 
the delivering of a speech), performed by a member of Parliament out- 
side the chamber could bear an offensive character. If it was punish- 
able by law, the lifting of parliamentary inviolability was necessary 
before proceeding with any legal process against the member.(1) 
What did parliamentary immunity mean? Parliamentary inviolability 
was a measure of public order enacted for the purpose of placing the 
legislative power beyond the reach of injurious attack by the executive 
power. It was not meant to make members of Parliament immune from the 
consequences of committing a crime or misdemeanour, but to ensure that 
they were not subjected to frivolous or purely malicious prosecution 
of political rather than judicial character. One should notice that 
parliamentary inviolability was not a privilege conferred on a category 
of individuals. As it was a measure meant only to safeguard the legis- 
lative from the aggression of the executive, parliamentary inviolability 
did not cover the person of a member of Parliament as an individual. 
It was attached to him solely in his capacity as a Deputy or a Senator 
and a member of the legislative body. Consequently, while remaining a 
member of Parliament one could not divest himself of it, even if he 
wished.(2) Differences on the application of inviolability to the 
1 Sabri: op.cit. pp.440-443; Kámil: op.cit. pp: 324-326. 
(2) Sabri: E. & (-Id, L.: Al- Hassánatu 'l- Barlamaniyah, p. 154. 
Cf. The case when Mahmoud Abu El -Fath asked the Chamber to lift 
the parliamentary inviolability he enjoyed as a Deputy, during his 
absence from attending the sittings. It was only because the Rules 
of Procedures stipulated that absentee members of Parliament would 
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domicile of the member of Parliament arose. However, despite these 
differences, and the fact that the Constitution was not quite clear on 
that point, it was laid down that the principle applied,(1) Parlia- 
mentary inviolability was effective only while Parliament was in 
session. Therefore, it ceased during the parliamentary recesses; but 
it remained valid when Parliament was adjourned.(2) 
If the government or an individual citizen wished to initiate 
legal proceedings against a member of Parliament on a charge of a 
crime or a misdemeanour, the permission of the chamber to which he 
belonged had to be sought beforehand. (3 ) Moreover, the Chamber of 
Deputies created the precedent that even if a Deputy was already under 
arrest, having been previously arrested during a recess between two 
sessions, the authorities had to obtain the consent of the Chamber 
before taking any further proceedings.(4) 
not enjoy parliamentary inviolability that the Chamber agreed to 
that request. Attention should be paid to the fact that "the 
Chamber," the President said, "has been tolerant witti regard to 
the application of that rule." La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit.VII- 
iv, .30,p.240. 
(1) ,Sabri & 'Id: op.cit. p. 156. 
(2) Ibid, pp.157 -159; Kamil: op.cit. p.307. 
When the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, the sittings of the 
Senate were adjourned, according to the Constitution, till the new 
Chamber was elected. During this period,,Senators continued to 
enjoy parliamentary inviolability. Sabri & 'Id: op.cit. p.158. 
(3) 1921-Constitution, Art. 109 & 110. 
(4) Sabri & Td: op.cit. p. 160; Klmil: op.cit. pp. 310 -313L Sabri: 
òp.cit. p. 442; Majlisu)n- Nuwwáb: Al -La il'atu`° d- däkhiliyah, Art. 
175; Ma jlisu ash- Shuyúkh : op.cit. Art. 33. 
It might be interesting to mention that this resolution of the 
Chamber, which the government accepted, was taken in 1926, when a 
Deputy was arrested because of a charge of a crime before the con- 
vocation of Parliament in November. The authorities did not ask 
for the consent of the Chamber to carry on with the legal proceed- 
ings, but merely notified it of the arrest of the Deputy. Discuss- 
ing this incident in the Chamber, the above mentioned constitutional 
precedent was established. 
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domicile of the member of Parliament arose. However, despite these 
differences, and the fact that the Constitution was not quite clear on 
that point, it was laid down that the principle applied.(1) Parlia- 
mentary inviolability was effective only while Parliament was in 
session. Therefore, it ceased during the parliamentary recesses; but 
it remained valid when Parliament was adjourned.(2) 
If the government or an individual citizen wished to initiate 
legal proceedings against a member of Parliament on a charge of a 
crime or a misdemeanour, the permission of the chamber to which he 
belonged had to be sought beforehand. (3 ) Moreover, the Chamber of 
Deputies created the precedent that even if a Deputy was already under 
arrest, having been previously arrested during a recess between two 
sessions, the authorities had to obtain the consent of the Chamber 
before taking any further proceedings. 
(4) 
not enjoy parliamentary inviolability that the Chamber agreed to 
that request. Attention should be paid to the fact that "the 
Chamber," the President said, "has been tolerant with regard to 
the application of that rule." La Chambre des Députes: op.cit.VII- 
iv, .:.30,p.240. 
(1) abri & "Id: op.cit. p. 156. 
(2) Ibid, pp.157 -159; Kamil: op.cit. p.307. 
When the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, the sittings of the 
Senate were adjourned, according to the Constitution, till the new 
Chamber was elected. During this period, Senators continued to 
enjoy parliamentary inviolability. Sabri & 'Id: op.cit. p.158. 
(3) 192a-Constitution, Art. 109 & 110. 
(4) Sabri & Id: op.cit. p. 160; Kamil: op.cit. pp. 310 -313; abri: 
öp.cit. p. 442; Majlisu)n- Nuwwab: Al -La 'il atu' d- däkhiliyah, Art. 
175; Ma jlisu ash- Shuyúkh : op.cit. Art. 33. 
It might be interesting to mention that this resolution of the 
Chamber, which the government accepted, was taken in 1926, when a 
Deputy was arrested because of a charge of a crime before the con- 
vocation of Parliament in November. The authorities did not ask 
for the consent of the Chamber to carry on with the legal proceed- 
ings, but merely notified it of the arrest of the Deputy. Discuss- 
ing this incident in the Chamber, the above mentioned constitutional 
precedent was established. 
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The established method of asking the permission of the Chamber 
was the presentation, to its President, of a request for lifitng the 
parliamentary inviolability from, and the authorisation to prosecute 
a specified member of Parliament. When the request was made by the 
judiciary, it was usually presented by the Minister of Justice after 
being so asked by the. Prosecutor General (Attorney General). A private 
citizen must support his request with proofs that he was trying to 
initiate legal proceedings, but he was impeded by the parliamentary 
inviolability of the member concerned. 
(1) 
The Committee of Legislative 
Affairs, to which all question concerning the personal inviolability 
of Deputies, and all requests for lifting the inviolability and for 
authorisation to prosecute were referred, examined and discussed these 
requests, and reported on them to the Chamber. (2) The chamber itself 
was the only competent authority to lift the parliamentary inviolabilitl 
a member enjoyed. In such a matter, the task of both the Committee 
and the chamber was strictly limited. The object of their investiga- 
tion was simply to ascertain whether the proposal to bring a charge 
against a member of Parliament had a genuine and serious basis, that it 
was not prompted by any political motives, and that it had not been put 
forward without due formality and consideration. The merits of the 
of the charge itself could not be discussed either by the committee or 
by the chamber. They were considered only by the court. (3 ) 
717-5111i1: op.cit. pp. 316 -317; Sabr & d: op.cit. p.167; Majlisu'n- 
Nuwwab: op.cit.:. Art. 177; Majlisu sh- Shuyúkh: op.cit. Art.34. 
(2) Majlisu ?n- Nuwwab: op.cit. Art. 172. 
It is important to notice that the competent committee in the Senat 
was the 
' 
Committee of Justice. Majlisu'sh -Shuyu b: op.cit. Art.34. 
(3) Majlisun -Nuw ab: op.cit. Art. 173; B'Iajlis}z' h -ihuyu : op.cit. 
Art. 35; Kamil: op.cit. pp. 118 -119; Sabri & «_d: op.cit. pp. 
168 -175. 
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The penal code in Egype, did not provide, as in France, for the 
punishment of police officers and members of the judiciary who contra- 
vened the provisions of parliamentary inviolability.(1) Examples of 
such contraventions could easily be provided. The most widely recog- 
nised incidents are, first the search of the house of Hamid Gouda and 
Mahmoud Hamam Hamadi in 1941, and of Shams El Din Azzam in 1946. These 
searches were the subject of interpellations in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Although both the Cabinet and the Chamber confirmed the 
principle of parliamentary inviolability, no effective resolution was 
passed by the Chamber:(2) Secondly, the arrest of the two Senators, 
Aly Maher Pasha in the buildings of the Senate in 1942, and Neguib 
ïtlikhaeil Bishara Bey in 1944 without previous authorisation from Par- 
liament was the subject of two interpellations and some heated dis- 
cussion in the Chamber of Deputies. These arrests were made during the 
war while Egypt was under martial law. Since they were initiated by 
the Military- Governor General (who was at the same time the Wafdist 
Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha) the Chamber decided to recognise the right 
of the Military- Governor General to order the arrest of members of 
Parliament.(3) However, no sound rules were laid down with regard to 
the suspension of parliamentary inviolability. On the whole, however, 
requests by private citizens for authorisation to prosecute were in- 
variably rejected. On the other hand, such requests by the government 
were usually granted provided genuine evidence of the charge was 
presented.(4) 
11 Ibid. p. 15. 
(2) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VII -iv, S.47, p.421; 3.50, pp.442- 
447; 8.70, Pp582 -583; IX -ii, S.41, p.401. 
(3) Ibid VIII -i, S.4, pp. 13 et seq.; VIII -iii, S.31, p.304. 
(4) Kámil: op.cit. pp. 318 -319. 
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Members of Parliament in Egypt were entitled to a salary. This 
right was provided by the Constitution (Art. 11$) which bestowed on 
Parliament itself the right to fix the sum of such salary. One of the 
first laws passed by Parliament in 1924 was that which fixed this sum 
at £E600 per annum. One would wonder whether that sum was sufficient 
to turn a member of Parliament into a professional politician. It is 
true that almost all members of Parliament had other work to do: they 
were lawyers, business men, landlords, and so forth. This might be the 
reason of their insistance on calling that payment a parliamentary 
remuneration and not a salary. However, one could say that the sum of 
the remuneration was rather high in comparison with salaries paid to 
those who rendered public services, and in view of socio- economic con- 
ditions in Egypt. (1) Therefore, it could be said that the parliamentary 
remuneration would induce some members of Parliament to become pro- 
fessional politicians. The only proof one could provide with regard 
to this is the fact that certain individuals persisted in standing for 
every parliamentary election following no set course in the matter of 
policy. 
Egypt suffered from the absenteeism of members of Parliament. The 
Chamber was often adjourned because of the absence of the constitution- 
al quorum. According to the Constitution, the presence of an absolute 
majority of the members was required. However, from the records of the 
debates where usually the names of absent members were cited in the 
preamble to the minutes of every sitting - one could easily observe the 
1 Haykal: op.cit. Vol. I, p. 1 7. 
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high percentage of absenteeism. A disease of modern government, 
absenteeism was partly due to the fact that members of Parliament were 
more interested in the fun and excitement of gaining their seats and 
enjoying the prestige of membership than in fulfilling their obliga- 
tions as members. They had their professions and business to attend 
to. The Chamber as a public authority, should have commanded the 
regular attendance of members save in cases of illness and sudden con- 
tingencies. Although sittings of Parliament were arranged to be held 
at a late hour to enable such members to complete the bulk of their 
work in the morning hours, the application of that demand would have 
aroused a valid and important criticism: It would necessarily lead to 
excluding from Parliament men whose minds were valuable and fresh but 
professionally occupied, and to vest the privilege of government in 
professional politicians who would do nothing but govern. However, 
there is no good without sacrifice to obtain it. The alternative to a 
Parliament of amateurs which did nothing but registering the work of 
the Cabinet, was a Parliament of full time, or nearly full time members 
who could stand the brunt of the necessary work. The large sum paid as 
parliamentary remuneration would add to the arguments in favour of that 
suggestion. As an alternative, Parliament should have made public 
the names of those members who did not attend regularly. This would 
have caused their embarrassment, and would have given public opinion 
an opportunity of condemning such laxity. 
A vital aspect of representation was the attitude of the member 
of Parliament to his constituency and vice versa. The Constitution was 
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clear that a member of Parliament was elected to represent the whole 
nation. This would mean that the member was chosen to represent the 
nation as well as the local area, and he was expected to use his talent: 
and perfòrm his duties largely according to his own personal judgments. 
However, in practice, one could say that, generally speaking, the member 
of Parliament acted as the mouthpiece of his constituency. He was the 
necessary human agent through which the voters continually registered 
their will. This could be illustrated not only by providing examples 
of motions in Parliament which were moved for no other purpose, than 
the benefit of the constituency of the member who initiated. it, 
(1 but 
also by the fact that members of Parliament used their influence with 
the civil service and their access to ministers for the advancement of 
the personal interests of their constituents. This defect in the par- 
liamentary system was detected not only by political observers, but 
also by the members of Parliament themselves.(2) The President of the 
Chamber urged the Deputies to cease from such approaches to ministers 
because as he said: "when the Minister accepts the mediation of a 
Deputy, the latter will feel indebted and will not be able to exercise 
his task to control that Minister, despite the fact that the first 
function of the Deputy is to control the Ministers. Moreover, the 
In The parliamentary annals of Egypt contain many examples of par- 
liamentary questions, and even interpellations of that kind. As 
regards questions, they were numerous and it is rather difficult 
to specify any of them. However, it is interesting to refer to the 
debate on the closing down of two sugar factories in Upper Egypt 
and the attitude of the member who presented the motion. The 
factories in concern were situated in his constituency. Majlisu -- n- 
Nuwwáb: Mal ádiru 'Al- Ualasát, IX -v, 3.19, pp. 544 -652. Cf. 'cHllúbah: 
op.cit. p. 103. 
(2) Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. 3.33, p. 57. 
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extravagance in such personal approaches to ministers will cistract 
us from our original work. "(1) 
The Chamber of Deputies was the organised medium through which the 
public will could find expression and exercise its ultimate political 
power. It formed an indispensable part of the legislature; and it 
was the body to which at all times the executive should turn for 
justification and approval. The fundamental importance of the Chamber 
of Deputies was derived from its representative character. It could 
speak as no other body in the Egyptian parliamentary system could 
pretend to speak for the people. It presented in condensed form 
different interests, religions, classes and occupations. The structure 
of the Chamber of Deputies and its correspondence to the formation of 
the Egyptian nation has been discussed in the beginning of this Chapter 
The presence of different interests in the Chamber was reflected 
in the debates and functioning of that body. The most apparent 
interest was that of landlords. Since they composed the majority 
of the members they were the most powerful group in the Chamber. 
Examples to prove that viewpoint are numerous. However, it is enough 
to refer to the incident of the private member's bill aiming at the 
reduction of the rate of the land tax. In 1951 the government 
decided to double the rate of the land tax with retrospective effect 
for 1949 and 1950. Ahmed iohamed Abaza presented a private member's 
bill to amend the government's decision by proposing that it should 
not be retrospective in its operation. In spite of the fact 
(1) Ibis. 1 -ii, 6.33, 2.59 
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that some opposition to this bill was manifest in the Chamber, and the 
Cabinet was not in its favour, the general trend of opinion in the 
Chamber was towards its approval. From the discussions, one could feel 
that the main motive which induced members to support the bill was 
self- defence. The passage of the bill meant that landlords would save 
the payment of taxes for two years. From the words of the Deputy who 
initiated the bill, when he was defending it one could deduce its real 
motives. He said: 
"Some of yola may imagine that landlords are rich because of what 
they gained during some exceptional.circumstances. Therefore, I present 
to you information about taxpayers to show that a large section of the 
tr(1) group of landowners will be harmed through that measure 
He continued to illustrate the contribution of different groups 
of taxpayers to the treasury endeavouring to prove that the greatest 
share was the burden of landowners. In opposition to that bill, Dr. 
Nour El Din Tarraf said: 
"It is well known that when we come across such legislation which 
concerns a tax imposed on one of the social groups, we should rid our- 
selves of any favouritism. We should not pass any judgment except 
(2) 
according to our belief in the general interest of the whole country." 
The trend of the Chamber in favour of the bill was expressed when 
it voted on it for the first reading.(3) Under pressure from the 
governrnent,however, and its declaration that the passage of the bill 
would mean the non- confidence of the Chamber in its fiscal policy and 
(1) Ibid. X-ii, S.16, p. 57. 
(2) Ibid. X-ii, S.16, p. 34. 
(3) Ibid. X-ii, S.17, p. 11. 
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in the person of the Minister of Finance, who was in the same time the 
(1) 
Secretary -General of the governing party, the Chamber rejected the bill. 
The pressure of the group of landlords in 1949, during the debate 
on the land tax, to reduce its rate could be provided as further evi- 
dence.(2) Moreover, from the attitude of members towards different 
issues, one could easily observe that the interests of landlords were 
well defended. The debate on legislation respecting the right of the 
workers to form trade u.hions illustrates the power of the group which 
had interests in land, and its attempts to illegalise the formation of 
agricultural trade unions. 
(3) 
The endeavours of representatives of 
landlordism to persuade, and in certain cases to force, the government 
to raise the prices of agricultural products were countless. For 
illustration it seems sufficient to refer to the following: Their 
attempt to cause a rise in prices of wheat during the discussion in 1941 
of an interpellation about the policy of the government with regard to 
the exportation of that product;(4) the repetition of the same attempt 
later during the same year;(5) and the initiation of a resolution in 
1943 aiming at raising the prices of wheat and maize.(6) 
To show how the interests of landlords were preserved, it seems 
appropriate to quote Uthman Mohamed Abaza when he commented on the 
report of the Standing Committee of Finance on the Budget of 1949 -50. 
1 Ibid.- X. -ii, S.10, pp. 9 -10. 
(2) Ibid. IX -v, S. 22, pp. 790 - 794. 
(3) La Chambre des réputés: op.cit. VIII -i, S.26, pp. 335 -335. 
(4) Ibid. VII -iv, 3.9, pp. 40 -42. 
(5) Ibid. VII -iv, S.52, pp. 455 -460; S.53, p.461. 
(6) Ibid. VIII -ii, S.46, pp. 432 -435. 
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When he was urging a scheme to secure a minimum standard of living 
for rural workers, he said: 
"On October 25, 1943, the Fellah Department presented to the 
government a memorandum suggesting the fixation of a maximum rent for 
cultivated land. It asked for the promulgation of a military order. 
The Minister of Social Affairs and the Prime Minister agreed to that 
suggestion; and it was referred to the State Legal Services. Then it 
was presented to the Council of Ministers which thought it preferable 
to initiate a bill instead of the military order. Actually the bill 
was presented to Parliament, and it was referred in the Chamber of 
Deputies to the competent standing committee.. 
"In J larch 191+5 a ministerial comittee was formed to study the 
subject. Its members were the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of 
Finance, Justice and Agriculture. 
"Personally, I have presented last year a private member bill 
for the organisation of relations between landlords and tenants. It 
was referred to the Committee of Social Affairs, and this referred it 
to the Committee of Agriculture which examined the matter and 
completed its report despite the difficulties created by the government. 
The report was on its way to be examined by the general committee to 
approve its presentation to the Chamber; but I do not know the cir- 
cumstances which have forced its postponement from last year up till 
(1) 
now." 
From this one could infer that landlordism managed to preserve its 
(1) Majli.su'n-Nuwwáb: op.cit. Ii:-v, S.19, ï_. 655. 
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interests in different circumstances. Whether the Wafd or the anti - 
Wafdist coalition was holding the majority in Parliament the interests 
of this group had priority to others, and were kept intact. 
In some cases members were not satisfied with the defence of the 
interests of a group, but sought personal ones. During the debate 
on the limitation of the area to be cultivated with cotton in 1942, two 
members, namely Ahmed El Wakil and Kamil Youssef Saleh, suggested that 
a particular part of the country- Markaz El- Delingate, where they 
possessed some land - should be allowed to cultivate a larger area than 
had been proposed.(1) 
Sometimes it happened that in order to preserve their interests 
landlords had to clash with some other group. An interesting incident 
of that kind emerged during the discussion of legislation organising 
relations between employers and employees. The point of difference 
concerned rural workers and the application of that legislation to 
them. Representatives of industrial interests stressed that there 
should be no discrimination between rural and industrial workers; but 
landlordism managed to counter that argument and secure the preserva- 
tion of its own interests. 
(2) Another example is the argument in 1950 
about the imposition of a tax on the export of cotton. Landlords 
thought that this tax would ultimately be transferred by the cotton 
merchants to be paid by them; and therefore, they fought desperately 
for its elimination. Another motive seemed to be their belief that the 
tax was the cause of the deterioration of cotton prices. However, 
(1) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VIII -i, 5.22, pp.287 -28 . 
(2) Ibid. VII -iv, S.23, pp. 177 -178; 3.26, p.203. 
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despite these controversies in the Chamber, when the government 
insisted on its viewpoint about the tax, the Chamber approved- ending 
the discussion with the customary resolution to return to the rder of 
the Jay.(1) 
When interested groups attacked one another, representatives of 
the attacked groups defended themselves earnestly. During the debate 
on the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne in 194a, certain 
members attacked business men in general, and merchants in particular 
as the main cause of the high cost of living. El -Sayed Galal, a 
representative of the group attacked, said in its defence: 
"Certain honourable Deputies, yesterday, accused merchants of 
exploiting the people and making business in the black market. There- 
fore, I would like to point out that real merchants have nothing to do 
with all that kind of thing; those who are responsible for it are new 
participants in commercial activities."(2) 
Other interested groups were vocal in the Chamber. Professional 
groups not only tried to preserve their personal interests, but also 
defended those of their colleagues. This is to be seen from the 
granting of an allowance to engineers in the civil service. This 
allowance did not apply to all the civil service. Some Deputies 
opposed it; and it is interesting to notice that this opposition 
emanated from another section of professionals.(3) However, it seems 
Majlisú n- Nuww5b: op.cit. X -i, S.11, pp. 11 et seqs. 
(2) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX -ii, 3.10, p. 79. 
(3) See the opposition of Dr. Nour El Din Tarraf. he made comparison 
between medical doctors and engineers, and concluded that there 
was scarcity in both professions. Despite that scarcity he_ :yid 
not agree to giving any allowances to either because it would 
create dissatisfaction and discrimination among civil servants. 
a j li su) n -Nuww b : op.cit. X -i, 3.18, pp. 44-45. 
410. 
that since the Minister of Public Works, who was pressing that action, 
was the President of the Union of Engineers, and the reporter of the 
Committee of Finance on the matter was also an engineer, the Chamber 
was under their influence when it approved the granting of that allow- 
ance. 
Moreover, manual labour, which had no representation in Parliament, 
found some members to defend its claims. When certain enterprises 
dismissed some of their workers in 1944, and dissatisfaction amongst 
the working class became evident, parliamentary questions aiming at 
clarifying the situation were answered in the Chamber, and motions 
urging the Cabinet to do something for the satisfaction of workers 
were presented.(l) A similar situation appeared in 1946, and an 
interpellation about the dismissal of workers was discussed.(2) However, 
one could say that manual labour did not find more than the voicing of 
its grievances in the Chamber. None of the members of Parliament cared 
to act in preservation of the interests of the working class, because 
such preservation would mean the sacrifice of the interests of some 
other social class powerfully represented in Parliament. 
One might wonder whether pressure groups ever influenced the 
working of Parliament in Lgypt. Although, as has been indicated, 
particular interests were preserved and defended by representatives of 
certain groups, one could hardly say that pressure groups had ever had 
any effective róle in the working of Parliament. Trade unions were 
authorised to be formed on condition that they would not have any 
(1) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VIII -iii, 3.45, p. Q. 
(2) Ibid. IX -ii, S.13, pp. 115 -116. 
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political activities. On that basis the trade unions of workers were 
legalised in 1942,(1) and the establishment of syndicates for engineers) 
and teachers(3)was approved. If any pressure was exerted by so- called 
pressure groups, it seems that it was on the executive and not on 
Parliament. This might be inferred from the following words of Ali El 
Shishini. In 1949, he said: 
"The calamity in this country results from the enterprises which 
exploit the workers, the consumers and the people. All the 'Pashas' 
and big shots in the country are members of these enterprises (4) 
In 1950, he was. more emphatic when he said: 
"It is painful to admit the facts; but hiding the disease is 
worse than airing it. Therefore, I say that there is no enterprise 
which does not get the help of some of our important figures whom it 
appoints on its board of administration. 
"Do you know what is the function of these members It is 
exclusively to mediate between the enterprise and government officials?. 
The work of the Chamber of Deputies in the sphere of finance is 
to be considered now. So far, it has been our concern to deal only 
with legislation on ordinary matters. There is still something to add 
(1) Ibid. VIII -i, S.26, pp. 227 et seqs. 
(2) Majlisun- Nuwwáb: op.cit. X -ii, S.42, p.23. 
(3) Ibid X -ii, S.41. p. 32. 
(4) Ibid Iii -v, S.27, p. 1306. 
(5) Ibid X -i, S.9, p. 49. 
It would be of some benefit to recall here the circumstances of the 
resignation of El Hilaly's Cabinet in June 1952. It was said that 
differences between the government and the "Societé des Sucreries 
d'Égypte" were the direct reason for the downfall of the Cabinet. 
The campaign against the Cabinet cost the company £E1,000,000. 
The New York Times, July 8, 1952. 
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in regard to legislation where finance was directly involved. Attentior 
is drawn to the fact that in practising its control over financial 
matters, Parliament exercised another important function; namely, 
control of the administration. By seeking the money required for the 
working of all its departments, the executive gave Parliament its 
ultimate authority to criticise in detail the whole mechanism of the 
administration while discussing the estimates of State expenditure. 
Financial legislation, meaning laws which directly voted supplies 
or affected taxation, did not follow a different procedure from other 
legislation. They were usually referred to the standing Committee of 
Finance,which examined and reported on them to the Chamber. Reports of 
the Committee were, generally speaking, in accordance with the view- 
. point of the Cabinet. For instance, the acceptance by the Committee 
of Finance of the point of view of the Cabinet in 1941 on the taxes on 
moveable capital, commercial and industrial profits, and income from 
work;(l) and in 1942 on the increase of certain taxes including the 
additional tax, stamp duties and taxes on places of entertainment.(2) 
Moreover, if the Committee introduced some amendments into legislation 
as proposed by the government, it usually expressed the attitude of the 
Cabinet towards such an amendment. For instance when the Cabinet in 
1944 suggested an increase in the. rate of the additional tax, the 
Committee of Finance, in its report on the subject suggested that this 
increase should be in a progressive manner. In the report, it was - 
stated also, and emphatically that this amendment was approved by the 
Cabinet. (3 ) 
(11 La Chambre des Depute's: op.cit. VII -iv, S.46, pp. 409 -412. 
(2) Ibid VIII -i, S. 7, pp. 88 -90. 
(3) Ibid -ii, S. 33, p. 313. 
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Sometimes the Committee did not agree with the Cabinet. In such 
a case, the Committee also referred in its report to that disagreement. 
It was the Chamber itself which decided on these divergences of view- 
points. The report of the Committee of Finance on the private member's 
bill initiated by Ahmed _'ohamed Abaza in 1951 aiming at reducing land 
tax, shows that in spite of the opposition of the Cabinet to that bill, 
it recommended the passage of the bill.(1) 
The discussion of financial legislation was characterised by 
heated debates. This might have arisen out of self interest, but it 
might also have been based on mere political differences between the 
Cabinet and the opposing members. In a few cases it simply aimed at 
the general good. 
During the Second World War, when because of the international 
situation industrialists in Egypt gained unexpected profits, the 
Cabinet drafted a bill imposing what came to be known as the "Special 
Tax on Exceptional Profits." Opposition to that tax was found in the 
Chamber of Deputies. In defence of the interests of the industrialists 
Ismail Sidky Pasha said: 
'This bill is important from many points of view. It is a 
financial measure which calls for new abnormal orientations in matters 
of financial legislation. It affects equally the structure of both 
industry and commerce which, with agriculture, form the basis of 
international economy. Industry does not consist only of the 
investment of capital. It also requires initiative; it needs experience 
(1) The report cited in Aajlisu'n- Nuwwgb: op.cit. X -ii, 3.16, pp. 
129 -136. For further information on that bill see supra plp, 1a,_r 
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and bears risks. Do not we need to take into consideration all these 
factors? By imposing a tax on all these factors, you are killing the 
most important elements of economic progress. I hope that the 
Cabinet, which has all my support, will inaugurate an epoch of 
encouraging industry, instead of creating difficulties and obstacles. 
41 ) 
In defence of the bill and in reply to Sidky Pasha, Ali Bey El 
Manzalawi said: 
"In the name of social. justice, I demand, Gentlemen, that you 
should adopt that bill The whole country and the Government of 
His majesty Farouk I are full of good will towards industry and its pro- 
tection. Therefore, one cannot pretend that they want to kill it 
instantly at its birth. The existing industrial enterprises have 
already amortised a great deal of the cost of the establishiaents and 
2) 
equipments." 
These controversies in views in the Chamber were mainly due to the 
existence of some conflicting interests. El Manzalawi seemed to have 
been representing the non -industrialists. In other words, he seemed 
to represent landlords' interests. Since the imposition of that tax 
would not affect the material and financial interests of landlordism, 
no opposition against the bill emanated from the ranks of landowners. 
Actually, since the majority of members did not derive any personal 
benefit from industry, and since the Cabinet was keen on the passage 
of that bill, the Chamber approved it with a majority of 131 votes 
against 9.(3) From, this incident, one could infer that industry was 
177) La Chambre des Deoutes: op.cit. VII -iv, 5.39, pp. 34.5 -348. 
(2) Ibid. VII -iv, 5.39, p. 362. 
(3) Ibid. VII -iv, S.39, pp. 344 et seqs.; S.40, pp. 364 -370; 
S.41, 
Pp. 371 et seqs; S.42, P. 390. 
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not sufficiently represented in Parliament. The representation of 
industrialists was too weak to defend their interests. 
Time marches on, and with the lapse of time conditions change. 
It was ,in 1950 when the Chamber of Deputies discussed a governmental 
bill providing for the elimination of that "Special Tax on Exceptional 
Profits." The government stressed that this tax was a temporary one 
due to war conditions; and since these circumstances had disappeared 
with the war there was no need for its continued existence. The 
abrogation of that tax meant the lifting of some burdens imposed on 
industry and commerce. By taking such a measure the government hoped 
that the country would benefit and avoid a forecasted slump. {1) 
Nevertheless, a vigorous opposition against the bill from amongst the 
rank and file of the Wafd, the party in power at the time, arose. It 
was based on the following: firstly, that this tax was a means of 
controlling rising prices, and secondly, it was :a, good source of State 
revenue, imposed on both individuals and enterprises. The general 
progressive tax, which, according to the Cabinet, would compensate the 
treasury, was applicable only to individuals. 
(2) 
The discussion was so 
heated that the President of the Chamber left the chair to speak on the 
subject. He said: 
t"I never imagined that a house of representatives, in any country, 
(1) The address of the Minister of Finance in Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: op. 
cit., X -i, S.22, pp.17 -1$. See the report of the Committee of 
Finance on the subject, pp.26 -27 
(2) The viewpoint of the opposing group in the Committee of Finance, 
see the report, Ibid. X -i, S.22, p. 27; Also the views expressed 
by Dr. Mohamed Belal, Ibid. pp. 10 -11: Kamil Youssef Saleh, p. 
11. Dr. Mohamed Mandour, pp. 13 -14. 
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would be asked to abrogate a tax, and yet would insist on its con- 
tinuation. 
"The Minister of Finance, who supervises the treasury, is ask- 
ing you to abrogate that tax saying that he does not need it, and does 
not want to occupy the governmental machine with the task of collect- 
ing it. But some of the Honourable Deputies say that we do not want 
its abrogation:: I do not think that this is permissible, because 
the function of representative bodies, which represent the people, is 
to try as much as possible to lighten the burden of taxes on the 
(1) 
people. rr 
However, after that hot discussion, and under pressure from the 
government, when the Minister of the Interior declared that the 
government insisted on the abrogation as constituting a part of the 
government's fiscal policy, the Chamber approved the bill.(2) The 
controversies in the Chamber about that financial measure seem to have 
originated, more or less, in the difference of opinion as to what was 
best for the country as a whole. It seems that there was no influence 
of personal or group interests behind the discussion. 
In this study the Budget comes next. The procedure in regard to 
the Budget was elaborate, and was outlined by the constitution. 
Article 138 provided that the Budget should be presented to Parliament 
three months before the beginning of the financial year. Therefore, 
in the autumn of every year the different Departments prepared their 
estimates for the coming financial year. They did not merely set down 
(1) Ibid. X-i, S.22, p. 13. 
(2) Ibid, X-i, S.22, pp. 1$-20; S.?3, p. 22. 
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lump sums. They had to go into details: so much for this purpose and 
so much for that; so much from this source and so much from that. 
Their,completed estimates were very elaborate and complicated documents. 
These estimates were closely examined and revised by the Ministry of 
Finance which was the chief watch -dog against extravagance, and res- 
ponsible for balancing the Budget. They were then laid before the 
Cabinet which could not possibly discuss them in detail, but if it was 
in an economising mood it might demand that this Department or that, 
should reduce its estimates of expenditure by so many thousands. Such 
a demand was likely to lead to warm discussions. Finally the Budget 
was laid before the Chamber of Deputies. (1) 
Before the discussion of the Budget began, it was customary for the 
Minister of Finance to deliver a speech in the Chamber reviewing the 
economic, social and financial conditions of the country; and explain- 
ing the measures the Cabinet was taking for their improvement. On that 
point, Makram Ebeid Pasha, the Minister of Finance said on the occasion 
of delivering his address on the 1945 -46 Budget: 
It is according to parliamentary tradition the custom of the 
Minister of Finance to present to Parliament, in every year, in the 
name of the constitutional government a detailed address on the Budget, 
after he has prepared and carried out carefully a thorough investiga- 
tion of the different aspects of the national economy. 
"To prove that this tradition is excellent, it is sufficient to 
say that it provides the representatives of the people with all 
necessary explanations of a subject of vital importance, on which 
(1) Bihayri, cA: Al- Maws13Catu'1- Málryah, pp. 6 -10. 
depends not only their future as members of the Egyptian community, 
but equally engages their responsibility, in their quality as Deputies 
charged with watching the interests of the people. "ill 
The address of the inister of Finance was usually referred to 
the Standing Committee of Finance for study and report. The debate on 
that report gave the Chamber a unique opportunity to tackle many pro- 
blems which otherwise would never have been brought to the attention of 
the representatives of the people. Usually the report of the Committee 
of Finance on the General Economic and Financial Policy coincided with 
the views of the Minister of Finance; and consequently the Committee 
used to recommend approval of the address by the Chamber. when the 
address was passed the Chamber proceeded to discuss the Budget in detail 
It has been mentioned previously that the estimates of the Budget 
had to be presented to Parliament three months before the beginning of 
the financial year. Before going any further,one is to be certain as 
to when the beginning of the financial year in Egypt was. When the 
Constitution came into effect in 1924 the regulations ruling the 
financial system remained as they had been arranged in 1914. Therefore, 
the financial year began on the first of April. In 1926 the government 
presented to Parliament a bill in order to change thet date, to the 
first of June. Parliament did not agree to that and appointed the 
first of May to be the opening day of the financial year as from 1927. 
That rule remained effective until 1946 when a decree law changed the 
date to the first of March. However, in 1950 the government suggested 
the modification of that rule. It presented a bill providing 
for July 
i La Chambre dés Deputes: op.cit. ICI -i, 5.1ó, p. 4. 
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to be the beginning of the financial year. Parliament approved that 
bill to be effective as from 
1951.(1) 
The clear provision in the Constitution that the Budget should be 
presented to Parliament three months before the beginning of the 
financial year was designed to ensure that the representatives of the 
people should have sufficient time to discuss and approve the Budget in 
time for its application. However, different Parliaments and Cabinets 
failed to follow that rule of the Constitution. The following table 
(2) 
would help in explaining that point. 
Financial. Date of presenting 
year the Budget to 
Parliament 
1943-44 1 February 1, 1943 
1944 -45 January 31, 1944 
1D45 -46 February 5, 1945 
1946 -47 'February 4, 1946 
1947-48 February 4, 1947 
1948 -49 December 1, 1947 
1949 -50 December 6, 1948 
1950 -51 ' March 13, 1950 
Date of the Address 
of the Minister of 
Finance 
March 16, 1943 
January 31, 1944 
May 14, 1945 
July 2, 1946 
March 24, 1947 
February 2, 1948 
December 27, 1949 
March 28, 1950 
May 30, 1943 
August 13, 1944 
August 11, 1945 
July 30, 1946 
July 12, 1947 
July 8, 194e 
August 13, 1949 
August 1950. 
In explaining the causes of the delay of the approval of the Budget 
by Parliament, the Committee of Finance in 1950 expressed the following 
viewpoint: 
(1) Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. X -i, 8.46, pp. 46 -48; see also the 
Report of the Committee of Finance on that bill, Ibid, 
pp. 179 - 
184. 
(2) The table is based on material provided by the 
Committee of 
Finance in its Report on the bill_ aiming at changing the date of 
the beginning of the Financial year. Ibid X -i, 5.40, p. 
180. 
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"If the Budget comprehending all items of expenditure and sources 
of revenue were presented in full and accompanied with the explanation 
of the government in the constitutionally fixed time; and if the 
information required by the Committee from different Ministries and 
Departments arrived in a convenient time; and if the successive govern- 
ments did not introduce amendments into the Budget so late as they did, 
the promulgation of the Budget law would never have been delayed until 
after the beginning of the financial year."(1) 
After its approval of the General Economic and Financial Policy, 
Parliament proceeded to the discussion of the Budget. That discussion 
provided the members with an excellent opportunity of exercising an 
effective control over the Cabinet. Members of Parliament were entitled 
to discuss and argue every item in the Budget except those alloted to 
the payment of instalments of the public debt and expenditure listed 
for the execution of an international obligation. (2) During the dis- 
cussion of the estimates devoted in the Budget of 195J -51 to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there came an opportunity for the Chamber 
to discuss the international situation and debate the foreign policy 
of the Cabinet. That debate started with the presentation of two 
amendments to these estimates. Ibrahim Talaat suggested the curtail - 
ment from the Budget of the funds devoted to the share of Egypt in its 
(1) Ibid. X -i, S.40, p. lól. Cf. The case when in 1941 some Deputies 
criticised the delay of the discussion of the Budget. The Presi- 
dent of the Chamber answered that it was due to the request of some 
ministries to introduce amendmgnts,into the estimates of their 
Departments. La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VII -iv, S.57, 
p. 490. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 141. 
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participation in both the U.N.O. and the Arab League. After a hot 
discussion in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs took part to 
oppose these two amendments, the President of the Chamber ruled that 
the proposed amendments were contrary to Article 141 of the Constit- 
ution and refused to take a vote on them.(1) 
Moreover, the discussion of the Budget enabled Parliament to 
examine and criticise the organisation of public administration and 
suggest some means for its improvement. It was during the debate on 
the Budget in 1950 that the Chamber criticised the government's plan 
to divide the Department of f=ines and Quarries into two. Mohamed 
Hanafi El Sherif said about that matter: 
"I cannot find any justification for that partition because it 
burdens the State with sums that could be easily dispensed with. We 
know that from the viewpoint of their work, the two Departments are 
in close conjunction. From the viewpoint of finance, this partit- 
ion will burden the Budget because of the establishment of high rank- 
ing posts." 
On the same subject another Deputy, Sheikh Abdel Azim Eid said: 
'We always complain of the great number of posts and of civil 
servants. Therefore, there is no need to create from one Department 
with coherent functions, two independent Departments with the ultim- 
ate consequence of an increase in the number of civil servants and 
more burdening of the Budget. "(3) 
It was only after the participation of the Linister of Commerce 
and Industry in the debate to explain the viewpoint of the Cabinetthat 
(1) Majlisu'n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. X -i, S.29, pp.l8 -22. 
(2) Ibid. X -i, S.31, p.12. 
(3) Ibid. X -i, S.31, p.13. 
(2) 
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the Chamber approved the division of that Department into two.(1) 
In spite of the absolute right of members of Parliament to control 
the executive and discuss the Budget, as indicated, restrictions on 
the discussion of the Budget were imposed at certain times. In 1942, 
before the debate on the general financial policy began, the President 
of the Chamber declared: 
"The report of the Committee of Finance on the general financial 
policy of the State shall be submitted during the sitting of next 
`:onday. I suggest that members who wish to take part in the dis- 
cussion of that subject should present to the Bureau of the Chamber a 
request indicating the points which they intend to treat. It is my 
opinión that there is no need to discuss the estimates of expenditure 
of the different Ministries, because the time does not allow that, and 
the Budget has been sufficiently delayed. "(2) 
Although that rule was faced with criticism from both supporters 
of the Cabinet,(3) and the weak Opposition,(4) the Chamber decided to 
accept it. Again, the effectiveness of that rule was confirmed when 
the President in 1951 declared: 
"The Committee of Finance has completed its Report on the general 
financial policy of the State. It will be distributed tomorrow. Then, 
we shall start its examination during a sitting to be held next Sunday; 
and we should continue that discussion during the following sittings. 
(1) Ibid. X -i, S.33, p. 14. 
(2) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VIII -i, S.12, p. 12e. 
(3) Cf. The criticism of Fakhry Bey Abdel :our, Ibid. 
VIII -i, S.15, 
pp. 182 -186. 
(4) Cf. The criticism of Mohamed Mahmoud Galal, Ibid. 
VIII -i, S.12, 
p. 12$. 
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Therefore, I request the Honourable Deputies who asked to participate 
in the discussion to notify the Secretariate of their intention to 
participate and the subjects about which they want to talk 
':[hen we finish the discussion of the general financial policy we shall 
turn to discuss the estimates of expenditure of the different Ministries. 
No one will be permitted to take the floor except in particular cases 
and in accordance with the parliamentary custom of 1942, that is to say, 
when the amendment or omission of an item is suggested. "(1) 
It is of some interest to quote here part of a discussion on that 
point. During the examination of the Budget in 1951 one of the Deputies 
presented an amendment to the estimates of the Id.nistry of Justice. 
It was introducing an increase in these estimates in order to raise the 
salaries of judges of the Islamic Courts (Al- Mahnkiniu's i- aaarciyah) . 
Announcing this proposed amendment; the President said: 
"I pray that it should be noticed that constitutionally we are not 
allowed to propose to raise estimates provided in the Budget if they 
were devoted to the civil service. Our task,when treating the Budget,is 
exclusively to approve, to reject or to reduce; to increase is, there- 
fore, not of our rights, and that is according to constitutional tradi- 
tions and parliamentary precedents."(2) 
In reply, Sheikh Abdel Azim Eid said: 
"The presentation of the Budget to the Chamber means that its 
approval, rejection, or amendment in any manner is an absolute right of 
that Chamber. Otherwise, the Chamber would not have the complete 
(1) Majlisu?n-Aduwwáb: op.cit. X-i, S.23, p. 4. 
(2) Ibid., X-ii, S.36, p. 13. 
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authority on the Budget of the State; because if it is prevented to 
(1) 
amend by increasing the funds, its authority would become incomplete..." 
In spite of that clear divergence on such an important constitutions 
al point, the Chamber did not give the matter serious attention. The 
Chamber yielded to the autocracy of the executive and accepted its 
deprivation from one of its essential rights. 
To provide more proof of the ineffectiveness of the financial 
control of Parliament, one should refer to the 'supplementary credits'. 
This was a system which enabled the executive to face any financial 
emergency for which it had not provided while preparing the Budget. It 
was allowed to ask Parliament to approve the expenditure of a certain 
sum devoted to a particular purpose. On the surface the system seems 
to be of some value; but the fact that during a parliamentary session 
59 per cent (89 out of .152) of the legislation passed in the Chamber of 
Deputies provided for supplementary credits leads one to doubt its real 
value.(2) The Cabinet did not only exaggerate in asking Parliament to 
.authorise supplementary credits - something which indicates the in- 
efficiency of the Budgetary system - but also it frequently decided the 
matter and directed the funds to their destinations before acquiring the 
authorisation of Parliament. In criticism of such an action of the 
Cabinet, Ali Bey El Manzalawi said: 
"The credit requested has been already spent; something which is 
not permitted, because in such a case the control of Parliament over the 
actions of the government is paralysed. The Constitution provided that 
Ti id Ib. x-ii, 5.377, p,13 
(2) La Chambre des Députbs: op.cit. VIII-iii, S.GO; p. 454. 
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the government should obtain, in advance, the authorisation of Parlia- 
ment before drawing such credits; not to spend them first and then ask 
for their approbation. "(1) 
Moreover, it might be of interest to quote here some of the dis- 
cussion on a bill providing for a supplementary credit. 
"Ahmed Mohamed Birairi:- It is said that what you deal with is a 
supplementary credit, but in fact it is not one, it is an 'excess' 
"The President:- In my capacity as President of the Chamber I never 
allow the government to spend and come afterwards to the Chamber seeking 
its consent to that expenditure. This is an unconstitutional action 
which I do not accept. 
"Dr. Hamid El Sherif : - This is not the first time in which the Cabinet 
on.the Chamber 'de facto' conditions by spending in excess and 
then coming to the Chamber asking its approval of what it has already 
spent." 
(2) 
The Audit Department criticised bitterly these unconstitutional 
actions and considered them dangerous. It referred to them in its 
reports, and the Committee of Finance in the Chamber echoed the cries 
of the Audit Department, when in one of its reports it said: 
One of the most dangerous actions is to exceed the funds 
provided for by the Budget of the State without any authorisation from 
the Chamber. This case is repeated every year, and the Chamber has been 
criticising and admonishing against it. But in every case we find 
that the responsible officials continue to spend and face the Chamber 
with the 'de facto' conditions. 
(1) Ibid. IX -ii, 5.4, p. 14. 
(2) Majlisu)n- Nuwwâb: op.cit. X -ii, S.41, pp. $ -9. Cf. A similar case 
and discussion, La Chamber des Députés: op.cit. VII -iv, S.68, 
p. 563. 
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!!No doubt that the continuation of that situation is only due to 
the certainty of these officials that the best way to force the Chamber 
to agree to their wishes is to face it with the de facto condition. 
It is regrettable to admit that the Chamber has enabled them to assault 
(1) 
its authority and to continue practising these unconstitutional actions'.' 
The Audit Department (Diwánú 1 -Mul ásabah) was established in 1942 
with the aim of controlling finances. It audited the accounts and 
reported to Parliament. It was concerned with the proofs of payment 
and the proper expenditure of the money. It did not only report upon 
legality but also upon the wisdom and economy of expenditure; that is 
to say it was concerned with waste in so far as it could be detected. 
In creating the Audit Department, Parliament placed a permanent exe- 
cutive office with the task of controlling the executive elements 
engaged in spending. 
The status of the : ".udit Department was unique. It was an inde- 
pendent institution, and formed no part of the executive power. The 
President of the Audit Department was appointed by the King on the 
recommendation of the Cabinet for the period of five years. He was 
responsible only to Parliament, and was removeable only on a resolution 
passed by the Chamber of Deputies.(2) 
(1) Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. X -ii, S. 37, p. 10$. 
(2) The only precedent when the Chamber of Deputies resolved on the 
dismissal of the President of the Audit Department was in 1945. 
After the return to power of the anti-Wafdist coalition, the 
Chamber supporting that coalition passed a resolution urging the 
Cabinet to dismiss Kainil Pasha Sidky, the Wafdist President of the 
Audit Department. La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX -i, S.ô, pp. 
2 -3. In accordance with that resolution he was dismissed and the 
Cabinet officially conveyed that to the Chamber. Ibid IX -i, 5.10, 
p.2. 
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The independence of the Audit Department enabled it to perform its 
function in an appreciated manner.(1) The ultimate result, however, 
was that Parliament which was the only authority that could take 
effective measures to stop irregularity in financial actions, stood 
paralysed before the dictatorship of the executive. For instance, when 
¿_ifferences between the Cabinet, and the President of the Department 
obliged the latter to resign his post some Deputies tried to find out 
the real motives behind that resignation, the Cabinet did not give any 
explanation and the Chamber kept. silent . 2) Moreover, Parliament did 
not pay much attention to the reports of the Department, with a result 
that different executive elements disregarded the Department's directions 
That point was raised in the Chamber of Deputies when Atta Bey Afifi 
said: 
"The Audit Department has emanated from the will of the Chamber 
of Deputies. The first report presented by the Department revealed 
numerous infractions in the administration. But the different ad- 
to 
ministrations paid no attention /the remarks formulated by the Depart- 
ment; and this would result in the ineffectiveness of the control which 
(3) it exercises 
The ineffectiveness of the Chamber of Deputies in the sphere of 
finance has been shown. The evidence provided proves that this ineffect 
iveness originated from its actions with regard to State Expenditure. 
The question of custom duties provides further evidence of ineffective- 
ness with regard to the function of supervising State Revenue. 
Tl) Cf. The Report of the Department reviewed by the Committee of 
Finance, Majlisun- tuwrwiab: op.cit. X -ii, 5.37, pp. 107 et sect. 
(2) Ibid. X -i, S.23, ,p. 4. 
(3) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. IX, -ii, 3.14, p. 144. 
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Custom duties were imposed by the executive. Parliament delegated 
its authority to supervise this kind of tax to the Cabinet. This del- 
egation of authority originated, when during the abrogation of the 1923 
Constitution a decree law fixing the rates of custom duties was prom- 
ulgated. This decree law should have been presented to Parliament 
during the 1936 -37 parliamentary session to pass it as a law. Instead 
it became customary to prolong every year the period during which that 
decree law should be brought before Parliament. Thus leaving in the 
hands of the executive, without any supervision from the representat- 
ives of the people, the fixation of that important item of State 
revenue. (1) So important were custom duties that the Committee of 
Finance in its report about the 1949 -50 Budget said: 
'The greatest element in the Revenue is custom duties which 
amounted to £E65,627,000, i.e. more than 45% of the aggregate Revenue. 
No doubt that resorting to custom duties for the collection of about 
half the revenue is one of the economic principles which could not be 
defended. The burden of custom duties, which are indirect taxes,lies, 
ultimately on the consumer. It results in increasing prices and 
decreasing purchasing power t' 
As mentioned by the 'inister of Finance in 1946, certain 
members used to express their opposition to the right of Parliament 
to supervise custom duties being delegated to the Cabinet.(3) The 
opposition mainly came from Ali Bey El Manzalawi who addressed the 
(1) The Explanatory Note presented by the ministry of Finance 
on that 
subject, cited in Ma jlisu'n- Nuwwáb : op.cit. X -ii, 3.40, 
p.621 
(2) The report of the Committee. of Finance, cited in 
Ibid. IX -v, 
8.19, p.679. < 
(3) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. IX -ii, S.41, p.392. 
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Chamber of Deputies on that point in 1946 saying: 
'The mandate, which you demand every year to be conferred on the 
government, constitutes a blow to your right to control the actions of 
the government in relation to the customs. That question is extrefiely 
serious, because custom duties have effect on prices of necessary goods 
and on local industry. Therefore, I urge you not to accord that 
mandate. r' (1) 
However, Parliament deliberately agreed in the succeeding years 
to grant the executive that mandate, which meant depriving itself of an 
aspect of its functions. 
As indicated before, every parliamentary session was inaugurated 
with a Speech from the Throne. That Speech passed in review the 
activities of the executive in the previous year, and its plans for the 
following one. In accordance with the Constitution, each of the two 
Chambers of Parliament presented an Address in reply to the Speech.(2) 
The custom was that each of the two Chambers selected a special standing 
committee, usually presided over by one of the Vice -Presidents, to 
draft the Address. Generally speaking, the committee backed the 
Cabinet. The draft of the Address complied with the government's policy 
appreciating what the Cabinet had done and supporting what it was 
intending to perform. Sometimes tendencies hostile to the Cabinet were 
found in the Committee. They were weakened, if not crushed by the 
strength of the majority the government usually held. While drafting 
the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne in 1950 such a 
1 Ibid. ILL -ii, S.41, p. 391. 
(2) 1923 Constitution, Art. 42. 
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situation was found. Although the Committee paid little attention to 
the voices of the Opposition inside the Committee, the divergence of 
views was brought before the Chamber which decided in favour of the 
Cabinet and the majority in the Committee.(1) 
The Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne was not definite 
before it was discussed and voted on by the Chamber. This provided the 
Chamber with an opportunity to debate on the general policy of the 
Cabinet. Emphasising the merits of the debate on the Address, Abdel 
Aziz Bey El Sofani said: 
"The Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne provides an 
opportunity, every year, for criticising or praising the policy of the 
government. "(2) 
That opportunity was presented as soon as Parliament settled down 
to the work of the session. The atmosphere of such a debate varied 
from one year to the other. Its ultimate ending, however, was the 
approval of the committee's report and the draft Address. The leaders 
of the Opposition parties directed the attack on the government's 
policies, past, present and future. Supporters of the Cabinet spoke in 
its defence. The Prime Minister.or one of the ministers astute and of 
sound standing, defended these policies at length. Members of Parlia- 
ment felt free to join in the debate on the Address in reply to the 
Speech from the Throne. The great merit of that debate from the view- 
point of the private member was that the field of argument was virtually 
unlimited, and it was, therefore, possible to talk about anything under 
1 Majlisu'n- Nuwwab:, op.cit. X -ii, S.4, pp. 17 -19. 
(2) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VIII -iii, S.8, p. ál. 
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the sun.(1) The extent to which members took advantage of this 
extended field varied from year to year, but the tendency was for a 
large number to use it as a convenient chance of expressing their own 
views, if not for the edification of their constituencies. They 
expressed no precise views or presented no useful ideas, but only 
touched on the general outlines of different subjects. Since the 
Speeches from the Throne were identical - they usually treated two main 
subjects: (a) the foreign policy, mainly Anglo- Egyptian relations, and 
the efforts of the Cabinet to achieve the national demands; and (b) 
home affairs and their improvement, but the measures suggested were 
rather ambiguous - it is not strange to find that the debate in 
different years followed one pattern. Moreover, Deputies repeated 
themselves every year.(2) 
In 1941, on a request from the Cabinet the Chamber decided to 
divide the debate on the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne 
into two parts: (a) internal policy, and (b) foreign policy with 
reference to the international situation and events of the Second World 
War. It was decided also that the latter part of the debate would be 
(1) Cf. The case when in 1942 Abdel Aziz Bey El Sofani tried to tackle 
the subject of the legality of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance with 
Great Britain. The Cabinet objected to that and requested the 
President of the Chamber to prevent that member from continuing his 
talk on this subject. The President, after consulting the Chamber, 
agreed to the request of the Cabinet. However, it was explained 
that the debate on the Address in reply to the Speech from the 
Throne ought to be within the limits of t1 ose subjects treated by 
both the Speech and the Address. Ibid. VIII -i, S.5, pp. 61 -63. 
(2) See the debates on the Address in reply to the Speech from the 
Throne. Ibid. VII -iv, S.8, pp. 35 -39; VIII -i, S.5, pp. 61 -67; 
VIII -ii, 3.3, pp. 14 et seq; IX -i, S.4: pp. 2 et seq.; 
IX -ii, 
Ss, pp. 49 -57; S.9, pp. 59 et seqs., and 3.10 pp. 76 et seqs.; 
Majlisu'n- Nuwwab: op.cit. IX -v, S.6, pp. 71 et seq; X -i, 6.3, pp. 
15 -17, 19 et seq; X -ii, 3.4, pp. 19 et seq.; 
S.5, pp. 15 et seq. 
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held in camera. However, it seems that there arose a strong opposition 
to the Cabinet's policy in that regard. This may be easily deduced 
from the following statements: 
"The Prime Minister: - I present before the Honourable Assembly 
the question of confidence in the policy of the government with regard 
to foreign affairs and the military situation which the Chamber has 
been discussing at length during the three sittings held in camera. 
"Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, The President of the Chamber. -) I demand 
that action should be taken in regard to my protest against the govern- 
ment for its delay in submitting its statement to the Deputies in a 
time suitable to allow them to discuss and decide on it. Uoreover, 
declare, in my own name and on behalf of my colleagues, that we have no 
confidence in such a government."(2) 
However, the Chamber voted confidence in the government with a 
majority of 122 against bps. This was the only time that the debate on 
the Address developed into a question of confidence in the Cabinet. 
Moreover, the Opposition in 1943 tried to introduce amendments into 
the draft of the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne in order 
to force the government to end the state of martial law. However, the 
government mobilized all its supporters and these amendments were 
rejected. The incident had some importance because it was the first 
time that such a positive attitude towards amending the Address had 
appeared. Moreover, .it showed, as was expressed in the debate by the 
Prime Minister, that the introduction of any amendment into the Address 
(1) He was in the same time the leader of the Saadist Party. 
(2) La Chambre des éputés: op.cit. Vii-iv, 5.7, p. 29. 
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would mean a vote of no confidence in the government.(1) 
In its control over the executive, the Chamber of Deputies had at 
its disposal four means: (1) The question; (2) the interpellation; 
(3) the motion for discussion; and (4) the vote of confidence. The 
first two methods have been discussed while speaking about the Senate. 
Nevertheless, the addition of a few observations about their use in 
the Chamber of Deputies seems useful, and there now follows a study of 
the way in which the Chamber exercised control over the Cabinet. 
(1) The Luestion: 
AS already mentioned the purpose behind the interrogation varied. 
It might be a simple inquiry for information, or a covert attack on a 
minister. It might be a search for material to use in a later debate, 
or an attempt to win favour in a constituency. It might be an 
endeavour to call public attention to a grievance, or a chance to induce 
the government to commit itself to a policy. Parliamentary questions, 
in the Chamber of Deputies, covered a vast range of public affairs. 
Despite their great number, parliamentary questions were abused by 
different members. They were used by those members who could not 
participate in any parliamentary activity and desired to prove their 
existence as members in Parliament. Moreover, they were frequently 
used to embarrass a particular Minister or to achieve some immediate 
personal advantage or purpose.(2) However, parliamentary questions, 
generally speaking, were aimed at revealing facts about both home and 
foreign problems. From that viewpoint one could say that the 
(1) Ibid. VIII-iii, 8.8, pp. 78 et seq. 
(2) 14adk.r and Gháli : op.cit. p. 111. 
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parliamentary question was a successful device in the working of the 
Egyptian representative system. The records of the Chamber are filled 
with various parliamentary questions, with different motives behind 
each. In nearly every sitting, Ministers had to answer questions 
presented to them by different members of Parliament.(1) 
(1) For the reinforcement of the argument some sampling of these 
questions are provided. For instance questions were answered on 
the following subjects: the dompensation of victims of air -raids 
on Egypt, La Chambre des Déput6s: op.cit. VII -iv, 3.5, pp. 13 -14; 
sequestrators on enemy property, Ibid, VII -iv, S.6, p. 19; members 
of Parliament engaged in membership of boards of administration of 
different enterprises, Ibid, VII -iv, S.8, p. 34.; social centres, 
Ibid. VII -iv, S.18, p. 148; the possibilities of establishing an 
industrial Bank, Ibid VII -iv, S.31, p. 241; prices of food 
supplies especially fish, VIII -ii, S.16, p.121; the Black Book, 
VIII -ii, S.25, p. 171, (during that session - 1942 -43- questions 
which had no aim except attempting to defend the Vafdist Cabinet 
against accusations provided by the Black Book were answered in the 
Chamber), the installation of a pipe line by the British authorities 
in Egypt, VIII -iii, S.32, p. 306; the electrification of the Aswan 
Dam, VIII -iii, S.35, p. 322, the relation between Bank Misr and the 
government, VIII -iii, 8.41, pp. 384 -385; the distribution of food 
supplies especially flour, sugar and kerosene in Cairo, IX -i, 8.5, 
p. 1; conditions of irrigation; cleaning the streets of Cairo, 
IX -i, 8.20, pp. 2 -4, the participation of Egypt in the reconstruct- 
ion of Europe, and the U.N.O.; IX -i, S.20, pp. 2 -4; financial con- 
ditions, IX -i, S.24, p. 2; Anglo- Egyptian relations and the 
national demands, IX- extraordinary session, Oct. 1945, S.3, p.20; 
prices of Sudanese products; means of transport in Cairo, IX, -ii, 
S.3, p. 10; dismissal of workers from the British Ordinance, IX -ii, 
S.29, p.250; company law, the share of Egypt in the revenue of the 
Suez Canal Company, IX -ii, S.34, p. 300; civil servants, IX -iii, 
S.7, p.27; electricity in Alexandria, IX -ii, S.14, p.97; the 
possibility of nationalising the National Bank of Egypt; the 
application of the Company law to the Suez Canal Company, Majlisuan- 
Nuwwab: op.cit. IX -v, S.7, p. 90; causes of the deterioration of 
prices of.cbtton, Ibid, IX -v, S.24, pp. 960 -961; the activities of 
the Minister of Foreign Affais abroad, Ibid, IX -v, 5.37, p.2483; 
causes of the rise in price6Ypetrol, Ibid X -i, S.5, p.8; the pro- 
gress of the investigation into the murder of Hassan El Banna, the 
leader of the Moslem Brotherhood, Ibid X -i, 5.31, pp. 10-11; the 
incident of the British vessel Empire Roch, and Anglo- Egyptian 
relations. Ibid X -ii, S.36, pp. 5 -10 
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When questions were embarrassing, the Cabinet or the Minister 
responsible attempted to avoid answering them. One of the best examples 
is a question about certain incidents in the Canal Zone in 1951. The 
question was on the Order of the Day of the Chamber to be answered in 
the Sitting of September 3, 1951. The Prime Minister asked for the 
postponement of answering this question. This request was repeated 
three times until the parliamentary session came to a close and there 
was no chance at all of answering the question.(1) 
2. The Interpellation. 
As mentioned before, interpellations were an effective means of 
controlling the executive. They expressed resentment of the Cabinet 
for a particular act. Thus an interpellation could develop into a 
question of confidence in the Cabinet. However, it seems what members 
of Parliament never fully realised the difference in the nature of 
the question and the interpellation. This resulted in a great number 
of interpellations being moved in Parliament. It looked ridiculous 
that on the Order of the Day of that sitting or the other, one item of 
the Chambers business was the discussion of six or seven interpellations. 
Actually, if the Chamber wished to discuss seriously any of these inter - 
pellations, it would take from its time more than one sitting. Accord- 
ingly, it is not to be wondered at that almost all interpellations 
ended with the customary resolution to return to the Order of the Day. 
Moreover, it seems that the rules of procedure which gave priority to a 
proposed resolution aiming at bringing the discussion to an end and 
(1) Ibid. X-ii, S.42, p. 4; S.43, P. 6; 3.45, p.4; 3.46, p.3. 
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returning to the Order of the Day, were also responsible for the in- 
effectiveness of interpellations. It may be interesting to note that 
interpellations appeared more during certain seasons, namely when the 
downfall of a Cabinet was in sight. In other words, interpellat- 
ions were numerous and vigorous when the weakness of the Cabinet was 
felt. When it was in a solid position, Deputies scarcely interpellated 
the executive. Therefore, one could say that interpellations did 
not create or cause any ministerial crises, but they were the outcome 
(1) 
of or were motivated by such crises. 
Sometimes, members presented interpellations without any previous 
study of their subjects, or of the actions of the government which 
they were not only criticising, but also reproaching. For instance 
the Chamber fixed a certain sitting for the discussion of an inter - 
pellation presented to the iini ster of Communications about the der- 
ogation of the rules concerning permits for running buses. The member 
who had reproached the ¿overnment on that subject, Mohamed Bey Sakr, 
came to say on that particular sitting: 
"After presenting that interpellation, it came to my knowledge 
that the Linistry of Communications is preparing a bill to regulate all 
means of transport, and to eradicate all reasons for complaints. Also 
the bill will remedy the defects to which I have referred in my inter - 
pellation. Therefore, that interpellation wnich I have presented has 
lost its 'raison d'etre'." 
(2) 
(1) i`dadkur and ah ni: op.cit. pp.112 -1 4. 
(2) La Chambre des D4putes: op.cit. IX -ii, ,C.2, p.243. 
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In few cases, the Chamber passed, in consequence of discussing 
interpellations, resolutions urging the executive to perform a specific. 
'action. After a keen discussion about the appointment of members of 
Parliament as sequestrators of the property of Germans and Italians 
during the Second World War, the Chamber of Deputies passed the follow- 
ing resolution: 
"After hearing statements from the interpellators, the government, 
and Honourable members taking part in the discussion, the Chamber does 
not approve the principle of nominating members of Parliament as 
sequestrators on property sequestrated because of the War. "(1) 
It is worth noticing that the Cabinet submitted to that resolution 
and notified the Chamber about the effective steps taken by it for the 
(2) 
application of that rule. 
On the other hand, the Cabinet frequently paid no attention to 
such resolutions. This negligence of Parliament's opinion induced 
Abdel Hamid Abdel Hakk to declare in the Chamber: 
"It seems that suggestions and interpellations presented by the 
Honourable Deputies are neglected. In its answers, the government 
tries to satisfy the Honourable Deputies by friendly and pleasant 
speeches, without attempting to bring them to be effective. This 
attitude reveals the absence of any collaboration between Parliament 
and successive governments; it denotes that the government has no 
stable policy but adopts programmes improvised according to cir clm- 
stances." 
(3 ) 
(1) Ibid, VII -iv, S.24, p.194. 
(2) Ibid. VII -iv, S.34, p.274. 
(3) Ibid. VII -iv, S.54, p.474. 
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Although, as it has been repeated, an interpellation was a means 
of reproaching the government, and could develop into an issue of con- 
fidence in the Cabinet, such development was never found unless the 
Cabinet so desired. Naturally, as one would expect, raising the 
question of confidence in the Cabinet was very infrequent. However, 
to illustrate this argument, the discussion of the interpellation about 
air -raids on Alexandria and the achievement of the government in the 
sphere of civil defence is a good example. In spite of a strongly 
hostile attitude towards the Cabinet, certain deputies siggested the 
closure of thé discussion and the return to the Order of the Day. 
Nevertheless, faced with another proposed resolution moved with the aim 
of blaming the Cabinet and considering the precautions of civil defence 
to be insufficient, the Cabinet raised the issue of the confidence of 
Parliament in it. This appeared as a challenge from the Cabinet to 
the Chamber to vote in its favour, otherwise it would resort to the 
King's right to dissolve the Chamber. This opinion could easily be 
inferred from the insistance of the Cabinet that the voting on the 
question of confidence should be carried out without any application 
of the constitutional rule permitting the postponement of such a motion 
for eight days.(1) 
In other cases the majority which the Cabinet held in the Chamber 
was a sufficient safety valve enabling the Cabinet to hold the con- 
fidence of the Chamber. For instance, after the discussion of the 
interpellation moved by Makram Ebeid Pasha about certain specified 
(1) Ibid. V1.I-iv, S.55, pp479-480 
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accusations against the Wafdist Cabinet and administration, the 
Chamber passed a resolution expressing its regret for what it called 
"unjust and criminal accusations ". Simultaneously, the Chamber 
passed a unanimous vote of confidence in the Cabinet, This vote of 
confidence was, as described in the resolution, a renewal or reinforce- 
ment of the Chamber's confidence in the Cabinet.(1) It was the out- 
come of party manoeuvre. It aimed at washing out all traces of that 
vigorous attack on the Cabinet, and the accusation of its members with 
corruption and nepotism which had been made against the Wafd and the 
Cabinet. 
3. The Motion for Discussion. 
This device, which was introduced to the Egyptian Parliament in 
1941, enabled the private member to move the discussion of any subject 
he judged to be of public importance. It seems to have been something 
in between the question and the interpellation. It allowed an ex- 
change of opinions between the Chamber and the government, but it did 
not carry with it any reproach against the Cabinet. As emphasised by 
the President of the Chamber, the device of the motion for discussion 
was adopted in the Egyptian Parliament in imitation of the British 
system. He added; 
"Its aim is apparent when there emerge important matters 
which 
may affect the public weal economically or politically, and the 
Chamber wishes to ascertain the views of the government, or the 
\1! Ibid.VltI-ilr, 347, pp.390-391. 
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government thinks it appropriate to be informed with the attitude of 
the Chamber, then such matter may be moved for discussion. Therefore 
it is neither a question which aims at obtaining information, nor an 
interpellation which bears certain accusations. It is only a dis- 
(11 
cession where ideas are exchanged for the sake of the public interest..:` 
The motion for discussion was simply a means to enable a subject 
to be brought before the Chamber. The member moving such a motion 
would probably succeed in doing more than force a. discussion, for the 
Cabinet could not abstain from offering some comment on the issue which 
had been raised. A minister was, therefore, apt to attempt a defence 
or at least make a statement which would involve an enunciation of 
government policy. For illustration, the discussion on the decision 
of the 'Societe des Sucreries' to close down two factories in Upper 
Egypt causing the unemployment of some thousand workers and, affecting 
the interests of sugar -cane planters, helped in clarifying the attitude 
of the Cabinet towards the matter, and in expressing the views of 
members of Parliament. Moreover, the discussion resulted in a promise 
(2) 
from the Cabinet to induce the Company to keep the two factories going. 
Again, the discussion in 1949 on the restrictions imposed on the in- 
dustry and trade of textiles was of some importance, because as the 
Prime Minister declared: 
the object of this discussion is to know the trend of public 
opinion. Every Deputy is in contact with his constituents, and he is 
in a better position to know what they wish. The government will 
(1) Ni4jlisu ñ.-iduwviab: op.cit. X-i, 3.9, pp.10-11 
(2) Ibid. IX-v, 3.19, pp.644-552 
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stand as a judge between the companies and the people. "(1) 
Although the discussion did not result in any concrete resolution, 
and the Chamber simply agreed to the closure of the discussion and the 
return to the Order of the Day, one could not overlook the fact that 
it reflected public opinion and showed the conflict of differently 
interested groups in the Chamber. (2) Motions for discussion covered 
a vast field of the Egyptian life; and it seers sufficient to mention 
some of the subjects moved for discussion: the national demands, 
(3 ) 
the deteriorating social and sanitary conditions,(4) the agricultural 
policy,(5) the high cost of living,(6) and the deterioration of prices 
of cotton. (7 
) 
4. The Vote of Confidence. 
This was the most direct method of launching an attack on the 
Cabinet. Although the Constitution provided for such a measure to be 
moved in the Chamber of Deputies, it was usually brought in as an amend- 
ment to another motion or by an immediate attack on a government 
measure. The question of confidence raised in 1943 in consequence of 
the discussion of Makram Pasha's interpellation could be considered as 
an amendment to an original motion; while that raised in 1941 during 
the debate on the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne was 
(1) Ibid. IX-v, S.21, p.766 
(2) Ibid. IX-v, S.21, pp.760-766; S.23, pp.$71-$76 , o 
(3) Ibid. X-i, S.28, pp.38 et seq and 53-58; La Chambre des réputes: 
op ci t. IX-iii, S.9, pp36-46; IX-iv, S.3, p.5. 
(4) Ibid. IX-iii, S.16, pp.124-126 
(5) Ibid. IX-iv, S.11, pp.2-3; Piajlisu "n-Nuwwab: op.cit. IX-v, 5.31, 
pp.l581-158$ 
(6) Ibid. X-i, S.9, pp.44 et seq; S.13, pp7 et seq; 3.14, pp.30 et seq 
La Chambre des Députts: op.cit. IX-iv, 8.14, pp.10-11 
(7) Majlisus)ñ-Nuti,iwäb: op.cit. X-i, S.11, pp.11 et seq. 
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the result of a direct attack on the government's foreign policy. 
(1) 
Usually the Cabinet took the initiative to demand a vote of con- 
fidence from the Chamber. This demand generally appeared as a threat 
by the Cabinet to take measures for the dissolution of the Chamber if 
that body did not vote in its confidence. Thus in February 1946, 
after the resignation of El Nokrashy Pasha, the new Prime ïinister 
feeling that the Saadist Party which held the majority of seats in the 
Chamber was not in complete favour of his Cabinet, asked the Chamber 
to confirm its confidence in the Cabinet. Virtually, the Chamber 
voted in confidence of Sidky Pasha and his Cabinet.(2) 
It seems important to point out that the Chamber scarcely used 
its right to move an issue of confidence in the Cabinet. Moreover, 
whenever such a questioh appeared, the Chamber vote 
no confidence in the Cabinet, to the extent that even those who had 
expressed their opposition to the government did not cast votes of no 
confidence, but abstained altogether from voting. However, attention 
is drawn to the fact that the Chamber never passed a vote of no- 
confidence in any Cabinet. 
Besides legislating and controlling the executive, a Lower Douse 
of Parliament, according to Alalter Bagehot should express the mind of 
the people it represents, and should educate public opinion on differ- 
ent questions.(3) Now let us consider the activities of Parliament in 
Egypt with regard to these two functions. 
1) Both incidents have been discussed above, see supra 
(2) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. IX -ii, S.15, pp.148-149 & 155. 
(3) Bagehot, W.: The English Constitution pp.117 -118. 
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It seems that Parliament expressed the Egyptian nation's opinion 
in words, when it happened that words, not laws, were wanted. Subjects 
discussed in Parliament covered a vast scope. They extended to reach 
nearly every branch of life. When prices rose high and food supplies 
became scarce the subject was discussed in earnest.(1) When some 
cities were bombed during the Second World War, the Chamber busied 
itself to examine and discuss the validity of the preparations taken by 
the government for the civil defence of the country. 
(2) 
Horne affairs, 
ranging from minor matters, such as the acceptance of particular stud- 
ents in the University,(3) to such big issues as the improvement of 
social and sanitary conditions,() and plans for land reform(5) were 
brought in front of the Chamber. To enumerate such cases where 
functioned to express grievances the aspirations of the 
people would be neither an easy nor a brief task. The above mentioned 
examples, however, may suffice to prove that viewpoint. 
Moreover, in the sphere of foreign affairs, and especially on the 
question of Anglo- Egyptian relations, Parliament discussed them freely. 
Members expressed themselves in a manner, never adopted otherwise, and 
which found appreciation amongst the people. Incidents where foreign 
affairs were discussed, and national demands and aspirations were ex- 
pressed, are numerous in the parliamentary annals of Egypt. Therefore, 
(1) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VIII -i, S.11, pp.121 -122; 
S.14, pp.l38 et seq; Majlisu)n- Nuwwab: op.cit. X -i, S.13, 
pp.7 et seq; S.14, pp.35 45 
(2) La Chambre des Deputes: op.cit. VII -iv, S.6, pp.19 -21 
(3) Ibid. VII -iv, S.13, pp.92 -93; 8.25, pp.197 -198 
(4) Ibid. IX -iii, S.16, pp.124. -126 
(5) Majlisu .'n- Nuwwáb: op.cit. X -i, 3.12, p.14. 
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it seems sufficient to refer to a few incidents where this particular 
subject was dealt with: the interpellation about a broadcast by the 
British Prime Minister on December 12, 1940 which was interpreted to 
mean the placing of Egypt under a British Protectorate,(1) the inter - 
pellation about Anglo -Egyptian relations and certain statements made by 
British authorities considered as violations of Egypt's independence 
and the 1935 Treaty; 2) the discussion following the surrender of 
Germany, it extended to comprehend the national demands of Egypt;(3) 
and, the discussion of the foreign policy of the government.(!) Not a 
single parliamentary session expired without the discussion of one 
interpellation or more relating to foreign affairs. The discussion of 
foreign affairs did not require any legislation, all that was needed 
was a thorough expression of sentiment poured out in words only. 
Frequently the Chamber discussed many questions on which the 
electorate did not have any convictions, or on which they might need 
further information and guidance. The debates in Parliament, however, 
had little teaching efficacy. It seems that certain members of Par- 
liament monopolised the platform in the Chamber. The same names 
appeared whenever a debate of any kind was carried on. Parliament 
talked, agreed, investigated, opposed, decided and sometimes postponed 
action on some matters. This would have aroused the interest of the 
people and would have helped in creating an enlightened opinion through- 
out the country. However, Parliament did not actually teach the 
(1) La Chambre des Députés: op.cit. VII -iv, S.13, pp.91 -92 
(2) Ibid. VIII -iii, 3.38, pp.340 -346 
(3) Ibid. IX -i, S.l8, pp.2 -3 
(4) Ibid. IX -ii, S.15, pp.149 -155 
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people as much as it night. This teaching would not rriean philosophy 
and hard abstract matters to be stated in Parliament. Only popular 
teaching was required. Popular in the sense of being concrete, short, 
to the point and in accordance with the popular understanding. 
Professor Ivor Jennings described the process of educating the 
electorate in Britain. He said: P1So the discussion radiates from 
Westminster in waves of ever- decreasing elasticity. Arguments are 
transmuted, prevented, simplified, perhaps distorted. A 'common 
opinion' develops, and creates new waves which find their way back to 
Westminster. They set going new arguments in the smoke room, and 
more frequently in the House. In their turn these arguments produce 
new rays which go back to the ordinary people. In this way there is 
a constant assimilation of opinion ''(l) This successful method 
of educating public opinion was never found in Egypt. The relations 
with regard to public matters, between members of Parliament and their 
constituents were usually non -existent after the electoral campaign was 
over. Discussions and debates in Parliament hardly came to the know- 
ledge of the common person. means of conveying news of these activities 
were either in the hands of the government as the State Broadcasting 
system, or under censorship as the case was with newspapers. In addit- 
ion, social conditions, specifically illiteracy and poverty caused the 
function of Parliament to educate the public opinion to be a failure. 
To prove that Parliament never paid attention to public opinion, it 
seems ap -ropriate to quote the Reporter of the Standing Committee of 
(1) Jennings, ;.I.: Parliamentary reform, pp.l8-19 
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Legislative Affairs in his reply to criticism of the legislation of 
illegal earnings. He said: 
i7Dr. Nour El Din said that this legislation not being retrospect- 
ive, appears incomplete to public opinion. This is right; but down 
with legislation which submits in its framing to the public opinion. 
If we follow the layman there will be no legislation to be promulgated. 
The layman demands heads for any slight error; shall we emulate him? 
Shall we pass our legislation contrary to the Constitution for the sat- 
isfaction of the layman? :e are a legislative body resr)onsible for 
every word, and even for every letter, of legislation. Therefore if 
we make mistakes we are held responsible for them. In legislating I 
do not care for public opinion, but only frame it in accordance with 
(1) 
the general principles of legislation " 
The failure of the Chamber of Deputies to perform its functions 
has already been indicated and one should enquire as to the causes of 
that failure. First of all it seems that the inherent cause was the 
non- representative character, if one may say so, of the Chamber. The 
electoral system resulted in a Parliament which did not correspond with 
the structure of the country it was representing. The dictatorship 
of the Cabinet and its practice of treating any serious criticism in 
the Chamber, as an attack on itself to be resisted by the whole strength 
of the majority it commanded, formed the second factor. This resulted 
(1) I'iajlisu ''n-hTuwwáb: op.cit. 1i-ii, S.43, p.46 
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in the Chamber becoming a body to give only consent to and approval 
of the Cabinet's actions. Last, but not least there was the 
omnipotence of the majority. One could say that strong, efficient 
Opposition never existed inside the Chamber. If any kind of opposition 
seemed to gather strength it was undermined by the majority. This led 
to the practice of the withdrawal from the sitting of any dissatisfied 
group, as a sign of protest. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing study shows that the parliamentary system, as it 
functioned in Egypt between 1924 and 1952, was not a success. This 
failure was due to various inter -related factors. 
In spite of the fact that prior to the introduction of the 
parliamentary system in 1924, semi- parliamentary government had been 
found in Egypt, the democratic concept as emphasised by the 1923 
Constitution was rather an advanced system in view of the political 
comprehension of the people and their social and economic conditions. 
The introduction of the parliamentary system in Egypt was the 
ultimate result of the 1919 Revolt. But this Revolt flared up with 
the aim of ridding the country of the British Occupation and without 
any conception whatever of the system of government to be applied in 
Egypt after the achievement of the objective of the Revolt. Accept- 
ing these facts, as well as the fact that the Revolt was an expression 
of the Egyptian national spirit, the failure of the 1919 Revolt is 
self evident. 
Instead of the struggle for the independence of Egypt being 
continued, a parliamentary system was imported from Europe. 
Democracy, which has developed and flourished in the West, is not 
a political doctrine for exportation to other countries. 
That system, 
in order to be successful, should evolve and develop 
within the 
community to which it is applied. Not only was the 
political 
structure in Egypt cursed with the application 
of a foreign political 
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doctrine, but also the Constitution, which provided for the par - 
liamentary system, was drawn up on the pattern of the Belgian Con- 
stitution:. No allowance was made in view of the great differences 
between the social, economic and political conditions of Egypt and 
Belgium. Therefore, the basic factor leading to the unsuccessful 
working of democracy in Egypt, is the unfitness of the parliamentary 
system, as described by the 1923 Constitution, to match the conditions 
of the country. 
The position of Britain with relation to the institutions of 
government in Egypt, supplies another cause of the failure of the 
working of parliamentary institutions. The continual interference 
of Britain in Egypt's internal political affairs, especially before 
the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty, is manifest. That interference 
did not stop with the conclusion of that treaty; the influence 
exerted by Britain on parliamentary institutions in Egypt continued, 
though in a disguised shape. 
The problem of the settlement of Anglo- Egyptian relations 
pushed all political potentialities in Egypt towards 
one object. All 
political activities were concentrated on attempts 
to settle Egypt's 
relation with Britain. Political parties and groups 
exploited the 
nationalist tendencies of the people by directing 
their attention to 
this one aspect of the political problem of 
Egypt. All efforts were 
made to solve a problem which did not concern 
Egypt only, while 
nothing was done for the promotion of democratic 
government. Politic- 
ians did not try to tackle the internal 
political and social problems, 
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and the mass of the people found their interest and satisfaction in 
the question of the achievement of the national aspirations. 
There was no solid ground in Egyptian society for the develop- 
ment of varying political parties. Their programmes were alike, and 
they did not differ on matters of policy. Yloreover, they differed 
slightly in the methods they followed to achieve their ends. The 
challenge between different political parties was only motivated by 
their determination to reach the seats of the mighty. 
The Wafd, which enjoyed continuously the support of the mass 
of the people, originated with the 1919 Revolt. The activities and 
programmes of that party were mainly drawn on a pattern to satisfy 
the national sentiments of the people. Although it showed some 
democratic inclinations, the Wafd did not to 
ment of parliamentary government in Egypt. 
In their opposition to the Wafd, other political parties really 
derived their power from the King, and did not have much popular 
support. All political parties, including the Wafd, were an 
important factor in the failure of representative government in 
Egypt. They did not try to educate public opinion, promote 
the 
political consciousness of the people, and bring to their attention 
and understanding the different problems of the country. 
Although the King was non -responsible, and was 
not entitled to 
practice as full authority as he did, he was the 
point of focus of 
the political system in Egypt. This special position 
of the King 
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was due not only to the fact that the Constitution itself was 
ambiguous and conferred on the sovereign an extensive authority, but 
to the fact that other political institutions did not check effective- 
ly the practice of the prerogatives of the King. If any of these 
institutions tried to exercise its constitutional rights to control 
the acts of the King, these attempts carne after too long a period 
of reluctance and revealed only the weakness of these institutions. 
The King's right to appoint and dismiss his ministers caused 
a relative weakness of the Cabinet. On the other hand, his right to 
dissolve the Chamber of Deputies gave some power to the Cabinet in 
its relation with Parliament. This means that the omnipotence of 
the Cabinet appeared only when it faced the people and their rep - 
resentatives. However, this power of the Cabinet was derived from 
the autocracy of the King. 
The Cabinet's weakest spot was its inability to frame far -seeing 
and stable policies. This was not due only to the inefficient party 
system, but was also the natural outcome of the short life of the 
Cabinet. This short life was the result of the interference 
of the 
King in dismissing or demanding the resignation 
of the Cabinet, or 
by foreign interference, but hardly by the 
will of the people ex- 
pressed through their representatives. 
The Cabinet did not face 
any criticism from Parliament. Actually 
Parliament functioned to 
ratify the Cabinet's actions whether 
in the administrative or leg- 
islative fields. 
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The weakness of Parliament was very obvious. The basic reason 
of that weakness is the electoral system according to which members 
of Parliament were elected. It resulted from the fact that Par- 
liament did not constitute in miniature the society which it rep- 
resented. No representatives of the working classes were found 
amongst members of Parliament. The so- called representatives of 
the people were mainly from social classes which had interests 
conflicting with the mass of the people. This situation was due 
not only to the social framework in Egypt, but it was also created 
by the interference of the administration in the running of the 
elections. 
Parliament failed to perform its legislative function and to 
enact laws meeting the social necessities of the country. Its 
task was merely to give consent to the bills prepared by the 
,Cabinet, and to those private member's bills which gained the con- 
sent of the Cabinet. The Senate, however, succeeded in acquiring 
more legislative authority than it possessed under the Constitution, 
and its predominence over the Chamber of Deputies was 
manifest. 
In performing their function of controlling the 
Cabinet, both 
chambers of Parliament were incompetent. 
The Cabinet exerted 
influence on both chambers through the 
rights of the King to nomin- 
ate two -fifths of the Senators and to 
dissolve the Chamber of 
Deputies. Sometimes the powerfal majority 
which the governing 
party had in Parliament, helped 
the Cabinet to keep both onambers 
under its influence. 
APPENDIX I 
(1) 
Royal Rescript No.42 for 1923 
Establishing a Constitutional System for 
The Egyptian State. 
We, King of Egypt, 
Whereas, since our succession to the throne of our ancestors 
and our undertaking to guard the trust given to us by Almighty God, 
all our efforts have constantly been directed towards the well- 
being of our people and their guidance along the paths leading to 
the happiness, progress, and achievements enjoyed by free civilised 
nations; and 
Whereas, this aim cannot be truly attained except through the 
possession of a Constitution similar to the most modern and the 
most perfect constitutional systems in the world, and so adapted as 
to ensure to the people a happy, prosperous and absolutely free life, 
and which will guarantee to them an effective participation in the 
(administration of the country, in the framing of laws and the control 
of their execution, and which would inspire in the nation a feeling 
of peace and confidence in its present and its future, safeguarding 
at the same time the national spirit, the characteristics and dis- 
tinctions of the nation which are its glorious historical heritage; 
and 
(1) In view of the fact that the available translations are from 
the French text, which differed in some articles from the 
Arabic, this translation is from the Arabic text of the 
Constitution. 
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Whereas, this realisation has been our dearest wish and the 
principal object of our endeavours to raise our people to the high 
level which their intelligence and aptitude rightly warrant and 
which is in accordance with their glorious past history and which 
will allow them to maintain with dignity their rightful place auongst 
the peoples and nations of the civilised world; 
We order the following: 
Title I - The Egyptian State and the Form of 
its Government. 
ART.1 - Egypt is a sovereign State; it is free and independent, 
its sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable, and its govern- 
ment is an hereditary monarchy having a representative form. 
Title II - Rights and Duties of Egyptians. 
ART.2 - Egyptian nationality shall be deterrdined by law. 
ART.3 - All Egyptians shall be equal before the law. They shall 
enjoy equally civil and political rights and shall be equally 
subject to their public duties and responsibilities without any 
distinction of race, language, or religion. They alone shall 
be eligible for appointment to public offices, civil and milit- 
ary; foreigners shall not be eligible for such appointment 
save in exceptional cases determined by law. 
ART.4 - The liberty of the individual shall be guaranteed. 
A?T.5 - No one may be arrested or detained except 
in accordance 
with prescriptions of the law. 
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AHT.v - No crime and no punishment shall be constituted except by 
virtue of law. No punishment shall be inflicted except for 
acts perpetrated after the promulgation of the law which applies 
to them. 
ART.? - No Egyptian may be expelled from the Egyptian territory. 
No Egyptian may be prevented from staying in a particular place 
or be obliged to remain in any specified. place except in cases 
prescribed by law. 
ART.8 - Homes shall be inviolable. There shall, therefore, be no 
entry thereto except under conditions provided by law and in 
the manner thereby prescribed. 
ART.9 - Private property shall be inviolable. Therefore, no one may 
be deprived of his property except for public use under con- 
ditions provided by law and in the manner thereby prescribed, 
and on condition of his receiving just compensation. 
RT.lO - Punishment by complete confiscation of property shall be 
forbidden. 
A-tT.11 - The secrecy of letters, telegrams, and telephone communic- 
ations may not be violated except under conditions prescribed 
by law. 
ART.12 - Liberty of Conscience shall be absolute. 
ART.13 - The State shall protect the free practice of religions and 
beliefs in accordance with the customs observed in Egypt, pro- 
vided such practice shall not disrupt public order 
and shall 
not be prejudicial to morals. 
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íT.11+ - Liberty of opinion shall be guaranteed. Every person 
shall have the right to express his opinion by speech, in 
writing, by illustration or otherwise within the limits of law. 
ART.15 - The Press shall be free within the limits of law, censor- 
ship of news shall be forbidden. Administrative reprimand, 
suspension, or suprension is equally forbidden, except where 
such a course shall be necessary for the protection of the 
social order. 
ART.16 - No restriction may be imposed upon the free use of any 
language in private or commercial transactions, in matters of 
religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind as well 
as in public meetings. 
.AaT.l7 - There shall be freedom of education in so far as it is not 
contrary to public order and morals. 
AR T.18 - The regulation of public education shall be by law. 
ART.19 - Elementary education shall be compulsory for Egyptian boys 
and girls. It shall be free in public °'makátebu. 
(1) 
aT'.20 - Egyptians shall have the right of peaceful and unarmed 
assembly. No police officer may be present at their assembly 
and notice to the police shall be unnecessary; but this rule 
shall not apply to public meetings which. shall be subject to 
the provisions of the law. Furthermore, this rule shall not 
prevent or restrain any measure being taken for the protection 
of the social order. 
(1) ";.'a.kateb" is the plural of "Maktab" which is a special kind of 
school teaching reading and writing, arithmetic, and the 
Koran 
and Islamic religion. 
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ART.21 - Egyptians shall have the right to form associations. The 
law shall prescribe the manner in which this right shall be 
exercised. 
ÁRT.22 - Individual Egyptians shall have the right to address them- 
selves to public authorities in co :icern with problems which 
confront them and that by petitions bearing their signatures; 
but the addressing of authorities on behalf of groups shall be 
by no one except authorised bodies and proper persons. 
Title III - Powers 
CHAPTER I - General Provisions 
ART.23 - All authorities have their source in the people. Their 
exercise shall be in the manner established by this Constitution 
ART.24 - The legislative power shall be exercised by the King with 
the concurrence of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. 
ART.25 - No law shall be promulgated unless it has been ratified by 
Parliament and sanctioned by the King. 
ART.26 - Laws shall be enforceable in all parts of Egypt by virtue 
of their promulgation at the hand of the King, and such pro- 
mulgation shall be made known by publication in the "Official 
Journal ". 
Laws shall be enforeeable in all parts of Egypt immediately 
their promulgation shall have been made known. 
The promulgation of these laws shall be 
held to be known in 
all parts of Egypt thirty days after their 
publication, and this 
period may be shortened or prolonged 
by cl=ar provision in these 
laws. 
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AiT.27 - The provisions of all laws shall apply only to events 
subsequent to the date of their coming into effect; they shall 
have no retrospective effect except as otherwise prescribed by 
special provision. 
ART.2$ - To the King, to the Senate, and to the Chamber of Deputies 
shall be given the right to initiate all laws with the exception 
of those imposing or increasing taxation, the right of initiat- 
ion of which shall reside in the King and in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
ART.29 - The executive power shall be exercised by the King within 
the limits of this Constitution. 
ART.30 - The judicial power shall be exercised by courts of different 
jurisdiction and degrees. 
ART.31 - The judgements of different courts shall be delivered and 
executed according to law and in the name of the King. 
CHAPTER II - The King and the l:inisters 
Section 1 - The King 
ART.3 2.- The Throne of the Kingdom of Egypt is hereditary in the 
dynasty of Mohamed Ali. 
The succession to the Throne shall be according to the 
regulations established by the Royal Rescript of Shacban 15, 
1340 (April 13, 1922). 
ART.33 - The King is the supreme head of the $tate 
a.:d his person 
is inviolable. 
459. 
ÄRT.34 - The King shall sanction laws and promulgate them. 
1RT.35 - If the King shall deem to be inexpedient the sancton of 
a bill passed by Parliament, he shall send it back to Parliament 
within one r, onth for re-examination. !! 
Failure to return it within the said period shall constitute 
sanction by the King and the law shall thereupon be promulgated. Ir' 
AHT.33 - If a bill be sent back to Parliament within the said period 
and be again passed by a majority of two- thirds of the members 
composing each of the two chambers it shall have the force of 
law and shall be promulgated. If the majority. be less than 
two- thirds, the debate on it shall not be resumed during the 
same session. If in another session Parliament shall again 
pass the bill by an absolute majority of votes, it shall become 
law and shall be promulgated. 
ART.37 - The King shall frame all regulations necessary for the 
execution of laws in a manner that shall not modify or suspend 
their operation nor dispense with the execution of such laws. 
ART.38 - The King shall have the right to dissolve the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
ART.39 - The King may adjourn the sittings of Parliament. 
Neverthe- 
less, in no case may the adjournment exceed one 
month, nor may 
it be repeated during the same session without 
the consent of 
both chambers. 
AKT.40 - The King may, in cases of necessity, 
convoke Parliament to 
extraordinary sessions; he may also 
convoke it if so requested 
by a petition signed by an absolute 
majority of members of eithe 
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of the two chambers. The King shall pronounce the closure 
of the extra -ordinary session. 
.' LT.l4i - If it should happen between sessions of Parliament, that 
there should arise the need to take urgent measures which can- 
not be delayed, the King may issue decrees in that regard which 
shall have the force of law, provided that they shall not be 
contrary to the Constitution. Parliament should then be con - 
voked in an extra- ordinary session and these decrees should be 
submitted to it at its first sitting; if they are not submitted 
or not approved by either of the two chambers, they shall cease 
to have the force of law. 
!T.42 - The King shall open the ordinary session of Parliament 
with a speech from the Throne addressed to both chambers meeting 
together reviewing conditions in the country. Each of the two 
chambers shall present an address embodying its reply. 
1T.43 - The King shall create and confer civil and military titles, 
decorations and other ranks of honour; and he shall have the 
right to mint monies in execution of law. He shall, also, have 
the right of pardon and of commutation of sentence. 
ART.44 - The King shall organise public services, and shall appoint 
and dismiss civil servants according to conditions determined 
by law. 
J T.45 - The King shall proclaim martial law. The proclamation of 
martial law shall be immediately submitted to Parliament for 
confirmation or cancellation; if such proclamation be made 
whilst Parliament is not in session, it should be convoked forth 
with. 
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ART.46 - The King is the supreme commander of land and sea forces; 
and he shall appoint and dismiss officers, declare war, make 
peace, and conclude treaties and shall communicate them to 
Parliament accompanied by suitable explanations as far as the 
interest and the safety of the State shall allow. 
Nevertheless, the declaration of an offensive war may not 
be made without the consent of Parliament; furthermore treaties 
of peace, alliance, commerce, navigation, and all treaties which 
involve any modification in the territories of the State, or any, 
diminution of its rights of sovereignty, or any burdening of the 
treasury with expenditure, or any prejudice of public or private 
rights of Egyptians shall not be valid unless and until Par- 
liament shall consent thereto. 
In no case shall secret articles in a treaty contradict 
the published text. 
ART.47 - The King may not along with his monarchy of Egypt be the 
ruler of another state without the consent of Parliament, and 
deliberations in this regard, in either of the two chambers, 
shall not take place unless two thirds 
of the members of such 
chamber are present; and no resolution shall 
be valid unless 
passed by a majority of two -thirds 
of the ::.embers present. 
ART.48 - The King shall exercise his powers 
through the intermediary 
of his ministers. 
ART.i9 - The King shall appoint and dismiss 
his ministers. He shall 
appoint and recall diplomatic 
representatives on the advice of 
the sinister of foreign affairs. 
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ART.50 - Before the King shall assume his constitutional powers he 
shall take the following oath before the two chambers assembled 
together: "I swear by Almighty God that I shall respeät the 
Constitution and the laws of the Egyptian people, and that I 
shall maintain the independence of the realm and the integrity 
of its territories." 
ART.51 - Regents shall not assume office until they have taken before 
the two chambers assembled together the oath prescribed in the 
immediately foregoing article with the addition: "and to be 
faithful to the King." 
ART.52 - On the death of the King the two chambers shall meet by 
force of law within ten days from the date of the proclamation 
of death. If the Chamber of Deputies has been dissolved and 
the date of its convocation stated in the act of dissolution 
be later than the expiry of the tenth day, the old Chamber shall 
take up office again until the convocation of the Chamber 
succeeding it. 
ART.53 - If there shall be no one to succeed the King to the Throne, 
the King may nominate his successor with the cansent of Par- 
liament assembled in congress; and for the validity of its 
decision an attendance of three -fourths of each of the two 
chambers and a majority of two thirds of the members present 
shall be necessary. 
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Á-.R.54 - In case of a vacancy of the Throne due to the absence of 
an heir to the King or a successor nominated according to the 
provisions of the immediately foregoing article, the two chamber 
shall sheet in congress immediately with the force of law to 
choose a King. This choice must be made within eight days of 
their meeting; and for its validity an attendance of three - 
fourths of each of the two chambers and a majority of two -thirds 
of the members present shall be necessary. 
If such choice be not possible within the specified period, 
the two chambers jointly shall, on the ninth day, proceed to a 
choice without regard to the number of the members present; and 
in this case, the choice shall be voted by a relative majority. 
If the Chamber of Deputies stands dissolved at the moment of a 
vacancy to the Throne, it shall take up office again until the 
convocation of the Chamber succeeding it. 
.'RT.55 - From the date of the death of the King until his successor 
or the Regents take the oath, the constitutional powers of 
the 
King shall be exercised by the Council of Ninisters in the 
name 
of the Egyptian people and on its own responsibility. 
á'.:R.56 - At the succession of the King, his civil list and the 
allocations to the Royal family shall be fixed by law 
for the 
duration of his reign: and such law shall also 
fix the 
remuneration of the Regents, which will 
be deducted from the 
civil list. 
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Section 2 - The Ministers. 
ART.57 - The Council of Ministers shall supervise the State services. 
ART.58 - No one can be a minister except an Egyptian. 
ART.59 - No member of the Royal family can be a minister. 
ART.60 - The acts of the King in relation to State affairs must, to 
be effective,- be countersigned by the President of the Council 
of Ministers and the ministers concerned. 
ART.6l - The ministers are collectively responsible to the Chamber 
of Deputies for the general policy of the government and each 
is individually responsible for the acts of his own ministry. 
ART.62 - Oral or written commands of the King shall not, under any 
circumstances, exempt ministers from responsibility. 
ART.63 - Ministers may attend the two chambers and must be heard 
whenever they wish to speak; they shall have no effective 
voice in the deliberations unless tney are members. They may 
have the assistance of those whom they may choose from amongst 
the high ranking officials of their departments, and whom they 
may also appoint to represent them. Each minister may demand 
the presence of ministers to its sittings. 
ART.64 - No minister may purchase or rent any state property even by 
public auction; nor shall he during his term of office be a 
member of a board of any company nor take any active part in any 
commercial or financial enterprise. 
ART.65 - If the Chamber of Deputies pass a resolution of no confidence 
in the ministry, it must resign. If the resolution shall refer 
to an individual minister, he must resign. 
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ART.66 - The Chamber of Deputies alone shall have the right to 
impeach ministers for any crime committed by them in the 
exercise of their functions, and the resolution of impeachment 
may only be passed by a majority of two- thirds of votes. 
The Special Court of Justice alone shall have the right to 
try ministers for such crimes. The Chamber of Deputies shall 
nominate certain of its members to sustain the accusation 
before that Court. 
ART.67 - The Special Court of Justice shall be composed of the 
President of the high national court, who shall .pre side, togeth- 
er with sixteen members eight of whom shall be members of the 
Senate chosen by the drawing of lots and eight of whom shall be 
Egyptian judges of that court in order of seniority: and in 
case of necessity the number shall be completed by the inclusion 
of presidents of tribunals ranking next in order, whom failing, 
by judges of these courts in order of seniority. 
ART.68 - The Special Court of Justice shall apply the penal code to 
crimes which are covered by its provisions; and a special law 
shall define such cases of responsibility of ministers as are 
not covered by the penal code. 
ART.69 - Conviction by the Special Court of Justice shall be sus- 
tained by a majority of twelve votes. 
ART.70 - Until the promulgation of a special law, the Special Court 
of Justice itself shall lay down the procedure to be followed 
in the trial of Ministers. 
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ART.71 - The minister who shall be impeached by the Chamber of 
Deputies shall be suspended from office until the Special Court 
of Justice shall have decided his case. His resignation shall 
not prevent the institution or continuation of his trial. 
ART.72 - Pardon of a minister convicted by the Special Court of 
Justice may not be granted except with the consent of the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
CHAPTER III - Parliament. 
ART. 73 - Parliament shall be composed of two chambers: a Senate 
and a Chamber of Deputies. 
Section 1 - The Senate. 
ART.74 - The Senate shall be composed of a number of members, two - 
fifths of whom shall be nominated by the King and the other 
three- fifths shall be elected by universal suffrage according 
to the electoral law. 
ART.75 - Each 'ioudiriah' or Governorate composed of 180,000 in- 
habitants or more may elect a member for each 1$0,000 or fract- 
ion of that number not less than 90,000. Each 'IUloudiriah' 
or Governorate having less than 180,000 inhabitants but not 
less than 90,000 may elect a member. Each Governorate of 
less than 90,000 may elect a member, as long as the electoral 
law does not attach it to another Governorate or 'i'ioudiriaht. 
ART.78 - Each 'Moudiriah' or Governorate which has the right to 
elect a member to the Senate shall be considered an electoral 
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constituency, as shall each part of a 'Moudiriaht or Governor- 
ate which has the right to elect a member to that chamber. 
Electoral constituencies shall be determined by a law 
assuring as far as possible the equality of constituencies in 
'Moudiriahs' and Governorates having the right to elect more 
than one member to the Senate. Nevertheless, the law may con- 
sider the chief centres of 'Moudiriahst whose inhabitants do not 
number 180,000 but are not less than 90,000 to be, each of them, 
an independent electoral constituency; and in this case, the 
other parts of the 'Loudiriah' may be considered to be an in- 
dependent 'Moudiriah' for the purpose of determining the number 
of members to be elected and for determining the electoral con- 
stituencies. 
ART.77 - In addition to the conditions laid down by the electoral 
law, a member of the Senate shall have attained the age of at 
least forty years according to the Gregorian calendar. 
ART.7$ - Whether elected or nominated, a member of the Senate shall 
belong to one of the following categories: 
(1) Ministers, diplomatic re ,resentati.ves, Presidents Of 
the Chamber of Deputies, under -secretaries of State, presidents 
and judges of the Court of Appeal. or of any other tribunal of 
the same or higher dignity, attorneys general, "battonierstt of 
the order of the advocates, Government officials of the rank of 
director general and above - whether still in office or retired. 
(2) High "culamás" and chief clergymen, retired high -ranking 
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officers of the rank of "Lewá'" or above, Deputies who have 
served throughout two legislative terms, property owners paying 
taxes of not less than £x.150 yearly, persons engaged in finan- 
cial, commercial or industrial enterprises or in professions 
who have a minimum annual income of ß;E.1500. All this shall 
be in accordance with such incompatibility of functions as is 
provided by this Constitution and the electoral law. 
Furthermore, tax and annual income to be regarded in the 
'jvioudiriaht of Aswan shall be fixed by the electoral law. 
ART.79 - The duration of membership of the Senate shall be ten years. 
Half of the nominated Senators and half of those elected 
shall be replaced every five years. Those whose mandate has 
expired shall be eligible for re- election or re- nomination. 
ART.80 - The President of the Senate shall be nominated by the King; 
and the chamber shall elect two Vice -Presidents. The appoint- 
ment of the President and Vice -Presidents shall be for two 
years. They are eligible for re- election. 
ART.$1 - If the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved, the sittings of 
the Senate shall be suspended. 
Section 2 - The Chamber ofDeuties. 
ART.82 - The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed of members ,- cte 
on the basis of universal suffrage according to the pr_-; w L ns 
of the electoral law. 
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ART.83 - Each 'i'=oudiriaht or Governorate whose inhabitants number 
60,000 or more may elect a deputy for every 60,000 inhabitants 
or fraction of that number not less than 30,000. Each 
tlx2oudiriah' or Governorate whose inhabitants do not number 
60,000 and are not less than 30,000 may elect a deputy. Every 
Governorate whose inhabitants do not number 30,000 may elect a 
deputy as long as the electoral law does not attach it to 
another Governorate or 'Moudiriah'. 
ART.$! - Each toudiriah' or Governorate which has the right to 
elect a deputy shall be considered an electoral constituency, 
as every part of a 'ioudiriah' or Governorate which has that 
same right. 
Electoral constituencies shall be determined by a law 
assuring as far as possible equality of constituencies in 
'Moudiriahs' and Governorates which have the right to elect 
more than one deputy. Nevertheless, the law may consider the 
chief centres of 'Moudiriahs' whose inhabitants do not reach 
60,000 and are not less than 30,000 to be (each of them) an 
independent electoral constituency. 
In such case, other parts of the 'oudiriah' may be con- 
sidered to be an independent 'Moudiriah' for the purpose of 
determining the number of members eligible for election and 
determining the electoral constituencies. 
ART.$5 - In addition to the conditions laid down by the electoral 
law, a Deputy shall have attained the age of at least thirty 
years according to the Gregorian calendar. 
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ART.$6 - The duration of membership as a deputy shall be five years. 
ART.$7 - The Chamber of Deputies shall, every year, elect a Presid- 
ent and two Vice -Presidents at the commencement of each ordin- 
ary session. The President and the two Vice -Presidents shall 
he eligible for re- election. 
ART.EE - If the Chamber of Deputies shall be dissolved for a certain 
reason, the new Chamber may not be dissolved for the same 
reason. 
ART.$9 - The act which provides for the dissolution of the Chamber 
of Deputies shall provide for the invitation of delegates to 
hold new elections within two months and for the re- assembly 
of the new Chamber within the ten days following the completion 
of the elections. 
Section 3 - General Provisions Applying to Both Chambers. 
ART.90 - The seat of Parliament shall be Cairo. Nevertheless, in 
case of necessity its location may be determined by law to be 
elsewhere; and its convocation in any place other than that so 
determined shall be legally null and void. 
ART.91 - The member of Parliament shall represent the whole nation. 
Neither the electors nor the power which nominates him may 
place him under any obligation to be their delegate for a 
specific purpose. 
ART.92 - No one may combine membership of the Senate with that of the 
Chamber of Deputies. Apart from this, the electoral law shall 
determine other cases of incompatibility. 
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ART.93 - Princes and Kinsmen of the Royal family may be nominated 
members of the Senate, but they may not be elected to either 
chamber. 
ART.94 - Before assuming office, members of the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies shall swear to be loyal to country and King, 
to obey the Constitution and laws of the country and to carry 
out their duties conscientiously. 
The oath shall, in each chamber, be publicly administered 
in its hall of assembly. 
. RT.95 - Each chamber shall be competent to judge the validity of 
the mandate of its members. A mandate may not be considered 
invalid except by a resolution passed by a majority of two- 
thirds of the votes. 
A law may confer this power on another authority. 
ART.96 - The King shall convoke Parliament annually in ordinary 
session before the third Saturday in i November. If it be not 
so convoked, it shall meet with full authority on that date. 
The ordinary session shall.. last for at least six months; 
the King shall proclaim its closure. 
ART97 - Sessions shall be the same for both chambers; if either 
or both snail meet outwith the legal period, such meeting shall 
be illegal and resolutions passed shall be null and void by 
force of law. 
ART.98 - Sittings of both chambers shall be public, but either of 
them may meet in secret session at the request of the Government 
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or of ten members; it shall then decide whether deliberations 
on the subject to be discussed should take place in public 
sitting or not. 
ART.99 - Neither of the two chambers may pass a resolution unless a 
majority of its members are present at the sitting. 
ART.100 - Except in cases where a special majority is required, 
resolutions shall be passed by an absolute majority, and where 
the number of votes shall equal, the resolution shall be held 
to be rejected. 
ART.101 - Votes shall be given either orally or by standing and 
sitting. 
With bills in general, and a question of confidence in the 
Chamber of Deputies, votes shall always be given by roll call 
of names of the members in audible voice. ìAnisters small 
always have the right to demand from the Chamber of Deputies an 
adjournment for eight days of the discussion of a motion of no 
confidence in them. 
ART.102 - Every bill, before being discussed, shall be referred to 
a committee of the chamber for examination and report. 
ART.103 - Every bill presented by one or more members shall be 
referred to a committee for examination and decision as to 
whether the chamber shall consider it or not. If then the 
chamber shall decide to consider it, the provisions of the pre- 
vious article shall be followed. 
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ART.104 - Neither chamber may pass a bill unless it has been voted 
on clause by clause. Both chambers shall have the right to 
amend and divide clauses and propose amendments. 
ART.105 - Every bill passed by one of the two chambers, shall be 
transmitted by its President to the President of the other 
chamber. 
ART.106 - Every bill initiated by one of the members and rejected 
by Parliament, may not be presented again in the same session. 
ART.107 - Every member of Parliament has the right to address to 
ministers questions or interpellations and that in such manner 
as shall be determined by the 'Standing Orders' of each chamber; 
the discussion of any interpellation may not proceed until after 
eight days from its presentation except in case of urgency and 
with the consent of the minister. 
ART.10 - Each chamber has the right to institute an enquiry for its 
enlightenment upon specific matters coming within its competence. 
ART.109 - Members of Parliament may not be held culpable on account 
of opinions expressed or votes given by them in the Chambers. 
ART.11O - During a session, no criminal indictment may proceed 
against a member of Parliament, nor may he be arrested except 
with the consent of the chamber to which he belongs or when 
taken in " flagrante delicto ". 
ART.111 - No ranks or decorations shall be conferred upon members 
of Parliament during the period of their membership. Excepting 
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from this members who hold public offices compatible with 
membership of Parliament, and excepting also military ranks 
and decorations. 
ART.112 - No one may be dismissed from membership of Parliament 
except by a resolution passed by the chamber to which he belongs. 
The resolution must, in cases other than those of incompatibil- 
ity and forfeiture, as provided by this Constitution and the 
electoral law, be passed by a majority of three -fourths of the 
members who compose the chamber. 
ART.113 - If a vacancy in a seat of a member of Parliament shall 
occur by death or resignation or through any other cause, the 
choice of a successor shall be by way of nomination or election 
according to circumstances, and that within two months from the 
date when Parliament shall notify the Government of the vacancy. 
The mandate of the new member shall not extend beyond the date 
of expiry of his predecessor's term of office. 
ART.114 - General elections for the renewal of the Chamber of Deput- 
ies shall be held within the sixty days preceding the expiry of 
its mandate; and in the event of it being impossible to hold 
these elections within the said period, the mandate of the old 
Chamber shall be prolonged until the date of the said elections. 
ART.115 - One half of the Senate shall be renewed whether by election 
or by nomination within the sixty days preceding the date of 
expiry of the mandate of the retiring members. If such renewal 
within the said period be impossible, the mandate of those 
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members whose term of office has ceased shall be prolonged 
until the election or nomination of the new members. 
ART.116 - It is not permitted to any one to petition Parliament in 
person. Each chamber may refer to ministers petitions which 
are addressed to it; and these ministers shall provide all 
relevant information concerning such petitions when asked by 
the chamber so to do. 
ART.1l7 - Each chamber, acting through its President, has the sole 
right to maintain order within itself. 
No armed force may enter the chamber or be posted near its 
doors except on the demand of its President. 
ART.11$ - Every member of Parliament shall receive an annual remuner- 
ation which shall be fixed by law. 
ART.119 - Each chamber shall frame its own Standing Orders determinin, 
the manner in which it may exercise its functions. 
Section 4 - Provisions Relevant to Meetings of Parliament 
in Congress. 
ART.120 - In addition to the instances in which both chambers meet 
together according to law, they shall meet in congress on con- 
vocation by the King. 
ART.121 - When both chambers meet together in congress the presidency 
shall reside in the President of the Senate. 
ART.122 - Resolutions of the congress shall not be valid unless there 
is present an absolute majority of members of each of the two 
chambers composing the congress. When voting on these resolut- 
ions, congress shall comply with the provisions of articles 100 
and 101. 
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ART.123 - The meeting of both chambers in congress during ordinary 
or extra- ordinary sessions of Parliament shall not impede 
either chamber in the continuation of its constitutional 
functions. 
CHAPTER IV - The Judicial Power 
ART.124 - Judges shall be independent, they shall in arriving at 
their judgements be influenced by no authority other than the 
law and no governmental authority may intervene in legal 
processes.. 
ART.125 - The organisation of judicial bodies and the definition 
of their competence shall be determined by law. 
ART.126 - Judges shall be appointed in the manner and according to 
the conditions provided by law. 
ART.127 - Limits and conditions of the irremoveability and non - 
dismissal of judges shall be fixed by law. 
ART.128 - The appointment and dismissal of public prosecutors 
appearing in various courts shall be in accordance with con - 
ditions provided by law. 
ART.129 - The sittings of courts shall be in public, unless a court 
shall order its proceedings to be held in camera in the interest 
of public order and morality. 
ÁRT.13 0 Everyone accused of a crime shall have someone to defend 
him. 
A3.T.131 - A special law shall regulate the organisation and compet- 
ence of military courts, as also the qualifications 
required of 
those who dispense justice in them. 
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CHAPTER V - Provincial and Municipal Councils 
ART.132 - Provinces, towns and villages shall in the exercise of 
their rights be considered to be proper persons in accordance 
with public law and under conditions provided by law. 
They shall be represented by provincial councils and 
different municipal councils. 
The law shall define the limits of their competence. 
ART.133 - The organisation of provincial councils and of different 
kinds of municipal councils, as also their competence and their 
relation with government departments shall be determined by 
laws. In these laws the following principies shall be observedi 
(1) The choice of members of such councils by election, 
save in exceptional cases in which the law may permit the nom- 
ination of some non elected members. 
(2) The competence of these councils to deal with all that 
concerns the province, the town or the district without prejud- 
ice to the approval of their acts in circumstances defined by 
and in the manner provided by laws. 
(3) The publication of their budgets and accounts. 
(4) Publicity of meetings within the limits provided by law, 
(5) The intervention of the legislative or executive power 
to prevent these councils from exceeding the limits of their 
authority or endangering public interests, and the annulment of 
any act of this nature. 
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Title IV - Finance 
ART.134 - No tax may be imposed, modified or abrogated except by 
law. No person may obliged to pay any assessments or 
duties except within the limits of law. 
ART.135 - No one may be exempted from the payment of taxes except 
in cases provided for by law. 
ART.136 - No pension, indemnity, subsidy or reward can be paid by 
the Treasury except within the limits of law. 
ART.137 - No public loan or obligation to burden the Treasury for 
one or more subsequent years may contracted without the 
consent of Parliament. 
Any concession having for its object the utilization of 
one of the natural resources of the country, or one of the 
public services, and any monopoly may be granted only by law 
and for a fixed period. 
The previous consent of Parliament shall be necessary for 
the construction or demolition of railways, public rDads, 
canals, drains, and all works of irrigation which concern more 
than one province, and every gratuitous alienation of State 
property. 
ART.138 - The Budget, embodying theState revenue and expenditure, 
shall be submitted to Parliament at least three months before 
the beginning of the financial year for examination and approv- 
al. The financial year shall be fixed by law. 
The Budget shall be voted on item by i:,em. 
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ART.139 - The discussion and vote on the Budget shall be held first 
in the Chamber of Deputies. 
ART.140 - The session of Parliament may not be closed before the 
vote on the Budget has been taken. 
ART.141 - Items in the Budget allotted to the payment of instalments 
of the public debt may not be modified in a manner prejudicial 
to Egypt's commitments in that regard. The same provision 
shall also apply to every expenditure listed in the Budget for 
execution of an international obligation. 
ART.142 - If the law embodying the Budget be not promulgated before 
the beginning of the financial year, the preceding Budget shall 
operate until the promulgation of a law embodying the new 
Budget. 
Nevertheless, if the two chambers shall have passed some 
items of the Budget, such items may be put into provisional 
operation. 
ART.143 - Every expenditure not embodied in the Budget, or any ex- 
penditure exceeding the estimates embodied therein, must be 
sanctioned by Parliament. Its sanction must also be granted 
when the transference of funds from one item of the Budget to 
another is necessary. 
ART.144. - The final accounts of the department of finance for the 
immediately preceding year shall be presented for approval by 
Parliament at the beginning of each ordinary session. 
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ART.145 - The Budget embodying the revenue and expenditure of the 
Ministry of Wakfs, and its final accounts, shall be subject to 
the foregoing provisions made with regard to the Budget and 
final accounts of the Government. 
Title V - The Armed Forces. 
ART.146 - The component units of the Army shall be fixed by law. 
ART.147 - The law shall determine the method of recruiting, the 
organisation of the army and the rights and duties of its 
personnel. 
ART.148 - The law shall determine the organisation and authority 
of the police forces. 
Title VI - General Provisions. 
ART.149 - Islam is the religion of the State, and Arabic is its 
official language. 
ART.150 - Cairo is the Capital of the Kingdom of Egypt. 
ART.151 - The extradition of political refugees shall be forbidden 
and that without prejudice to international agreements having 
as their object the protection of social order. 
ART.152 - Amnesty may not be granted except by law. 
ART.153 - The law shall regulate the manner in which the King shall 
exercise his authority in accordance with the principles laid 
down in this Constitution with regard to religious foundati. ons, 
the nomination of religious chiefs, the religious endowments 
entrusted to the management of the inistry of Wakf s, and in 
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general all matters concerning religions tolerated in the 
country. If legislative provisions shall not have been effect- 
ed, the exercise of such powers shall be continued according to 
the usages and traditions existing at the present time. 
The prerogatives which the King personally exercises as 
head of the Royal family shall continue to be governed by law 
No.25 of 1922 regulating the status of the Royal family. 
ART.154 - No prejudice shall result throuzh the application of this 
Constitution to the obligations of Egypt towards foreign States, 
nor shall it affect any rights which foreigners in Egypt may 
have acquired by law, international treaties and recognised 
traditions. 
4RT.155 - Under no pretext shall any of the provisions laid down by 
this Constitution be suspended except temporarily in time of 
war or during the existence of martial law and in the manner 
fixed by law. 
Nevertheless, meetings of Parliament may not be suspended 
so long as conditions established by this Constitution for its 
convocation are fulfilled. 
ART.156 - To the King and to each of the two chambers shall apper- 
tain the right to propose the amendment of this Constitution 
either by modifying or abrogating one or more of its provisions, 
or by adding other provisions; nevertheless, no amendment of 
the provisions relative to the form of the representative par- 
liamentary government, to the order of the succession to the 
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Throne, and the principles of liberty and equality guaranteed 
by this Constitution shall be capable of proposal. 
ART.157 - For the amendment of the Constitution, each chamber shall 
pass a resolution as to its necessity and substance by an 
absolute majority of all its members. 
And if the King shall sanction this resolution, then the 
two chambers, acting in agreement with the King, shall pass 
enactments with regard to those matters which come within the 
scope of the amendment; and the discussion in each of the two 
chambers shall not be in order unless two -thirds of the members 
are present, and resolutions shall be valid only when they are 
passed by a majority of two- thirds of the votes. 
ART.15$ - No amendment of the Constitution on any question as to the 
rights of the King may take place during a regency. 
ART.159( -) The provisions of this Constitution shall apply to the 
Kingdom of -Egypt without the least prejudice to Egypt's rights 
in the Sudan. 
Title VII - Final and Tem orary Provisions. 
(2) 
ART.160 - The title which the King of Egypt shall bear shall be dec- 
ided after the authorised delegates have fixed the definite 
status of the Sudan. 
(1) This article was amended in October 1951 to read as follows: 
ART.159 - "The provisions of this Constitution shall apply to 
all the Egyptian Kingdom. Although Egypt and the Sudan are 
one nation, the regime of rule in the Sudan shall be defined 
by a special law." 
(2) This article was also amended in October 1951 to read: 
ART.160 - "The King shall be titled the King of Egypt and of 
the Sudan." 
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ART.161 - The civil list of the present King shall amount to 
£E.150,000 and the sum allocated to the Royal family shall be 
£E.111,512, and these shall remain so fixed during his reign 
and may be increased by a resolution of Parliament. 
ART.16 2 - The choice of members of the Senate to retire at the end 
of the first five years shall be made by the drawing of lots; 
and the mandate of these Senators and elected Deputies for the 
first legislative term shall expire on October 31, 1928. 
ART.163 - This Constitution shall come into effect as from the date 
of the convocation of Parliament. 
ART.164 - The principles and procedures to be followed in the admin- 
istration of the affairs of the State and relative legislation- 
from the date of the publication of this Constitution to the 
time when Parliament shall be convoked, shall be those now 
existing. Nevertheless, it shall be necessary to observe that 
actions taken shall not be contrary to the fundamental prin- 
ciples embodied in this Constitution. 
ART.165 - The Budget for the financial year 1923 -1924 shall be sub- 
mitted to Parliament when convoked; the Budget law for the 
said year shall have effect only for the remainder of the year 
from the date of its publication. 
The final accounts of the department of finance for the 
year 1922 -23 shall be held to be approved by Parliament in the 
form in which they shall have been approved by the Council of 
Ministers. 
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ART.166 - If there shall be prolonged disagreement between the two 
chambers as to the approval of one of the items in the Budget, 
it shall be settled by a resolution of both chambers meeting in 
congress by an absolute majority of votes. 
Such provision shall be in operation until the issue of a 
law to its contrary. 
ART.167 - All provisions of laws, decrees, orders, regulations, and 
resolutions, and all acts performed and measures taken in the 
past in accordance with rules and usages then existing, shall 
remain effective on condition that their execution is in harmony 
with the principles of liberty and equality which are guaranteed 
by this Constitution; and all this, without prejudice to the 
right of the legislative power to abrogate or modify them within 
the limits of its power, on condition that this shall not affect 
the principles provided in Article 27 with regard to the non - 
retrospective effect of laws. 
ART.16$ - The provisions of law No.28 of 1922 concerning the liquid- 
ation of the estates of the ex- Khedive, Abbas Hilmy Pasha, and 
restricting his rights shall be considered to have constitution- 
al character and no proposal for their amendment shall be 
competent. 
ART.169 - Laws which should have been presented to the Legislative 
Assembly according to the second article of the decree of 
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11Zí1 Qi dah 28, 133241 (October 18, 1914) shall be presented to 
both chambers of Parliament in first session. If they are not 
presented to them in that session, they shall cease to operate 
in all time coming. 
2i-C2.170 - Our i'iinisters are charged, each in so far as it concerns 
himself, with the execution of this Constitution. 
Signed at Abdin Palace, 'Ramadan 3, 1341' 
(April 19, 1923) 
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1924(2) 69,689 67,504 96 42,222 61 
1925(2) 
75,784 72,353 96 46,528 61 
1926 1,792,171 1,135,264 64 812,854 42 
1929 1,566,377 1,002,662 64 613,870 39 
1931(3 ) 
45,794 43,706 90 37,639 82 
1936 2,120,477 1,261,330 59 783,778 37 
1938 3,003,326 1,779,893 59 1,410,254 47 
1942 2,234,647 1,271,496 57 862,775 39 
1945 3,234,042 1,770,238 54 1,332,688 41 
1950 4,126,879 2,496,208 61 1,547,248 37 
(1) The data from which this table is prepared was obtained through 
personal investigation from the Department of General Elections 
and Secretariate, 2,inistry of the Interior, Cairo, Egypt. 
(2) They were indirect elections; the first ballot was to elect 
delegates each of them representing 30 votes; these delegates 
in their turn were to elect the member of the Chamber. 
(3) It was also an indirect election, but each of the delegates 
represented 50 of the electorate. 
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1$6 31,482 46.$ 113 53.6 99 +14 
7$ 13,771 20.4 40 19.0 43 - 3 
24 2.931 4.4 7 3.2 9 - 2 
11,65 17.0 29 13.& 36 
64 7,693 11.4 22 10.4 24 - 2 
192 771,737 68.0 171 81.o 144 # 27 
n6,025 19.0 29 13.7 40 - 11 9 22,136 2.0 5 2.4 4 + 1 
75 70,643 6.2 0.5 13 - 12 
52 54,723 4.8 5 2.4 10 - 5 
(1) The data from which this table is prepared was obtained through personal 
investigation from the Department of General Elections and Secretariate, 
i iinistry of the Interior, Cairo, Egypt. 
(2) Eight of these candidates, though they were adherents of the ;kafd, were 
not officially nominated as that Party's candidates. 
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1929 Tafd 228 610,461 60.9 216 93.1 141 4' 75 
Lib.Consts. 22 159,014 15.5 5 2.2 44 - J; 
National 12 30,550 3.1 4 1.7 7 - 3 
Unionist 17 49,437 4.9 - - 12 - 12 
Independents 25 122,570 12.3 7 3.0 25 - 21 
1931 National 14 1,904 4.3 5 5.3 6 
j 
2 
Unionist 55 10,351 23.5 40 26.7 36 4 
People's 137 25,256 55.1 54 56.0 57 - 3 
Independents 63 5,768 
'277 
13.2 15 12.0 20 - 2 
Others 4(1' 0.6 - - 1 - 1 
1936 Jvafd 277(2) 794,966 62.1 190 51.9 144 -1- 46. 
Lib.Consts. 42 157,454 12.3 15 6.5 29 - 14 
National 5 20,275 1.6 4 1.7 3 ,r 1 
Pop.Unionist 51 174,535 13.6 14 6.0 32 - 15 
Independents 54 133,555. 10.4 9 3.9 24 - 15 
1935 Wafd 223 111,106 6.2 14 5.3 16 - 2 
Kaumyoun sr 119 755,951 42.6 105 39.8 113 - 5 
Saadist 111 451,146 25.4 57 32.9 67 .r, 20 
Independents 139 455,535 25.5 55 22.0 65 - 10 
(1) They were one dafdist and three Liberal Constitutionalists who participated 
in the election in spite of the fact that the two political parties to which 
they adhered boycotted that election. 
(2) Amongst them forty -five were not official candidates of the Party. 
(3) The ¢'Kaumyounn was a political front composed of the Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party, the National Party and the People's Unionist Party. 
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1 - 1 
(1) Although the Saadist and Liberal Constitutionalist Parties boycotted that 
election, yet some of their members participated in it. They are referred 
to as "others ". 
(2) The Wafd boycotted these elections. It is worth noticing that the four parties 
agreed on the division of the electoral constituencies into what was known as 
"open " and "closed" constituencies. The latter were those which were devoted 
to these four parties in such a way that only one candidate of these four parties 
was to be nominated. Actually other candidates of political parties other than 
the one to which a constituency was devoted contested the election under disguised 
independence. The above mentioned figures showing the number of candidates and 
the number of effective votes refer:, to those so- called "independents" who masked 
their political tendencies and party colours as they were in fact and as they 
appeared after the declaration of the results of the election. 
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(1) This table is prepared according to results reached through 
personal investigation, and with the help of material obtained 
from the Secretariate of the Chamber of Deputies, Cairo. 
491. 
TABLE IV 
0L117.1_21C,21 i11r 02 ï.J:ii'iJjE ?,o U' r-nT--.', (' P iÿt"ÚTi:J 1 THE J17111L L;l11. LJl 
.CCOAD`l'NG TO OCCUr1.T.iüN. (1) 
Laràlorc Businessmen Lawyers Doctors Ex.Civil Servants C therE 
Llection 
, 
I:o. ` ì`io i i:o. i ìio. ï No. , 
1924 117 L ,f .4 1 ̂  3 0. 7 3 1 .6 13 6.2 32 15.2 . 3 1.1f 
1925 140 66.3 15 7.1 32 15.2 9 4.3 14 6.6 1 0.5 
1926 127 60.2 14 6.6 39 18.5 8 3.8 19 9.0 4 1.';' 
1929 130 56.0 15 6.5 4720.2 83.5 25 10.8 73.0 
1931 114 76.0 7 4.6 10 6.7 1 0.7 17 11.3 1 C. 
1936 144 62.0 14 6.0 38 16.4 9 3.9 24 10.5 -, 1.:. 
1938 173 655 30 11.3 23 8.7 11 /.3 24 9.1 
1942 15s 59.9 19 7.2 55 20.8 9 3.4 17 6.4 
1945 168 63.6 26 9.9 27 10.2 12 L.0 22 8.3 9 3 
1950 201 63.0 28 8.8 56 17.6 2.5 22 6.9 L 1. 
(1) This table is prepared according to results reached through 
personal investigation and the help of material obtained from 
the Secretariate of the Chamber of Deputies, Cairo. 
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